Rivalry intervention in civil conflicts: Afghanistan (India–Pakistan), Angola (USSR–USA), and Lebanon (Israel–Syria)

ABSTRACT

This article focuses on international intervention into civil conflict by international rivals; that is, the phenomenon of two states, locked in a long-term and ongoing acrimonious relationship, intervening on opposing sides of a civil conflict occurring in a third party. International rivalry, it is argued, is an ongoing strategic relationship in which the push of the past and the pull of the future engenders balancing behaviour vis à vis third-party civil conflicts. This argument is evaluated in the context of three cases of rivalry intervention: Afghanistan (India–Pakistan); Angola (USSR–USA); and Lebanon (Israel–Syria). While rivalry dynamics are not the sole motivator for intervention in each case, rivals do worry about the future, and as a result consider and assess the implications of their opponents’ involvement in a civil conflict in the context of potential future confrontation.

RÉSUMÉ

Cet article se concentre sur l’intervention d’adversaires internationaux dans les guerres civiles ; c’est-à-dire sur le phénomène selon lequel deux États, bloqués dans une relation difficile à long terme et continue, interviennent dans les camps adverses d’un conflit civil tierce. Il soutient que la rivalité internationale est un rapport stratégique continu dans lequel le rejet du passé et l’attraction du futur engendrent l’équilibrage des comportements vis-à-vis des conflits tierces. Cet argument est évalué relativement à trois cas d’interventions dans des contextes de rivalité : l’Afghanistan (Inde-Pakistan) ; l’Angola (URSS-USA) ; et le Liban (Israël-Syrie). Si la dynamique de rivalité n’est pas le seul élément de motivation pour intervenir dans chaque cas, les adversaires se soucient réellement du futur, et par conséquent, chacun prend en compte et évalue les implications de l’engagement de son rival dans une guerre civile, sans perdre de vue la possibilité d’une confrontation future.

KEYWORDS:

• Rivalry
• civil conflict
• international security
• intervention

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes on contributor

In 2016–17, John Logan Mitton was a Visiting Fulbright Scholar at the University of Southern California. He is a Doctoral Fellow at the Centre for the Study of Security and Development. His work has appeared in International Journal, Contemporary Security Policy, and the Canadian Journal of Political Science. His book Fighting for Credibility: US Reputation and International Politics (co-authored with Frank Harvey) was published by the University of Toronto Press in 2017.

Notes

1. This estimate is based on ‘consensus’ rivalries as identified by Colaresi et al. (2008), and civil war data drawn from Mullenbach (2001), Regan (2002) and Wolak (2014).

2. Nota bene, the tactics employed may be “offensive” (i.e., aggressive, active targeting of rival interests, personnel, or allies); the argument here is that the underlying motivation is defensive. Once the rival intervenes, the balancing intervention is an overt act designed to offset strategic advantage. Indeed, one of the more novel insights of this explanation is the possibility that outwardly offensive and aggressive behavior can be spurred by defensive designs (this possibility is highlighted and supported by the case narratives below).

3. Soviet aid was briefly suspended in 1974, but resumed shortly thereafter, partially as a reaction to Chinese involvement (see Garthoff 1994).

4. Largely as a result of Soviet and Cuban support – as well as the inability of the US to continue its support for UNITA because of the Clark Amendment – the MPLA was able to effectively establish itself as the recognized government of Angola by the end of 1976, marking the end of the first stage of what was to become a decades-long conflict.

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada [grant number 752-2015-1381].