Galicia: a bulwark against Russia? Propaganda and violence in a border region during the First World War

Abstract

The mobilization of the Galician home front was of particular importance for the Habsburg monarchy because of the strategic importance of this province during the First World War. The aim of this article is to take a closer look at the diverse political measures of the Habsburg political and military authorities in Galicia, which were often inconsistent with one another. It deals with propaganda as well as with oppressive measures and discriminatory policy towards certain nationalities. It argues that the political situation in Galicia, which was a national trouble spot in the decades before the First World War, as well as the fact that the province was a war zone, influenced these measures. Moreover, the article demonstrates the contribution of Galician protagonists both to the propagandistic mobilization for war and to the acts of violence. The article argues that the mobilization of the Galician home front was a failure. The propaganda efforts contrasted strongly with the brutal measures of the Austro-Hungarian army and with the growing national conflicts in Galicia. Instead of strengthening a sense of community in view of the common enemy, the war rather alienated the different Galician population groups from each other, but also from the Austrian state.

Keywords:

• First World War
• Galicia
• propaganda
• violence

Notes on contributor

Elisabeth Haid studied History and Slavonic Studies at the University of Vienna. She was a research fellow at the interdisciplinary Doctoral Program “Austrian Galicia and its Multicultural Heritage” and University Assistant at the Institute of East European History at the University of Vienna. In 1916, she finished her dissertation “From the Point of View of Two Empires: Galicia in Austrian and Russian Press Reporting during World War I (1914–1917).”

Notes

1. On the strategic importance of Galicia for the Habsburg Monarchy see Maner, Galizien, 168–201; on the military preparations see also Lein, “Strategische und taktische Vorbedingungen.”

2. Cf. Leidinger et al., Habsburgs schmutziger Krieg, 51–91.

3. On the political situation in Galicia see Maner, Galizien, 127–65. On the nationalities and their relations see Himka, “Dimensions of a Triangle.”

4. See Magocsi, “Galicia,” 7f.

5. Poles were predominantly Roman Catholic and Ruthenians Greek Catholic. This dates back to the sixteenth century, when the Orthodox hierarchy of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth decided to unite with the Roman Catholic Church by preserving the Eastern rite. The Uniate Church was renamed the Greek Catholic Church under Habsburg rule. In the nineteenth century the Greek Catholic Church became a quasi-national institution for Ruthenians in Galicia, whereas it was repressed in Russia.

6. See Himka, “Dimensions of a Triangle,” 27–31.

7. The Russian government, which supported Russian nationalism as an underlying principle of the Russian Empire, considered the Ukrainians part of the Russian nation. From a Russian point of view, the Ukrainian national movement in Galicia and the nationality rights in Austria compromised the policy of Russification in the Ukrainian-speaking part of the Romanov Empire. Moreover, Polish influence in the Austrian Parliament and in Galicia alarmed the Russian government, arousing concerns about Polish national ambitions in Russian Poland. See Wendland, Die Russophilen in Galizien.

8. On the role of Galicia in the tensions between Austria and Russia see in detail Bachmann, Herd der Feindschaft; cf. Mitter, “Galizien;” on Galician Russophiles, see Wendland, Die Russophilen in Galizien; on the suspicions of Russophilism see ibid. 514–24; on Russian politics concerning the "Ukrainian Question," see Miller, Ukrainian Question.

9. See Bachmann, Herd der Feindschaft, 65–127; 234–58; on the details of the Polish-Ukrainian compromise see Kuzmany, “Der Galizische Ausgleich.”

10. On the press and censorship see Scheer, Ringstraßenfront, 108–29; Spann, “Zensur in Österreich.”

11. On propaganda activities of the Kriegspressequartier see Džambo, “Armis et litteris.”

12. Demm, Ostpolitik und Propaganda, 7.

13. See Sauermann, Literarische Kriegsfürsorge; Buxbaum, Des Kaisers Literaten.

14. See Szlanta, “Unter dem sinkenden Stern,” 142.

15. See Szlanta, “Der Erste Weltkrieg,” 154–8; Milewska et al., Legiony Polskie.

16. The “Union for the Liberation of Ukraine” (Sojuz Vyzvolennja Ukraïny) was an organization of Ukrainian émigrés from the Russian Empire, which sought to use the war as a means of gaining Ukrainian independence. They made propaganda for their ideals in several German-language publications. When the Austro-Hungarian government treated them with greater reserve (mainly out of consideration for the political interests of the Poles), the Ukrainian émigrés found support in the German Empire. See Bihl, “Bund zur Befreiung der Ukraina.”

17. Compared to the Polish Legions, however, the Ukrainian volunteer units faced much more distrust and opposition from the Austro-Hungarian military authorities. See Golczewski, Deutsche und Ukrainer, 102–6; Rutkowski, k. k. Ukrainische Legion.

18. “Do społeczeństwa polskiego!,” Słowo Polskie, 6 August 1914, morning edn., 1.

19. “Holovna Ukraïns’ka Rada do vseho Ukraïns’koho Narodu!,” Dilo, 6 August 1914, 1.

