EU decision-making: reinforcing interest group relationships with national governments?

Abstract

Theories of interest intermediation in the European Union (EU) increasingly emphasize how domestic embeddedness influences the strategies of domestic interest groups. This article investigates a number of hypotheses advanced in this area empirically, based on analysis of the mobilization of local government interests in Denmark, Ireland and the Britain in relation to EU environmental directives. Interest groups that have a weak influence over national governments may be tempted into a ‘by-pass’ strategy, while interests that have a privileged position in domestic policy networks may be initially reluctant to embark on EU-level strategies. However, such strategies are not static but rather evolve and change over time – there is evidence of policy learning and a trend towards ‘venue shopping’ at both national and EU levels. On the other hand, those interests that remain weak at national level may also remain weak at European level.

Keywords:

• Domestic politics
• environmental policy
• European Union
• interest groups
• lobbying
• local government

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am grateful to the two anonymous reviewers for their helpful and constructive comments on an earlier draft of this article.

Notes

One could make the case that the UK, given the recent programme of devolution to certain parts of the country (in particular Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland) is evolving into a quasi-federation, at least on an asymmetric basis. In England, a strong meso-level tier of government does not exist, and therefore we keep with the traditional view of England as a unitary state.

Each EU special committee (or specialudvalg) follows EU developments in specific policy areas, such as environment, agriculture, industry, social affairs and the internal market, which may decide to give a formal ‘mandate’ to the relevant Ministry on a proposal.

As Coen (2007: 338) has argued, ‘increasingly sophisticated EU interest groups have recognized that the locus of activity is primarily a function of the policy cycle: with interests focussing on agenda-setting and formulation of EU directives at the European institutions, and the implementation of directives and ‘day-to-day’ regulatory monitoring in the member states' (see also Eising 2004).