An analysis of Jordan's 2013 policy regarding Iraqi refugees

Abstract

The Iraqi refugee population in Jordan has become a sustained humanitarian emergency, and Jordan must take new action to respond. The inability of Jordan to address the needs of Iraqi refugees causes not only the suffering of those refugees, but also that of the larger native populations, as needy Iraqis depend upon Jordan's already strained resources. In addition, non-governmental organizations cannot keep up with Iraqi refugee needs due to funding restrictions. Moreover, the UNHCR and other aid agencies may not be suited to performing the task of addressing the Iraqi refugee crisis as a majority of this response relates to humanitarian aid, not addressing the political roots of the problem. There are also fundamental statistical issues relating to Iraqi refugees in Jordan. Numerical discrepancies and political connections make it difficult to determine whether the currently purported number of 450,000 Iraqi refugees in Jordan is accurate. The clear benefits Jordan receives from aid might give rise to suspicions of inflated reported numbers of Iraqi refugees. Also, reports make contrary claims about the average social level of Iraqi refugees, making it difficult to determine what type of aid is needed. Jordan should alter internal policy regarding Iraqi refugees to initiate a political solution for the crisis. It must also carry out up-to-date surveys of the numbers and needs of Iraqi refugees to address the significant gaps in current data, and additionally should push for increased social integration of Iraqis within society.

Keywords:

• Iraqi refugees
• refugees in Jordan
• Jordan refugee policy
• refugee movements
• Iraqi refugee crisis

Acknowledgement

I would like to acknowledge the support of Dr. Mohammed Shunnaq at Yarmouk University, who encouraged me throughout my research and helped with the editing of this piece.

Disclosure statement

There is no interest or benefit arising from the direct application of this research, and no personal or institutional conflicts of interest.

Funding

No funding or grants were involved in this research.

Notes

1. Numbers are according to December 2013 estimates.

2. According to the UNHCR report of Iraqis registered in various regions of Jordan in 2012, Amman holds about 30,000, Zarqa about 2,000, Irbid 900, and other areas less than 300. Considering this is greater than the total number of Iraqis registered with the agency, however, these numbers are more useful as an indication of UNHCR Iraqi refugee population concentration rather than raw numbers.

3. This billion may be an over exaggeration, however; one analysis suggests the cost to Jordan's government is less than $300 million annually.

4. To obtain a residence permit, Iraqis needed to

either invest in Jordanian business enterprises, be employed in fields deemed to be of national interest or prove they are able to support themselves. This means they are required to deposit what amounts to nearly US$150,000 in a Jordanian bank and must maintain a sufficient balance (about half) to earn interest.

5. Active residency requirements are a $35,285 deposit, marring a Jordanian, or holding a position with employer sponsor showing that a Jordanian cannot do same job.

6. Education costs for one student (elementary, secondary, or vocational) are about $1,412 according to the Education Ministry. Public school tuition is about $57 at primary and $86 at secondary. Considering the aforementioned monthly family expenses, these costs are prohibitive for many.

7. In 2010, Jordan spent $63 million on health care for refugees, mainly Iraqi.

8. This 26% comes from a 2009 study that only considered UNHCR registered Iraqi refugees.

9. Financial assistance is provided to about 5,000 Iraqi families, and 3,000 Iraqis are referred for secondary and tertiary care.

10. A RSD is an interview with the UNHCR to determine the status of the Iraqi.

11. A blue card is official acknowledgment of the person as a refugee.

12. The actual FAFO report's final estimate however, concluded that there were 450,000–500,000 Iraqi refugees, contrary to its own collected data. Again, this could be due to politics or dependency on the Jordanian government's permission for operations.

13. The UNHCR wanted to expand its temporary protection regime (TPR) outside its understanding with Jordan and to all refugees, therefore enabling Iraqis to access services and preventing Jordan from repatriating Iraqis. But in 2005, Jordan made it clear that it would not accept the TPR; yet the UNHCR acted under the TPR until it published its 2008–2009 year plan. Belatedly, the UNHCR switched to arguing that all Iraqis should be considered refugees, yet Jordan disagreed and demanded that they were only asylum-seekers until their status was determined. Essentially, Jordan wanted the previously established agreement to remain solid, while the UNHCR wanted to distribute refugee status without spending its resources on interviews. The clash resulted in the UNHCR suspending its activities for the majority of March 2007. During this period, it is impossible to know how many Iraqis were ignored.

14. It is not within the scope of this paper to judge if aid being given to improve legal policy is morally acceptable.