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Abstract
In this contribution we conceptualize the under-investigated interplay between external and domestic actors in democracy promotion. We first propose a typology of the instruments and means used both by external and domestic actors to influence reform outputs and then trace these instruments' effects on outcomes, thereby expanding the existing concepts of domestic agency. Although democracy promotion continues to be a rather asymmetric relationship between the “donors” and “receivers” of aid and advice, domestic actors employ a wide array of instruments to manage external demands for reform, including diplomacy, take-over, slowdown, modification, resistance, and emancipation. The article draws on a case study of European Union democracy promotion within two reform initiatives in the field of Public Administration Reform (PAR) in Croatia.
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank Richard Batley, Timm Beichelt, Franziska Blomberg, Jan-Hinrik Meyer-Sahling, Gerald Schneider, the members of the research network “External Democracy Promotion”, the members of the Frankfurt Institute for Transformation Studies, the members of the Standing Group “Democracy Research” at the German Foundation for Political Research, and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this manuscript. Special thanks to Claire Bacher for her kind and careful proofreading. Financial support from the Young Scholar Fund at the University of Konstanz is gratefully acknowledged.
Notes on contributors
Lisa Groß is a PhD candidate in the Department of Politics and Public Administration, University of Konstanz. She specializes in post-conflict peace-building in the Western Balkans with a special focus on the transition in Kosovo.
Sonja Grimm is Senior Lecturer in the Department of Politics and Public Administration, University of Konstanz. She specializes in studies of transition to democracy in post-conflict societies and has previously co-edited special issues of Democratization on “War and Democratization: Legality, Legitimacy, and Effectiveness” (15, no. 3 (2008), with Wolfgang Merkel) and “Do All Good Things Go Together? Conflicting Objectives in Democracy Promotion” (19, no. 3 (2012), with Julia Leininger and Tina Freyburg).
Notes
1. Burnell, Democracy Assistance; Youngs, “Democracy and the Multinationals”; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, The Europeanization; Vachudova, Europe Undivided.
2. For various typologies of democracy promotion instruments, see Burnell, Democracy Assistance; Zeeuw and Kumar, Promoting Democracy; Grimm, Erzwungene Demokratie.
3. Leininger, “‘Bringing the Outside In.”’ The literature on European integration discusses domestic factors mitigating the “effectiveness” of external instruments in the form of adaption costs (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, The Europeanization). However, domestic agency in the interaction with external actors is not explicitly discussed.
4. Leininger, “‘Bringing the Outside In.’”
5. Burton and Higley, “Elite Settlements”; Przeworski, Democracy and the Market, 51–99, 56–60.
6. Weiffen, Entstehungsbedingungen von Demokratien, 63–6; Burnell, Democracy Assistance; Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad; Youngs, “Democracy and the Multinationals”; Grimm and Leininger, “Not All Good Things Go Together.”
7. Zeeuw and Kumar, Promoting Democracy; Amichai, Risse, McFaul, Promoting Democracy and the Rule of Law.
8. Burnell, Democracy Assistance; Zeeuw and Kumar, Promoting Democracy; Grimm, Erzwungene Demokratie; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, The Europeanization.
9. Zürcher, Röhner, and Riese, “External Democracy Promotion”; Leininger, “‘Bringing the Outside In.’”
10. Schimmelfennig, and Sedelmeier, “Governance by Conditionality”; Grabbe, The EU's Transformative Power; Trauner, “Policy Conditionality.”
11. Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, The Europeanization; Youngs, “Democracy Promotion as External Governance?”; Toshkov, “Embracing European Law”; Börzel and Buzogány, “Governing EU Accession in Transition Countries”; Freyburg and Richter, “National Identity Matters”.
12. Börzel et al., “Obstinate and Inefficient”; Noutcheva, “Fake, Partial and Imposed Compliance”; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, “Governance by Conditionality.”
13. With the exception of Vachudova, Europe Undivided.
14. Keck and Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders; Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink, Power of Human Rights.
15. Börzel et al., “Obstinate and Inefficient,” 30; Fisher, Improving Compliance, 20.
16. Finnmore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics”; Manners, “Normative Power Europe”; Acharya, “How Ideas Spread.”
17. Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad, 137; Stedman, “Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes”; Richmond, “Resistance and the Post-Liberal Peace.”
