Canada, the United Nations, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict

ABSTRACT

Canada's official foreign policy regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has long reflected a continued commitment to protecting both Israel's right to exist in security, as well as Palestinian rights and aspirations for self-determination. Despite a fairly consistent official foreign policy that seeks to balance both Israeli and Palestinian rights and interests, Canada's voting behavior at the United Nations has undergone significant modifications in the decades following the passing of Resolution 181, which called for the partition the British Mandate of Palestine into an Arab state and a Jewish state. This paper analyzes the contributing factors that have influenced Canada's voting at the UN on issues related to the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. These factors include Canada's international reputation, domestic pressures, and strategic partnerships with both the United States and European allies.

RÉSUMÉ

La politique étrangère officielle du Canada concernant le conflit israélo-palestinien reflète depuis longtemps un engagement continu à protéger à la fois le droit d'Israël d'exister en sécurité, ainsi que les droits et les aspirations des Palestiniens à l'auto-détermination. Malgré une politique étrangère officielle plutôt cohérente qui poursuit un équilibre entre les droits et les intérêts tant israéliens que palestiniens, le comportement de vote du Canada aux Nations unies a subi d'importants changements dans les décennies qui ont suivi l'adoption de la résolution 181, appelant à la partition du mandat britannique de la Palestine en un État arabe et en un État juif. Cet article analyse les facteurs qui ont influencé le vote du Canada à l'ONU sur les questions liées au processus de paix israélo-palestinien. Ces facteurs comprennent la réputation internationale du Canada, les pressions intérieures, et les partenariats stratégiques avec les États-Unis les autres pays alliés en Europe.

1. Introduction

As a founding member of the United Nations (UN), Canada’s history of global engagement has long included a commitment to addressing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Since Canada’s participation in the drafting of the 1947 Partition Plan to divide the British Mandate of Palestine into a Jewish state and an Arab state, Canada has continued to use the United Nations as a forum to ensure meaningful participation in the Arab-Israeli peace process.¹ In the years following the 1947 partition plan, Canada’s official policy has remained fairly consistent, continuously expressing Canadian support for both the existence and security of the Israeli state, whilst supporting the right of self-determination for the Palestinian people. Thus, Canada’s official foreign policy regarding the “two-state solution” to the Middle East conflict has persisted in light of geopolitical changes in the region, international developments, and domestic electoral shifts. However, Canada’s voting patterns at the United Nations on issues related to the conflict have, at times, experienced significant fluctuations. This paper will analyze how concerns about international reputation, domestic considerations, and strategic alliances with both the United States (U.S.) and European allies, have impacted Canada’s votes as Ottawa attempted to balance different, and at times contradictory, interests. Despite continued rhetorical support for certain official policies, we find that Canadian foreign policy on issues relating to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been marked by ad-hocism, as competing interests and pressures created significant variation in Canada’s votes at the UN.

2. Canada’s strategy at the United Nations

Canada’s membership in international institutions did not begin with the advent of the United Nations. Throughout the interwar era, Canada expressed support for the values of internationalism and multilateralism through participation in various international organizations, such as the International Labour Organization, the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, and the League of Nations (MacKenzie, 2017, pp. 24–25). Following the First World War, Canadian participation in international institutions reflected a desire for global recognition of Canada’s status as a distinct, sovereign nation with considerable resources, influence, and unique perspective. Following Canada’s contributions to the Allied efforts during the Second World War, Canadian officials felt that Canada deserved stronger representation and influence internationally (Nossal, Roussel, & Paquin, 2011, p. 52). Canada had demonstrated its resilience, commitment, and strength throughout two global wars; therefore, Canadian foreign policy sought a more active, engaged internationalism that both recognized Canada’s distinct capacity and influence, and allowed Canada to contribute to the pursuit of peace. Consequently, Canada became an ardent supporter of the creation of a multilateral institution tasked with protecting international peace and security and became a founding member of the United Nations in 1945.

In the years following the advent of the United Nations, Canada’s participation and role in the UN voting bodies of the General Assembly (UNGA) and Security Council (UNSC) can be best understood through an examination of its status as a “middle-power” state. Canada’s status as a “middle-power” state has long been a subject of academic debate. While a detailed discussion of the “middle-power” question is beyond the scope of this paper, we adopt this designation as we consider how Canada’s material capabilities, interests, and international position influence its behaviour at the UN. Canadian foreign policy has long recognized that Canada has limited, or “average” economic and military capabilities compared to the “great power states” that played a more prominent role in the creation and maintenance of the international order (Musu, 2012, p. 66). However, Canadian representatives have also argued that the country’s abundance of natural resources, material capacity, and sphere of influence were more significant and effective than those of the world’s smaller powers.

In addition to material capabilities, the concept of “middle-power” status also considers interactions with other states in the international sphere (Nossal et al., 2011, p. 55). Given their limited ability to obtain decisive results through unilateral action, “middle-power” states such as Canada have an interest in supporting multilateralism and the pursuit of stability within a rules-based international order. Consequently, “middle-power” states tend to adopt tactics that prioritize “compromising, building coalitions, participation in international organizations, forging consensus, and maintaining international order” (Welsh, 2004, p. 587). Through participation in international organizations and multilateral negotiations, “middle-power” states such as Canada are therefore provided with an opportunity to exert influence internationally, express their national interests, and contribute to international diplomacy.

Canada’s status as a “middle-power” state has been a hallmark of its foreign policy at the United Nations, where its participation allowed the Canadian voice to be projected internationally, and gave credibility to the promotion of Canadian interests and foreign policy goals to a wider, global audience (Hynek, 2004, p. 40; Nossal et al., 2011, p. 55; Paris, 2014, p. 277). As a “middle-power”, Canadian strategy at the United Nations has also reflected a desire to build, sustain, and strengthen strategic global alliances. Through official declarations and public votes at the UN, Canada has used this international platform to express support for like-minded states, or actors for which Canada has a regional interest. Canada has largely articulated a UN strategy that is similar to those of key European allies, often voting in unity with their western European partners of France, the United Kingdom, and Germany, as well as Australia (Vucetic & Ramadnovic, 2019, p. 92).

