Not so intergovernmental after all? On democracy and integration in European Foreign and Security Policy

Abstract

The status of democracy in European foreign and security policy is increasingly questioned. In order to identify if there is something at the European Union (EU) level that requires legitimation, we need to establish whether there has been a move beyond intergovernmentalism. In this contribution an analytical scheme that makes it possible to identify such a move and its putative democratic implications is developed. Four constituent pillars of intergovernmentalism are identified and discussed. These pertain to actors, decision-making procedures, the scope of delegated powers and the raison d'être of the intergovernmental endeavour. These pillars constitute necessary requirements if intergovernmentalism is to be democratic. Developments within the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) are assessed with reference to this analytical scheme, with a view to identify whether, when and where a move beyond intergovernmentalism has created a democratic dilemma.

Keywords:

• Common Foreign and Security Policy
• democracy
• European Parliament
• intergovernmentalism

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Many thanks to Erik O. Eriksen and Ian Cooper, as well to two anonymous referees, for detailed and helpful comments on this contribution. Research conducted for this paper was supported by a grant from the Norwegian Ministry of Defence. The paper is a contribution to the RECON project, financed by the 6th Framework Programme of the European Commission.

Notes

‘External Action of the EU: General Debate’, Comment number 4-031, p. 16. Minutes of the Convention meeting of 11 July 2002. Available at http://www.diss.fu-berlin.de/diss/servlets/MCRFileNodeServlet/FUDISS_derivate_000000005252/Hatakoy_Dissertation_4.pdf;jsessionid=A2C0C11FB5631D87C9D8EE7843565F84?hosts= (accessed 21 September 2011).