The EU's many representative modes: Colliding? Cohering?

Abstract

At first glance the European Union's (EU's) compound form of representation allows a wide-ranging spectrum of actors to claim to be representative, and allows different channels to feed their demands and interests into the political system. While this may be understood as a redeeming feature of supranational politics, this article sounds a note of caution. The historically developed system of representation comprising different principles and practices may combine in ways that undermine standards by which claims to political representation can be justified. First, it is demonstrated that the urge to combine multiple channels of representation has its roots in the history and theory of representation itself. Second, we show the development of the EU's compound form of representation. Third, tests of how well principles and practices of representation combine in the European arena are proposed. It is shown that the EU's specific combination of representative practices hardly allows for ensuring public control with political equality.

Keywords:

• Democracy
• European Union
• representation

Notes

See also e.g. ‘Brutus’ in the Anti-Federalist Papers (Bailyn 1993) and John Adams (Peek 1954). Cf. modern authors such as Birch (1971), Mansbridge (1999), Phillips (1995, 1997).

One is tempted to call it the ‘American model’ where James Madison in the Federalist Papers (No. 10 and No. 52) describes the importance of representatives being delegates of local interests.

Edmund Burke's famous Bristol speech set the standard for the discussion of the imperative mandate. However, Burke took up ideas developed by John Toland and Humphrey Mackworth in 1701. See Pollak (2007).

See Manin (1997).

See Wahlke et al. (1962).

See Eulau and Karps (1977).

See, e.g., Bovens (2007).

Within democratic theory, informal representation via interest groups has played a prominent part in associative democracy (Hirst 1994; Abromeit 1998; Saurugger 2003) and deliberative democracy approaches (Eriksen and Fossum 2000) which maintain that a democratic decision emerges from deliberation among those affected by the decision or issue in question, i.e. members of civil society debate an issue and arrive at a solution that is acceptable to all members as the best for the common good.

A neo-Aristotelian argument which is beautifully explicated in Arendt (1958). See also Naschold (1969).

Jessop (2002) argues that participation, or participatory governance, is a means of coping with the omnipresence of governing failures.

And they do according to the studies of e.g. Bréchon (2002), Norris (2002), Dalton (2003), Cain et al. (2003).