Governance between expertise and democracy: the case of European Security

Abstract

The European Union (EU) constitutes a multifarious security environment in which the demand for expert knowledge is on the rise. The objective of securing the sound specialized knowledge required for the EU's so-called comprehensive security strategy may not meet the requirement of being democratically accountable. There is hardly any objective knowledge basis for ‘experts’ in this field and different knowledge systems are connected to different validation and accountability procedures. A comprehensive security policy would blur the institutional and legal boundaries of the constitutional state. The deliberative approach to democratic governance offers some prescripts for achieving a comprehensive security policy involving humanitarian and civilian aspects alongside the military and technological ones. But deliberation cannot bear the burden of democratic legitimation.

Keywords:

• Deliberation
• democracy
• epistemic communities
• multilevel governance
• technocracy

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am grateful for comments from Helene Sjursen, from three reviewers, and for help from ARENA's research assistants.

Notes

The Butler Report, Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction, London, 14 July 2004, p. 138.

The Commission itself pointed to the need for ensuring rights in its ‘White Paper on European governance’ (European Commission 2001).

In these processes, the European Commission was accused of intransparency, vested interests and biased scientific advice, maladministration and lack of independence of scientific committees (Fischer 2008: 3).

See ‘The European Security Research and Innovation Forum (ESRIF) – public–private dialogue in security research’, MEMO/07/346, Brussels, 11 September 2007.

This is one of the two Council working parties which are entirely focused on the fight against terrorism. This situation remains unaltered after the Lisbon Treaty. The TWG handles practical co-operation (law enforcement), internal threat analysis and co-ordination between EU bodies. COTER deals with the external aspects of terrorism. See http://police-eu2010.be/mu-eu2010/en/working-groups/working-party-on-terrorism/ (accessed 15 June 2011).

Meaning the structure of three categories of co-operation with different areas of competence: the Economic Community (Pillar I); the Common Foreign and Security Policy (Pillar II); and Police and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters (which are outside of Community law) (Pillar III). Following the introduction of a single legal personality (Art. 47 TEU), the third pillar will disappear after a transition period of five years (Protocol on Transitional Provisions, Art. 10). Policies in the field of justice and home affairs, including Schengen, will then be integrated into the first pillar. The partial abolition of the pillar structure is further evidenced by Art. 289 TFEU referring to the ‘ordinary legislative procedure’, which is specified in Art. 294 TFEU, and Art. 16 TEU on qualified majority. However CFSP/ESDP remains intergovernmental.

On the EU's military staff, see http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=1039&lang=en (accessed 15 June 2011).

European Council (2001), see also the Council press release ‘Preparatory document related to the CESDP: establishment of a European Committee for Civilian Crisis Management’, 6755/00, 10 March 2000.

For example the Terrorism Working Party includes representatives from police forces and of the intelligence services of the member states as well as officials from the ministries in charge of combating terrorism (European Council 2004, 2009, 2011).

As Keohane and Nye (1974) observed: transgovernmental co-operation depicts the process under which sub-units of governments engage in direct and autonomous interaction separate from nation states.

The network which was initiated by the Commission on Radicalization (ENER) has grown into a dialogue between academics and policy makers working in the field (European Commission 2010). See also http://www.ec-ener.eu (accessed 15 June 2011).

See Joachim and Dembinski (2011). In their review on the European Security Strategy, Erik Brattberg and Mark Rhinard (2011) highlight the co-operation of the Commission with experts through seminars hosted by the European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS).

See Bohman (2007); see further Cohen and Sabel (1997, 2003); Gerstenberg (2002); Zeitlin and Trubek (2003); Sabel and Zeitlin (2010).

Marks et al. (1996); Joerges and Neyer (1997a, 1997b); Joerges and Vos (1999); Neyer (2003).

Cp. the lifting of the ban on torture in the Iraq war by the US.

UNSC Resolution 1267 in 1999 (concerning the Taliban); UNSC Resolution 1333 in 2000 (concerning Osama Bin Laden and Al Qaida); UNSC Resolution 1373 on 28 September 2001 (in the aftermath of 9/11); UNSC Resolution 1540 in 2004 (on weapons of mass destruction). Follow-up resolutions include UNSC Resolutions 1390 (concerning Afghanistan) and 1452 (on terrorist acts) in 2002 and UNSC Resolution 1483 in 2003 (on Iraq and Kuwait).

Basic constitutional rules – jus cogens norms – unconditionally protect the separation of powers, hence the red-tape argument. The firewall argument concerns human rights protection (see Eriksen 2006: 80).