Cheap talk in the UN arenas? Some evidence on the impact of UN speeches on aid allocation decisions

Abstract

This study examines the relationship between bilateral and multilateral aid giving patterns and the number of speeches country representatives delivered in the two core bodies of the United Nations (UN)–the UN Security Council and the UN General Assembly, respectively. For the 1990s, empirical evidence indicates a financial return on voice solely for appeals addressed in the Security Council whereas the General Assembly plenary seems to be an ineffective floor for attracting international development assistance.

Notes

¹ Official Development Assistance (ODA) to developing countries as well as Official Assistance (OA) to transition and newly industrialized countries comprises net amounts of both grants and concessional loans minus amortization converted in constant US$ 2002.

² Political rights refer e.g. to fairness in elections with real feasibility to overtake power, freedom for finding a party, party competition and allowance of political opposition. Civil liberties relate to freedom to assemble, religious freedom, freedom of the media, or protection from political suppression.

³ The governance variable composites data for voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and corruption control. These data are originally normalized so that they range from −2.5 to +2.5, with mean = 0 and SD = 1.

⁴ Alternatively, we tested whether (nonpermanent) membership in the UN Security Council plays a more significant role for raising aid funds than just the right to speak. However, dummy results for temporal (2 years) UN Security Council member countries did not affect neither bilateral nor multilateral aid allocations in any form whatsoever. Results for nonpermanent UN Security Council membership are not reported, but they are available on request.

⁵ However, Belgium (member in 1991/1992) and Japan (member in 1992/1993), which have nonsignificant estimates for the Scouncil variable, contradicts the idea that UN Security Council membership makes donor countries more sensible for developing country appeals.