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ABSTRACT
Between 1997 and 2013, more than 5000 recall referendums were activated against democratically elected authorities from 747 Peruvian municipalities (45.5% of all municipalities). This makes Peru the world's most intensive user of this mechanism of direct democracy which is designed to remove elected authorities from office before the end of their term. What are the reasons for this extensive use of recall referendums in Peru and, more importantly, what consequences do they have in terms of democratic legitimacy and government efficiency? This paper sets out to answer these questions by comparing the Peruvian case against the background of other countries in the Andean region. It proposes an explanation for the intensive activation of recall procedures through the combination of two factors: first, the features of the institutional design of the mechanism, which affect the probability of a successful activation of recall referendums, and second, the degree of institutionalization of political parties, which influences the incentives of political actors to gain power between regular elections.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Saskia Ruth, Jonathan Wheatley, Fernando Tuesta Soldevilla and the reviewers for their critical comments and useful suggestions.
This work was part of the project ‘Democratic Innovation: What Europe can learn from Latin America’ conducted at the Centre for Democracy Studies Aarau (ZDA).
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Funding
This work was financially supported by the AVINA STIFTUNG.
Notes on contributor
Yanina Welp is currently the Regional Director for Latin America at the Center for Research on Direct Democracy (C2D).
Notes
1. Tuesta, Una onda expansiva.
2. Spivak, “California's Recall”; Cronin, “The Recall Device.”
3. Piasecki, “Twenty Years of Polish Direct Democracy at the Local Level.”
4. IPSOS Apoyo, Opinión y Mercado, “Captura de Artemio y recuperación de Humala.”
5. Mill, “Two Methods of Comparison.”
6. Bolivia's new constitution entered into force in 2009, however, the recall mechanism was not available until 2012. The recall referendum activated on 10 August 2008 does not qualify as a bottom up activation because this call was initiated by a law submitted by President Evo Morales to the congress.
7. The referendum was scheduled for 2 March 2014, but was cancelled when the attorney general's office (Procuraduría) removed him from office (Welp and Rey, “Revocatoria de mandato y democracia”).
8. The recall referendum against President Hugo Chávez in 2004 in Venezuela has been studied by Kornblith (“The Referendum in Venezuela”) and McCoy (“The 2004 Venezuelan Recall Referendum”). For more recent studies on the local level see Welp and Serdült, La dosis hace el veneno; Ramírez, “El despliegue de la democracia directa en el Ecuador post constitucional”; Quintanilla, “El debate sobre la revocatoria y las reformas de la ley 26300”; Tuesta, Una onda expansiva; Bland and Chirinos, “Democratization Through Contention?”
9. Breuer, “Institutions of Direct Democracy”; Altman, Direct Democracy Worldwide; Ruth and Welp, “How Participative are Latin American Populist's in Public Office?”
10. Goldfrank, Deepening Local Democracy in Latin America; Seele and Peruzzoti, Participatory Innovation.
11. Breuer, “Institutions of Direct Democracy.”
12. Garret, “Democracy in the Wake of the California Recall”; Qvordrup, “Hasta la Vista.”
13. Cronin, “The Recall Device”; Spivak, “California's Recall”; Smith and Lubinski, “Direct Democracy during the Progressive Era.”
14. Bowler, “Recall and Representation Arnold Schwarzenegger meets Edmund Burke.”
15. Serdült, “The History of a Dormant Institution.”
16. Serdült and Welp, “Direct Democracy Upside Down.”
17. Cronin, “The Recall Device”; Smith and Lubinski, “Direct Democracy during the Progressive Era”; Quintanilla, “El debate sobre la revocatoria.”
18. Cronin, “The Recall Device”; Tuesta, Una onda expansiva; Welp and Serdült, La dosis hace el veneno.
19. Bowler, “Recall and Representation Arnold Schwarzenegger Meets Edmund Burke.”
20. Qvordrup, “Hasta la Vista.”
21. Breuer, “Institutions of Direct Democracy.”
22. Nolte and Schilling-Vacaflor, New Constitutionalism in Latin America; Massuger and Welp, “Legality and Legitimacy.”
23. Ortíz Crespo, “Participación ciudadana.”
24. Kornblith, “The Referendum in Venezuela.”
25. Nolte and Schilling-Vacaflor, New Constitutionalism in Latin America; Negretto, Making Constitutions.
26. Qvordrup, “Hasta la Vista”; Bowler, “Recall and Representation Arnold Schwarzenegger Meets Edmund Burke.”
27. Latinobarometro Corporation, “Informe Latinobarómetro 2004.”
28. Latinobarometro Corporation, “Informe Latinobarómetro 2009.”
29. Ramírez, “El despliegue de la democracia directa en el Ecuador post constitucional.”
30. Ibid.
31. Not surprisingly, in this context, the strategy of mayors facing recall is to do nothing and expect a low level of participation. What remains open is the question of the number of signatures required (40% of the electorate), which often exceeds the votes then recorded in the referendum; Breuer, “Obstacles to Citizen Participation by Direct Democracy in Latin America.”
32. Party system institutionalization has been recognized both as a key prerequisite for the consolidation of democracy and an important factor in guaranteeing the quality of democratic governance in established democracies; Mainwaring and Zoco, “Secuencias políticas”; Mainwaring and Scully, Building Democratic Institutions.
33. Levitsky and Cameron, “Democracy Without Parties?” 1.
34. Crabtree, “Democracy without Parties?, 379.
35. Taylor, “Politicians without Parties and Parties without Politicians.”
36. Tuesta, Una onda expansiva; Welp and Serdült, La dosis hace el veneno. Aside from small communities, recall procedures also took place in large communities, however, with a lower rate of success. Attempts have been registered, for example, in Quito, two attempts in Buenos Aires, several in Bogotá, and one in Lima (the only successful activation).
37. Sabatini, “Decentralization and Political Parties.”
38. Bland and Chirinos, “Democratization through Contention?,” 83.
39. Arce, “La repolitización de la acción colectia tras el neoliberalismo en el Perú”; Bland and Chirinos, “Democratization through Contention?”
40. Bland and Chirinos, “Democratization through Contention?”; Remy, “Los gobiernos locales en el Perú”; Tanaka, “Representación, descentralización.”
41. Franco Cuervo, “La revocatoria del mandato en Colombia.”
42. Conaghan and de la Torre, “The Permanent Campaign of Rafael Correa.”
43. Ibid.
44. Tuesta, Una onda expansiva.
45. Ibid.
46. Quintanilla, “El debate sobre la revocatoria,” 112.
47. ONPE, Las Nuevas Elecciones Municipales.
48. With nine million inhabitants and six million voters, Lima constitutes 30% of Peru's electorate.
49. Vásquez Oruna, “Cuando los vientos revocadores azotaron Lima.”
50. According to law 26864, the party with more votes received half plus one of the number of seats on the local council.
51. Ibid.
52. It must be noted, however, that the campaign was highly relevant. Close to the referendum date, the Brazilian-Argentine publicist Luis Favre (previously in charge of Humala's campaign) was hired to develop the campaign against the recall. He designed a strategy focussed on the outcomes of the local government, overcoming one of Villarán's weaknesses (the slogan was “Lima no puede parar” [Lima can't stop]).
