Abstract
The Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992 (NZ) ushered in a new definition of mental disorder which shifted from diagnostic to phenomenological, containing more explicit severity criteria. Failure to understand that mental disorder under the Act was not the same as mental illness, combined with a more litigious environment, as well as structural changes in the mental hearth services resulted in failure of provision of compulsory care to many who needed it. The Act was seen as deficient. This resulted in the introduction of potentially draconian amending legislation into the New Zealand Parliament in 1994. Increasing understanding about interpretation of the Act and better cross‐disciplinary understanding among Family Court Judges, counsel for the patient and responsible clinicians has resulted in more stability of decisions of the extent of compulsory care. For instance, serious danger to others was initially interpreted very narrowly but now includes psychological and physical harm, and is not linked to a criminal standard. Further, the interpretation of the most ambiguous terms in the statutory definition (volition, cognition) has become more narrow and for the most part been applied to mental illness alone. With use, the original presumed limits to the definition of mental disorder have been extended. Debate must occur about the appropriate limits of such interpretation.