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Abstract
Controversy overshadowed preparations for the twentieth anniversary of the Srebrenica genocide, as conflict arose over the adoption of a number of commemorative resolutions: while motions in the Parliament of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the United Nations Security Council were blocked, the US House of Representatives and the European Parliament did adopt declarations. The article outlines how the memory of Srebrenica was de-contextualized from particular interpretations of the past and re-contextualized in favour of universal frames of interpretation. Starting from the interpretations pertaining to Srebrenica from the early 1990s, processes of dealing with the massacre in reports have made it possible to process the lessons learnt from the experience as a narration of progress. In parallel with efforts to establish legal accountability and a local memorial for the massacre’s victims, there has been a series of resolutions commemorating Srebrenica contributing to the formation of a Srebrenica memory regime. That regime mirrors the Holocaust-based global cultural memory imperative, a set of norms and rules of behaviour that was re-actualized and expanded on by Srebrenica as a symbol for the unfulfilled hope of a final ‘never again’. The commemoration of Srebrenica has become a universal ethical imperative that has spread far beyond the actors involved in the 1995 events. The 2015 controversy has to be understood as a (local) act of resistance against the recognition of Srebrenica as genocide and against the selective character of the Srebrenica memory regime.
Notes
1. European Parliament, European Parliament Resolution of 9 July 2015 on the Srebrenica Commemoration.
2. Levy and Sznaider, Human Rights and Memory, 4.
3. Nielsen, “Surmounting the Myopic Focus on Genocide,” 22 ff.
4. Ibid., 23.
5. Duijzings, “Commemorating Srebrenica,” 150.
6. Ibid., 151.
7. Levy and Sznaider, Erinnerung im globalen Zeitalter, 184–90.
8. For a contemporary analysis, see Petrović, “Ethnic Cleansing: An Attempt at Methodology;” for a general discussion of the similarities between ethnic cleansing and genocide in the context of Bosnia’s and Croatia’s genocide claims against Serbia before the International Court of Justice, see Singleterry, “Ethnic Cleansing and Genocidal Intent,” 41–3.
9. United Nations General Assembly, The Situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2.
10. ICJ, Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina vs. Serbia and Montenegro), Application of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1.
11. United Nations General Assembly, Letter Dated 24 May 1993, 5.
12. The mission’s capacities and mandate were expanded gradually. Overall, troops from 22 countries participated; the largest contingents of soldiers were deployed by France and the United Kingdom, followed by Jordan and Pakistan.
13. Roger Cohen, “US and Allies Differ on Arms for Bosnia Muslims,” The New York Times, April 22, 1992, http://www.nytimes.com/1993/04/22/world/us-and-allies-differ-on-arms-for-bosnia-muslims.html
14. Margaret Thatcher, TV interview for BBC (Attacks British Policy towards Bosnia), April 13, 1993, http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/110821. As a response to the British policy of securing the continuation of the arms embargo, Bosnia-Herzegovina intended to file proceedings against the United Kingdom before the ICJ in November 1993, claiming that it and other permanent members of the UNSC illegally imposed an arms embargo that would prevent them from exercising their right to self-defence. On the pressure on Bosnia-Herzegovina not to initiate proceedings see Boyle, The Bosnian People Charge Genocide, Postscript.
15. Duijzings, “Commemorating Srebrenica,” 142.
16. Florence Hartmann and Ed Vulliamy, “How Britain and the US Decided to Abandon Srebrenica to its Fate,” The Guardian, July 4, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/04/how-britain-and-us-abandoned-srebrenica-massacre-1995
17. United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1004.
18. European Parliament, European Parliament Resolution on Srebrenica.
19. Ibid.
20. Power, “A Problem from Hell,” 430 ff.
21. Bellou, “Srebrenica – The War Crimes Legacy.”
22. In March 1994, the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina was created although the Parliament of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina elected in 1990 had not been dissolved. In the period from March 1994 to September 1996, both institutions coexisted within the territory under Bosniak or Croat control. The Parliament elected in 1990 at times held sessions as the Parliament of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and sometimes as Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in which case only Bosniak and Croat deputies convened.