18. Groß and Grimm, “(State-)Building Socio-Economic Insecurity.”
19. Flyvbjerg, “Five Misunderstandings about Case-Study Research,” 426.
20. Grimm, Erzwungene Demokratie, 349–63; Grimm and Mathis, “Stability First.”
21. Flyvbjerg, “Five Misunderstandings about Case-Study Research,” 426.
22. Grandits, “The Power of ‘Armchair Politicians’”; Zakosek, “Democratization, State-Building and War”; European Commission, Croatia 2010 Progress Report, 7ff.
23. Gerring, “What is a Case Study and What is it Good for?,” 343.
24. Grimm and Mathis, “Stability First.”
25. European Commission, Croatia 2011 Progress Report, 8.
26. SIGMA, European Principles for Public Administration, 8–14.
27. Grimm and Mathis, “Stability First.”
28. The cut-off point was chosen due to pragmatic reasons; however, our findings are still valid. The most recent EU Progress Report of 10 October 2012 yet admonishes the Croatian government that “[t]he legal framework on salaries, necessary to ensure merit-based promotion and reward mechanisms and to attract and retain qualified personnel, still remains to be finalized” (European Commission, Comprehensive Monitoring Report on Croatia, 6).
29. The previous GAPA, dating from Yugoslav times, was regarded as too complex, as (over-)regulating individual administrative steps, and as suffering from unclear procedures and limited chances for appeal (European Commission, Communication from the Commission, 8) while being prone to arbitrary decision-making, legal uncertainty, and corruption (SIGMA, Croatia. Public Service and the Administrative Framework, 26).
30. Interview D5.
31. The GAPA received slightly more attention, with two EU grants (CARDS 2003 and IPA 2008), while the CSSA profited from a CARDS 2001 project grant and lesser assistance from external consultants from the World Bank and SIGMA (Interviews D5; E3; E4; E6).
32. Gerring, “What is a Case Study and What is it Good for?”; George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development.
33. Meuser and Nagel, “Das Experteninterview.” Document analysis refers to the annual EU Progress Reports, Pre-Accession Economic Recovery Programmes, and project evaluations.
34. Ritchie, Lewis, and Elan, Designing and Selecting Samples, 56.
35. George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development.
36. Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, The Europeanization; Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, “EU Rules Beyond EU Borders.”
37. Scharpf, Verwaltungswissenschaft als Teil der Politikwissenschaft.
38. Ibid., 169.
39. Anderson, Public Policymaking.
40. See Grimm, Erzwungene Demorkratie, for more details.
41. Berridge, Diplomacy: Theory & Practice.
42. Burnell, Democracy Assistance, 4–5; Grimm and Mathis, “Stability First.”
43. Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad.
44. Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, “Governance by Conditionality,” 662.
45. Grimm, Erzwungene Demokratie, 180–231.
46. SIGMA, Croatia. Public Service and the Administrative Framework.
47. The Yugoslav GAPA from 1956 was amended in 1965, 1977, 1978, and 1986, but its main features remained similar, even to the old Yugoslav General Administrative Procedure Act of 1930; see Kopric, “Administrative Technology,” 439.
48. German political party foundations supported administration reform already in 1991–1992, but with limited financial resources.
49. Interview D6; Republic of Croatia, 2004 Pre-Accession Economic Recovery Programme.
50. Interview D2.
51. Interview D6.
52. Kopric, Novi Zakon; European Commission, Croatia 2011 Progress Report.
53. SIGMA, Croatia. Public Service and the Administrative Framework.
54. Ibid.
55. Samostalnu službu za socijalno partnerstvo [Independent Service for Social Partnership] and Interview D1.
56. Republic of Croatia, 2009 Pre-Accession Economic Recovery Programme.
57. To understand the strong opposition on behalf of different domestic actors one has to take into account two things. First, the average net earnings of a Croatian employee is 7679 kuna (€1020) while the salary of state civil servants is calculated with a base rate of 5.108 (€679) (Državni Zavod Za Statistiku, Hravatska U Brojkama 2011, 11). Second, in 2011, Croatia's state budget amounted to 42% of gross domestic product (GDP) and the government spent 10.7% of GDP civil servants' salary (IMF, The Republic of Croatia, 29 and 31). Plus, the 37,400 Croatian state civil servants made up for 2.3% of the employed population, which is a relatively high percentage in regional comparison (ranging from 1.28% to 5.5%); see Cohen, “Administrative Development,” 10). The problem of finding a solution suitable to everyone was also mentioned in interviews D1; D6; D7.
58. Republic of Croatia, 2005 Pre-Accession Economic Recovery Programme, 76.
59. Republic of Croatia, 2006 Pre-Accession Economic Recovery Programme, 66.
60. Interview E2.
61. Interview E3.
62. Interview E3.
63. Interview D4.
