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ABSTRACT
During the 2015 election campaign, the opposition Liberal party pledged that if elected, it would re-establish diplomatic relations with Iran, which had been suspended in 2012 by the Conservative government of Prime Minister Stephen Harper. The Liberals won a majority, and subsequently tried to act on that promise. In June 2018, however, they suspended these efforts. Four factors explain this outcome: the legacy of hard-line Conservative policies against Iran, especially the Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act; the complex politics of consular cases; growing opposition within the Liberal party; and the reality that the issue was not a priority for either Canada or Iran. This outcome is costly: not having an embassy in Tehran prevents Ottawa from achieving some interests in the Middle East. This article, based on more than 20 interviews with officials involved in Iran policy between 2006 and 2018, explains how this outcome came about, and with what consequences.
Acknowledgements
I am grateful to the anonymous reviewers for their useful comments. I am also very grateful to the 23 anonymous individuals who agreed to be interviewed for this article. Interviews were semi-structured, loosely based on a prepared set of questions, and lasted about one hour. Most were conducted in person, in Ottawa, though a small number was held over the phone. Interviewees, each of whom was previously known to this author, were selected because of their personal and direct involvement in Canada-Iran relations since 2006 (and, in some cases, before 2006). The 23 interviewees included diplomats, other civil servants, political staffers, elected politicians, and civil society activists (both serving and retired). Six individuals contacted for an interview declined, in some cases because they were still in government. As with any interview-based research, recollections sometimes diverged. I tried my best to cross-verify contradictions. I am especially thankful to one individual for his willingness to extensively support this research.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Note on contributor
Thomas Juneau is an assistant professor at the University of Ottawa’s Graduate School of Public and International Affairs. From 2003 to 2014, he was an analyst with Canada’s Department of National Defence. He is the author of “Squandered Opportunity: Neoclassical Realism and Iranian Foreign Policy” (Stanford University Press, 2015).
Notes
1. Ottawa recalled its ambassador to Iran, Philip MacKinnon, in July 2003, and appointed a new one, Gordon Venner, in November 2004. The Leader of the Official Opposition, Stephen Harper, referred to this decision as “callous, spineless” (CBC News Citation20Citation18).
2. In the words of Foreign Minister Pierre Pettigrew, quoted in in Bookmiller (Citation2011, p. 27).
3. One official insisted that the controlled engagement policy was partly the bureaucracy’s attempt to find a compromise that would allow the government to claim it was responding to Iran’s murder of Kazemi while forestalling future attempts to close the embassy.
4. The first, Ahmad Azizi was not a hostage taker during the 1979-1981 crisis, as sometimes reported, but had been part of the team of negotiators. As such, Washington objected to his candidacy, leaving Canada with little choice but to reject him (confirmed by an interviewee; see also an American embassy cable released by Wikileaks (Citation2005)). The rejection of a third in late 2007, Mohammed Reza Bagheri, was less reported in the media, which usually referred to two rejected candidates. Bagheri was highly unpalatable, close to hard-line factions, making his acceptance improbable (interview with official). Mundy was expelled shortly after Ottawa rejected Bagheri. Canada’s last ambassador was thus Gordon Venner (late 2004 until August 2006). After Mundy’s departure, Michel de Salaberry was acting chargé, followed by Dennis Horak until 2012. Ben Rowswell was selected to replace Horak and started language training but his nomination was canceled when the decision to eventually suspend relations was taken.
5. In the words of one official, the government told the bureaucracy “thanks for your advice, now do it”.
6. The Harper Government also listed the Quds Force, the special operations branch of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, as a terrorist entity.
7. One official recollected that the department advised the government that by convention foreign diplomats declared personae non grata are given 30 days to leave. The Conservatives rejected this and gave them five. Another recalled that the Foreign Affairs deputy minister was supposed to call the Iranian Chargé to advise him of his expulsion, but could not reach him. Two lower-ranked officials managed to find him, telling him only five minutes before Minister Baird made the announcement.
8. One interviewee explained that some of Canada’s traditional allies refused to play that role, not wanting to “wear our taint” given Canada’s poor relations with Iran. They were also concerned they would be burdened with many consular cases.
9. The government launched other initiatives to promote human rights, such as supporting financially the UN special rapporteur on human rights in Iran, Ahmed Shaheen, creating a “Rainbow Railroad” to help bring LGBT Iranians to Canada, and funding international (such as the International Republican Institute and the National Endowment for Democracy) and Iranian NGOs working in human rights.
10. Canada provided at least $5 million, including $3 million through the Global Partnership Program.
11. It is distinct from digital diplomacy, the broader use of information technologies for diplomatic purposes.
12. This was the dominant view, but a minority disagreed: direct diplomacy “achieved no results”; “it was only preaching to the choir”.
13. Institutional organization and political involvement in the Iranian-Canadian community are low. Few, in particular, pushed hard in favor of such a tough policy, with the exceptions of the Baha’is who, despite their small size, had good access to ministers, and the Mujahedeen-e Khalq (MeK), a small and cultish former terrorist group which also had strong access to politicians.
14. Confirmed by multiple interviews.
15. When the JCPOA was agreed in July 2015, the Conservative government did not openly oppose it. But from 2013 to 2015, it had expressed lukewarm support for negotiations, claiming the P5+1 was offering too many concessions while asking too little in return and expressing its skepticism of Iranian intentions in both public and private (according to multiple interviews). In opposition, the Conservatives have remained critical of Iran and of the Liberal Government’s re-engagement efforts (National Post Citation2016).
16. Mostly, the moderate Rouhani government wanted to show its own strategy of re-engagement was working; the regime, across factions, was keen to show it was not as isolated as the United States, Israel, and Saudi Arabia claimed.
17. Perhaps foreshadowing difficulties to come, interviewees confirmed Iranian officials were offended that Canada was represented “only” at the DG level.
18. Confirmed by multiple interviews.
19. This was confirmed by multiple interviews.
20. In many cases, the Prime Minister held such meetings against the advice of some officials, according to interviewees.
21. Confirmed by multiple interviews.
22. When this author testified in support of re-engagement with Iran in front of the House of Commons foreign affairs committee in 2016, the most confrontational questions came from Levitt, not Conservatives.
23. Multiple interviewees also highlighted that a tweet by Iran’s Supreme Leader two weeks before referring to Israel as a cancer contributed to opposition within the party.
24. Multiple interviewees highlighted how Jowhari’s tweet in December 2017 referring to the Islamic Republic’s “elected government” and his meeting with Iranian parliamentarians in his constituency office in 2016 also sparked controversy.
25. Afshin-Jam MacKay and Majumdar (Citation2018).
26. Some interviewees disagreed. Many argued that it was a “no-brainer” that an embassy would have a limited but positive impact on consular cases. A few, however, argued that an embassy would have made no difference given the poor state of relations.
27. One official recalled how a sentence from a report written by the Canadian embassy found its way, verbatim, in an Obama speech.
28. Confirmed by multiple interviews.
29. Confirmed by interviews; see also Stoffel (Citation2016).
30. As one official said, Canadians have very limited “business intelligence” on Iran.
31. Though as one interviewee nuanced, Canadian personnel were less harassed than British ones.