23. According to the tape recording of the 20th session of the Parliament of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina held in Sarajevo on 1 August 1996, written version: Irfan Ajmović (SDA), 23/2, cited in Bougarel, “Reopening the Wounds?,” 115.
24. Duijzings, “Commemorating Srebrenica,” 164.
25. Mustafić, Planirani haos, 25, 34–35. Ibran Mustafić was a Bosniak politician in Srebrenica during the war and a soldier in the Bosniak army. After the war, he headed a family association from Srebrenica and reported about war crimes committed by the Bosniak division in Srebrenica, supporting the Serbian narrative. He is still actively involved in Republika Srpska politics.
26. Nettelfield, Courting Democracy, 107 f.
27. Duijzings, “Commemorating Srebrenica,” 162.
28. United Nations General Assembly, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 53/35: The Fall of Srebrenica, 108.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid.
31. Also, there were rumours of an unwritten agreement between him and the Bosnian Serb army that French soldiers held hostage would be set free if he were to abstain from ordering air strikes in the case of an attack on Srebrenica. Henry Porter, “France's Role in a Bosnian Massacre,” The Observer, 22 April 2001, http://www.theguardian.com/observer/comment/story/0,6903,476501,00.html
32. Nettelfield, Courting Democracy, 120.
33. National Assembly of France, Rapport d’Information sur les Événements de Srebrenica, 187.
34. Ibid. France lacked full support with the ICTY as it opposed its officers giving testimony before the court.
35. Nettelfield, Courting Democracy, 117.
36. NIOD, Srebrenica: Reconstruction, Background, Consequences and Analyses, 1424.
37. House of Representatives of the Netherlands, Parliamentary Inquiry Commission, Rapport: Missie zonder vrede, 445–52.
38. Klep, “A Tale of Two Commissions,” 77.
39. See extensively on the development that led to the acknowledgement of the Srebrenica massacre in the Republika Srpska in Nettelfied, Courting Democracy, 122–8 and Picard and Zinbo, “The Long Road to Admission.”
40. Trifunović, Report about Case Srebrenica (The First Part). A second part never followed.
41. Nettelfield, Courting Democracy, 124 f.
42. Government of the Republika Srpska, Commission to Investigate the Events in and around Srebrenica from July 10th to 19th 1995, Events in and around Srebrenica from 10th to 19th July 1995.
43. “Serb Leader’s Srebrenica Regret,” BBC, June 23, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3831599.stm
44. Bellou pointed to earlier UK assistance in providing the keystone memorial in Srebrenica-Potočari and the support of a memorial-room exhibition which was delayed because of local and international political friction, Bellou, “Srebrenica – The War Crimes Legacy,” 389.
45. Duijzings, “Commemorating Srebrenica,” 165.
46. ICTY, Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstić. Trial Chamber, Judgement.
47. Duijzings, “Commemorating Srebrenica,” 165.
48. United States Embassy Sarajevo. “Address by Former President Clinton.”
49. ICTY, Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstić. Appeal Chamber, Judgement. The instrument of plea-bargaining prevented a range of indicted persons before the ICTY from being charged with genocide. See on this topic and its effects for reconciliation Clark, “Plea Bargaining at the ICTY.”
50. The definition of the Srebrenica massacre as genocide has been a matter of dispute among legal scholars as it established a precedent in interpreting the dolus specialis of the Genocide Convention, the specific intent to destroy a group in whole or in part and hereby expanded the definition of genocide. The politicization of this scholarly debate and its reflection in legal practice in recent scholarly accusations that international legal findings of crimes other than genocide constitute ʻgenocide denial’ are particularly troubling, see Nielsen, “Surmounting the Myopic Focus on Genocide,” 25–8.
51. United States House of Representatives, Expressing the Sense of the House of Representatives Regarding the Massacre at Srebrenica in July 1995. Since 2005, several cities in the United States have passed resolutions and proclamations recognizing the Srebrenica genocide; see Nettelfield and Wagner, Srebrenica in the Aftermath of Genocide, 341, n. 27.