While Canada must consider its alliances with a variety of regional actors and blocs, its strategic relationship with the United States, with whom it shares economic, security, and political interests, remains a key foreign policy priority. As Canada’s largest trading partner, Canadian prosperity and economic stability rely upon an open trading partnership with the U.S., and the threat of punitive or retaliatory economic sanctions remains a leading foreign policy consideration. Given Canada’s dependency on trade with the U.S., “decisions tend to be based on a calculation of the degree to which the issue-and the options being discussed will impinge on their relationship with the United States” (Nossal et al., 2011, p. 35). The extensive common border between the two states means that Canada also shares national security concerns with the U.S., and remaining a dependable American ally ensures the continued allocation of resources towards those shared security concerns. Maintaining a close relationship with the U.S. has also traditionally allowed Canada to further its interests globally. By aligning with a hegemonic state with expansive influence and capacity, Canada’s international role and sphere of influence has been bolstered and given a further sense of legitimacy. While in the Trump era Canada has relied significantly less on its relationship with the U.S. in order to strengthen its international position, the close geographical, economic, and security relationship with the U.S. does continue to influence Canada’s foreign policy. In other words, Canada’s relationship with the U.S. remains a critical aspect of Canadian strategy at the United Nations.

Lastly, Canada’s early participation in the United Nations also aimed at promoting key liberal values, in the belief that the promotion of “liberal” values was both good for the world and supported the Canadian national interest. The values and goals articulated in the UN Charter, and later within the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, lent international credibility to what were perceived to be distinctly Canadian interests, including the protection of security, sovereignty, and human rights within a rules-based international system. As for the Middle-East specifically, Canada, like most countries, stands to benefit from regional stability (Abella & Sigler, 1989, p. 227), for which the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict is seen as a necessary pre-condition.

Canada’s reputation as a contributor to the United Nations was bolstered by Canada’s commitment to peacekeeping, beginning with former Canadian Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson’s critical role in mediating the 1956 Suez Crisis. Pearson, then Secretary of State for External Affairs, approached the United Nations to propose a solution to the conflict that would both ensure the continuity of Canada’s key strategic partnerships and decrease international tensions, thereby playing a seminal role in the creation of the first UN peacekeeping mission (Dorn, 2005, p. 9; Mondal, 2018, p. 39). As Canada continued to support UN missions, it gained a reputation as an active contributor to international peace and security, and peacekeeping became a hallmark of Canadian national identity both domestically and internationally² (Spooner, 2017, p. 208; Dorn, 2005, p. 7). Canada, however, became more selective in its peacekeeping deployments throughout the 1990s, generating questions about the relevance of Canada’s role as a “liberal mediator” in the contemporary era (Dorn, 2005, p. 23).

Contributions to missions remained relatively low throughout the tenure of Conservative Prime Minister Stephen Harper (Carroll, 2016, p. 168). The new Liberal government of Prime Minister Justin Trudeau elected in 2015 expressed the desire to restore Canada’s commitment to internationalism with an increase of peacekeeping contributions (von Hlatky, 2016, p. 4), but in fact Canada’s contributions to peacekeeping missions remained substantially smaller than those of previous decades.

To conclude, Canada’s strategy at the United Nations has required a balance between the pursuit of pragmatic Canadian interests, including economic and strategic factors, and more idealistic considerations, such as those reflected in the UN values of peace, freedom, and human rights (Nossal, 2017). As a middle-power state, Canada’s voting behavior at the United Nations traditionally emphasized a desire to be perceived as an impartial, neutral mediator, a “honest broker” with a commitment to the ideals of multilateralism.

3. Canada’s UN voting behavior on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (1947-1993)

As a member of the United Nations, Canada played a prominent role in the establishment of the state of Israel. Upon the creation of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) in 1947, Canada was selected as one of eleven “neutral” states to participate in the negotiations regarding Arab- Israeli land claims and aspirations (Husseini, 2008, p. 44; Bercuson, 1985, p. 60). Canadian Supreme Court Justice Ivan Rand was selected as Canada’s representative to the UNSCOP, and consistently expressed support for the creation of an independent Jewish state alongside an Arab state (Brynen, 2007, p. 74). Importantly, Canada’s endorsement of an independent Jewish state was backed by strong domestic support. Many Canadians supported Jewish aspirations to self-determination in response to centuries of antisemitic discrimination, violence, and persecution in both Europe and North America (Brynen, 2007, p. 74). Canada’s early advocacy for the creation of an Israeli state was also endorsed by some of Canada’s most prominent religious communities: many Christian and Jewish Canadians strongly encouraged the creation of an Israeli state, partly as a response to rampant antisemitism and the atrocities of the Holocaust, but also because of the religious association of the “Holy Land” with Judaism, Christianity, and Biblical prophecy (Brynen, 2007, p. 74; Mondal, 2018, p. 38; Husseini, 2008, p. 52). Thus, Canadian representatives at the UN enjoyed significant domestic approval for the establishment of a state called “Israel” that would allow for Jewish political self-determination. In November of 1947 Canada voted in favour of UNGA Resolution 181, which recommended the partition of the former British Mandate of Palestine into an Arab state and a Jewish state. Subsequently, as a member of the Security Council, Canada voted in favour of UNSC Resolution 69, which approved Israel’s membership of the United Nations in 1949 (Abu-Laban & Bakan, 2008, p. 648, 653).

