EU politicization and policy initiatives of the European Commission: the case of consumer policy

ABSTRACT

European integration is increasingly contested in public. What are the policy consequences of this EU politicization? This article argues that politicization challenges the hitherto often technocratic mode of policy preparation in the European Commission. Increased public attention and contestation render the diffuse public a more relevant stakeholder for Europe’s central agenda-setter because future competence transfers to Brussels are more likely to be scrutinized in the public realm. This incentivizes Commission actors to generate widely dispersed regulatory benefits through its policy initiatives, particularly where an initiative covers publicly salient issues. Applying this expectation to 17 European consumer policy initiatives suggests that the Commission orients its policy proposals towards wide-spread consumer interest during periods of high EU politicization and issue salience. However, the mechanism is constrained by internal turf conflicts and anticipated Council preferences. These findings highlight that politicization entails both chances and risks for further, policy-driven integration in Europe.

KEYWORDS:

• Consumer policy
• European Commission
• European integration
• politicization
• responsiveness
• salience

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes on contributor

Dr Christian Rauh is a senior researcher in the Global Governance department of the WZB Berlin Social Science Center. More information at www.christian-rauh.eu

Notes

1 A more detailed discussion of these indicators is provided in Rauh (2016: Chapter 2). Data are available at www.christian-rauh.eu/data-and-resources (accessed 5 March 2018).

2 Given varying attitudes in the Commission (Kassim et al. 2013), this is a simplifying assumption. However, Commission officials tend to assess their organizational environment along rational calculations (Bauer 2012) and realize that the politicization of European integration challenges supranational competences (Bes 2017). The model developed here also works with the more constrained assumption that Commission officials on average hold a preference to at least retain the regulatory powers of the Commission.

3 This implies an interaction effect of general EU politicization and the salience of specific issues. Both together account for policy choices geared towards serving wide-spread interests. In a hypothetical scenario in which supranational authority is not publically contested at all, salience of specific issues should not have a direct effect on a Commission without direct electoral accountability. Conversely, where the contemporaneous public would not care about a specific issue at all, the Commission should not deviate from the interests of its primary stakeholders.

4 Identification resorted to the EUR-Lex directory codes ‘general consumer policies’ (15.20.10), ‘consumer information, education and representation’ (15.20.20), ‘protection of consumer health and safety’ (15.20.30), and ‘protection of economic interests’ (15.20.40). The full universe of cases is part of the replication package.

5 For example, the 2008 proposal on consumer rights comprises six key provisions on scope and harmonization approach, pre-contractual information obligations for traders, trader obligations for off-premise and distance contracts, trader obligations after the sales contract, commercial guarantees and general rules on contract terms.