52. Ibid.
53. From 1991 on, the Scorpions were a regular unit of the Yugoslav Army under the command of Republika Srpska Krajina, until 1995, when the command passed to the Serbian Interior Ministry. As Gordy notes, there is a dispute about the date when command passed to the Serbian Interior Ministry; see Gordy, Guilt, Responsibility, and Denial, 225. On the reception of the Scorpion video in the Serbian population and political reactions, see Zveržhanovski, “Watching War Crimes.”
54. European Parliament, The Balkans: 10 Years after Srebrenica.
55. Assembly of Kosovo, Resolution No. 02–556/05.
56. An alliance of human-rights organizations and NGOs in Belgrade (Helsinki Committee for Human Rights, Committee of Lawyers' for Human Rights, Belgrade Circle, Woman in Black, the Youth Initiative for Human Rights, Civic Initiative, the Centre for Cultural Decontamination and the Humanitarian Rights Centre) demanded a condemnation of the Srebrenica massacre in an open letter; see in greater detail Mehler, How Serbians Face the Past, 186 ff. and Dragović-Soso, “Apologising for Srebrenica,” 167ff.
57. The first, written by several Belgrade-based NGOs and proposed in the Parliamentary Assembly by two representatives of the liberal GSS and social-democratic SDU, was countered by declarations of the national-monarchist SPO, the national conservative DSS, the nationalist SRS, the social-democratic DS and a compromise version from Predrag Marković, the President of the Assembly. See in detail Mehler, How Serbians Face the Past, 273–6.
58. R.D./M.T. “Odbrana zločina je takođe zločin” [The defence of a crime is also a crime], Danas, June 16, 2005, 1.
59. The statement that a large majority of the citizens of Serbia and Montenegro had opposed the Milošević-Regime is highly exaggerated and should be understood as the protagonists’ idealistic self-perception ex post. Demonstrations against the regime were frequent, but limited in extent. The political opposition was divided, relatively marginal and in part cooperated with the regime. Few opposed the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It was only in spring 2000 that the student protests of OTPOR and the unification of the political opposition made possible a mobilization that resulted in the ‘revolution’ of 5 October 2000 and the resignation of Milošević.
60. R.D./M.T. “Odbrana zločina je takođe zločin” [The defence of a crime is also a crime], Danas, June 16, 2005, 1.
61. International Court of Justice, Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina vs. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgement. To understand the court’s judgement, the most illuminating article on the Bosnian Genocide case with regard to the strategies of both parties might be Dimitrijević and Milanović, “The Strange Story of the Bosnian Genocide Case.”
62. “Bosnian Presidency Members Call for Abolition of Entities,” BalkanInsight, June 18, 2007, http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/bosnian-presidency-members-call-for-abolition-of-entities.
63. Initiative of the coalition around the LDP: Predlog Deklaracije o genocidu u Srebrenici. Furthermore, two small parties from northern Serbian Vojvodina proposed a joint text, demanding the prosecution of perpetrators and facilitators of the massacre and acknowledging the involvement of high state representatives in the preparation, realization and covering up of the crimes in Srebrenica, Mehler, How Serbians Face the Past, 277–9.
64. United Nations General Assembly, Holocaust Denial. The resolution condemned without reservation any denial of the Holocaust, with only Iran publicly disassociating itself from the consensus resolution.
65. European Council, Council Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA.
66. Nielsen pointed to incidents in 2011 when accusations of appeasement and of acquiescing in genocide denial were used by Bosniaks to attack members of their own group who deviate from the party line, see Nielsen, “Surmounting the Myopic Focus on Genocide,” 31.
67. European Parliament, European Parliament Resolution of 15 January 2009 on Srebrenica.
68. Rijsdijk, “‘Forever Connected,’” 144ff. In the ‘Canon of the Netherlands’ the Dutch historical canon is narrated in 50 pictures, one of them is Srebrenica, http://entoen.nu/srebrenica.
69. On the discussion and the parliamentary debate see Mehler, How Serbians Face the Past, 211–18; Dragović-Soso, “Apologising for Srebrenica,” 170–3.
