Why the EU’s constitutional deadlock is hampering EMU reforms, and how this could be resolved

ABSTRACT

Economic and financial crisis measures stretched the legal fundaments of the EMU Treaty framework to their utmost boundaries and provoked watering down, mutating or even circumventing the existing Treaty limits. Instead of continuing with this pattern when pursuing further reforms, we advise to not only adjust the underlying constitutional EMU framework substantively but address first and foremost the deadlock given by the rigid EU Treaty framework as such by de-constitutionalizing EMU law.

KEYWORDS:

• EU Treaty limits
• crisis measures
• EMU reform
• de-constitutionalization

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 Such legislation has to remain within the scope of Art 126 TFEU and requires unanimity in the Council as it concerns laws with the status of primary law.

2 Monetary policy, by contrast, should not fundamentally be changed, and keep the ECB as the central and independent actor.

Additional information

Funding

This paper is a result of the project EMU_Choices under the European Union’s Horizon research and innovation programme [grant agreement No. 649532].

Notes on contributors

Stefan Griller

Stefan Griller is professor of European Union Law at the University of Salzburg and Deputy Director of the Salzburg Centre of European Union Studies. He co-coordinated the Horizon 2020 Project “EMU Choices” and led its legal team.

Elisabeth Lentsch

Elisabeth Lentsch worked as a post-doc researcher in the Horizon 2020 Project “EMU Choices” since July 2015. She investigated the development of legal framework of the European Economic and Monetary Union and the legal feasibility of EMU reform scenarios. She coordinated the project network of national constitutional lawyers dealing with fiscal and economic integration.