Defamation Law and Epistemic Harm in the #MeToo Era

ABSTRACT

The #MeToo movement has encouraged victim-survivors of sexual misconduct to make use of social media and mass media journalism to report incidents in ways that are contrary to established legal norms. In part, this is an acknowledgement that traditional legal processes achieve little in responding to gendered harm. However, media companies and victim-survivors have increasingly been sued by alleged perpetrators for defamation. Because Australian defamation law presumes the falsity of alleged defamatory statements, victim-survivors are often required to give evidence in defamation proceedings in an effort to displace the presumption and prove that the allegations were ‘substantially true’ as a defence. This article identifies the issues facing victim-survivors who become involved in defamation disputes arising from allegations of sexual misconduct or gendered harm. It emphasises that in this context, victim-survivors encounter the same testimonial injustice typically experienced in the criminal jurisdiction, which harms them specifically in their capacity as knowers or givers of knowledge.

Acknowledgments

Thank you to the editors and anonymous reviewers for their thoughtful feedback and to Dr Sarah Hook for her ongoing support. Any errors remain my own. 

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 Jodi Kantor and Megan Twohey, ‘Harvey Weinstein Paid off Sexual Harassment Accusers for Decades’ The New York Times (New York, 5 October 2017) <www.nytimes.com/2017/10/05/us/harvey-weinstein-harassment-allegations.html>.

2 Bianca Fileborn and Rachel Loney-Howes (eds), #MeToo and the Politics of Social Change (Palgrave Macmillan 2019) 14.

3 Whilst the majority of recent cases suggest that defamation proceedings are being commenced by alleged perpetrators against publishers and victim-survivors, it is acknowledged that defamation proceedings have also been commenced by victim-survivors against alleged perpetrators in response to statements calling them liars or suggesting their accusations were false: Dent v Burke (2020) 182 ACTR 13. For similar examples in the United States, see generally Pooja Bhaskar, ‘Milkovich, #MeToo, and “Liars”: Defamation Law and the Fact-Opinion Distinction’ (2019) 88(2) Fordham Law Review 691, 694–97.

4 David Rolph, ‘A Critique of the National, Uniform Defamation Laws’ (2008) 16(3) Torts Law Journal 207, 248.

5 Serious harm was introduced as an element for defamation in the Defamation Amendment Act 2020 (NSW) sch 1 item 6.

6 Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) s 25. See also Civil Laws (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) s 135; Defamation Act 2005 (Qld) s 25; Defamation Act 2005 (Tas) s 25; Defamation Act 2005 (Vic) s 25; Defamation Act 2005 (SA) s 23; Defamation Act 2005 (WA) s 25; Defamation Act 2006 (NT) s 22.

7 See for example Leigh Gilmore, Tainted Witness: Why We Doubt What Women Say about Their Lives (Columbia University Press 2017) 44.

8 Catharine MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State (Harvard University Press 1989) 232; Martha LA Fineman, ‘Feminist Theory and Law’ (1995) 18(2) Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 349, 351; Hilaire Barnett, Sourcebook on Feminist Jurisprudence (1st edn, Routledge-Cavendish 1997) 241.

9 Gilmore, Tainted Witness: Why We Doubt What Women Say about Their Lives (n 7) 4.

10 See broadly Joanne Conaghan, Law and Gender (1st edn, Oxford University Press 2013); Catharine MacKinnon, Butterfly Politics: Changing the World for Women (1st edn, Harvard University Press 2017).

11 Margaret Davies, Asking the Law Question (4th edn, Thomson Reuters 2017).

12 ibid 232–40. Given the diverse theories which underpin different feminist perspectives, it may be reductive to speak of ‘feminism’ in general terms as a single body of thought.

13 Conaghan, Law and Gender (n 10) 8.

14 Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC), Equality before the Law: Justice for Women (Report No 69, 1994) [2.7].

15 Lucinda Finley, ‘Breaking Women’s Silence in Law: The Dilemma of the Gendered Nature of Legal Reasoning’ (1989) 64(5) Notre Dame Law Review 886, 892.

16 Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex (Vintage Publishing 2011).

17 Kate Manne, Down Girl: The Logic of Misogyny (Oxford University Press 2017) 185.

18 Helene Love, ‘The Vulnerable Subject on Trial: Addressing Testimonial Injustice in the Rules of Evidence’ (2019) 12 Elder Law Review 3, 7.

