Tabling and waiting: a preliminary assessment of Canada's treaty-tabling policy

Abstract

To achieve a more democratic treaty-making process, the Canadian government introduced in 2008 a policy whereby treaties are tabled before Parliament for at least 21 sitting days before ratification. The decision came many years after other democracies had already adopted mechanisms to address the democratic deficit at the legislative level. It was also preceded by domestic demands for an end to the executive dominance over treaty-making. This article explores the implementation of the policy from 2008 to 2013 to assess its relevance to the democratization of the process. The findings suggest that, even though the process became more predictable and transparent, the policy neither promoted the debate of treaties nor altered the executive pre-eminence. Moreover, treaties not requiring implementing legislation were either not debated during the 21-day period or ratified despite the will of the House. The minority status of the government until the 2011 elections may explain the influence of opposition MPs over the passage of some bills implementing treaties.

Afin de parvenir à un processus plus démocratique pour l’élaboration des traités, en 2008, le gouvernement canadien a lancé une politique selon laquelle les traités doivent être déposés devant le Parlement pendant au moins 21 jours de séance avant d’être ratifiés. Cette mesure a été décidée bien des années après son adoption par d'autres démocraties, en réponse au déficit démocratique. Elle a également été précédée d'exigences du public d'en finir avec la position dominante de l'exécutif dans l’élaboration des traités. Cet article examine la mise en œuvre de cette politique entre 2008 et 2013 pour évaluer sa pertinence dans la démocratisation du processus. Les résultats suggèrent que, bien que le processus soit devenu plus prévisible et plus transparent, cette politique n'a ni encouragé les débats sur les traités, ni modifié la prééminence de l'exécutif. De plus, concernant les traités n'exigeant pas la mise en œuvre de la législation, ou bien ils n'ont pas été discutés au cours des 21 jours, ou bien ils ont été ratifiés, malgré la volonté du Parlement. Le statut minoritaire du gouvernement jusqu'aux élections de 2011 peut expliquer l'influence des parlementaires de l'opposition sur l'adoption de certaines lois mettant à exécution certains traités.

Keywords:

• treaty-making process
• democratic deficit
• treaty-tabling policy

Acknowledgments

I thank the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for research support – SSHRC-Postdoctoral Fellowship [756-2010-0098], and Professor Bill Cross and the anonymous reviewers for useful comments and suggestions.

Notes

1. The notion of democratic deficit was first applied in the 1970s to describe the shortcomings of the European Union's institutional framework. This notion has been extended today to highlight the legitimacy problems that face other multilateral organizations as well as countries in their national domain (Meny 2003, Moravcsik 2004, Berg and Schmitz 2006, Follesdal and Hix 2006). At the national level, particularly in Westminster-based democracies, three dimensions of the democratic deficit in the treaty-making process have been analyzed and compared: the lack of parliamentary involvement, the absence of permanent institutional mechanisms for provincial input and the limited participation of civil society organizations (Capling and Nossal 2003, Harrington 2006, Capling 2007, de Mestral and Fox-Decent 2008). For analyses of the participation of civil society organizations in the foreign policy process in Canada, see Nossal (1995), Cameron (1998), Stairs (2000, 2002) and McCormick (2006). Regarding the involvement of Canadian territories and provinces, see Harrington (2006) and Kukucha (2008).

2. For a thorough analysis of the executive dominance in Canada, see Savoie (1999).

3. An analysis of the arguments in favor of an increased parliamentary role can be found in two documents of the Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia: the Trick or treaty? report (Legal and Constitutional References Committee, Senate of Australia 1995) and Report 128 (Joint Standing Committee on Treaties 2012). The reforms that strengthened the role of the Australian Parliament in treaty-making were largely based on the recommendations of the first report. The second document reviews a bill that attempts to introduce the approval of treaties by both houses before ratification.

4. On opposition days, members of the opposition can choose the subject of debate and bring on a vote.

5. The author can provide information regarding all treaties tabled in this period.

6. In the period covered by this study the following occurred: the 39th Parliament was dissolved on 7 September 2008, and a Federal Election was held in October 2008; the 1^st and 2^nd sessions of the 40^th Parliament were prorogued on 4 December 2008 and 30 December 2009; the 40th Parliament was dissolved on 26 March 2011 after a vote of no confidence against the minority Conservative government, and a Federal Election was held in May 2011.

7. Policies to support the shipbuilding industry were announced in the House on 9 May 2008, and 2 February and 13 March 2009.

8. Most FTAs are complemented by side agreements that commit parties to respect key labor and environmental management principles.

9. The action plan on corporate social responsibility, Building the Canadian advantage, was announced on 26 March 2009. During the debate, MP Wayne Easter (Liberal) said that the government's plan included safeguards for this FTA. Hansard, May 29, 2009, p. 3935.

10. The FOPO recommended against the ratification of ”the amendment to the Convention […] until the Standing Committee on Fisheries and Oceans has had an additional twenty-one (21) sitting days to study the matter further and to report the results of that study to the House” (Canada 2009e).

11. Non-conforming measures are laws and regulations that discriminate against foreign investors. See Canada 2012b, and Canada 2013b.

12. As Conservative MPs recalled during the debate, 18 April 2013 was the 17th opposition day the NDP had to debate the treaty.