Beyond LAVs: corruption, commercialization and the Canadian defence industry

ABSTRACT

The Trudeau government’s decision to uphold a 2014 contract to sell CAD $15 billion worth of military equipment to Saudi Arabia has attracted considerable controversy in Canada, garnering both opposition and support. Yet public discussion of the Canada–Saudi light armored vehicle (LAV) contract has sidestepped the most serious problems raised by Canada’s escalation of its involvement in the international arms market through this sale: the violence and corruption of the international arms trade, to which this sale contributes; the subordination of Canadian foreign policy and of international peace and security to commercial aspirations and the short-term interests of electoral politics, which this contract evinces; and the questionable importance of the Canadian defence industrial base, upon which arguments in favor of this contract rely. Given both the political and economic salience of defence industry jobs in the 2015 election and the export-driven nature of Canada’s defence industry, Canadians should not be surprised by the Canada–Saudi LAV deal. The real question, however, is whether Canada should support its own defence industrial base, whatever the costs and contribution to corruption – or not.

RÉSUMÉ

La décision du gouvernement Trudeau de respecter un contrat de vente d’équipement militaire à l’Arabie Saoudite, datant de 2014 et d’une valeur de 15 milliards de dollars canadiens, a entraîné une controverse considérable au Canada, en suscitant à la fois l’expression d’une opposition et celle d’un soutien. Cependant le débat public autour du contrat entre les deux pays concernant le véhicule blindé léger (VBL) a éludé les problèmes les plus graves soulevés par l’escalade de l’implication du Canada sur le marché international de l’armement représentée par cette vente : la violence et la corruption du marché international de l’armement, auxquelles contribue ce contrat ; la subordination de la politique étrangère canadienne, de la paix et de la sécurité aux aspirations commerciales, et aux intérêts à court terme visés par les politiques électorales, que ce contrat met en lumière ; et l’importance discutable de la base industrielle de défense canadienne, sur laquelle reposent les arguments favorables à ce contrat. Étant donné l’importance à la fois politique et économique accordée aux emplois dans l’industrie de défense lors des élections de 2015, et le caractère axé sur les exportations de cette même industrie au Canada, les Canadiens ne devraient pas être étonnés de l’accord canadien-saoudien sur le MBL. La vraie question, cependant, est de savoir si le Canada doit soutenir – ou non - sa propre base industrielle de défense, quels qu’en soient le coût et la contribution à la corruption.

KEYWORDS:

• Canada
• arms trade
• foreign policy
• electoral politics
• defence industry

Notes

1 Sources citing these figures, however, neglect to add to that this represents a mere 0.375 per cent of Canada’s CAD $1783.78 billion gross domestic product (GDP) in 2014 (Trading Economics 2016).

2 In the period 2011–2015, the world’s top five arms exporters, which together accounted for 74 per cent of the total volume of arms exports, were the United States of America, Russia, China, France and Germany. The five largest arms importers by share of imports as a percentage of the global share were India (14 per cent), Saudi Arabia (7 per cent), China (4.7 per cent), United Arab Emirates (4.6 per cent) and Australia (3.6 per cent) (SIPRI 2015, Fleurant et al. 2016).

3 For another discussion of the subordination of human rights to industry interests in Canadian foreign policy, see Webster (2010).

4 As with all industries subsidized with public funds, all Canadians support the defence industry, but not everyone reaps the benefits of defence manufacturing, even with the mandated dispersion of sub-contracts and offsets.

5 As with the broader pattern of trade in Canada, the United States is by far Canada’s largest market for defence goods, and shrinking American defence budgets have played a major role in prompting it to find export markets for its defence production in unstable parts of the world. In 1994, when the first contract to sell LAVs to Saudi Arabia was signed, that sale was negotiated after the London production line seemed at risk of shutting down, following the completion of a large order for the American military (Epps 2014). The 2014 deal came on the heels of a post-Iraq, post-Afghanistan reduction in American (and Canadian) military expenditure.

6 Interestingly, the omission of large warships from the pre-war Canadian naval inventory was deliberate, and based on a common-sense threat assessment. As a de facto protectorate of the UK, and in such close proximity to the United States – the dominant naval powers – Canada had no need for a large-ship navy, and could instead focus on smaller ships for much-needed coastal defence and control (Sarty et al. 1990).

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada [grant number 767-2016-1617].