Canada’s economic assistance to the OPT: ideology, politics, and flawed responses

ABSTRACT

While Canada has been providing development assistance to the Palestinians in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) since 1993, its economic development assistance program took shape in 2007 after the formation of the Palestinian technocratic government. Even though the Canadian government had access to substantial analysis regarding the most significant impediments to the economic development of the OPT, its chosen areas of focus were informed more by its ideology, politics towards the region, and a belief in maintaining a viable economy until such time that efforts to work out the political issues related to illegal settlements, access and movement, borders, and the final formation of a Palestinian state bear fruit. As demonstrated, Canada’s actions, along with that of other donors, have allowed for Israel to continue undertaking actions that have a significant economic cost for Palestinians and that make adequate economic development impossible and a long-term viable Palestinian economy less likely.

RÉSUMÉ

Alors que le Canada fournit une aide au développement aux Palestiniens vivant dans les territoires occupés de Palestine (TPO) depuis 1993, son programme d'aide au développement économique a pris forme en 2007 après la formation du gouvernement technocratique palestinien. Même si le gouvernement canadien a eu accès à une analyse substantielle concernant les obstacles les plus importants au développement économique des TPO, les domaines sur lesquels il s'est concentré ont été davantage orientés par son idéologie, sa politique envers la région et sa conviction qu'il fallait maintenir une économie viable jusqu'à ce que les efforts pour résoudre les problèmes politiques en rapport avec les colonies illégales, l'accès et les déplacements, les frontières et la formation finale d'un État palestinien portent leurs fruits. Comme cela a été démontré, les actions du Canada, ainsi que celles d'autres donateurs, ont permis à Israël de continuer à entreprendre des actions qui ont un coût économique considérable pour les Palestiniens, et qui rendent impossible un développement économique approprié, et moins probable une économie palestinienne viable à long terme.

KEYWORDS:

• West Bank and Gaza
• economic development
• Canada
• international aid
• Israel
• access and movement

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes

1 Valuable and detailed work on Canada’s aid program to the OPT in other sectors, including work and/or support for security and justice, has already been done (Bahdi & Kassis, 2016; Ibrahim & Beaudet, 2012; Monaghan, 2016; Monaghan & Santos, 2020; Wildeman, 2015, 2020).

2 The politics of Canada’s choice of sectors to support in the OPT and the reasoning behind these choices is also influenced by domestic political narrative and perceptions.

3 Khalidi and Samour (2011) also demonstrate the link between the Oslo Accords, the belief in the neoliberal ideology by some leaders in the Palestinian Authority, and corruption on the part of some Palestinian politicians and businessmen.

4 Btselem, Settlements, 16 January 2019, https://www.btselem.org/settlements.

5 Data was taken from Peace Now’s website, https://peacenow.org.il/en/settlements-watch/settlements-data/population. This amount does not include the estimated 3500 settlers living in East Jerusalem (OCHA, Humanitarian impact of settlements in Palestinian neighborhoods in East Jerusalem: evictions and displacements, 5 June 2018, https://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanitarian-impact-settlements-palestinian-neighbourhoods-east-jerusalem-evictions-and).

6 Btselem, Settlements, 16 January 2019, https://www.btselem.org/settlements; PeaceNow, Jerusalem Municipal Data Reveals Stark Israeli-Palestinian Discrepancy in Construction Permits in Jerusalem, 9 September 2019, https://peacenow.org.il/en/jerusalem-municipal-data-reveals-stark-israeli-palestinian-discrepancy-in-construction-permits-in-jerusalem.

7 Btselem, Settlements, 16 January 2019, https://www.btselem.org/settlements.

8 Ibid.

9 As an example of the control that Israel exerts on Gaza, the Karni crossing – the only crossing where cargo can be cleared – was closed for the majority of 2006 (The World Bank, 2007).

10 This information is based on work that the author had done while working for the Government of Canada. For further analysis on Canada’s aid, refer to Ibrahim and Beaudet (2012), Monaghan (2016), Monaghan and Santos (Monaghan & Santos, 2020), and Wildeman (2015, 2018, 2020).

11 The AHLC is a committee that was established to coordinate between donors and the PA. The AHLC was established in 1993 and includes the PA, the Government of Israel, the IMF, the Word Bank, the United Nations, and several donors. It is chaired by Norway. (Ibrahim & Beaudet, 2012; Mason, 2013; Wildeman, 2017).

12 This is based on the author’s first-hand knowledge and experience while working for the Government of Canada’s Development Program.

13 Government of Canada, Project Browser, Project profile — Export Development in the West Bank – Evaluation, https://w05.international.gc.ca/projectbrowser-banqueprojets/project-projet/details/z020950001.

14 Canadian international assistance in the West Bank and Gaza, https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/issues_development-enjeux_developpement/priorities-priorites/where-ou/west_bank_gaza-cisjordanie_gaza.aspx?lang=eng. Accessed on 31 March 2020.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Ruby Dagher

Ruby Dagher is an Adjunct Professor at the School of International Development and Global Studies at the University of Ottawa. She has a PhD in Public Policy and Administration with research focused on conflict and development studies. She previously worked at the Middle East Desk for the Canadian International Development Agency, now Global Affairs Canada – Development.