In addition to early support for Jewish claims to political self-determination and territorial independence, Canada also sought to use the platform of the United Nations to express support for Palestinian self-determination, for example voting in favour of UNGA Resolution 194 in 1948, which outlined the principles that would allow Palestinian refugees, displaced by the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, to return to their homes and “live at peace with their neighbors” (Bell, Molloy, Sultan, & Shaker, 2007, p. 20). In 1967, following the Six Day War, Canada voted in favour of UNSC Resolution 237, which emphasized the Israeli responsibility to respect the rights and safety of the people living within the recently occupied territory, and reaffirmed the “right of return” for those displaced by the war. Canada also voted in favour of UNSC Resolution 242, which called upon Israeli forces to withdraw from territories occupied throughout the war, and sought to reaffirm the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states in the region. By voting in favour of UNSC Resolutions 237 and 242, Canada refused to recognize permanent Israeli control over the territories acquired through the conflict, including the Golan Heights, West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip. Canada’s policy during this period drew from the humanitarian principles of the 4th Geneva Convention, which would require Israel to ensure the protection of the inhabitants of occupied territories and facilitate the return of those Palestinians who had been displaced by the hostilities of the 1967 war.

In 1978 Canada strongly opposed Israel’s invasion of Lebanon, and consistently used the platform of the United Nations to reaffirm the importance of respecting Lebanon’s sovereignty and territorial autonomy. Canada voted in favour of several UNSC resolutions throughout 1978 that called upon Israel to respect the sovereignty of Lebanon, and cease military hostilities in the region, and supported the creation of a UN Interim Force task group in Lebanon to monitor the conflict, as outlined in UNSC Resolutions 425, 426, 427, 434 (1978), and 630 (1989). These votes, which were met with general approval from the international community, emphasized Canada’s commitment to the principles and values of international law, including humanitarian law. Importantly, support for Resolutions 237, 242, and 181 has remained at the forefront of Canada’s official foreign policy regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict since they were first adopted.

In 1988 Canada abstained, alongside the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Australia, from voting on UNGA Resolution 43/177, which called for the recognition of the state of Palestine and Palestinian sovereignty over the territories occupied since the 1967 war (Eden, 2013, p. 227). It is important to note that the United States, alongside Israel, were the only two states to vote against Resolution 43/177; therefore, Canada’s decision to abstain from the vote, alongside a number of Western allies, was likely due to strategic considerations regarding Canada’s relationship with the United States. Abstaining from Resolution 43/177 allowed Canada to express support for the interests and considerations of their closest strategic ally, maintain their status as impartial mediator, and avoid isolating themselves from the international community and other strategic allies. The abstention reflected an attempt to balance Canada’s bilateral relationship with the U.S. with its global reputation, its respect for international law, and its relationship with other states.

The ongoing violence in Lebanon, as well as the beginning of the first Palestinian Intifada in 1987, resulted in an increased sense of sympathy amongst Canadian citizens towards Palestinian suffering (Brynen, 2007, p. 75). In keeping with its attempts to act as a mediator, Canada voted in favour of UNSC Resolution 636 in 1989, condemning Israel’s unwillingness to abide by previous UN resolutions, denouncing the forceful deportation of Palestinians living within the occupied territories, and reaffirming the importance of the Geneva Conventions (United Nations Security Council, 1989, Res. 636). Thus, Canadian foreign diplomacy continued to recognize, and express support for, Palestinian rights at the UN while still supporting the security and existence of the state of Israel.

In 1992, Canada was granted a more prominent and critical role within the Israeli-Palestinian peace process as chair, or “gavel holder” of the Refugee Working Group (RWG) created at the 1991 Madrid Peace talks (Bell et al., 2007, p. 8). Canada’s reputation as an impartial “honest broker” that recognized both the Israeli right to exist in peace and security, as well as Palestinian rights, lent credibility to the notion that Canada would apply a non-partisan, fair lens to the contentious issue of refugee resettlement and aid (Goldberg & Shames, 2004, p. 208). Furthermore, Canada’s history of contributing to peacekeeping missions both in the Middle East and internationally, coupled with its reputation as an “immigrant-receiving country” further solidified their assignment as chair of the RWG (Robinson, 2011, p. 699; Goldberg & Shames, 2004, p. 208).

It is important to note that all decisions taken by the RWG had to be taken by consensus, requiring explicit agreement from all participants. While Palestinian representatives focused on the “right of return,” i.e. the right of all Palestinian refugees from 1948 and their descendants to return to their original homes in the former British Mandate of Palestine, and called for the implementation of policies to improve the living conditions of Palestinian refugees, Israel opposed this interpretation of the “right of return” and sought to ensure that the negotiations emphasized “humanitarian, rather than political issues” (Brynen, 1997, p. 284). Canada’s ability to affect positive change regarding the issues of refugees, settlements, and border disputes between Israel and Palestine was therefore highly susceptible to changes in the peace process (Brynen, 2008, p. 2; Robinson, 2011, p. 701). While the Arab-Israeli peace process saw positive developments throughout the years 1992–1995, including the Oslo Accords, the 1994 peace treaty between Jordan and Israel, and the 1994 Paris Protocol, any progress was subsequently diminished by the assassination of former Labor Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, the election of Benjamin Netanyahu in 1996, violence between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon, terrorist attacks against Israel, and the continued construction of West Bank settlements (Robinson, 2011, pg. 696, 701). Despite these challenges, Canada’s participation in a contentious but critical aspect of the peace process like the refugee question contributed to its reputation as an impartial actor, committed to cooperation, multilateralism, and diplomacy (Goldberg & Shames, 2004, p. 215).

