59
Views
1
CrossRef citations to date
0
Altmetric
Original Articles

Individual strategies and aggregate behavior in a public-goods experiment

Pages 969-973 | Published online: 11 Dec 2006
 

Abstract

Our aim is to see whether the general result of a decreasing over contribution over time in a public goods game is still available at the group and at the individual levels. We find that individuals are heterogeneous and that they interact differently.

Acknowledgments

I am indebted to Alan Kirman, Sylvie Thoron, Marc Willinger and Marie-Claire Villeval for their comments. I also thank Jordi Brandts and Antoni Bosh for making the LeeX available for me.

Reprints and Corporate Permissions

Please note: Selecting permissions does not provide access to the full text of the article, please see our help page How do I view content?

To request a reprint or corporate permissions for this article, please click on the relevant link below:

Academic Permissions

Please note: Selecting permissions does not provide access to the full text of the article, please see our help page How do I view content?

Obtain permissions instantly via Rightslink by clicking on the button below:

If you are unable to obtain permissions via Rightslink, please complete and submit this Permissions form. For more information, please visit our Permissions help page.