19 Miranda Fricker, Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing (Oxford University Press 2007) 17.

20 Manne (n 17) 193–94.

21 ALRC, Family Violence – A National Legal Response (Report No 114, 2010) [24.21].

22 In 2020, of 4,191 reported incidents of sexual assault, just 17.4 per cent resulted in the commencement of criminal proceedings: See NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research, ‘The Progress of Sexual Assault Offences through the NSW Criminal Justice System – Adult Victims’ (Infographic, 2020) <www.bocsar.nsw.gov.au/Documents/Landing_Pages/Sexual%20Assault%20infographic%202020.pdf>.

23 Patrick Tidmarsh and Gemma Hamilton, ‘Misconceptions of Sexual Crimes against Adult Victims: Barriers to Justice’ (2020) 611 Trends & Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice <www.aic.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-11/ti611_misconceptions_of_sexual_crimes_against_adult_victims.pdf> accessed 19 June 2022, 3.

24 Jane Gilmore, Fixed It: Violence and the Representation of Women in the Media (1st edn, Viking 2019) 182.

25 Gilmore, Tainted Witness: Why We Doubt What Women Say about Their Lives (n 7) 7–10.

26 Ibid 31, 80.

27 Ibid 18–19.

28 Fricker (n 19) 20.

29 ‘History and Inception’ (Me Too) <https://metoomvmt.org/get-to-know-us/history-inception/> accessed 19 June 2022.

30 Kantor and Twohey (n 1).

31 @Ayssa_Milano (Alyssa Milano) (Twitter, 16 October 2017, 7:21am AEST) <https://twitter.com/Alyssa_Milano/status/919659438700670976> accessed 19 June 2022.

32 Beverley McLachlin, ‘The Relationship between the Courts and the News Media’ in Patrick Keyzer, Jane Johnston and Mark Pearson (eds), The Courts and the Media: Challenges in the Era of Digital and Social Media (Halstead Press 2012).

33 Cassandra Sharp, ‘What’s in a Hashtag? Vulnerability as a Transformative Disposition within Social Media’ (2018) 22 Media and Arts Law Review 363, 363–65.

34 Cassandra Sharp, ‘#Fear&Loathing in Sydney: Law, Justice and the Experience of Fear in a Hashtag World’ (2018) 30(1) Law and Literature 29, 32; Kate Tubridy, ‘So the Justice System Was to Blame Yet Again: Discourses of Betrayal and Retribution on Facebook’ (2018) 22 Media and Arts Law Review 382.

35 Michael Salter, ‘Justice and Revenge in Online Counter-Publics: Emerging Responses to Sexual Violence in the Age of Social Media’ (2013) 9(3) Crime, Media, Culture 225, 237.

36 Ibid 225.

37 Gilmore, Tainted Witness: Why We Doubt What Women Say about Their Lives (n 7) 170.

38 John Beverley, ‘The Margin at the Centre: On Testimonio (Testimonial Narrative)’ (1989) 35(1) Modern Fiction Studies 11, 13, cited in Salter (n 35). Beverley defines ‘testimonio’ as a narrative told in the first person by a narrator who is also the real protagonist or witness of the events he or she recounts.

39 Gilmore, Tainted Witness: Why We Doubt What Women Say about Their Lives (n 7) 100.

40 Martha Chamallas, ‘Will Tort Law Have Its #MeToo Moment?’ (2018) 11(1) Journal of Tort Law 39, 68.

41 Penny Griffin, ‘#MeToo, White Feminism and Taking Everyday Politics Seriously in the Global Political Economy’ (2019) 54(4) Australian Journal of Political Science 556, 564.

42 Stavroula Pipyrou, ‘#MeToo Is Little More than Mob Rule vs #MeToo Is a Legitimate Form of Social Justice’ (2018) 8(3) Journal of Ethnographic Theory 415.

43 Griffin (n 41) 566–67.

44 Jessamy Gleeson and Breanan Turner, ‘Online Feminist Activism as Performative Consciousness-Raising: A #MeToo Case Study’ in Bianca Fileborn and Rachel Loney-Howes (eds), #MeToo and the Politics of Social Change (Palgrave Macmillan 2019) 53–54.

45 Bridget Haire, Christy E Newman and Bianca Fileborn, ‘Shitty Media Men’ in Bianca Fileborn and Rachel Loney-Howes (eds), #MeToo and the Politics of Social Change (Palgrave Macmillan 2019) 207.

46 Jane Gilmore, ‘Presumption of Innocence and the #MeToo Backlash’ Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney, 23 October 2018) <www.smh.com.au/lifestyle/life-and-relationships/presumption-of-innocence-and-the-metoo-backlash-20181019-p50aqw.html> accessed 19 June 2022.

