Abstract
The financial crash of 2008 following the selling of fictitious derivatives was a crisis of both rationality and values whose aftermath has thrown the legitimation of deregulated markets, and governments, into question. This paper critiques the Becker metaphor of human capital and submits that human value is central to and the fulcrum of both economic and social values. It illustrates that Hume and Adam Smith directly countered the Hobbesian hypothesis that human nature is based only on self-interest, distinguishes market values from social values, explicit from implicit values and parallels Sen in adopting an ordinal ranking of what people value rather than a search for cardinality. It draws on cognitive psychology, neural research, revealed preference theory and a principle of implicit verification. It also outlines implications for what Adam Smith centrally valued as concern for the welfare of the whole of society.
Notes
**Coimbra Centre for Innovative Management
Centro de Estudos e Investigação em Saúde da Universidade de Coimbra
1. Such as the UN Charter of Human Rights and the right to well-being in the sense of the UNDP criteria of health, longevity, education and standard of living which Sen has played a key role in both instigating and developing.
2. Which Smith recognised in the Wealth of Nations in the tendency of markets to reduce wages to a subsistence level, and recommending the legalisation of ‘working men’ associations' to countervail this.
3. The Adlerian analysts included Adler himself, whom Popper knew well.
4. Hume's text continues ‘… When there offers, therefore, to our censure and examination any plan of government, real or imaginary, where the power is distributed among several courts and several orders of men, we should always consider the separate interest of each court and each order; and if we find that, by the skilful division of power, this interest must necessarily in its operation concur with the public, we may pronounce that government to be wise and happy’ (Hume ibid.).