Exploring the impact of mass cultural changes on the patterns of democratic reform

Abstract

In this article, a typology of reforms most suitable for Western democracies is built using two dimensions. These are the aggregative–integrative dimension and the indirect–direct dimension. Using a data set of reforms, consisting of 21 democracies, reforms in the last two decades are categorized as either pendulum, consensus, voter or participatory reforms. In the second part of this article, it is explored whether patterns of reforms follow mass-level cultural changes in four egalitarian societies. Following grid-group cultural typologies some of the patterns of democratic change anticipated are: that pendulum reforms are accompanied by changes towards a more atomistic culture, consensus reforms are associated with hierarchical societies, voter reforms are guided by accelerated individualism, and finally, that participatory reforms match increasingly egalitarian societies. This article concludes that these expectations have not been met. Elites are trying to restore the slump of the hierarchical culture and with it the consensus democratic model despite the resulting mismatch with mass cultures.

Keywords:

• patterns of democratic reforms
• types of democracies
• established Western democracies
• grid-group theory
• democratic legitimacy

Acknowledgements

The author thanks R. Andeweg, W. Heijstek and the anonymous reviewers for their comments. She also thanks NWO for financing this project (grant no. 017.004.016).

Notes on contributor

Kavita Heijstek-Ziemann is Junior Researcher and Lecturer at Leiden University in the Netherlands.

Notes

1. For my illustrations of democratic reforms in first section, I look at first and second wave democracies which also have a high level of economic development (N = 21). Later in Table 3, I only discuss the countries that are present in both my inventory of reform and Grendstad's, “A Political Cultural Map of Europe”, cultural analysis (N = 11). Later, in sixth section, I limit my analysis to those four countries which experienced a substantial cultural change between 1980 and 1990 (N = 4).

2. Such as annual expert country reports in the European Journal of Political Research (1990–2008); Keesing's Historical Archive (1990–2008); The Annual Register (1990–2008); the expert data set on the spread of autonomous regulatory agencies (Jorana et al., “The Global Diffusion of Regulatory Agencies”) and on independent regulatory agencies in Western Europe (Gilardi, “Delegation in the Regulatory State”); electoral system reforms in Gallagher and Mitchell, The Politics of Electoral Systems; For alternative forms of voting I used the online data set collected by IDEA, as part of the ACE project (http://aceproject.org/), C2D, “Direct Democracy Databases” and Scarrow, “Direct Democracy and Institutional Design”; data set on regional authority by Hooghe et al., The Rise of Regional Authority; the Committee of Regions data set on local and regional governments (www.cor.europa.eu/en/archived/documents/4677db29-47fa-4093-b42c-ed34b34092af.pdf); IDEA data set on party financing (http://www.idea.int/political-finance/sources.cfm); enactment of national freedom of information laws based on Cain et al., “Toward More Open Democracies”, Figure 6.1, 118 and Banisar (www.freedominfo.org/documents/global_survey2006.pdf); Ansell and Gingrich, “Reforming the Administrative State”, Table 8.1, 167 New Public Management reforms aimed at public access; Participedia: an open global knowledge community for researchers and practitioners in the field of democratic innovation and public engagement (http://participedia.net/).

3. Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the USA.

4. Fiskin, Democracy and Deliberation.

5. Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy.

6. Hendriks, “Vital Democracy”.

7. Lijphart , Patterns of Democracy.

8. This was first used in 1994. See Sundberg, “Finland”. In 2000, however, measures were taken to reduce the powers of the president and strengthen the position of the parliament. At that moment, it moved towards a parliamentary system. See: Raunio, “Finland: Moving in the Opposite Direction”.

9. Iceland (for supplementary seats), Israel, Belgium, Italy and France (for regional elections).

10. Switzerland, the UK, Luxembourg and Denmark (2007).

11. Norway merged its two chambers in (2008). However, despite the fact that the Storting in Norway was divided into two departments they tended to function as a unicameral parliament (qualified unicameralism).

12. Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy.

13. France increased the use of PR to districts with three or less seats (2001).

14. This reform gives voters the option to bypass the candidate selection made by the party. This reform increases the chances for certain candidates to enter parliament even if he/she is not on the top of the party list.

15. Introduced or increased party funding: Iceland, Canada, Sweden, Belgium, Japan, Norway, New Zealand, Luxembourg and Ireland.

16. Italy (2005), Belgium (1998), Switzerland (1992), Austria (2007) and Canada (1993).

17. Jorana et al., “The Global Diffusion of Regulatory Agencies”.

18. Japan (2003), Canada (1997), New Zealand (2002), Australia (2002, 2006), Ireland (1998, 2001), France (1993), and Switzerland (2000).

19. France (1996 and 2005), Belgium (2004), Austria (1997), Norway (1997), Ireland (1996, 2002), Iceland (2003, 2002), Germany (1996, 1997), Italy (1995), Switzerland (1997), Luxembourg (1997, 2000), UK (2003, 2000), Australia (1997, 1995) and the Netherlands (1998, 1997).

20. Australia (1996, 2004), Austria (1999, 2000), Belgium (1999), Denmark (1999), France (2000, 2003), Germany (2005), Iceland (2003), Ireland (1999, 1992, 2002), Italy (1995), Luxembourg (2000, 2001), the Netherlands (2004), New Zealand (2003, 2004), Norway (1991), Sweden (2004) and the UK (1991).

21. Ireland (1991), Iceland (1993), the Netherlands (2004), Sweden (1992), New Zealand (2004), Belgium (1991), Italy (1990), Switzerland (1995), Austria (2002) and Australia (1995).

