Canada, grand strategy and the Asia-Pacific: Past lessons, future directions

Abstract

Canada pursued a consistent and relatively successful grand strategy towards the United States for much of the post-war period. It was designed to ensure greater adaptability to strategic shifts in American security policy and any bilateral disagreements that consequently emerged. Without the capacity to shape the international system, Canadian grand strategy was largely confined to managing strategic relations with its superpower patron in North America and the NATO alliance. Yet this article argues that Canada has a much more modest capacity when it comes to independently shaping and engaging in the Asia-Pacific as a relevant political and economic player. As it will reveal, Canada had twice before applied strategic principles towards the Asia-Pacific – first as a direct participant in the Korean War and later with a more arms-length approach to the Indochina conflict. These episodes provide important clues on the trends, patterns, and limits to any purported Canadian grand strategy for the Asia-Pacific, which must adapt to a shifting world order defined by Asian dynamism and European (and possibly American) decline. The article will conclude with some thoughts on how Canada's strategic choices might evolve towards the region.

Keywords:

• Canada–US
• security
• Asia-Pacific

Notes

For an important exception, see Molot (1982).

In its use of adaptive/incremental policy responses and the minimally purposeful pursuit of higher-order priorities (security, sovereignty, independence), this process can rightly be seen as cybernetic. For a full exposition on the theoretical framework that underpins this analysis, see McDonough (2011).

References to the debate over Canada's role in Korea and Vietnam are raised by Timothy Sayle (2007) and Patrick Lennox (2009).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

David S. McDonough

David S. McDonough is a SSHRC Post-Doctoral Fellow in the Department of Political Science, Balsillie School of International Affairs at the University of Waterloo. He is also a Research Fellow at Dalhousie University's Centre for Foreign Policy Studies. He is author of the Adelphi Paper, Nuclear Superiority: The New Triad and the Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (2006), and editor of the University of Toronto Press volume, Canada's National Security in the Post-9/11 World: Strategy, Interests, and Threats (2012).