47 Sarah K Burgess, ‘Between the Desire for Law and the Law of Desire: #MeToo and the Cost of Telling the Truth Today’ (2018) 51(4) Philosophy and Rhetoric 342, 346.

48 Manne (n 17) 178.

49 Attorneys-General of New South Wales, Queensland and Victoria, ‘Reform of Defamation Law’ (Discussion Paper, 1990); David Brennan, ‘The Defence of Truth and Defamation Law Reform’ (1994) 20(1) Monash University Law Review 151, 152; Sally Walker, ‘Lange v ABC: The High Court Rethinks the “Constitutionalisation” of Defamation Law’ (1998) 5(1) Murdoch University Electronic Journal of Law <http://classic.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MurdochUeJlLaw/1998/3.html> accessed 19 June 2022.

50 The Honourable Mr Justice M D Kirby, ‘“The Purest Treasure?” National Defamation Law Reform in Australia’ (1977) 8(2) Federal Law Review 113, 114; David Rolph, ‘Preparing for a Full-Scale Invasion? Truth, Privacy and Defamation’ (2007) 25(3–4) Communications Law Bulletin 5, 7.

51 Explanations of the concept of reputation include that it is ‘the good esteem in which others hold us’ (Hugo Grotius, The Jurisprudence of Holland (RW Lee tr, Clarendon Press 1926) 481), ‘good name’ (William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (University of Chicago Press 1979) vol 3, 123), ‘honor’ (Robert C Post, ‘The Social Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation and the Constitution’ (1986) 74(3) California Law Review 691, 699), and ‘property’ (Thomas Starkie, A Treatise on the Law of Slander, Libel, Scandalum Magnatum and False Rumours (first published 1826, Franklin Classics Trade Press 2018)). More recently, David Rolph has considered reputation in a new light, theorising the possibility of reputation as a construct of the media, the economy, society, and celebrity: David Rolph, ‘Dirty Pictures: Defamation, Reputation and Nudity’ (2006) 10 Law Text Culture 101, 103.

52 Eric Descheemaeker, ‘Protecting Reputation: Defamation and Negligence’ (2009) 29(4) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 603, 609.

53 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976).

54 Ibid art 17.

55 Ibid art 19.

56 ALRC, Traditional Rights and Freedoms – Encroachments by Commonwealth Laws (Report No 129, 1 March 2016) 84.

57 Monis v The Queen (2013) 249 CLR 92 [60] (French CJ).

58 Eric Barendt, Freedom of Speech (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2007) 13.

59 George Williams, ‘Protecting Freedom of Speech in Australia’ (2014) 39(4) Alternative Law Journal 217, 217.

60 See for example Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106, 139.

61 Comcare v Banerji [2019] HCA 23 [209].

62 Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520, 531 (‘Lange’). See also ALRC, Traditional Rights and Freedoms – Encroachments by Commonwealth Laws (n 56) 86.

63 See broadly Dan Meagher, ‘Is There a Common Law “Right” to Freedom of Speech?’ (2019) 43(1) Melbourne University Law Review 269.

64 Attorney-General v Guardian Newspapers (No 2) [1990] 1 AC 109, 283, cited in Lange (n 62) 564.

65 Des Butler and Sharon Rodrick, Australian Media Law (5th edn, Thomson Reuters 2015) 33; David Rolph, Defamation Law (1st edn, Thomson Reuters 2016) 92.

66 See for example Defamation Amendment Act 2020 (NSW) sch 1 item 6.

67 Newman v Whittington [2022] NSWSC 249 [64]–[69].

68 New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 29 July 2020, 2865–73 (Mark Speakman SC, Attorney General).

69 See for example Gayle v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd (No 2) [2018] NSWSC 1838 [30]–[32]; Rush v Nationwide News Pty Ltd (No 7) [2019] FCA 496 [229]; CD v FG [2021] NSWSC 300 [193].

70 Amanda Mason, ‘Defamation Law and the Me Too Movement in Australia’ (2020) 23 Media and Arts Law Review 325, 329.

71 Herald & Weekly Times Ltd v Popovic (2003) 9 VR 1, 57.

72 New South Wales Law Reform Commission, Defamation (Report No 75, September 1995) [2.6] (‘NSWLRC Report No 75’).

73 Joseph M Fernandez, ‘Making Defamation Law’s Truth Defence More Public Interest Speech Friendly’ (Submission to Greg Smith, Attorney General, New South Wales, 28 April 2011) 11 –12.

74 Paul Mitchell, The Making of the Modern Law of Defamation (Hart Publishing 2005) 94; ALRC, Unfair Publication: Defamation and Privacy (Report No 11, 7 June 1979) [120].

