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Research Article

The tale of the donkey and the elephant: an estimated optimal fiscal policy rule for the US

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ABSTRACT

We derive an optimal fiscal policy rule that reflects the US government’s desire to reduce fluctuations in the output gap and the primary deficit in the post-World War II period. The results from Bayesian estimations show a lower weight on output gap stabilization under predominant democratic presidencies relative to republican ones. The opposite holds with respect to maintaining a zero primary deficit. Our time-consistent fiscal rule indicates a countercyclical government response to GDP fluctuations at all times.

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Supplementary material

Supplemental data for this article can be accessed here.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1 Note that it can be shown that the condition for saddle point stability is given by the inequality ζ+(β1)σ1ϕg>0 where the expression ζ=(1β)ϕy+(ϕπ1)κ is known from Bullard and Mitra (Citation2002). It follows that the Taylor principle, i.e., ϕπ>1, is not strictly required to hold for given values of ϕg in this version of the purely forward-looking New-Keynesian model.

2 All corresponding files used for data alignment and estimations via Dynare together with a technical appendix are downloadable via the journal’s web page.

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