20. See for example “Viĭna zaUkraïnu,” Dilo, 10 August 1914, 1; “Viĭna za Ukraïnu,” Dilo, 12 August 1914, 1.

21. Ibid.; “Holovna Ukraïns’ka Rada do vseho Ukraïns’koho Narodu!,” Dilo, 6 August 1914, 1.

22. See for example ibid.

23. Z. Tarnowski, “Do rolników,” Czas, 6 August 1914, afternoon edn., 1.

24. “Do społeczeństwa polskiego!,” Słowo Polskie, 6 August 1914, morning edn., 1.

25. Ibid.

26. “Eine Kundgebung des Erzbischofs Grafen Szeptycki von Lemberg,” Reichspost, 30 August 1914, morning edn., 2.

27. See for example “Manifest Koła polskiego,” Czas, 17 August 1914, morning edn., 1.

28. See for example “Wojna moskiewska,” Słowo Polskie, 7 August 1914, afternoon edn., 1.

29. See Wöller, "Europa" als historisches Argument, 257–367.

30. This conduct was unexceptional. In other regions of the Habsburg Monarchy similar lines of action can be found. Sabine Schmitner’s article in this special issue describes how political parties in Wiener Neustadt used the war to gain a political advantage.

31. Alexander Watson describes this as “double mobilization”: official patriotic mobilization was combined with a semi-official national mobilization. Watson, Ring of Steel, 94.

32. Ernst et al., “Zeitenbruch und Kontinuität,” 17f.

33. See, for example: “Ein Manifest der Ruthenen Galiziens. Für eine ‘freie Ukraina’,” Reichspost, 12 August 1914, morning edn., 6; cf. “Aufruf des ukrainischen Nationalrates,” Neue Freie Presse, 18 August 1914, morning edn., 6; “Der Krieg im Osten. Mazeppas Geist,” Reichspost, 15 August 1914, morning edn., 2; cf. “Viĭna za Ukraïnu,” Dilo, 10 August 1914, 1; “Die ‘Ukrainischen Sitschower Schützen’,” Reichspost, 17 August 1914, morning edn., 3; “Ein Aufruf der russischen Ukrainer,” Neue Freie Presse, 10 September 1914, morning edn., 6; cf. “Die Ukrainer gegen den Zarismus. Ein Aufruf an Europa,” Reichspost, 10 September 1914, morning edn., 2.

34. See Spann, “Zensur in Österreich,” 250–320, 289–97.

35. Cf. Leidinger et al., Habsburgs schmutziger Krieg, 89f.

36. See Leidinger et al., Habsburgs schmutziger Krieg; Hagen, War in a European Borderland, 10–18.

37. See Leidinger, “Einzug des Galgens und des Mordes,” 245f; cf. Watson, Ring of Steel, 152–5. On Austro-Hungarian military justice, see for example, Hautmann, “Kriegsgesetze.”

38. See this special issue's contributions by Alessandro Livio on Trentino, and Ionela Zaharia on Habsburg Romanian military clergy.

39. See Hoffmann et al., Thalerhof; Golczewski, Deutsche und Ukrainer, 99.

40. See Mentzel, “Kriegsflüchtlinge,” 57–91.

41. See Watson, Ring of Steel, 151.

42. See for example Roda Roda, “Die russophile Spionage in Ostgalizien,” Neue Freie Presse, 6 September 1914, morning edn., 4; Roda Roda, “Die Spionage von galizischen Russophilen für die russischen Truppen,” Neue Freie Presse, 3 September 1914, evening edn., 2.

43. See Mentzel, “Kriegsflüchtlinge,” 92–4.

44. See Prusin, Nationalizing a Borderland, 13–42; Mick, Kriegserfahrungen, 79–82; 104–111.

45. See Hagen, War in a European Borderland, 32–42; Mick, Kriegserfahrungen, 111–27.

46. See Hagen, War in a European Borderland, 41.

47. See Mick, Kriegserfahrungen, 130–3; Bachturina, Politika, 187–92.

48. See Mick, Kriegserfahrungen, 86–96; Hagen, War in a European Borderland, 31f.

49. See Hautmann, “Kriegsgesetze,” 83; Mentzel, “Kriegsflüchtlinge,” 89f.

50. See Mick, Kriegserfahrungen, 137–46.

51. See Rydel', “Poljaki,” 174; for some examples see also Mick, Kriegserfahrungen, 141.

52. See Schuster, Zwischen allen Fronten, 242–9.

53. See Cornwall, Undermining, 18; Szlanta, “Unter dem sinkenden Stern,” 145–8; Binder, Galizien in Wien, 493–507.

54. See Tamara Scheer’s article in this special issue.

55. See Mick, Kriegserfahrungen, 73–167.

56. See Leidinger, “Einzug des Galgens und des Mordes;” Cornwall, Undermining, 18f.; 30.

57. See Watson, Ring of Steel, 411–13; Wargelin, “Austro-Polish Solution,” 261.

58. See Golczewski, Deutsche und Ukrainer, 66–128.

59. See Mick, Kriegserfahrungen, 69–202.