75 Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) s 25.

76 David J Brennan, ‘The Defence of Truth and Defamation Law Reform’ (1994) 20(1) Monash University Law Review 151, 155; Roy Robert Ray, ‘Truth a Defence to Libel’ (1931) 16 Minnesota Law Review 43, 56.

77 Rofe v Smith’s Newspapers Ltd (1926) 27 SR (NSW) 313.

78 See for example Ngaire Naffine, Law and the Sexes: Explorations in Feminist Jurisprudence (Allen and Unwin 1990); Pat K Chew and Lauren K Kelley-Chew, ‘Subtly Sexist Language’ (2007) 16(3) Columbia Journal of Gender and Law 643, 644.

79 Mason (n 70) 338.

80 Slander and Libel Act 1847 (NSW) (‘Libel Act’).

81 Ibid. Section 4 of the Libel Act provided that in pleading the defence of justification, a defendant was required to establish that the matters complained of were true, that ‘it was for the public benefit that the said matters charged should be published’, and ‘the particular fact or facts by reason whereof it was for the public benefit that the said matters charged should be published’.

82 Paul Mitchell, ‘The Foundations of Australian Defamation Law’ (2006) 28(3) Sydney Law Review 477, 477–78.

83 Defamation Act 1901 (NSW) (‘1901 Act’).

84 Defamation Act 1912 (NSW) (‘1912 Act’).

85 Defamation Act 1958 (NSW) (‘1958 Act’).

86 1901 Act (n 83) s 6; 1912 Act (n 84) s 7; 1958 Act (n 85) s 16.

87 Defamation Act 1974 (NSW) s 15(2).

88 Rolph, ‘A Critique of the National, Uniform Defamation Laws’ (n 4) 228.

89 Defamation Act 2001 (ACT) s 16 (repealed); Defamation Act 1889 (Qld) s 15 (repealed); Defamation Act 1957 (Tas) s 15 (repealed).

90 See broadly ALRC, Unfair Publication: Defamation and Privacy (n 74); NSWLRC Report No 75 (n 72).

91 Civil Laws (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) s 135; Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) s 25; Defamation Act 2005 (Qld) s 25; Defamation Act 2005 (Tas) s 25; Defamation Act 2005 (Vic) s 25; Defamation Act 2005 (SA) s 23; Defamation Act 2005 (WA) s 25; Defamation Act 2006 (NT) s 22.

92 Rolph, ‘A Critique of the National, Uniform Defamation Laws’ (n 4) 228.

93 To meet the threshold of substantial truth, it must be established that the matters complained of were ‘true in substance or not materially different from the truth’: Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) s 4.

94 Rolph, ‘A Critique of the National, Uniform Defamation Laws’ (n 4) 245.

95 See generally Catherine Althaus, Peter Bridgman and Glyn Davis, The Australian Policy Handbook (6th edn, Allen & Unwin 2017) 50.

96 See generally Rolph, ‘A Critique of the National, Uniform Defamation Laws’ (n 4).

97 See broadly Council of Attorneys-General, Review of Model Defamation Provisions (Discussion Paper, February 2019).

98 Defamation Amendment Act 2020 (NSW) s 29A.

99 Sarah Ailwood, ‘“Collateral Damage”: Consent, Subjectivity and Australia’s #MeToo Moment’ (2020) 46(2) Australian Feminist Law Journal 17–18.

100 Council of Attorneys-General, Review of Model Defamation Provisions – Stage 2 (Discussion Paper, 31 March 2021) 82–97.

101 New York Times v Sullivan 376 US 254 (1964).

102 Ibid. For context, the defendant in Sullivan did not plead the defence justification or ‘truth’. Instead, the judgment occurred in the context of the defence of qualified privilege. Nonetheless, the result was that defamation plaintiffs classed as ‘public officials’ were required to prove the additional element of falsity to establish a cause of action: see Rolph, Defamation Law (n 65) 179.

103 Frederick Schauer, ‘Fear, Risk and the First Amendment: Unraveling the “Chilling Effect”’ (1978) 58(5) Boston University Law Review 685, 709–10.

104 Garrison v Louisiana 379 US 64 (1964). See also John Tobin, ‘The United States Public Figure Test: Should It Be Introduced into Australia?’ (1994) 17(2) University of New South Wales Law Journal 383, 388.

105 Snyder v Phelps 562 US 443, 206 (2011).

106 Meiring de Villiers, ‘Substantial Truth in Defamation Law’ (2008) 32(1) American Journal of Trial Advocacy 91, 122–23.

