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Abstract
This article investigates how the economic role of the state shapes the relationship between economic development and democracy. We argue that the state is not passively under the influence of socio-economic development as assumed in extant empirical studies. Through participating in economic production, the state is able to mitigate positive effect of economic development on politics through shaping the strength and preference of both the state and the societal forces in a way unfavourable for democracy. We thus model the state's economic engagement as a moderator variable to capture the variation in the effect of economic development on regime transition. Empirical analyses consistently show that state engagement attenuates the positive effect of development on probability of democratic transition. And economic development benefits democracy only when the level of state engagement in the economy is relatively low.
Notes on contributors
Dr Min Tang received his PhD in political science from Purdue University. Currently he is an assistant professor at Shanghai University of Finance and Economics. His research focuses on comparative democratization, political communication, and Chinese public opinions. His recent publications appear in Democratization, Journal of Chinese Political Science, Political Studies Review, African and Asian Studies, and an edited book published by Cambridge University Press. This research is supported by the following grants: National Natural Science Foundation of China (No. 71203130), Shanghai Pujiang Program (No. 12PJC054), and Fudan University “985-3 project” (No. 2011SHKXZD011).
Dwayne Woods is an associate professor of political science at Purdue University. He works on Western European politics, social and political developments in sub-Saharan Africa, and democratization.
Notes
1. For example, Lipset, “Some Social Requisites of Democracy”; Bollen, “World System Position”; Burkhart and Lewis-Beck, “Comparative Democracy”; Huntington, The Third Wave; Londregan and Poole, “Does High Income Promote Democracy”; Coppedge, “Modernization and Thresholds of Democracy”; Barro, “Determinants of Democracy”; Boix and Stokes, “Endogenous Democratization”; Epstein et al., “Democratic Transitions.”
2. Przeworski and Limongi, “Modernization.”
3. Acemoglu et al., “Income and Democracy”; Linder and Bachtiger, “What Drives Democratization.”
4. O'Donnell, Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism; O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule.
5. Lewis, “Theories of Democratization”; Kennedy, “Contingencies and the Alternatives”; Kopecky and Mudde, “What Has Eastern Europe Taught US.”
6. Nwokedi, Politics of Democratization; Joseph, “Democratization in Africa.”
7. Franzese, “Context Matters.”
8. For example, Bollen, “World System Position”; Arat, “Democracy and Economic Development”; Barro, “Determinants of Democracy”; Boix and Stokes, “Endogenous Democratization”; Epstein et al., “Democratic Transitions.”
9. Bollen, “Political Democracy and the Timing of Development.”
10. Burkhart and Lewis-Beck, “Comparative Democracy.”
11. Londregan and Poole, “Does High Income Promote Democracy?”
12. Mainwaring and Perez-Linan, “Level of Development and Democracy.”
13. Bunce, “Comparative Democratization.”
14. Przeworski and Teune, The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry.
15. Hall and Soskice, Varieties of Capitalism; Streeck and Yamamura, The End of Diversity?
16. North, Structure and Change; Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States; Wade, Governing the Market; Evans, Embedded Autonomy; Kohli, State Directed-Development.
17. Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness.
18. Wade, Governing the Market; Evans, Embedded Autonomy; Kohli, State Directed-Development; Acemoglu, “Politics and Economics.”
19. Rodan, Political Oppositions; Crisp, “Lessons from Economic Reform”; Jones, “Democratization, Civil Society”; Remmer, “Regime Sustainability”; Kurtz, “Dilemmas of Democracy”; Bueno de Mesquita and Downs, “Development and Democracy.”
20. Bellin, “Contingent Democrats”; Chen, “Capitalist Development.”
21. Miller, “Economic Development, Violent Leader Removal, and Democratization.”
22. Lipset, “Some Social Requisites of Democracy”; Inglehart and Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy; Inglehart and Welzel, “Changing Mass Priorities.”
23. Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens, Capitalist Development and Democracy.
24. Boix, Democracy and Redistribution; Acemoglu and Robinson, Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy.
25. Bueno de Mesquita and Downs, “Development and Democracy,” 80.
26. Remmer, “Regime Sustainability”; Bueno de Mesquita and Downs, “Development and Democracy.”
27. Philip, “Mexican Oil and Gas”; Kamrava, “Royal Factionalism”; Morrison, “Nontax Revenue.”
28. Smith, “Oil Wealth and Regime Survival”; Ross, “Does Oil Hinder Democracy?”
29. Diamond, Linz, and Lipset, Democracy in Developing Countries; Weil, “Sources and Structure of Legitimation”; Diamond, “Economic Development and Democracy Reconsidered”.
30. Epstein, “Legitimacy, Institutionalization, and Opposition.”
31. Chen, Popular Political Support in Urban China; Gilley, “The Meaning and Measure of State Legitimacy.”
32. This section draws extensively on Bellin, “Contingent Democrats.”
33. Ibid., 188; Bertrand, “Business as Usual,” 443; Robison, Power and Economy.
34. Kuk, “The Government Role”; Koo, State and Society in Contemporary Korea; Fields, Enterprise and the State.
35. Cheibub and Vreeland, “Economic Development, Democratization and Democracy,” 7.
36. Chen and Dickson, “Allies of the State”; Chen, “Capitalist Development.”
37. Kurtz, “Dilemmas of Democracy”, 270; Crisp, “Lessons from Economic Reform.”
38. Bellin, “The Robustness of Authoritarianism.”
39. Whitehead, “Alternatives to ‘Liberal Democracy,’” 314.
40. Joseph, “Democratization in Africa,” 369.
41. Detailed information is available at http://www.freetheworld.com/.
42. Przeworski et al., Democracy and Development. The detailed information can be found at https://netfiles.uiuc.edu/cheibub/www/datasets.html.
43. Marshall et al., “Polity IV.”
44. Detailed information can be found at http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm.
45. Detailed information can be found at http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/.
46. Przeworski and Limongi, “Modernization”; Boix and Stokes, “Endogenous Democratization”; Epstein et al. “Democratic Transitions.”
47. There are four possible patterns: yt-1 = 0→ yt = 1 (democratic transition); yt-1 = 1→ yt = 1 (democracy duration); yt-1 = 0→ yt = 0 (authoritarianism duration); yt-1 = 1→ yt = 0 (democratic breakdown).
48. Since we are mostly interested in changes from autocracy to democracy, we only report beta coefficients.
49. Ai and Norton, “Interaction Terms in Logit and Probit Models”; Berry, DeMeritt, and Esarey, “Testing for Interaction in Binary.”
50. Marginal effects are calculated using Brambor, Clark, and Golder's Stata code (available at http://homepages.nyu.edu/%7emrg217/interaction.html; Brambor, Clark, and Golder, “Understanding Interaction Models”).
51. Boix, Democracy and Redistribution; Acemoglu and Robinson, Economic Origins.
52. Falleti and Lynch, “Context and Causal Mechanisms”; Morgan and Winship, “Bringing Context and Variability Back.”
53. Geddes, “What Causes Democratization?,” 336.