4. The Chrétien years: November 4, 1993-December 12, 2003

Despite the optimism of the Oslo era, the peace process began to falter and then unravel with the advent of the Second Palestinian Intifada in 2000, following the failure of the Camp David peace conference and Ariel Sharon’s provocative visit to the Temple Mount as leader of the right-wing Likud Party. Unlike the Intifada uprising of 1987, when Palestinian violence was largely restricted to rock-throwing and unsophisticated bombs, the Second Intifada saw devastating terrorist attacks and escalating violence, including suicide bombings and the deployment of rockets (Brym & Maoz-Shai, 2009, p. 615; Araj & Brym, 2010, p. 850). Israeli forces responded with significant force, prompting concerns of indiscriminate killings and targeted assassinations (Brym & Maoz-Shai, 2009, p. 621). Despite the ongoing violence and the collapse of the peace process, Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chrétien, elected in 1993, largely continued to support both Israeli security considerations, as well as Palestinian rights through Canada’s votes at the UNGA. In 2000, Canada backed UNSC Resolution 1322 which condemned the “excessive use of force” against Palestinian demonstrators and reiterated that the construction of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories represented a significant breach of international law (Seligman, 2018, p. 84). Furthermore, this resolution reaffirmed the importance of peaceful negotiation, based in Resolutions 242 and 338, that emphasizes respect for the holy places of Jerusalem.

However, as terrorist attacks and suicide bombings targeting civilians intensified, Canada’s voting at the UN began to reflect an increased concern regarding violence against Israel. The Israeli government acted decisively in response to the surge of violence against civilians, resulting in a substantial number of Palestinian casualties (Araj, 2008, p. 290). The intensifying violence stemming from the onset of the Second Palestinian Intifada led to new concerns that UN resolutions were biased in their failure to address Palestinian wrongdoing and their exclusive references to Israeli violence. The United States and Israel began condemning the UN for what was perceived to be an inability, or unwillingness, to properly address rights abuses and violence committed by Palestinian authorities, including Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades. Canada, in an effort to express its commitment to Israeli security, began abstaining from voting on resolutions that were perceived as singularly placing blame on Israel for ongoing hostilities in the region (Seligman, 2016, pp. 283–284). Abstentions, as opposed to “against” votes on resolutions sponsored by Arab states, were meant to acknowledge Palestinian grievances, and were largely based on a recognition that the resolutions proposed by Arab states represented the voice of the Palestinian people, who did not themselves have membership at the UN (Barry, 2010, p. 196). Furthermore, whilst not outright votes “against”, abstentions allowed Canada to express continued support for the Israeli right to security and recognized Israeli concerns regarding intensifying violence against civilians. Canada’s UN votes throughout the Chrétien era were often aligned with those of many of Canada’s closest allies, including the United Kingdom, France, and Australia (Seligman, 2016, p. 309). Thus, by abstaining from votes that the United States voted against, and voting in favour of votes that the United States abstained on, Ottawa continued to vote in step with a number of its European allies, whilst ensuring to never strayed too far from the positions of its closest economic and strategic ally.

In 2001, the United Nations held the World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance in Durban, South Africa. The conference, often referred to as “Durban 1”, drew significant criticism from both the United States and Israel, who eventually withdrew their participation in the conference in response to a draft resolution that equated Zionism with racism (Seligman, 2014, p. 4). While Canada did not withdraw from the 2001 conference, Canadian officials issued an explanatory statement condemning any statement that equated Zionism with apartheid or racism. Furthermore, Canadian officials explained the decision to remain at the conference as an attempt to “exert positive influence” on the conference, and to “condemn attempts to delegitimize the State of Israel and to dishonor the history and suffering of Jewish people” (Seligman, 2016, p. 308). Canadian representatives argued that statements equating Zionism with racism would not serve the pursuit of lasting peace and would intensify hostilities and tensions between Israel and Arab states (Seligman, 2014, p. 238). In 2009, Canada chose not to participate in the follow-up Durban II, under Stephen Harper’s leadership (Thorne, 2008; Smith, 2012, p. 25). Jason Kenney, then Secretary of State for Multiculturalism and Canadian Identity, later explained the decision, stating that “Canada will not participate in this charade any longer. The Government of Canada will not lend Canada’s good name to the organized exercise in scapegoating that is the Durban process” (Government of Canada, 2011a; Thorne, 2008).

Canada’s UN votes on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict need to also be understood in the context of the geopolitical environment that followed the 9/11 attacks on the United States. In the years following 9/11 Canada joined the U.S.-led “War on Terror”, as Ottawa sought to support its ally in its quest to identify and destroy terrorist organizations that posed a threat to Western security. Suicide bombings against Israelis soon became associated with jihadist terrorism more generally, leading to the belief that Israel and the West were similarly facing an existential threat posed by terrorism, which necessitated a coordinated response (Handley, 2010, p. 455). Given Israel’s long history with terrorism, its robust intelligence and military capabilities, and reputation as the only democracy in the Middle-East, Israel was perceived by many as an important ally in the “War on Terror” (Handley, 2010, p. 448). Canadian officials became increasingly reluctant to support any UN resolution that did not outwardly condemn terrorist activity perpetrated by Palestinian groups, and explicitly expressed concern that United Nations resolutions did not sufficiently address the threat posed to Israeli security. While Canada continued to express commitment to the so-called “War on Terror”, it is important to note that the decision not to join the 2003 U.S.-led war in Iraq created tensions between Canada and its closest strategic ally. In this context, Canada’s support for Israel in the post-9/11 era arguably aimed at demonstrating its enduring commitment to confronting terrorism and avoiding further tensions with the U.S. and other key allies.

In sum, throughout the Chrétien era, Canada continued to express support for Palestinian concerns, particularly through the provision of essential financial aid to Palestinians, and support for UNSC Resolution 1322, which condemned Israel’s excessive use of force in response to the Second Intifada. However, in light of increasing suicide bombings that directly threatened Israeli security, strong domestic support for Israel, and the desire to maintain a strong relationship with the United States in the context of the “War on Terror”, Canada’s UN strategy began calling for more comprehensive resolutions that did not singularly target Israel for ongoing tensions and violence. Canada’s UN votes under the Chrétien government therefore reflected, in part, an interest in expressing support for Palestinians concerns given the continued construction of Israeli settlements and use of force against Palestinian demonstrators. At the same time, however, they reveal a desire to prioritize the bilateral relationship with the U.S. in the context of the so-called “War on Terror” and, later, Canada’s decision not to join the Iraq war.

