Overpayment to directors and future operating performance

ABSTRACT

This article derives the predicted excess compensation from corporate governance variables and explores the impact of director excessive compensation on future operating performance. By using the data in Taiwan as the research samples, this article finds that overpayment to directors will decrease the future operating performance of the firm. The results are consistent, regardless of analysing in the form of fixed compensation or performance-based compensation.

KEYWORDS:

• Compensation
• performance
• corporate governance

JEL CLASSIFICATION:

• G30
• G34

Acknowledgement

The author acknowledges the financial support from the Ministry of Science and Technology of Taiwan (MOST 103-2410-H-130-012).

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by the Ministry of Science and Technology, Taiwan [MOST 103-2410-H-130-012].