The power of arms: rethinking armed parties and democratization through the Palestinian elections

Abstract

This article examines the role of armed parties in democratization. Usually considered volatile and thus excluded from the democratic process, we argue instead that in certain circumstances, armed parties can have a productive role in elections aimed at democratization – most notably by contributing to the balance of power between incumbents and opposition, both before, during and after elections. An in-depth analysis of the 2006 Palestinian elections, placed in comparative context, shows how arms affect the calculus of voters, opposition elites, and incumbents to make elections more competitive and democracy more likely. The article then directly addresses the objection that postponing disarmament fosters civil war, arguing rather that postponing disarmament may actually help promote peaceful, democratic outcomes of states emerging from civil war. It concludes by discussing the implication of the analysis for the study of democratization and for policies aimed at democracy promotion.

Keywords:

• democratization
• political parties
• civil war
• armed parties
• balance of power

Acknowledgements

The authors gratefully acknowledge Nathan Brown, Amaney Jamal, Stathis Kalyvas, Stephen Ndegwa, Peter Moore, Wendy Pearlman, Nicholas Sambanis, Alan Stam, Elisabeth Wood and participants in the Northeastern Middle East Political Economy Workshop, the Yale Comparative Politics Workshop, for helpful comments. Matthew Longo also gratefully acknowledges the Ganzfried Family Fellowship administered by the Council on Middle East Studies and the support of the Whitney and Betty MacMillan Center for International Studies at Yale University, which made part of the fieldwork for this article possible.

Notes

Lyons, ‘Postconflict Elections’.

Stepan, ‘Rethinking Military Politics’; Pion-Berlin and Arceneaux, ‘Tipping the Civil-military Balance’, 633–61; Barany, ‘Democratic Consolidation and the Military’, 21–43; Hunter, ‘Politicians against Soldiers’, 425–43.

Collier et al., Breaking the Conflict Trap; Lopez Pintor, ‘Reconciliation Elections’, 43–62; Karbo and Mutisi, ‘Post-Conflict Elections and Democracy’, 19–23; Kumar and Ottaway, ‘General Conclusions and Priorities for Policy Research’; Sisk and Reynolds, ‘Elections and Electoral Systems’, 14; Mansfield and Snyder, Electing to Fight. As Mansfield and Snyder note, this not only has negative domestic consequences but also increases the probability of external conflict.

Bermeo, ‘What the Democratization Literature Says – or Doesn't Say – About Postwar Democratization’, 159–77. Most scholarship on post-war transitions highlights cases in which one side defeats the other – cases far different than those of military stalemate.

Satloff, Ross, and Herzog, ‘The Washington Institute's Special Policy Forum’; Phillips, ‘Hamas's Victory’. Satloff, Ross, Herzog and Phillips argue that Hamas should never have been allowed to compete in the 2006 elections without disarming and disavowing violence. Brown, ‘Aftermath of the Hamas Tsunami’; Ottaway, ‘Promoting Democracy after Hamas’ Victory'; Hroub, ‘A “New Hamas” Through Its New Documents’, 6–27. Brown, Ottaway, and Hroub argue that political inclusion would moderate Hamas. None fully analysed the effect of Hamas' arms on the elections.

Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy; Huntington, The Third Wave; Przeworski et al., Democracy and Development. Readers may object that procedural democracy is an overly narrow, limited conception of democracy. However, it not only has a longstanding scholarly tradition (Dahl, Polyarchy), Robert Dahl argues procedural democracy can be intricately connected to broader conceptions of civil and political liberties.

Yaghi and Fishman, ‘Fatah's Prospects in the Legislative Elections’; Brom, ‘A Hamas Government’; Brown, ‘Aftermath of the Hamas Tsunami’; Usher, ‘The Democratic Resistance’, 20–36; Ottaway, ‘Promoting Democracy after Hamas’ Victory'; Council on Foreign Relations Interview with Henry Siegman, U.S., Israel and EU Must Deal with Hamas if it Drops Harsh Policies toward Israel. The key concern underlying discussions of Hamas' participation was the question of how Hamas would affect the Palestinian-Israeli peace process.

Rustow, ‘Transitions to Democracy’.

Przeworski, Democracy and the Market; Resende and Kraetzschmar, ‘Parties of Power’, 2.

Huntington, The Third Wave.

Bernard, The Functions of the Executive; Lasswell and Kaplan, Power and Society. This assumption underlies much of the literature, related to the failure to distinguish often between ruling elites and the state, which has legitimate authority and the monopoly on the use of arms.

International Crisis Group, ‘Enter Hamas’; Ali Jarbawi, interview by Matthew Longo, Ramallah, June 2008.

Putnam, Making Democracy Work; Jamal, Barriers to Democracy; Booth and Richard, ‘Civil Society, Political Capital, and Democratization’, 780–800.

Bunce and Wolchik, ‘Transnational Networks, Diffusion Dynamics, and Electoral Revolutions’, 92–9.

See, for example, Brynen, A Very Political Economy: Peacebuilding and Foreign Aid in the West Bank and Gaza. United States Institute of Peace (July 2000). Washington, DC: Jamal, Barriers to Democracy; Wiktorowicz, ‘The Political Limits to Nongovernmental Organizations in Jordan’.