5. Prime Minister Paul Martin: December 12, 2003-February 6, 2006

Canada’s voting at the United Nations began to reflect a stronger alignment with Israel and the United States following the election of Liberal Prime Minister Paul Martin, in 2003. Due to the sheer volume of UNGA and UNSC resolutions that criticized Israeli mistreatment of Palestinians, condemned the construction of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories, and called for Palestinian self-determination, Ottawa strengthened their opposition to resolutions that were perceived to disproportionately target Israel without consideration for Israeli security concerns. Importantly, the Martin era saw both the continuation of terrorism against Israelis as well as Israel’s unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza Strip in 2005. While a surprising move from Prime Minister Sharon, who was known for his “hawkish”, aggressive stance towards Palestinians, the withdrawal fostered optimism for the future of the peace process (Kesgin, 2019 p. 77). The unilateral withdrawal, coupled with the continuation of attacks against Israeli civilians, help explain Canada’s increased hostility towards UN resolutions that were seen as disproportionately targeting Israel throughout the Martin era. Canada’s representatives strengthened their criticisms of the UN’s perceived emphasis on anti-Israel rhetoric over the genuine pursuit of peace and regional stability. Excessive criticism of Israel was viewed as undermining the UN’s ability to provide an effective forum for the mitigation of threats to international peace and security, and resolutions were criticized for being “one-sided”, and ignoring Israel’s right to security vis-a-vis threats of terrorism. The Martin government argued that the majority of resolutions emphasized Israeli responsibility for peace, as opposed to supporting a comprehensive peace plan that placed obligations and responsibilities on both the Palestinian Authority and Israel (Seligman, 2016, p. 309).

As a result, former abstentions on resolutions criticizing Israel shifted to votes against such resolutions and were publicly justified by statements arguing that excessive criticism of Israel would stall peace initiatives. Consequently, Canada’s UN votes began deviating from the votes of some traditional allies, namely those of the United Kingdom and France, aligning more closely with those of the United States and Israel (Seligman, 2016, p. 309). For example, Canada abstained from voting on the 2004 UNGA Emergency Resolution ES-10/15, which called upon Israel to abide by an International Court of Justice (ICJ) report that claimed that Israel’s construction of a separation barrier between the West Bank and Israel was illegal under international law (Brynen, 2007, p. 78). In justifying the abstention, then Canadian Ambassador to the UN, Allan Rock, expressed concern that the ICJ’s international condemnation of the Israeli barrier may impede the pursuit of peace, and reiterated that “the issue of the barrier cannot be viewed in isolation from Israel’s security concerns … Israel has the right to take necessary measures to protect the security of its citizens and its borders from attacks by Palestinian terrorist groups, including by restricting access to its territory” (United Nations General Assembly 10th Emergency Special Session, 2004). It is important to underline, however, that while the Martin era saw a Canadian UN strategy that was more supportive of Israel, official Canadian policy maintained its support for a two-state solution based in UNSC Resolutions 242, 338, and UNGA Resolution 194.

6. Prime Minister Stephen Harper: February 6, 2006-November 4, 2015

While Canada’s foreign policy regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict had already begun to shift towards a stronger pro-Israel stance under Martin, this trend was greatly intensified when Conservative Prime Minister Stephen Harper came to power in 2006. Under Harper, Canada’s voting record at the United Nations became increasingly aligned with those of the United States and Israel (Vucetic & Ramadanovic, 2019, p. 93).

The Harper era of Canadian foreign policy represented a more general departure from Canada’s historical prioritization of liberal institutionalism, instead expressing skepticism about the efficacy and impartiality of the UN (Paris, 2014, p. 278). Canada’s UN strategy under the Harper government is perhaps best represented by Canada’s Minister of Foreign Affairs from 2011 to 2015 John Baird’s 2011 statement to the UNGA that, “Canada does not just ‘go along’ in order to ‘get along’” (Government of Canada, 2011b; Smith, 2012, p. 25). Baird also suggested that the UN had lost sight of its foundational purposes, accusing the institution of having become inefficient and hypocritical (Nossal, 2017, p. 174). Similarly, Harper’s first address to the UNGA in 2006 reflected a general skepticism of international organizations, including the UN, and criticized the international body for its lack of reform and failure to produce a comprehensive agenda (Smith, 2012, p. 23-24).

Within the context of the government’s general distrust of the UN, the Harper years were marked by a considerable intensification of criticism regarding the international organization’s approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Much of Canada’s official UN discourse throughout the Harper era expressed discontent and concern that the organization had become overly politicized, ineffective, and redundant, particularly in its resolutions condemning Israel. Canada’s Ambassador to the United Nations from 2006 to 2011, John McNee, referred to UN resolutions pertaining to the Middle East as “rarely helpful”, and criticized the international institution for using “inflammatory and divisive language” that was disproportionately critical of Israel and ignored the bilateral injustices, responsibilities, and requirements incumbent upon Palestinian representatives to respect the existence and security of Israel (Seligman, 2016, p. 310). Addressing the UNGA in 2011, Baird pledged that Canada would no longer support the UN in condemning the abuses of some whilst conveniently ignoring infringements of the rights of others, explicitly reaffirmed Israel’s right to exist, and reiterated Israel’s “fundamental right … to defend innocent civilians against acts of terrorism” (United Nations General Assembly, 2011).

