ABSTRACT
Since 2008, Hungary and Poland have developed a distinctive populist economic program, which has begun to spread to other Central and East European Countries (CEECs). This article develops a theory of the political economy of populism in CEECs, arguing that these countries’ dependence on foreign capital constrained them to follow (neo)liberal economic policies. After the global financial crisis, populist parties began to break from the (neo)liberal consensus, ‘thickening’ their populist agenda to include an economic program based on a conservative developmental statism. Case studies of Hungary, Poland, and Serbia describe these policies and show that they exhibit a particular form of economic nationalism that emphasizes workforce activation, natalism, and sovereignty. This shift has gone hand-in-hand with attempts to attract investments from Eastern authoritarian states, illustrating the connection between CEEC development strategies and sources of foreign capital.
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank two anonymous referees, as well as participants and organizers at the European Consortium for Political Research in Hamburg (2018) and European University Institute’s Robert Schuman Center for Advanced Studies’ Conference ‘30 Years After the Berlin Wall’ (2019) for their outstanding comments and challenging questions that forced us to revise, and Jeremy Richardson, editor, for his tremendous leadership of JEPP over the years.
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Notes on contributors
Mitchell A. Orenstein
Mitchell A. Orenstein is Professor and Chair of Russian and East European Studies at University of Pennsylvania. Correspondence: [email protected]
Bojan Bugarič
Bojan Bugarič is Professor of Law at University of Sheffield. Correspondence: b.bugarič@sheffield.ac.uk