Aid: are we doing our bit?

Abstract

Singer argues for aid to strangers on the ground that it is morally required from a non-discriminatory consequentialist perspective, while Unger argues that if we have intuitive moral obligations to aid those near to us then we have as strong an obligation to aid strangers. I shall argue that aid to strangers in a well ordered world would be a collective responsibility in which all nations and individuals would play a part according to their capacity. I shall argue that this responsibility is as much a matter of rights and justice as is our responsibility not to commit aggression against strangers. However, given that our collective responsibility to aid is hardly discharged in our less than ideal world, the question arises as to what responsibilities we still have as individuals to provide aid. I shall consider and reject Liam Murphy's argument that individual responsibility is limited to what we would contribute if anyone did their bit also but I shall argue that, nevertheless, our individual responsibility to aid strangers — while more substantial than Murphy allows — is limited by being a responsibility to play a part in collective aid.