Under Harper, Canada voted in lockstep with Israel and the United States on almost all issues pertaining to the Middle East, regardless of the voting positions of other strategic allies who largely continued to advocate for a more balanced approach to the conflict (Vucetic & Ramadanovic, 2019, p. 85, 87). Where under Martin and Chrétien Canada had voted in support of resolutions which addressed Palestinian claims for self-determination, Palestinian sovereignty over the Occupied Territories, and Palestinian displacement, under Harper Canada voted against several similar resolutions (Seligman, 2016, p. 310). For example, Canada voted against UNGA Resolution 67/19 in 2012, which granted the Palestinian Authority “non-member observer status” at the United Nations. On this vote, Canada isolated itself as one of only 9 states who rejected the resolution, including Israel, the United States, and a number of small island states (Eden, 2013, p. 238). Canada’s vote stood in clear contrast to those of its other strategic allies, including Australia, Germany and the UK who abstained on the vote, and France, Italy, and Japan who supported the resolution (United Nations Meetings Coverage, 2012). For this vote the close relationship with the U.S., in addition to the Harper government’s desire to prioritize the relationship with Israel, seems to have been the primary consideration influencing Canadian foreign policy, dominating other strategic relationships and international pressures. In 2008, Canada was the only state to vote against a United Nations Human Rights Council resolution that condemned Israeli rights violations in the Gaza Strip, citing concerns that the resolution was inherently unbalanced, and did not address Israel’s right to security, and its right to protect its civilians (Canada, 2008, p. 12). Canadian allies such as France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the UK abstained on the resolution. It should be highlighted that, in general, Canada has consistently argued that the UN Human Rights Council focuses disproportionately and unfairly on Israel, while ignoring the Palestinians.

The Harper government’s steadfast support for Israel also reflected the belief that Israel was a critical ally in the “War on Terror”. Harper defended Israel’s actions against Hezbollah in Lebanon in 2006, and drew similarities between Israel’s own history of dealing with terrorism and the larger “War on Terror” when addressing the Israeli Knesset in 2014, referring to “those forces, which have threatened the state of Israel every single day of its existence, and which, today, as 9/11 graphically showed us, threaten us all” (CBC News, 2014; Narine, 2017, p. 322; Smith, 2012, p. 24). Further, Canada’s Conservative government was the first to withdraw financial aid to the Palestinian Authority after Hamas’ electoral victory in 2006 (Galloway, 2006). While this decision, which suspended $7.3 million in aid and “restructured” $23.9 million in other projects, was criticized by Arab groups internationally, Canada continued to provide aid through UNRWA and other organizations that support Palestinian refugees in the West Bank, Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan (Brynen, 2007, p. 82). UNRWA funding was, however, cut by the Harper government in 2010 (Mondal, 2018, p. 42).³ The decision to withdraw funding to the Palestinian Authority must also be read within the larger context of the ongoing “War on Terror”. Concerned that Canadian aid funds could be used to bolster Hamas, a designated terrorist group with an explicit mandate to destroy the state of Israel, Canada sought to avoid channeling any funds through Hamas which could then be used to finance terrorist attacks. Canadian officials predicted that the United States, alongside the European Union, would also suspend funding following Hamas” electoral victory (Clark, 2007, p. 91). Thus, by being the first state to withdraw funds, Canada could distinguish itself as a leader, committed to the eradication of terrorism, without isolating itself from allies for whom the decision would be largely uncontroversial and replicated (Barry, 2010, p. 198).

Harper’s distinctly pro-Israel policy can be partly explained through an examination of the Conservative parties’ electoral concerns. In an attempt to widen the gap between Canada’s Liberal Party and the Conservatives, Harper aimed to present the Liberals as having only limited support for Israel, thereby allowing the Conservatives to differentiate themselves as the party that most clearly supported Israel and recognized Israeli security concerns. Harper’s anti-UN rhetoric aimed to associate internationalism, and the UN more generally, with the Liberal party. By framing internationalism as a Liberal value and arguing that the UN had become overly politicized and corrupt, Harper carved out a foreign policy that was perceived as distinctly Conservative and associated with conservative values, including absolute support for Israel. Furthermore, the Conservatives had received electoral support from many Jewish and Evangelical Christian communities, for whom the status of Israel remained an important issue (Seligman, 2016, p. 280). Arab groups lobbied as well, but these groups suffered from insufficient organization and mobilization, due to fragmentation and division within Arab communities regarding the importance of the Israel-Palestine issue, while a significant portion of Canada’s Jewish and Evangelical communities perceived Israel’s existence and security as a high-priority issue (Musu, 2012, p. 71).

Canada’s UN strategy throughout the Harper era presented support for Israel as indicative of morality and justice, suggesting that support of Israel was the “moral” or “right” response to the ongoing conflict (Narine, 2017, p. 325). It has been argued that Canada’s failed bid for a seat on the UNSC in 2010 was largely due to Canada’s refusal to endorse any UN resolutions that criticized Israel, thereby resulting in a loss of credibility as a fair mediator in the Middle East. (Merkley, 2011, p. 54; Heinbecker, 2010; Carroll, 2016, p. 175). Addressing an inter-parliamentary meeting on antisemitism in 2010, Harper referred to the failure to win a seat as a “bruise” that demonstrates Canada’s staunch commitment to support its Israeli ally, promising that Canada would “take a stand whatever the cost” (Seligman, 2018, p. 87). By suggesting that Canada’s inability to secure a seat on the UNSC was due to a refusal to idly undermine what is “right” for what is politically “useful,” Harper further widened the gap between the foreign policy initiatives of the Liberals, and those of the Conservative party.

It is important to note that while Harper’s government prioritized loyalty to Israel in both UN voting and official statements, Canada’s official policy regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict continued to support the two-state solution and recognized that Israeli settlements in occupied territories represented breaches of the 4th Geneva Convention. To summarize, Canada’s shift towards a strong support of Israel throughout the Harper years reflects the government’s skepticism towards international organizations, the perception of Israel as an important strategic ally, and domestic electoral considerations.