107 Matt Collins, ‘Nothing to Write Home about: Australia the Defamation Capital of the World’ (National Press Club, Canberra, 2019) <www.lawcouncil.asn.au/media/speeches/nothing-to-write-home-about-australia-the-defamation-capital-of-the-world> accessed 19 July 2022.

108 William G Hagans, ‘Who Does the First Amendment Protect? Why the Plaintiff Should Bear the Burden of Proof in Any Defamation Action’ (2007) 26(3) Review of Litigation 613, 637.

109 Peter L Felcher and Edward L Rubin, ‘Privacy, Publicity and the Portrayal of Real People by the Media’ (1979) 88(8) Yale Law Journal 1577, 1580, cited in Tobin (n 104) 390.

110 Gertz v Robert Welch Inc 418 US 323, 345 (1974), cited in Nadine Strossen, ‘A Defence of the Aspirations – but Not the Achievements – of the US Rules Limiting Defamation Actions by Public Officials or Public Figures’ (1986) 15(3) Melbourne University Law Review 419, 422.

111 Strossen (n 110). See also Michael Chesterman, ‘The Money or the Truth: Defamation Reform in Australia and the USA’ (1995) 18(2) University of New South Wales Law Journal 300, 302.

112 See for example McLachlan v Browne & Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd [2018] NSWSC 341; Gayle (n 69); Rush (No 7) (n 69); Hanson-Young v Leyonhjelm (No 4) [2019] FCA 1981; Porter v Australian Broadcasting Corporation [2021] FCA 863.

113 United States Constitution amendment 1.

114 Joanne Conaghan, ‘Law, Harm and Redress: A Feminist Perspective’ (2002) 22(3) Legal Studies 319, 334.

115 Nikki Godden, ‘Tort Claims for Rape: More Trials, Fewer Tribulations?’ in Janice Richardson and Erika Rackley (eds), Feminist Perspectives on Tort Law (1st edn, Routledge 2012).

116 Stephen J Schulhofer, ‘The Feminist Challenge in Criminal Law’ (1995) 143(6) University of Pennsylvania Law Review 2151, 2154.

117 See for example Department for Women, Heroines of Fortitude: The Experiences of Women in Court as Victims of Sexual Assault (Report, 1996) 7.

118 MacKinnon, Butterfly Politics: Changing the World for Women (n 10) 34.

119 ALRC, Equality before the Law: Justice for Women (n 14) [9.7]; ibid.

120 Regina Graycar and Jenny Morgan, The Hidden Gender of Law (2nd edn, Federation Press 2002) 314.

121 Gilmore, Fixed It: Violence and the Representation of Women in the Media (n 24) 236.

122 Australian Human Rights Commission (AHRC), Respect@Work: National Inquiry into Sexual Harassment in Australian Workplaces (Report, 2020) 565.

123 See generally Gayle (n 69); Rush (No 7) (n 69).

124 Rosemary Hunter, ‘Contesting the Dominant Paradigm: Feminist Critiques of Liberal Legalism’ in Vanessa Munro and Margaret Davies (eds), The Ashgate Research Companion to Feminist Legal Theory (Ashgate Publishing 2013).

125 Aurelien Breeden, ‘French #MeToo Movement’s Founder Loses Defamation Case’ The New York Times (New York, 25 September 2019) <www.nytimes.com/2019/09/25/world/europe/france-sandra-muller-verdict.html> accessed 19 July 2022.

126 ‘French Woman Overturns Conviction for Accusing Man of Sexual Harassment’ The Guardian (Paris, 1 April 2021) <www.theguardian.com/world/2021/mar/31/french-woman-sued-by-man-she-accused-of-sexual-harassment-wins-appeal-case>.

127 ‘Johnny Depp Wins Defamation Case against Former Wife Amber Heard’ ABC News (2 June 2022) <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-06-02/verdict-delivered-johnny-depp-amber-heard-trial/101115246>.

128 Depp v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2020] EWHC 2911 (QB). It is worth noting that whilst the trial judge accepted the defence of justification, he was not required to solely rely on the competing oral testimony of Depp and Heard because there was separate evidence to corroborate the allegations made against Depp.

129 Depp v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2021] EWCA Civ 423.

130 Gayle (n 69).

131 Ibid [91].

132 McLachlan (n 112).

133 McLachlan v Browne (No 9) [2019] NSWSC 10.

134 Harriet Tatham and Heath Parkes-Hupton, ‘Craig McLachlan Drops Defamation Case against ABC, Nine and Christie Whelan Browne’ ABC News (20 May 2022) <www.abc.net.au/news/2022-05-20/craig-mclachlan-applies-drops-defamation-case/101085010>.