Lust-Okar, ‘Elections under Authoritarianism ’; Lindburg, ‘The Surprising Significance of African Elections’, 139–51.

Howard and Roessler, ‘Liberalizing Electoral Outcomes in Competitive Authoritarian Regimes’, 365–81.

Morgenthau, Politics among Nations; Schelling, Arms and Influence; Waltz, Theory of International Politics.

Walter, ‘The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement’, 353–64.

Zartman, ‘Ripeness’.

New York Times, October 12, 1974. Cited in Zartman, ‘Ripeness’.

Zartman, ‘Ripeness’.

‘If bargaining is possible, then it is not clear how or why the relative military capabilities of rebels and the government would affect the duration of peripheral insurgencies. Roughly equal capabilities (a “hurting stalemate”) should incline the parties towards a deal. Unequal capabilities should lead to a quick loss or to concessions by the weaker side. Put differently, if we have no explanation for why the parties are fighting at all (rather than settling), it is not clear how we can “explain” variation in war duration’, Fearon, ‘Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So much Longer Than Others’, 289.

It is important to state up-front that in no way do we believe that enabling armed groups to participate in elections guarantees a peaceful transition to democracy. Certainly, with arms frequently comes violence – a matter discussed at length below – and any political stage is susceptible to external contingency. However, we contend that the creation of power-parity between actors creates democratizing dynamics – competition between actors, voter freedom, turnover of elites, and safeguarded results. In the short run, this can absolutely lead to a form of partial democracy – as in the dictablanda and democradura so common in Latin America. However, we argue that in the long run these conditions can be far more easily crafted into conditions of full democracy; and of course, nonetheless represent a vast improvement on the violent conditions that preceded.

Rustow, ‘Transitions to Democracy’.

Kaufmann, ‘Impossible and Possible Solutions to Ethnic Wars’, 136–75; Kaufman, ‘Peace-Building and Conflict Resolution’.

Marks, Colombian Army Adaptation to FARC Insurgency, 30.

Lust, ‘Legislative Elections in Authoritarian Regimes’; Shehata, ‘Egyptian Parliamentary Campaigns’, 100–1.

Seats were added in Gaza where Hamas was more popular.

Shikaki, ‘Results of PSR's PLC Exit Poll’, 1. Hamas' organizational resilience was clearly demonstrated in 2006, when it maintained impressive party unity in contrast to Fatah's fragmentation. One hundred and thirty Fatah candidates ran as independents, which had major consequences on the outcome. Had Fatah maintained its party cohesion, it would have won 16 additional seats, for a total of 33. Indeed, Hamas only won 44% of the vote.

Mukhimer, State Building Process. The failures of the PA are most acute in terms of health care. The PA Ministry of Health operates only 23 of the 78 hospitals in the Palestinian territories, including 55% of the total hospital beds.

Roy, ‘The Transformation of Islamic NGOs in Palestine’, 24–6.

The Council on Foreign Relations, ‘Hamas Backgrounder’.

United Nations, ‘The Palestinian War-Torn Economy’.

Roy, ‘The Transformation of Islamic NGOs in Palestine’, 24–6.

McGreal, ‘Palestinian Authority “May Have Lost Billions”’.

World Bank, ‘Palestinian Economy, PA's Fiscal Situation – Current Status as of February 1, 2006′.

Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, Special Information Bulletin, 6–7; Roy, ‘Gaza’, 20–31.

Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, Special Information Bulletin, 10–11.

International Crisis Group, ‘Enter Hamas’, 4.

Derluguian, Bourdieu's Secret Admirer in the Caucasus.

McFaul, ‘Ten Years after the Soviet Breakup’, 87–94.

Jamil Rabah, interview by Matthew Longo, March 24, 2006.

Benshitrit, ‘Evolution on Hamas’ Discourse on Women's Roles'.

Rabah, interview.

Rabah, interview.

Ammar Dwaik, interview by Matthew Longo, Ramallah, June 8, 2006. ‘Loyalty to the party, loyalty to the platform, etc. this was more important than…[local candidates’] friendships, their own families, their own local services and history and legacy'. Khalil Shikaki, interview by Matthew Longo, Ramallah, February 11, 2006.

Muhammad Abu Tayyar, number two on Hamas' list, explained: ‘in the past, it was said that we don't understand politics, only force, but we are a broad, well-grounded movement that is active in all areas of life. Now we are proving that we also understand politics better than the others.…The question of negotiations will be presented to the new parliament and, as with every issue, when we reach the parliament it will be discussed and decided in a rational manner’. International Crisis Group, ‘Enter Hamas’, 21–2. This argument was made in part to persuade voters, Israelis and the international community of Hamas' pragmatism. But it also demonstrates the extent to which Hamas – as other parties – emphasized policymaking.

Jerusalem Media and Communication Center, Palestinian Attitudes Towards the Results of the PLC Elections Held on January 25, 2006, 2.

Pintor, Gratschew, and Sullivan, ‘Voter Turnout Rates’. Palestine ranked 48th in world turnout (1945–2000).