7. The first J. Trudeau government: April 13, 2013-October 21, 2019

When Justin Trudeau led the Liberal Party to a majority victory in 2015, many assumed that the new, progressive government would mark Canada’s return to an internationalist foreign policy that prioritized multilateralism (Robertson, 2017). Trudeau’s foreign policy vowed to target gender inequality internationally, emphasize multilateralism, address climate change, and welcome refugees fleeing political violence; indeed, the new government seemed to want to signal a significant shift from the foreign policy of the previous nine years of Conservative government. Consequently, many presumed that Trudeau would change Canada’s position on peace process-related resolutions at the United Nations. However, Canada’s votes at the UNGA remained consistent with those of the previous Harper government and have by and large continued to prioritize support for Israel.

Prime Minister Trudeau’s policy regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict cannot be examined without an understanding of contemporary American foreign policy in the Middle East. The election of American President Donald Trump in 2016, and the implementation of his protectionist, “America First” agenda promised to include a staunchly pro-Israel foreign policy mandate. In December 2017, the Trump administration announced the unilateral decision to move the United States embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, a decision that promised to inflame tensions and spark violence between Israelis and Arabs. International law has consistently reiterated that the status of Jerusalem can only be determined by a comprehensive peace plan (Cattan, 1981, p. 7). According to UNGA Resolution 181, the City of Jerusalem is recognized as a corpus separatum under international law, denoting that the ancient city does not officially or exclusively belong to either the Israeli or Palestinian authority (Cattan, 1981, p. 7). The Trump government’s unilateral decision to move the American embassy to Jerusalem was a significant symbolic move that recognized Israeli sovereignty in the contested city.

In the wake of Trump’s unilateral decision to move the embassy, the UNGA held an emergency session to vote on Resolution ES-10/L. 22, which declared the action “null and void”, in recognition that international law forbids Israel from having legal authority over the whole city of Jerusalem. This vote was met with overwhelming international support, with 128 states voting in favour (United Nations General Assembly Resolution, 2017). Canada, however, was one of 35 states who abstained. Explaining its decision, the Canadian government expressed its commitment to a comprehensive peace agreement, recognizing the importance of maintaining the “integrity” of Jerusalem as a holy city for members of the Jewish, Muslim, and Christian faiths (Global Affairs Canada, 2017). Canada’s Ambassador to the UN, Marc-Andre Blanchard, claimed that the resolution was “one-sided”, and therefore would not advance peace in the Middle East, while Prime Minister Trudeau reiterated that “the idea of using votes in the UN to isolate or condemn Israel … is not productive in international relations … we are less interested in grousing and playing politics” (Marquis, 2018).

As predicted, the U.S.’ decision sparked violence and conflict along the Gaza Strip, as hundreds of Palestinians protested the embassy move (Holmes, 2018). Israeli forces responded to the protests with violence that killed 58 Palestinians, and wounded over 1,200 (Holmes, 2018). Amongst the scores of injured protestors was Tarek Loubani, a Canadian doctor who had travelled to the Gaza Strip to provide aid to injured protestors and was shot by Israeli forces. Responding to news of the violence and the injury of a Canadian citizen, Trudeau referred to the clashes as “inexcusable … an excessive use of force” and called for an “immediate independent investigation” into the use of indiscriminate violence (Fife, 2018). However, Canada later criticized Resolution S-28/1 that was passed 29–2 by the Human Rights Council of the UNGA, which condemned the violence, reiterated Israel’s obligations under international law, and established an independent investigation into the violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law in Gaza (United Nations General Assembly Human Rights Council, 2018). Despite Trudeau’s initial support for such an investigation, Canada’s representative to the UN in Geneva, Rosemary McCarney, stated that the investigation would be, “one-sided, and does not advance the prospects for a peaceful, negotiated settlement” (Reuters, 2018). Furthermore, former Foreign Affairs Minister Chrystia Freeland clarified that Canada would only support a “neutral inquiry” that would also consider Hamas’ role in instigating violence (Fife, 2018). The UNGA passed Resolution ES-10/L.23 in June 2018, with 120 states voting in favour, condemning the IDF’s use of violence against civilians, expressing concern for the deteriorating humanitarian crisis, and reaffirming Israel’s international obligation to respect the Geneva Conventions. Canada chose to abstain, but PM Trudeau reiterated that Canada would not follow the Americans in moving the Canadian embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem.⁴

Canada’s decision to abstain was at least partly motivated by economic interests, particularly those pertaining to trade with the United States. When outlining the decision regarding Jerusalem, President Trump stated: “for all of these nations that take our money and then they vote against us at the Security Council, or they vote against us potentially at the Assembly … well we’re watching these votes” (Rampton & Nichols, 2017). A vote against the U.S., therefore, put Canada potentially at risk of punitive economic retaliation by the U.S. The risk was particularly acute in the context of the re-negotiations of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). NAFTA was a key component of the American presidential campaign, and Donald Trump threatened to terminate the deal if it could not be “fixed” to protect American businesses. As President Trump’s “America First” policy seemed to embrace the idea of economic protectionism, the re-negotiation of the NAFTA deal became Canada’s key foreign policy priority. Canada’s decision to neither explicitly denounce, nor actively support the embassy move is therefore reflective of a strategic desire not to aggravate Canada’s closest ally and trading partner, whilst attempting to avoid isolating itself from other strategic allies, who largely voted in favour of the Resolution.

8. Conclusion

On November 1, 2019, Canada voted in favour of a UNGA resolution affirming the Palestinian right to self-determination (United Nations General Assembly, 2019, Res. A/C.3/74/L.58). Canada's vote was echoed by its European allies, but Israel, the U.S., and a number of smaller island states voted against the resolution (Dyer, 2019). Some observers accused the Trudeau government of abandoning its commitments to Israel and criticized the vote as a significant shift in Canadian foreign policy. In response, Trudeau defended the vote, stating that, “The government felt that it was important to reiterate its commitment to a two-states-for-two-peoples solution at a time when its prospects appear increasingly under threat” (Thomson, 2019).