70. National Assembly of Serbia, Deklaracija Narodne Skupštine Republike Srbije o osudi zločina u Srebrenici.
71. Tanjug, “Tadić: Čin najvišeg patriotizma” [Tadić: highest act of patriotism], Politika, April 1, 2010, A1.
72. Tadić, “An Apology for Srebrenica.”
73. Dragović-Soso, “Apologising for Srebrenica,” 165.
74. National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia, Deklaracija Narodne skupštine Republike Srbije o osudi zločina učinjenih nad pripadnicima srpskog naroda i građanima Srbije.
75. Mehler, How Serbians Face the Past, 281ff. The following Serbian government shared its impression of diverging standards of accountability on an international level when it presided over the United Nations General Assembly and conducted a debate on the role of international criminal justice in reconciliation on 10 April 2013. The United States and Croatia refused to participate; some participants such as the president of the ICTY cancelled their participation.
76. Karčić, “Remembering by Resolution: The Case of Srebrenica,” 206.
77. Halilovich, “Long-Distance Mourning,” 410.
78. Ibid., 414.
79. David Cameron, “18th Anniversary of the Srebrenica Genocide.”
80. Canada Parliament, House of Commons, Debates.
81. Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 13. sjednica Predstavničkog doma Parlamentarne skupštine Bosne i Hercegovine, 75.
82. Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Prijedlog rezolucije o genocidu u Srebrenici. The document saw 25 votes in favour, 13 against, while four abstained.
83. “Dodik: Srebrenica ʻnajveća prevara 20. vijeka’” [Dodik: Srebrenica ʻthe biggest sham of the 20th century’], Radio Slobodna Evropa, June 25, 2015, http://www.slobodnaevropa.org/archive/news/20150625/500/500.html?id=27093445&nocache=1.
84. Participants were the missions of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Chile, France, Germany, Jamaica, Jordan, Italy, Lichtenstein, Malaysia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Slovenia, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States; five of those governments provided troops to the UNPROFOR mission.
85. United Nations Security Council, Resolution 2150.
86. United Nations News Center, “Recalling ‘Responsibility to Protect’ UN Pays Tribute to Victims of Srebrenica Genocide,” news release, July 1, 2015. http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=51317#.Vrc1q1lv8Ul.
87. United Nations, Note Verbale Dated 1 July 2015 from the Permanent Mission of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the United Nations.
88. United Nations, Letter Dated 2 July 2015 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland to the United Nations.
89. The latter was published by Serbian media outlets and harshly criticized as a blundering and scandalous diplomatic move. See, until end of the paragraph: “Bruka i sramota! Tomislav Nikolić kraljici Elizabeti uputio tajno pismo na ćirilici! [Disgrace and shame! Tomislav Nikolić sent Queen Elizabeth a secret letter in Cyrillic!], Teleprompter, July 6, 2015, http://www.teleprompter.rs/bruka-i-sramota-tomislav-nikolic-kraljici-elizabeti-uputio-tajno-pismo-na-cirilici-foto.html.
90. United Kingdom House of Commons, Debate on the Srebrenica Genocide, col. 42WH.
91. Ibid., col. 48 WH.
92. Ibid., col. 47 WH.
93. Ibid., col. 55 WH.
94. United Nations Security Council, Jordan, Lithuania, Malaysia, New Zealand, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United Nations of America: Draft Resolution.
95. United Nations Security Council, The Situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 8 July 2015, 2.
96. Ibid.
97. Ibid., 5.
98. Angola, China, Nigeria and Venezuela abstained.
99. In partly polemic utterances, supporters of the resolutions demanded that the fact that genocide had occurred be recognized as a prerequisite for reconciliation; the US delegate accused their Russian counterpart of denying that genocide had taken place in Srebrenica. The Russian delegate responded to criticism from France, the UK and the United States by asking why there had been no meeting or resolution on the anniversaries of war crimes committed in Vietnam or during the invasion of Iraq and criticized that ‘the humanism of these delegations can be switched on and off depending on political circumstances.’ United Nations Security Council, The Situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 8 July 2015, 22.
