![Sample our Politics & International Relations journals, sign in here to start your FREE access for 14 days]({"type":"image" , "src" : "/sda/5947/TOC-Subject-Sample-2021-Politics-International-Relations.jpg"})
Abstract
What are the effective ways of responding to populists, especially radical populists in government? The pessimistic answer provided by Chavismo is that little can be done; most of the negative impact of highly populist movements cannot be avoided in the short to medium term. The reasons lie not only in Venezuela's unique oil-based economy, but in the country's previous failures of democratic governance, a condition shared by many developing countries. Such failures make it likely that radical populists will receive broad popular support. This does not suggest that international actors cannot play a useful role in responding to populism. But the most viable democratic strategy is a long-term one emphasizing patient efforts by domestic opponents to reorganize themselves into programmatic, pluralist options for the future.
Acknowledgements
Special thanks to Nathaniel Allred at Brigham Young University for his help in preparing this article, as well as to several anonymous reviews and the editors for their insightful comments. That said, the conclusions in this article are the responsibility of the author.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes on contributors
Kirk Hawkins is an associate professor at Brigham Young University, where he studies populism, Latin American politics, and political organization. He has published several works on Chavismo and populism, and has co-authored a book on Latin American party systems. He currently coordinates Team Populism, a research network studying the causes of populism across Europe and the Americas.
Notes
1. Hawkins and Kocijan, “Codebook for Measuring Populist Discourse.” The only chief executives in this European dataset that score close to Chávez are Vladimir Meciar of Slovakia and Alexander Lukashenko of Belarus.
2. See Hawkins, Venezuela's Chavismo and Populism.
3. Center for Systemic Peace, “INSCR Data Page”; Freedom House, “Freedom in the World 2014.”
4. United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, “Homicide Counts and Rates.”
5. Much could be said here about the past involvement of the military in Venezuelan politics. For now I will simply mention that the military had been largely subservient to civilian authority since 1958, but that it had a history of political involvement that preceded this, and that many Venezuelans on the right and the left (including Chávez) continued to see it as a guardian of the nation from internal threats. Following the 2002 coup, Chávez purged the military and worked to integrate it into his political project. See Trinkunas, “The Transformation of the Bolivarian Armed Force.”
6. Bloomberg News, “New Cars for the Army”; Wilson, “A Revolution in Green.”
7. Capoccia, Defending Democracy; Downs, Political Extremism in Democracies; Rummens and Abts, “Defending Democracy.”
8. Egaña, “Auge Y Caída.”
9. Caldera, “El Sobreseimiento de Chávez”; Caldera, “Respuesta de Rafael Caldera.”
10. Blanco Muñoz, Habla El Comandante; Zago, La rebelión de los ángeles.
11. Carter Center, The Carter Center; Legler, “Venezuela 2002–2004.”
12. Coppedge, “Explaining Democratic Deterioration”; Hawkins, Venezuela's Chavismo and Populism; Morgan, Bankrupt Representation; Seawright, Party-System Collapse.
13. Caldera, “El Sobreseimiento de Chávez.”
14. See Delgado, “Inquietud En El Chavismo.”
15. Hawkins, “The Logic of Linkages.”
16. Pérez-Liñán, Presidential Impeachment; Peruzzotti and Smulovitz, Enforcing the Rule of Law.
17. Levine, Conflict and Political Change.
18. Coppedge, “Parties and Society in Mexico and Venezuela”; Coppedge, “Venezuela's Vulnerable Democracy.”
19. Ortiz, “Entrepreneurs: Profits without Power?”
20. Ciccariello-Maher, We Created Chávez, chap. 7; Ellner, “The Emergence of a New Trade Unionism.”
21. Arenas, “Las organizaciones empresariales venezolanas”; The Catholic Church and some Evangelical Churches have also played a political role since the election of Chávez, either supporting or opposing Chávez in public statements. Their activism represents a striking departure from the political stance of churches in Venezuela, which in recent decades had been largely muted and apolitical. That said, with the partial exception of the Catholic hierarchy, they have not provided a unified voice for the opposition. See Smilde and Pagan, “Christianity and Politics.”
22. García-Guadilla, “Civil Society: Institutionalization, Fragmentation”; Salamanca, “Civil Society: Late Bloomers.”
23. “Challenging Chávez-for-Life”; Romero and Gould, “Students Emerge as a Leading Force.”
24. Neumann, “Protests Swell in Venezuela.”
25. Fernandes, “Radio Bemba”; Schiller, “Catia Sees You”; Hawkins, “Conflict and the Mass Media.”
26. Freedom House, “Freedom of the Press 2014”; Committee to Protect Journalists, “Attacks on the Press.”
27. Freedom House, “Freedom of the Press.”
28. Castaldi, “Judicial Independence Threatened in Venezuela”; Human Rights Watch, Rigging the Rule of Law.
29. Human Rights Watch, A Decade Under Chávez.
30. Human Rights Watch, Tightening the Grip; International Bar Association, Distrust in Justice.
31. European Union Election Observation Mission, European Union Election Observation Mission Venezuela 2005; Carter Center, Observing the Venezuela Presidential Recall; Carter Center, “Preliminary Report”; Carter Center, Study Mission; Ojo Electoral, Ojo Electoral a Propósito de Las Elecciones.
32. Carter Center, “Preliminary Report”; Observatorio Electoral Venezolano, Informe Final.
33. Levitsky and Way, Competitive Authoritarianism.
34. The Bush administration was not apparently involved in planning or executing the coup, but it quickly lent its support to the short-lived interim government and stymied the response of the OAS. This involvement lent credence to the anti-imperialist narrative of radical leftists in Chavez's movement, a narrative that he subsequently incorporated into his own populist discourse. See Legler, “Venezuela 2002–2004”; Hawkins, Venezuela's Chavismo and Populism, 61–62.
35. See Amnesty International, Amnesty International Report 2012; Human Rights Watch, Tightening the Grip.
36. Human Rights Watch, Tightening the Grip.
37. Smith, Talons of the Eagle.
38. Boniface, “The OAS's Mixed Record.”
39. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (OAS), “IACHR Deeply Concerned.”
40. Kurtz, Latin American State Building; Mainwaring and Scully, Democratic Governance in Latin America.
41. There is no comprehensive inventory of populist leaders or parties around the globe, but studies of populism in Latin America since 1945 generally show dozens of leaders covering most countries in the region, while in Western Europe populist parties are absent from governing coalitions until the 1990s, and since then have appeared in only a small number of countries, primarily those studied in this special issue. Compare for example Conniff, Populism in Latin America; Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe.
42. Kitschelt et al., Latin American Party Systems.