China's South China Sea policy and its implications for Canada: Claims, strategies and consequences

Abstract

Recent dramatic strategic manoeuvres in the South China Sea (SCS) sent shock waves around the world, and many consider it the harbinger of a Sino-US competition for regional and global hegemony. Would a counter-China alignment prevent or provoke a regional conflict and what should Canada's policy be? This research examines the nature and logic of China's claims, strategies, and policies in the SCS to understand China's intent and interests as well as viable solutions to the dispute. We find that: 1) China has not changed its SCS claims, strategies or policies since 2002 and most Chinese actions are reactive responses to perceived threats to its claims; 2) the SCS dispute has significant implications for Canada's economic and strategic interests and security in the Canadian Arctic; 3) Canada can play a unique role in a multilateral solution.

Keywords:

• Spratly
• South China Sea
• China
• Canada
• the United States

Acknowledgements

The authors thank the Center for International Peace and Security Studies (CIPSS/CEPSI) for its financial support for this research.

Notes

The Taiping Island is occupied by the Republic of China (Taipei).

In 1953, China removed two lines in the Tokin Gulf, thus the 11-dash line became today's nine-dash line.

On 15 June 1956, North Vietnam‘s Second Foreign Minister Ung Van Khiew remarked to the Chinese chargé d‘affaires Li Zhimin that according to Vietnamese data, the Paracel and Spratly Islands are historically part of Chinese territory. On 14 September 1958, Vietnamese Prime Minister Van Dong stated in a formal note to Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai that: “The Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam recognizes and supports the declaration of the Government of the People's Republic of China on China's territorial sea.” (Renmin Ribao 1980) This territorial sea declaration, which was published by the Chinese government on 4 September 1958, stated that it is applicable to all Chinese territories including the Dongsha (Pratas) Islands, Xisha (Paracel) Islands, Zhongsha Islands (Macclesfield Bank), Nansha (Spratly) Islands, and all other islands that belong to China.

Concerned with its conformity to UNCLOS, Chinese scholars have suggested revising China's Paracels baselines according to rules governing mid-ocean islands of continental states.

UNCLOS defines internal waters, territorial waters, EEZ and high seas, but not “international waters”. This US term referring to all waters seaward of the territorial seas (the contiguous zone, EEZ and high seas) has no legal standing in UNCLOS (Mandsager 1998).

The United States also argues that hydrographic surveys do not require consent like marine scientific research. China argues that hydrographic surveys relate to resources and environment in EEZ, thus qualifying as marine scientific research subject to jurisdiction of coastal states.

For example, Brazil, Uruguay, Iran, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Thailand, Malaysia, Myammar, North Korea, Kenya, Somalia and Cape Verde.

G2 signifies Group of Two, a proposed special relationship between the United States and China where the two states would work out solutions to global problems together.

China has been testing new weapons on the same date, 11 January, in 2007 (anti-satellite test), 2010 (mi-course missile interception) and 2011 (J-20).

Beyond the limited context of Southeast and East Asia, institutions such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) are trying to establish themselves as transcontinental integration gateways by bringing together around the same table states from the Americas, Europe, Oceania and Asia (see Beeson, 2009).

More specifically, it refers to informal processes where norms and principles may act as guiding sets of behaviors but are not made constraining. By opposition, hard multilateralism would refer to more binding structures and agreements (Caouette and Côté 2011, p. 15).

In doing so, Caouette and Côté are hoping to offer an explanation of the modus operandi behind what Frost (2008) describes as the new regionalism in Asia (see also Arase 2010).

In April 2012, the Philippine President on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the DOC, called for a peaceful settlement based on the DOC (Aquino 2012) and during the recent meeting of ASEAN in Phnom Penh in July, members including the Philippines and Vietnam reiterated such a call (The Guardian 2012).

This remark was made by Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji in 1998.

However, as he further notes, “continued Canadian ambiguity on the South China issue, however challenging, may be the best way forward” (Manicom 2012, p. 7).

According to the persistent objector rule of international law, a state persistently objecting to the status as custom of a particular practice in the process of evolving into a custom is not bound by that customary rule.

See the websites of the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada (http://www.asiapacific.ca) and Industry Canada (http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/sc_mrkti/tdst/engdoc/tr_homep.html).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Zhiming Chen

Zhiming Chen holds a PhD from Yale University.He teaches Chinese foreign policy and Chinese politics as well as IR theories and international security with a focus on Asia. He currently works on several research projects: 1) Japan's search for a new security strategy in a changing regional order; 2)China's grand strategy and its consequences on international security; 3) Why the world should not be afraid of a revisionist China (for the ISA conference 2012). His recent publication includes the following articles and book chapters: The Logic and Strategies of Beijing's Policy towards Taiwan (2011), La voie chinoise de développement (Études internationals 2010), La stratégie militaire “asymétrique” de la Chine: Logique et consequence (Études internationals 2010), La conception et la perception chinoises du pouvoir national (2010). He is finalizing his book manuscript: A Theory of Power Parity: Power Dynamics between A Rising Power and the Hegemon. Email: [email protected]

Dominique Caouette

Dominique Caouette has taught international relations and Southeast Asian politics since 2004. His current research interests include transnational advocacy networks, global social movements, and armed resistance in Southeast Asia. His works have been published in Kasarinlan: A Philippine Quarterly of Third World Studies), Pacific Focus, Geography Compass, Canadian Journal of Development Studies, Possibles as well as book chapters recently published in L'altermondialisme: Forums sociaux, résistances et nouvelle culture politique (2010), La politique internationale en question (2009), L'aide canadienne au développement (2008), La politique en question (2008), and L'état des citoyennetés (2007). Recently he co-directed Pascale Dufour and Dominique Masson, Solidarities Beyond Borders: Transnationalizing Women's Movement (2010) and with Sarah Turner, Agrarian Angst and Rural Resistance in Contemporary Southeast Asia (2009). Email: [email protected]