22. Australia (2001), Austria (2001), Belgium (1990), Japan (1992, 1998), Finland (1993), France (1996), the Netherlands (1992, 1998), Iceland (1998), Germany (1995), Luxembourg (1998,), Ireland (1995), Switzerland (1997), the UK (1997).

23. Australia (1998), Austria (2001), Belgium (2002), Iceland (1998), Ireland (2000), Japan (1998), the UK (1997), France, Netherlands (1991), Sweden (1991) and New Zealand.

24. Iceland (2001), Japan (1997), Australia (1996), UK (1997), France (1993), Belgium (1998), Italy (1998), Switzerland (1999), Sweden (1999) and Austria, the Netherlands (1998).

25. This list is based on a country expert survey conducted by Jorana et al. covering a selection of policy areas; their list is not exhaustive.

26. In the UK (1998), Israel (1992), New Zealand (1990), Switzerland (1999), Finland (1995) and Iceland (1995).

27. LeDuc, “The Politics of Direct Democracy”.

28. Fishkin, Democracy and Deliberation.

29. Hendriks, “Vital Democracy”.

30. Japan (2007), New Zealand (1997), Canada (parliamentary plebiscite 2008–2009), the UK, Italy (2007), Luxembourg and the Netherlands (for EU constitution 2004).

31. Australia (1997), Italy (1994), UK (1991), Norway (1998), France (1992), Finland (1997) and Ireland (1997/1999).

32. Hendriks, “Vital Democracy”.

33. Fishkin, Democracy and Deliberation.

34. Japan (1999), Italy (1990), United Kingdom (1997), Belgium (1995, 2004), Ireland (1997), Iceland (1996) and Germany (2005).

35. Japan (1994), Italy (1999), Ireland (1990), New Zealand (2001), United Kingdom (2000), Australia (2000), Sweden (1998) and the Netherlands (1998).

36. Participedia, “Strengthening Democracy through Shared Knowledge”.

37. In this sociological understanding of legitimacy, members of a community will obey the decisions of their governments not because of personal aspirations or terror, but inherent ideology. Legitimacy does not necessarily have to be connected to legality but rather refers to shared values, responsibilities and accountability.

38. The theme of this section can also be linked to the rich discussion within the politics of reform debate mainly between the sociological (such as institutions and culture), rational-choice (group and individual level), and comprehensive approaches (such as barrier model) of (electoral) reform. For an overview of the debate see: Leyenaar and Hazan, “Reconceptualizing Electoral Reform”; Rahat, “The Politics of Electoral Reform” and Ziemann, “Elite Support for Constitutional Reform”.

39. Hendriks, “Vital Democracy”.

40. Wildavsky, “Choosing Preferences by Constructing Institutions”.

41. Wildavsky, “Choosing Preferences by Constructing Institutions” and Grendstad, “A Political Cultural Map of Europe”.

42. Grendstad “A Political Cultural Map of Europe” and Hendriks, “Democratic Reform”.

43. Hendriks also has a table for Political Cultural Foundations of Democracy, which could be interpreted as the cultural disposition of the elites. The four categories are mass democracy, guardian democracy, protections it democracy and grassroots democracy.

44. Grendstad, “A Political Cultural Map of Europe”.

45. This mutual attraction between cultures and types of democracies is according to Hendriks an ideal-typical relation between ideal types in the Weberian sense, to be clearly distinguished from a causal relation in the Popperian sense “Vital Democracy,” 39.

46. Grendstad, “A Political Cultural Map of Europe”.

47. Ibid.

48. Ibid.

49. Ibid.

50. Only three of these four questions used by Grendstad for 1980 and 1990 were asked in preceding surveys. I am, therefore, unable to replicate the results for the 1999 and 2008 EVS surveys. Consequently, my analysis and conclusions are only limited to the 1990 survey.

51. In Table 3, I only present the countries that are present in my inventory of reform and Grendstad's analysis (N = 11).

52. Confidence in government and satisfaction with democracy were not measured.

53. Ansell and Gingrich, “Reforming the Administrative State”.

54. Jorana et al., “The Global Diffusion of Regulatory Agencies”.

55. Heidar, “Norway”.

56. Ibid.

57. Ansell and Gingrich, “Reforming the Administrative State”.

58. Hooghe et al., The Rise of Regional Authority.

59. Bille, “Denmark,” 1996.

60. Bille, “Denmark,” 1994.

61. Ibid.

62. Bille, “Denmark,” 1999.

63. Jorana et al., “The Global Diffusion of Regulatory Agencies”.

64. Cain et al., “Toward More Open Democracies”.

65. Hardarson, “Iceland,” 1994.

66. Hardarson and Kristinsson, “Iceland”.

67. Jorana et al., “The Global Diffusion of Regulatory Agencies”.

68. Hardarson, “Iceland,” 1996.

69. Hardarson, “Iceland,” 1993.

70. Lucardie and Voerman, “The Netherlands,” 1999.

71. Jorana et al., “The Global Diffusion of Regulatory Agencies”.

72. Lucardie and Voerman, “The Netherlands,” 2000 and 2001.

73. Lucardie and Voerman, “The Netherlands,” 1994.

74. Lucardie and Voerman, “The Netherlands,” 1993.

75. Andeweg, “Institutional Conservatism in the Netherlands”.

76. Ibid.

77. Lucardie and Voerman, “The Netherlands,” 1993.

78. Lucardie and Voerman, “The Netherlands,” 1998, 1999 and 2000.

79. Lucardie and Voerman, “The Netherlands,” 2001.

80. Hendriks, “Vital Democracy”.

81. Mair, Democracy Beyond Parties.

82. Ibid, 17.

83. Ibid.

84. Ibid, 17.

85. Ibid.