Prime Minister Trudeau also reaffirmed Canada’s continued commitment to Israel’s security, promising that, “our enduring friendship with Israel remains. We will continue to stand strongly against the singling out of Israel at the UN. Canada remains a steadfast supporter of Israel and Canada will always defend Israel’s right to live in security” (National Post, 2019). Adam Austen, Deputy Director of Communications to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, reiterated that support for a two-state solution has always been Canada’s official policy in the region: “In keeping with Canada’s long-standing position, it is important at this time to reiterate our commitment to a two-state solution and the equal rights and self-determination of all peoples” (Snyder, 2019).

Canada’s decision to support the resolution affirming the Palestinian right to self-determination must therefore be read within the wider context of competing foreign policy concerns. Importantly, the resolution came amidst increased attention and apprehension leading up to the release of President Trump’s proposed Middle-East peace plan. Further, the vote followed controversial statements from U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, who justified the construction of Israeli settlements in Palestinian territory as “not, per se, inconsistent with international law”, drawing international criticism (Dyer, 2019). By supporting the UNGA resolution, Canada was therefore able to signal to the international community that Canada will retain its long-standing official policy that recognizes the illegality of settlement construction in Palestinian territory under international law, and affirms that the pursuit of enduring, viable Israeli security necessitates the creation of a Palestinian state. At a time in which American rhetoric questioned the long-standing conviction that the construction of Israeli settlements represented a breach of international law, the UNGA vote allowed Canada to demonstrate to the international community that it had not changed its official policy regarding Palestinian self-determination.

This vote must also be examined within the context of Canada’s bid for a 2021 seat at the UNSC (Chapnick, 2020). When the Harper government failed to secure a UNSC seat in 2010, many speculated that Canada’s dwindling development aid and unwavering support for Israel had alienated a number of African and Arab states (Ibbitson & Slater, 2010). By voting in favour of Palestinian self-determination, Canada sought to signal a commitment to multilateralism, renew its traditional reputation as an unbiased mediator, and increase support for its bid for the coveted Security Council seat, a critical foreign policy goal for a government that had long promised to renew Canadian internationalism. Canada eventually lost its bid for the UNSC seat in June of 2020, but in November of the same year voted again in favour of a UN resolution in support of Palestinian self-determination which passed with 163 votes and only Israel, the United States, Marshall Islands, Micronesia and Nauru voting against. The vote underlined the decision of the part of the Trudeau government to continue emphazising their support of Palestinian rights as an essential element of the road towards a possible peace agreement.

It’s worth remembering that following the 2019 vote in favour of Palestinian self-determination, Canada joined Israel and the U.S. in voting against UNGA resolutions pertaining to the Syrian Golan Heights, the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, the Division for Palestinian Rights of the Secretariat (United Nations General Assembly, 2019). These votes clearly indicated that the Trudeau government did not intend to undertake a radically different policy on Israel and Palestine, but rather continued the balancing act between competing priorities and pressures.

In sum, Canada’s voting at the United Nations on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict cannot be analyzed in isolation from the many considerations that colour Canadian foreign policy. Canada’s votes have reflected the need to balance support for Israeli security and Palestinian rights with domestic pressures, preoccupation with international reputation, and strategic partnerships with both the United States and European allies. While Canada’s bilateral relationship with the U.S. has often been the dominant concern, on several occasions Canada prioritized other considerations, such as relationship with other strategic allies and support for international law. Essentially Canadian policy has been characterized by ad-hocism: at the core Canada has formally continued to support the centrality of international law and UN resolutions on final status issues, as well as the importance of an agreed solution negotiated between the parties, but many voting decisions over the years have been taken on the basis of interest and priorities that were, in fact, not exclusively related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict itself.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Amelia C. Arsenault

Amelia C. Arsenault is a PhD student at Cornell University’s Department of Government, specializing in IR. She recently obtained her Master’s degree from the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Ottawa. She previously published a paper in the Paterson Review of International Affairs on the risks posed to the NATO alliance by artificial intelligence. Her master’s research into the effects of AI on disinformation efforts has received funding from SSHRC and the DND MINDS Scholarship Initiative.

Costanza Musu

Costanza Musu is Associate Professor at the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Ottawa and Editor-in-Chief of the journal International Politics (Palgrave). She obtained her PhD in International Relations from the London School of Economics and Political Science and has published extensively on Western policies regarding the Middle East. Her current research, supported by a SSHRC Insight Grant, focuses on the fight against the illicit trafficking of antiquities looted from conflict areas in the Middle East.

Notes

1 While the formal peace process has largely stalled in the past few years, we will refer to the “Israeli-Palestinian peace process” or “the peace process” to address the ongoing conflict and negotiation between Israelis and Palestinians. Reference to the “Arab-Israeli peace process,” on the other hand, is used to examine the relationships between Israel and Arab countries, including Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria.

2 In addition to the United Nations Emergency Force in Suez (1956), Canada has provided peacekeeping forces to a number of UN missions in the region, including the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine (1948); the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force in the Golan Heights (1974); the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (1978); and the Multinational Force and Observers in Egypt (1981).

3 The Trudeau government reinstated funding to UNRWA in 2016.

4 It is worth remembering that Canada too has briefly considered relocating the Canadian embassy in Israel. In 1979, Conservative leader Joe Clark promised to move Canada’s embassy to Jerusalem, should his party win the 1979 federal election (Barry, 2010, p. 195). Clark later decided against moving the embassy, after it became clear that this move would spark violence in the Middle-East and isolate Canada from Arab states (Barry, 2010, p. 195)