The development and future of Canadian–Turkish relations

Abstract

Despite the passage of approximately 70 years of diplomatic relations between Canada and Turkey, the development of the relationship and its future have received little in the way of scholarly atten- tion. This paper, therefore, examines the development of CanadianTurkish relations and discusses how the relationship is likely to unfold. The discussion begins with a review of the current literature and then focuses on the early years of the relationship in the Cold War period up until the 1983 election of Prime Minister Turgut O¨ zal. This is followed by an examination of the post-1983 period and Canada s contemporary relations with Turkey. The paper argues that Turkey offers Canada long-term economic opportunities, but current domestic and regional challenges facing Ankara likely mean that bilateral relations will not accelerate in the near term.

Résumé

Malgré les 70 années de relations diplomatiques entre le Canada et la Turquie, le développement et l'avenir de cette relation ont rec¸u peu d'attention de la part des universitaires. Aussi cet article examine-t-il le développement des relations turco-canadiennes et comment cette relation est sus- ceptible d'évoluer. La discussion commence par une revue de la littérature actuelle puis se con- centre sur les premie`res années de la relation en temps de Guerre Froide, jusqu'a` l'élection du Premier Ministre Turgut O¨ zal en 1983. S'ensuit un examen de la période post-1983 et des relations contemporaines du Canada avec la Turquie. L'article soutient que la Turquie offre au Canada des opportunités économiques a` long terme, mais les difficultés domestiques et régionales auxquelles Ankara doit faire face signifient probablement que les relations bilatérales ne vont pas s'accélérer dans un avenir proche.

Keywords:

• Canada
• Turkey
• economic
• trade
• NATO

Notes

1. Searching for anything to link the two countries, the article noted that energy security was of great importance to both countries because “Canada is a large producer of oil, natural gas, hydroelectricity and nuclear power, while Turkey occupies a crucial position in the geopolitics of energy” (MacKay 2010, p. 32). Canada and Turkey, noted Mackay, had also “been drawn together by geopolitical forces, initially as belligerents during World War I and then as allies in World War II and the Cold War” (2010, p. 32). However, in the First World War Canadians and Turks had little contact, while during the Second World War Turkey joined the Allies just a few months before Germany surrendered.

2. This period was not without its challenges. In 2007, the relationship between the government and military reached one of its lowest points when the AK Party nominated then-Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül as a candidate for the post of President of the Republic – meaning that his headscarf-wearing wife would become Turkey's First Lady. The military was also particularly concerned that Gül's selection was a challenge to the secularist order in Turkey, and on their website a thinly veiled threat was issued to say that the armed forces were prepared to act if need be. This warning was similar in nature to those given to Prime Ministers Süleyman Demirel in 1971 and Necmettin Erbakan in 1997, shortly before both were driven from power. However, the military underestimated Erdoğan, who called for and easily won early general elections in 2007, increasing his vote percentage to 46 per cent from just 34 per cent in 2002. Gül was subsequently appointed by Parliament as Turkey's new President.

3. Turkey was neutral through much of the Second World War and finally declared war against Germany and Japan on 23 February 1945, albeit the decision was driven by Allied demands for Turkey to join the war effort or risk being left out of a new United Nations organization.

4. Odlum served in the Boer War, the First World War and Second World War. As a Major General he commanded the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division. However, judged too old, he was later removed from command by Prime Minister King and appointed as the High Commissioner to Australia from 1941 to 1942. From 1942 to 1946, he was the Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to China. In 1947, at the age of 67, he was sent to Turkey where he served until 1952. He retired from public life after serving in Turkey (Hilliker 1990, p. 264).

5. The Turkish Ambassador to Canada had first approached Ottawa in August 1950 to ask for Canada's support, but he was rebuffed. Delvoie added that diplomat John W. Holmes believed that many in NATO objected to having a Muslim country join NATO. Delvoie notes that there were also objections to Turkey not being a democratic state, but by the time the Turkish Ambassador approached the Canadian government in August 1950 the first free and fair elections in Turkey had already been held. In May 1950, Adnan Menderes and the Democratic Party replaced the long-serving government of Ismet İnönü (Delvoie 2011, pp. 2–6, see also Mango 2004, p. 45). In July 1950, a month after the Korean War began, the Turkish government also announced that Ankara would send a brigade of 5090 men to join the United Nations forces.

