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ABSTRACT
Africa's proliferation of dominant-party regimes is often regarded as an obstacle to democratization. Scholars and practitioners therefore face the task of understanding how and why constitutionally legitimate challenges to dominant party rule occur. This article asks: why do some presidential succession crises act as a catalyst to dominant party fragmentation when others do not? It argues that minority factions are more likely to defect from a dominant party when they have (1) been marginalized by the majority faction and (2) confidence in their mobilizational capacity. Factional purging is in turn traced to autocratic leadership and party under-bureaucratization, whilst high levels of factional self-confidence are linked to crises of dominance and the weakness of extant opposition parties.
Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank Nic Cheeseman and Nicolas Van de Walle for their advice during the preparation of this article. Any errors are mine alone.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes on contributor
Ian Cooper is a Teaching Associate in Politics at the University of Cambridge, UK. His research focuses on democratization, public policymaking, and electoral politics in sub-Saharan Africa.
Notes
1. Pempel, Uncommon Democracies.
2. If Sartori's definition is used, the following countries had dominant-party systems in 2015: Botswana, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chad, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, the Gambia, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, the Seychelles, South Africa, and Tanzania.
3. Lodge, “The Future of South Africa's Party System,” 164.
4. Giliomee and Simkins, The Awkward Embrace.
5. Huntington, The Third Wave.
6. Erdmann and Basedau, Problems of Categorizing and Explaining Party Systems, 18; Doorenspleet, “Political Parties, Party Systems and Democracy,” 181; Van de Walle and Smiddy Butler, “Political Parties and Party Systems,” 23.
7. Kuenzi and Lambright, “Party Systems and Democratic Consolidation,” 424.
8. Melber, “From Controlled Change to Changed Control,” 142.
9. Giliomee and Simkins, The Awkward Embrace, 2–3.
10. Cooper, “Parties, Factions and Votes,” 144–6.
11. Seekings, “Who Holds Power after Apartheid?”
12. King, Keohane, and Verba, Designing Social Inquiry, 210–11.
13. Mac Giollabhuì, “How Things Fall Apart.”
14. Van de Walle, “Presidentialism and Clientelism,” 310.
15. Mac Giollabhuì, “How Things Fall Apart,” 591.
16. Laswell, quoted in Köllner and Basedau, Factionalism in Political Parties, 8.
17. Beller and Belloni, “Party and Faction,” 419.
18. Hirschman, Exit, Voice and Loyalty, 70.
19. Ibid.
20. De Swaan, Coalition Theories and Cabinet Formations, 88.
21. Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, 28–31.
22. Strøm and Müller, “Political Parties and Hard Choices,” 5.
23. Zariski, “Party Factions and Comparative Politics,” 24–7.
24. Mill, A System of Logic, 452; Lijphart, “Comparative Politics,” 688; Whitehead, Democratization, 204.
25. Mill, A System of Logic, 452.
26. Melber, “From Controlled Change to Changed Control,” 146.
27. King, Keohane, and Verba, Designing Social Inquiry.
28. Of Africa's other dominant-party regimes, only Botswana and Cape Verde attract Freedom House's highest rating.
29. Bogaards, “Crafting Competitive Party Systems,” 168.
30. New York Times, 27 June 1993.
31. Gumede, Thabo Mbeki, 394.
32. Butler, “The ANC's National Election Campaign,” 68.
33. Booysen, The African National Congress, 67.
34. “Zuma's People on Top”; “All Politics is Provincial.”
35. The Sowetan, 11 February 2008; “All Politics is Provincial.”
36. Interview, COPE parliamentarian, 17 February 2013.
37. Interview, COPE official, 25 February 2013.
38. Daracq, “Being a ‘Movement of the People,'” 447.
39. Booysen, The African National Congress.
40. Interview, Adam Habib, 12 April 2012.
41. Booysen, The African National Congress.
42. Interview, COPE official, 4 March 2013.
43. Schlemmer, Can South Africa's Democracy Survive, 8–33.
44. McKinley, “Democracy, Power and Patronage,” 191.
45. Afrobarometer, rounds 2–5.
46. Democratic Alliance, “Vote to Stop Zuma!”
47. Seen by the author in Swellendam, 15 April 2009.
48. Mail and Guardian, 19 April 2009.
49. Booysen, The African National Congress, 328.
50. Reuters, 27 February 2009.
51. Mail and Guardian, 16 April 2009.
52. Lemon, “Mobilising Opposition.”
53. Dreyer, Namibia and Southern Africa, 177–92.
54. Du Pisani and Lindeke, Political Party Life.
55. Interview, journalist A, 23 June 2009.
56. Interview, journalist B, 16 June 2009.
57. Interview, Gwen Lister, 10 July 2009.
58. Mac Giollabhuì, “How Things Fall Apart.”
59. Interview, Hidipo Hamutenya, 11 May 2009.
60. Interview, Jeremiah Nambinga, 4 June 2009.
61. Interview, civil society activist, 24 June 2009.
62. Windhoek Observer, 23 June 2013. Ngurare was expelled from SWAPO in 2015, although it is unclear whether this move was related to his former support for Jerry Ekandjo.
63. Skype interview, journalist, 18 July 2013.
64. Personal communication, Henning Melber, 29 May 2015.
65. The Namibian, 29 July 2009.
66. Afrobarometer round 3.
67. Interview, RDP official, 9 July 2009.
68. Schmidt, Poverty and Inequality, 3.
69. Interview, RDP national executive committee member, 11 May 2009.
70. Afrobarometer round 5.
71. Ibid.
72. The Namibian, 5 February 2010.
73. Ten of the 18 members of SWAPO's Politburo are Owambo.
74. The Namibian, 28 September 2009.
75. Interview, Jesaya Nyamu, 5 June 2009.
76. The Namibian, 19 November 2007.
77. Interview, 11 May 2009.
78. Cooper, “Parties, Factions and Votes.”
79. Saul and Leys, “SWAPO,” 43.
80. The Namibian, 24 June 2013.
81. Rakner, “Institutionalizing the Pro-Democracy Movements,” 1117.
82. Cooper, “Zuma, Malema and the Provinces.”
83. Soiri, “SWAPO Wins, Apathy Rules,” 205.
84. Von Holdt, remarks at South African Discussion Group.
85. Congress of the People, A New Agenda, 2009.
86. Interview, RDP national executive committee member, 11 May 2009.
87. Interview, 25 February 2013.
88. Rakner, “Institutionalizing the Pro-Democracy Movements,” 1114.
89. Makgala, Elite Conflict in Botswana, 117.
90. Galvan, “Political Turnover and Social Change,” 59.
91. Makgala, Elite Conflict in Botswana, 169.