100. Venezuelan delegate, ibid., 10. The Holocaust and Rwanda were often cited.
101. UK delegate, ibid., 20.
102. The qualification of the crimes committed in the Prijedor area in 1992 as genocide was not reflected in the verdict of the ICTY against Radovan Karadzić due to lack of evidence for the genocidal intent to kill Bosnian Muslims or Bosnian Croats in the municipalities of Bratunac, Foča, Ključ, Prijedor, Sanski Most, Vlasenica and Zvornik; see ICTY, Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić. Trial Judgement Summary for Radovan Karadžić, 2.
103. Ibid.
104. The joint motion replaced the motion of the different factions. In their draft, the Greens/European Free Alliance group called on the EU organs and member-states to investigate whether EU citizens facilitated or committed war crimes in Bosnia; see European Parliament, Igor Šoltes, Terry Reintke, Ulrike Lunacek, Davor Škrlec on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group, Motion for a Resolution on the Srebrenica Commemoration. They probably referred to the widely hushed-up involvement of Greek volunteers in the Bosnian war and especially during the Srebrenica massacre. That fact recently gained new attention through investigative journalists who succeeded in linking the Greek volunteers’ participation in war crimes and their involvement in the Golden Dawn Party. Also one House of Commons member mentioned the involvement of Greek volunteers in Srebrenica, United Kingdom House of Commons, Debate on the Srebrenica Genocide, 43 WH. For extensive information on Greek support of the war in Bosnia, see Michas, Unholy Alliance.
105. European Parliament, European Parliament Resolution of 9 July 2015 on the Srebrenica Commemoration.
106. Levy and Sznaider, Human Rights and Memory, 4.
107. “Šta Srbija misli o Srebrenici?” [What does Serbia think of Srebrenica?] B92, June 26, 2015, http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2015&mm=06&dd=26&nav_category=11&nav_id=1008848.
108. With regard to similar effects of making the cooperation with the ICTY a condition of the EU accession process, see Spoerri, “Justice Imposed,” 1874.
109. Concurrently with the adoptions of Srebrenica resolutions in 2005, a Srebrenica photo exhibition opened at the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington. In 2009, Srebrenica was incorporated as a contemporary case of genocide in the permanent special exhibition ‘From Memory to Action: Meeting the Challenge of Genocide’, which explores ‘three contemporary cases of genocide’ – Rwanda, Srebrenica in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Darfur region of Sudan, see https://www.ushmm.org/information/exhibitions/museum-exhibitions/from-memory-to-action-meeting-the-challenge-of-genocide. In contrast to statements made by US representatives and others calling for action to stop the atrocities in Darfur, the UN concluded in 2005 that no genocidal policy in the legal sense of the term had been pursued. Nonetheless, the report insists that ‘the crimes against humanity and war crimes that have been committed in Darfur may be no less serious and heinous than genocide.’United Nations, Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, 4.
110. A prominent example was the UN Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for Syria, Staffan de Mistura, who urged international action to be taken in the case of the besieged Kobane, warning that another Srebrenica could be ‘imminent’; United Nations News Center, “As ISIL Advances on Syrian Town, UN Envoy Urges International Action to Avoid ‘massacre’,” news release, October 10, 2014. http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=49052. Already in 2012, a Srebrenica survivor and Bosnian politician applied the analogy of Bosnia and especially Srebrenica to the situation in Syria and particularly to Homs in an article published in major newspapers, in, among others, Spain, Germany, Turkey and Yemen; see Suljagić, Emir and Reuf Bajrović. “The Line That Stretches from Srebrenica to Homs,” Transitions Online, March 2, 2012, www.tol.org/client/article/23024-the-line-that-stretches-from-srebrenica-to-homs.html.
111. The draft resolution stated that there were innocent victims on all sides during the conflict in Bosnia and expressed its sympathy for and solidarity with all of them and further called for all proven war crimes to be condemned. It identified denials of the Srebrenica genocide as efforts hindering reconciliation.