EU rules beyond EU borders: theorizing external governance in European politics

Abstract

The concept of external governance seeks to capture the expanding scope of EU rules beyond EU borders. This article elaborates the theoretical foundations of this concept, differentiates the various institutional modes through which external governance takes place and suggests a set of hypotheses addressing the conditions under which EU external governance is effective. Here, we contrast institutionalist explanations, which are the most germane to an external governance approach, with competing expectations derived from power-based theories and approaches emphasizing the role of domestic factors in the target countries.

Keywords:

• Association policy
• external governance
• foreign policy
• neighbourhood relations

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

We gratefully acknowledge funding by the National Centre of Competence in Research ‘Challenges to Democracy in the 21st Century’ of the Swiss National Science Foundation as well as by the University of Lucerne in the preparation of this special issue. Our special thanks go to the two reviewers for this special issue.

Notes

For a general analysis of the external face of the acquis, see Magen (2007).

This approach is closer to conceptualizations of the EU's international role that depart from the unitary foreign policy actor model and emphasize its ‘variable and multi-dimensional presence’ (Allen and Smith 1990: 20; see also Bretherton and Vogler 2006) or its constitution as a ‘system of external relations’ that is fragmented across pillars and levels of policy-making (Hill 1993; Ginsberg 1999). The external governance approach is one way of analysing the effects of this fragmented multi-dimensional presence based on the projection of the acquis communautaire.

For the distinction between macro- and meso- (or sectoral) policies in the context of EU enlargement, see Sedelmeier (2002, 2005).

In the formal definition, sovereignty comprises the internal autonomy over legislation and enforcement institutions, external autonomy vis-à-vis other states and non-intervention, as well as territoriality.

External governance can theoretically also involve other effects than rule transfer, such as, for instance, the involvement of third-country policy-makers in joint regulatory networks (see Lavenex 2008).

Rule selection is a dimension usually not analysed in studies of compliance that take EU law as the given normative focus. Both adoption and application can be seen as two levels or dimensions of compliance or implementation. We prefer this terminology to ‘transposition’ and ‘enforcement’, which refer to compliance with EU law and thus imply a hierarchical mode of governance. Rule selection, adoption and rule application are open enough to be compatible with the network and market modes of governance.

For an overview of institutional mechanisms, see Scott (1995).

Here we start from the assumption that low interdependence will not generate any demand for governance.