135 Porter (n 112); Porter v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (No 2) [2021] FCA 1036.

136 Dent v Burke [2019] ACTSC 166 [46]–[48]; Dent v Burke [2020] ACTCA 22 [33]–[36].

137 Jordan Hayne and Tom Lowrey, ‘Don Burke Defeats Defamation Action as Judge Notes His Limited Credibility in Interview’ ABC News (28 June 2019) <www.abc.net.au/news/2019-06-28/don-burke-defeats-wendy-dent-defamation-action/11260302>.

138 Rush (No 7) (n 69).

139 Ibid.

140 Ibid [3].

141 Ibid [220].

142 Jamelle Wells, ‘Geoffrey Rush Trial: Eryn Norvill Wanted Complaint Kept Confidential, Defence Says’ ABC News (7 November 2018) <www.abc.net.au/news/2018-11-07/eryn-norvill-wanted-geoffrey-rush-complaint-confidential-court/10473138>.

143 See Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Rush [2020] FCAFC 115.

144 Rush (No 7) (n 69) [328].

145 Ibid [285].

146 Ibid [330].

147 Ibid [332].

148 Ibid [334]–[335].

149 Ibid [337].

150 Ibid [339]. This is an interesting conclusion in circumstances where a witness who may have been able to corroborate Norvill’s account was not permitted to give evidence in support of the defence. As Leigh Gilmore has argued, refusing to allow another woman who had allegedly been treated similarly to testify was a refusal to allow the witness to create a context in which her testimony might be deemed credible or meaningful: see Gilmore, Tainted Witness: Why We Doubt What Women Say about Their Lives (n 7) 31.

151 Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) s 293. Section 293 was renumbered as s 294CB on 1 June 2022: Crimes Legislation Amendment (Sexual Consent Reforms) Act 2021 (NSW) Sch 2[4].

152 Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld) s 632; Evidence Act 1906 (WA) s 50; Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas) s 136; Evidence Act 1929 (SA) s 12A; Evidence (National Uniform Legislation) Act 2011 (NT) s 164; Evidence Act 2011 (ACT) s 164; Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) s 164; Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 164; Evidence Act 2001 (Tas) s 164; Evidence Act 2008 (Vic) s 164. See also Conway v The Queen (2002) 209 CLR 203 [53] (Gaudron ACJ, McHugh, Hayne and Callinan JJ).

153 See generally Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW).

154 AHRC (n 122) 572–73 (Recommendation 39).

155 According to the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, of all sexual assaults reported to police in 2017, 60 per cent occurred in a private dwelling. It should be noted that the true extent of the number of incidents occurring in private is likely to be much higher given the number of unreported incidents: Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, Family, Domestic and Sexual Violence in Australia: Continuing the National Story (2019) 21. See also Bree Cook, Fiona David and Anna Grant, Sexual Violence in Australia (Australian Institute of Criminology 2001) 37.

156 Alison Gash and Ryan Harding, ‘#MeToo? Legal Discourse and Everyday Responses to Sexual Violence’ (2018) 7(2) Laws, 6 <www.mdpi.com/2075-471X/7/2/21> accessed 20 July 2022.

157 See for example Rush (No 7) (n 69) [286]; Gayle (n 69) [91].

158 See generally Elizabeth F Loftus, Eyewitness Testimony (Cambridge University Press 1996); Jill D Alonzo and Sean M Lane, ‘Saying versus Judging: Assessing Knowledge of Eyewitness Memory’ (2010) 24(9) Applied Cognitive Psychology 1245.

159 See Kirsten Campbell, ‘Legal Memories: Sexual Assault, Memory, and International Humanitarian Law’ (2002) 28(1) Signs 149; Amy Hardy, Kerry Young and Emily Holmes, ‘Does Trauma Memory Play a Role in the Experience of Reporting Sexual Assault during Police Interviews? An Exploratory Study’ (2009) 17(8) Memory 783.

160 MacKinnon, Butterfly Politics: Changing the World for Women (n 10) 281.

161 Heather Stewart, ‘“Why Didn’t She Say Something Sooner?” Doubt, Denial, Silencing, and the Epistemic Harms of the #MeToo Movement’ (2019) 36(2) South Central Review 68, 71.

162 Graycar and Morgan (n 120) 303–27.

163 Manne (n 17) 193–94.

164 Ibid.

165 Ibid 217.

166 Ibid 71.

167 Australian Bureau of Statistics, ‘Personal Safety’ (Catalogue No 4906.0, 8 November 2017).

168 Denise Lievore, No Longer Silent: A Study of Women’s Help-Seeking Decisions and Service Responses to Sexual Assault (Commonwealth of Australia 2005) I, 34.