6. Turkey and the United States signed an agreement on the provision of American economic and military assistance to Ankara in 1947. As a result of massive amounts of equipment and better training, the Turkish military soon began to see themselves as the most modern, advanced sector in Turkish society – and participation in the Korean War and NATO merely served to increase this belief. Turkish officers also became the defenders of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's secularist legacy, which resulted in four military coups, the first just eight years after Turkey joined NATO, when Prime Minister Adnan Menderes was overthrown.

7. Ankara often found it difficult to pay for the shipping of surplus Canadian military equipment to Turkey. As a result, after 1955, the Canadian government decided to pay the estimated $700,000 annual ocean related shipping charges itself, believing the decision to be in the best interests of NATO. In 2015 dollars, annual shipping costs would have amounted to approximately $6 million.

8. Canadian military assistance would continue after 1965, culminating in the eventual provision of 52 CF-104 Starfighter jet aircraft beginning in 1983 (Canadian Wings 2015).

9. The Canadian side of the Friendship Group officially formed in June 1996, and the Turkish side in January 2012.

10. The Council succeeded in raising awareness, and over a 10-year period membership grew considerably, from four founding companies to 26. Besides economic cooperation, following the August 1999 Istanbul earthquake, the Canadian government dispatched its military Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) with a 300-bed hospital and a field engineer team for humanitarian assistance purposes.

11. In May 2013, Turkey repaid the last of its loans from the International Monetary Fund but continues to borrow from the World Bank.

12. Similar resolutions were considered by Parliament in 1996 and 2002.

13. The Turkish government also pointed out that Canada had been one of the countries where Armenian terrorist groups had been very active in the 1980s. On 8 April 1982, Mr. Kani Güngör, the Trade Attaché, was paralyzed following an attack, while Colonel Atilla Altıkat, the Turkish Military Attaché, was assassinated in Ottawa on 27 August 1982. Later, in March 1985, the Turkish Embassy was stormed by terrorists from the Armenian Revolutionary Army. During the attack a Canadian security guard was killed, while 13 people including the Ambassador were held hostage for four hours.

14. The Honourable Ed Fast, Minister of International Trade, and Turkey's Minister of Economy, Zafer Çağlayan, announced the intent to create a joint economic and trade committee (JETCO) in August 2013 with a view to expanding trade and investment. The first JETCO meeting was planned for 2014 but has yet to occur.

15. The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs estimates that there are 60,000 Turkish–Canadian citizens living in Canada. In 2005, 2065 Turkish immigrants arrived in Canada, but by 2013 this number had declined to 729 (Government of Canada 2015a).

16. The committee report was originally tabled in the Senate in June 2013, re-tabled in November 2013 and adopted by the Senate in February 2014. The Government of Canada response has yet to be tabled (Government of Canada 2014b).

17. The number of Canadian tourists visiting Turkey in 2013 was 199, 497. In 2014, there was a 5 per cent decrease in this number, to 190,116 Canadian tourists.

18. The Ambassador added that Turkish entrepreneurs could also use Canada as a hub for expanding their businesses into North America. However, two-way trade between Turkey and the United States in 2014 amounted to $19.1 billion, and it is more likely that Turkish companies would see the United States as a hub for expanding into Canada instead. According to the American State Department, two-way trade with Turkey “remains modest compared to its potential” (United States Government 2015).

19. From a security perspective, Istanbul has also become a transit point for illegal migration and drugs. In addition, foreign fighters including Canadians use Istanbul as a transit point for onward travel to Syria. As a result, it has become imperative that countries such as Canada maintain close links with Turkish Intelligence and the Turkish Police, and vice versa.

20. Although the Turkish military has come under government pressure to reform and become more accountable, they nevertheless remain a major economic player in the country. Under the auspices of the Ordu Yardimlasma Kurumu (OYAK) Foundation (founded after the 1960 coup), the Foundation runs a massive business empire ranging from construction companies to financial institutions.

21. Previously, the Gülen movement and the AK Party were in close alignment, especially in their efforts to remove the military from politics.

22. Turkey ranked 64th out of 175 countries, still better than Greece (69th) and Italy (also 69th).

23. In September 2012, 324 mostly serving and retired military officers were sentenced to prison terms ranging from six to 20 years for conspiring to overthrow the government in 2003 – the “Sledgehammer” trial case. However, on 18 June 2014, Turkey's Constitutional Court unanimously ruled that the right to have a fair trial for those sent to jail in 2013 had been violated. The Constitutional Court noted that the convicted officers had been in lengthy pre-trial detention and called into question much of the evidence against them. The officers were subsequently freed, and some resumed their military careers.