Lust-Okar, ‘Elections in Authoritarian Regimes’.

Jerusalem Media and Communication Center, Palestinian Attitudes Towards the Results of the PLC Elections Held on January 25, 2006, 2.

Yaghi and Fishman, ‘Fatah's Prospects in the Legislative Elections’, 2–3; International Crisis Group, ‘Enter Hamas’, 10.

International Crisis Group, ‘Enter Hamas’, 32.

Ibid., 15–16.

Barghouti, ‘Posteuphoria in Palestine’, 94; Andoni, ‘The Palestinian Elections’, 11.

Yaghi and Fishman, ‘Fatah's Prospects in the Legislative Elections’, 2–3.

This does not include independents, which would account for several more supporters for both Islah and YSP.

de Soto, ‘End of Mission Report’.

Ibid.

International Crisis Group, ‘After Gaza’, 9.

Ibid., 9.

International Crisis Group, ‘After Mecca’.

After the first round of election, the FIS had gained 47.3% of the vote, compared to the FLN's 23.4% in the first round of elections, obtaining 188 of the 231 seats, compared to the FLN's 15. 199 o determined in the first round, compared to only 15 by the FLN. Of 430 parliamentary seats remained undecided, 199 remained undecided after the first round of elections involving armed groups.

The underlying concern that elections may yield either armed violence or authoritarianism is found, in varying forms, in Sisk and Reynolds, Elections and Conflict. Management in Africa; Walter, ‘Designing Transitions from Civil War’; Jarstad, ‘Dilemmas of War-to-democracy Transitions’; Kovacs, ‘When Rebels Change Their Stripes’; Cederman, Gleditsch, and Hug, Elections and Ethnic Civil Wars; Brancati and Snyder, Rushing to the Polls; Jarstad, ‘The Prevalence of Power-Sharing’; Hartzell and Hoodie, ‘Institutionalizing Peace’.

Tilly, Democracy, 164–5.

Wantchekon and Neeman, ‘A Theory of Post-Civil War Democratization’, 458. Wantchekon and Neeman contend that successful initial post war elections often take place before paramilitary groups are entirely disarmed. Wantchekon, ‘Strategic Voting in Conditions of Political Instability’. Wantchekon also makes this point especially with regard to El Salvador, where disarmament was phased in over a period of time.

Wood, ‘An Insurgent Path to Democracy; Jung, Lust-Okar, and Shapiro, ‘Problems and Prospects for Democratic Settlements. Readers may object to comparing these cases, citing correctly that the nature of armed insurgency carried out by the armed wing of the ANC in South Africa, for instance, differed from that in Northern Ireland or Fatah and Hamas in the Palestinian territories. Yet, the critical factor remains in each case that the parties controlled arms and used them variously in both domestic and ‘external’ contests (for example, white South Africans, Britain or the Israelis.) The value of these comparisons has also been recognized by Wood, Jung, Lust-Okar, and Shapiro.

International Crisis Group, ‘Enter Hamas’, 15.

Wantchekon, ‘The Paradox of “Warlord” Democracy’. Wantchekon asserts that the processes of democratization are fundamentally different after a civil war than during authoritarian transitions; having faced the abyss, parties after civil conflict are willing to compromise to ensure that conflict does not persist. Yet, party leaders, and their followers, need not have experienced civil war to know that they want to avoid it. This is even more likely when there is a parity of arms between opposition and regime forces, guaranteeing pyrrhic consequences of conflict.

A related critique is that armed groups might decide to form authoritarian enclaves of their own, rather than engage in national politics. This is a legitimate concern; however, we believe it is exceptional, predicated on geographical isolation, or pre-existing enclaves, which in Bosnia were termed ‘leopard spots’. These terms explicitly violate the aforementioned conditions that groups be nationally-based and integrated, rather than secessionary (which in nearly all cases, indicates some form of ethnic or regional attachment). In such cases it is not clear why disarmament would be a better solution, given that this will only make groups more likely to hoard their arms and construct defensible enclaves.

Glassmyer and Sambanis, Rebel–Military Integration and Civil War Termination; Toft, Securing the Peace; Walter, ‘Designing Transitions from Civil War’.

Walter, ‘Designing Transitions from Civil War’.

Lamb, ‘Reflections on Demilitarization’, 130.

Lodge, Kadima, and Pottie, Compendium of Elections in Southern Africa, 197–200.

Ottaway, ‘The March 1992 Referendum’, 119–34.

South Asian Terrorism Portal, ‘Nepal Assessment 2009’; International Crisis Group, ‘Nepal's Peace Agreement’; International Crisis Group, ‘Nepal's Faltering Peace Process’.

Wantchekon, ‘Strategic Voting in Conditions of Political Instability’. Leonard Wantchekon argues that post-war negotiations over elections involve a balancing act: elections must be fair and peaceful, but also preserving the balance of power that facilitated the ceasefire in the first place – thus enabling them to be free as well.

‘Interview with Senator George Mitchell’.

Glassmyer and Sambanis, ‘Rebel–Military Integration and Civil War Termination’.

Lyons, ‘Postconflict Elections’.

Walter, ‘Designing Transitions from Civil War’.