169 Department for Women (n 117) 18.

170 It is important to note that questions of credibility are often exacerbated by intersectional stereotypes. For instance, a combination of gender and racial stereotypes may make it even more difficult for women of colour who are victim-survivors of sexual misconduct to be considered authoritative in their evidence: see generally Stewart (n 161) 73.

171 Conaghan, Law and Gender (n 10) 75.

172 Kaitlynn Mendes and Jessica Ringrose, ‘Digital Feminist Activism: #MeToo and the Everyday Experiences of Challenging Rape Culture’ in Bianca Fileborn and Rachel Loney-Howes (eds), #MeToo and the Politics of Social Change (Palgrave Macmillan 2019) 37, 41–42.

173 AHRC (n 122) 414.

174 Ibid.

175 Deborah Tuerkheimer, ‘Unofficial Reporting in the #MeToo Era’ [2019] University of Chicago Legal Forum 273, 297.

176 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (University of Chicago Press 1979) vol 4, 358, cited in Frederick Schauer, ‘Social Foundations of the Law of Defamation: A Comparative Analysis’ (1980) 1 Journal of Media Law and Practice 3, 12–13.

177 Schauer, ‘Social Foundations of the Law of Defamation: A Comparative Analysis’ (n 176).

178 Rodney A Smolla, ‘Dun & Bradstreet, Hepps, and Liberty Lobby: A New Analytic Primer on the Future Course of Defamation’ (1987) 75(5) Georgetown Law Journal 1519, 1530; Stuart Gibson and Scott Colvin, ‘The #MeToo Effect on Defamation Law – Guilty Until Proven Innocent’ Australian Financial Review (15 November 2018) <www.afr.com/companies/professional-services/the-metoo-effect-on-defamation-law--guilty-until-proven-innocent-20181114-h17wm1>.

179 Marc A Franklin and Daniel J Bussel, ‘The Plaintiff’s Burden in Defamation: Awareness and Falsity’ (1984) 25(5) William and Mary Law Review 825, 860.

180 Collins (n 107) 33.

181 Smolla (n 178).

182 Franklin and Bussel (n 179) 860.

183 See for example Shira A Scheindlin and Joel Cohen, ‘After #MeToo, We Can’t Ditch Due Process’ The Guardian (8 January 2018) <www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/jan/08/metoo-due-process-televictions>.

184 Jessica A Clarke, ‘The Rules of #MeToo’ [2019] University of Chicago Legal Forum 37, 50.

185 Gash and Harding (n 156) 12.

186 Manne (n 17) 218.

187 See Gash and Harding (n 156).

188 Kathy Davis and Dubravka Zarkov, ‘Ambiguities and Dilemmas around #MeToo: #ForHowLong and #WhereTo?’ (2018) 25(1) European Journal of Women’s Studies 3, 4.

189 Gash and Harding (n 156) 12.

190 Mary Anne Franks, ‘Witch Hunts: Free Speech, #MeToo, and the Fear of Women’s Words’ [2019] University of Chicago Legal Forum 123, 133.

191 Michael Chesterman, ‘The Money or the Truth: Defamation Reform in Australia and the USA’ (1995) 18(2) University of New South Wales Law Journal 300, 303, 307–08.

192 Tobin (n 104) 393.

193 See for example Lindsey Bever, ‘Trump Jr Says Wave of Sexual Assault Accusations Makes Him Worry for Sons More than Daughters’ The Washington Post (Washington, 1 October 2018) <www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2018/10/01/trump-jr-says-wave-sexual-assault-accusations-make-him-worry-sons-more-than-daughters/>; Karlyn Borysenko, ‘The Dark Side of #MeToo: What Happens when Men are Falsely Accused’ Forbes (12 February 2020) <www.forbes.com/sites/karlynborysenko/2020/02/12/the-dark-side-of-metoo-what-happens-when-men-are-falsely-accused/#29289e17864d>.

194 Graycar and Morgan (n 120) 355. Existing literature indicates that false reporting occurs at a relatively low rate of approximately 5 per cent: Claire E Ferguson and John M Malouff, ‘Assessing Police Classifications of Sexual Assault Reports: A Meta-Analysis of False Reporting Rates’ (2016) 45(5) Archives of Sexual Behaviour 1185, 1189. It is important to note, however, that it is difficult to arrive at a definitive figure about the prevalence of false allegations due to a lack of consistent classification and definition of what constitutes a false report: Liz Wall and Cindy Tarczon, True or False? The Contested Terrain of False Allegations (Australian Institute of Family Studies 2013).

195 Matthew Hale, Historia Placitorum Coronae, The History of the Pleas of the Crown (London 1736) 635.

196 R v Henry (1968) 53 Cr App R 150, 153 (Salmon LJ), cited in R v Sherrin (No 2) (1979) 21 SASR 250, 254.

197 The ALRC has explained that stereotypical perceptions about women, often portrayed within the media, become the ‘norm of behaviour against which particular women are assessed’, which has a severe impact on the ability of women to be believed in formal proceedings concerning allegations of sexual misconduct: ALRC, Equality before the Law: Justice for Women (n 14) 27. See also Janice Du Mont, Karen-Lee Miller and Terri L Myhr, ‘The Role of “Real Rape” and “Real Victim” Stereotypes in the Police Reporting Practices of Sexually Assaulted Women’ (2003) 9(4) Violence against Women 466.

198 Nicola Gavey and Virginia Gow, ‘“Cry Wolf”, Cried the Wolf: Constructing the Issue of False Rape Allegations in New Zealand Media Texts’ (2001) 11(3) Feminism and Psychology 341, 345.

199 Susan Brownmiller, Against Our Will: Men, Women and Rape (Ballantine Books 1975) 386–87.

200 See Zoë Morrison, Antonia Quadara and Cameron Boyd, ‘“Ripple Effects” of Sexual Assault’ (Australian Institute of Family Studies 2007).

201 Financial costs include loss of earnings and earning capacity, counselling, and medical expenses (among other things): Patricia Mayhew, Counting the Costs of Crime in Australia (Australian Institute of Criminology 2003) 3.

202 Emotional barriers to reporting include feelings of shame, stigma, eroded self-esteem, and isolation: Cook, David and Grant (n 155) 27.

203 This is particularly so for women who experience misconduct at work: Elyse Shaw, Ariane Hegewisch and Cynthia Hess, ‘Sexual Harassment and Assault at Work: Understanding the Costs’ (Briefing Paper No B376, Institute for Women’s Policy Research, October 2018) 1.

204 With respect to personal costs, the Australian Institute of Criminology has reported that survivors of sexual misconduct may experience ongoing problems in forming relationships, relating socially, and maintaining personal relationships: Cook, David and Grant (n 155) 28.

205 See broadly Ngaire Naffine, ‘Windows on the Legal Mind: The Evocation of Rape in Legal Writings’ (1992) 18(4) Melbourne University Law Review 741.

206 See Elisabeth McDonald, ‘From “Real Rape” to Real Justice? Reflections on the Efficacy of More than 35 Years of Feminism, Activism and Law Reform’ (2014) 45(3) Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 487; Joanne Conaghan and Yvette Russell, ‘Rape Myths, Law, and Feminist Research: “Myths about Myths”’ (2014) 22(1) Feminist Legal Studies 25.

207 Dana A Weiser, ‘Confronting Myths About Sexual Assault: A Feminist Analysis of the False Report Literature’ (2017) 66(1) Family Relations 46, 47.

208 Stewart (n 161) 87–88. See also Manne (n 17) 197.

209 Penelope Pether, ‘Sex Lies and Defamation’ (1994) 6(2) Cardozo Studies in Law and Literature 171, 191.

210 Elizabeth Sheehy, ‘Evidence Law and “Credibility Testing” of Women: A Comment on the E Case’ (2002) 2(2) Queensland University of Technology Law Journal 157, 158.

211 Lea Corbett and Wendy Larcombe, ‘Lunar Landscapes: The Dark Side of Sexual Assault and the Law’ in Sandra McKillop and Patricia Weiser Easteal (eds), Women and the Law (Australian Institute of Criminology 1993) 132; Julia Grix, ‘Law’s Truth and Other Lies: Women, Sexual Assault and the Criminal Justice System’ (1999) 12(1) Australian Feminist Law Journal 83, 87; Lee Madigan and Nancy Gamble, The Second Rape: Society’s Continued Betrayal of the Victim (Macmillan Publishing 1991).

212 Chris Dent and Andrew T Kenyon, ‘Defamation Law’s Chilling Effect: A Comparative Content Analysis of Australia and US Newspapers’ (2004) 9 Media and Arts Law Review 89.

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Michelle Harradine

Michelle Harradine is a lawyer practising in public law litigation. She holds a Bachelor of Laws (Hons I), Bachelor of Criminology and Graduate Diploma of Legal Practice.