http://orcid.org/0000-0002-3413-2963
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ABSTRACT
This article tests whether Western election observers apply a “double standard” to elections in sub-Saharan Africa. It demonstrates that they do: Western election observers were statistically less likely to allege that significant fraud had occurred in an election in sub-Saharan Africa, than an election of the same quality held elsewhere, throughout the period from 1991 to 2012. This discrepancy exists despite controls for other factors commonly thought to influence the verdicts of observers, such as the strategic interests of Western countries. Yet, there is variation over time. Between 1991 and 2001, the double standard is partly explained by “progress bias,” a tendency to tolerate flawed elections that improved on those held previously. From 2002 to 2012, observers’ application of a double standard is much harder to explain. In that period, the analysis points to several factors that discourage Western observers from alleging fraud, including the risk of triggering electoral violence and a desire to protect relationships with strategic partners. It also identifies factors that make allegations of electoral fraud more likely, including the precedent set by past allegations of fraud and – unexpectedly – higher levels of foreign aid. None of these factors, however, account for the regional discrepancy.
Acknowledgements
Many thanks to colleagues who provided comments on earlier versions of this article, in particular Martin Ottmann, David Hudson, Niheer Dasandi and Nic Cheeseman. Thanks are also due to the anonymous reviewers whose feedback helped to sharpen the analysis in this paper.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
ORCID
Susan Dodsworth http://orcid.org/0000-0002-3413-2963
Notes
1 Chege, “Kenya’s Electoral Misfire”.
2 Kuo and Dahir, “Foreign Election Observers Endorsed a Deeply Flawed Election”; Cheeseman, Moss, and Smith, “It’s Time for International Election Monitors to Start Doing Their Job”.
3 Cheeseman and Klaas, How to Rig an Election, 198.
4 Hyde and Marinov, “Which Elections Can Be Lost?”
5 Kelley, Monitoring Democracy.
6 Carothers, “The Observers Observed”, 18.
7 Bush and Prather, “Who’s There? Election Observer Identity and the Local Credibility of Elections”.
8 For example, Obi, “International Election Observer Missions”; Cooper and Stroux, “International Election Observation in Uganda”.
9 Geisler, “Fair? What Has Fairness Got to Do with It?”
10 Brown, “Well, What Can You Expect?”
11 Cheeseman and Klaas, How to Rig an Election, chap. 6.
12 Ibid., 191.
13 Abbink, “Introduction: Rethinking Democratization and Election Observation”, 12.
14 Brown, “Well, What Can You Expect?”
15 Kelley, “D-Minus Elections”.
16 With regard to “special relationship bias”, Kelley does not clearly distinguish between the desire to reduce disruption to aid programmes and the strategic interests of donors: Kelley, ibid.; Kelley, Monitoring Democracy.
17 Kelley, “Assessing the Complex Evolution of Norms”.
18 Kelley, Monitoring Democracy, chap. 4.
19 Lynge-Mangueria, “Why “Professionalizing” International Election Observation Might Not Be Enough”; Hyde, “Why Believe International Election Monitors?”
20 Plattner, “The End of the Transitions Era?”, 13.
21 Hyde and Marinov, “Which Elections Can Be Lost?”
22 In coding this variable, NELDA draws on a range of sources, listed here: https://nelda.co/#sources. This list implies that the variable has been coded on the basis of observers’ “headline” verdicts. Unfortunately, however, it is not clear whether NELDA coders have referred primarily to observers’ interim statements or their final reports, which can vary considerably.
23 Coppedge et al., “V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v7.1”.
24 Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition.
25 López-Pintor and Fischer, “Cost of Registration and Elections (CORE) Project”.
26 Cheeseman, Lynch, and Willis, “Digital Dilemmas”.
27 The World Bank identifies the data source as World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files.
28 This draws on Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries, Development Co-operation Report, and International Development Statistics database, available online: https://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/idsonline.
29 Since a large number of cases receive no US military aid, this approach avoids creating a large number of missing values.
30 In its original form, this is expressed as a percentage of GDP, based on the sources and methods set out by the World Bank, The Changing Wealth of Nations.
31 Kelley, Monitoring Democracy.
32 Kelley, “Assessing the Complex Evolution of Norms”.
33 Roussias and Ruiz-Rufino, “Tying Incumbents’ Hands”; Simpser and Donno, “Can International Election Monitoring Harm Governance?”; Kelley, “Do International Election Monitors Increase or Decrease Opposition Boycotts?”
34 Simpser and Donno, “Can International Election Monitoring Harm Governance?”
35 Kelley, “Do International Election Monitors Increase or Decrease Opposition Boycotts?”
36 Roussias and Ruiz-Rufino, “Tying Incumbents’ Hands”.
37 Kelley, “Do International Election Monitors Increase or Decrease Opposition Boycotts?”
38 Kelley, “D-Minus Elections”.
39 Kelley, “Assessing the Complex Evolution of Norms”.
40 Roussias and Ruiz-Rufino, “Tying Incumbents’ Hands”.
41 Daxecker and Schneider, “Election Monitoring”.
42 Sylvia Bishop and Anke Hoeffler claim their measure of free and fair elections offers a more objective approach but its coverage and consistency are unfortunately limited: see Bishop and Hoeffler, “Free and Fair Elections”.
43 A list of sources used to code NELDA is available online: https://nelda.co/#sources.
44 Except where explicitly stated otherwise, marginal probabilities were calculated with control variables at observed values.
45 Kelley, “D-Minus Elections”, 778.
46 INCUMBENT LOSES is based on NELDA24, which is coded as “N/A” if there is no party associated with the incumbent leader, or it the regime does not allow parties.
47 This measure is the log of total ODA commitments, to the relevant recipient, from: (i) EU institutions; and, (ii) countries that are members of the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee.
48 Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr, Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800–2015, Dataset Users’ Manual.
49 Lynge-Mangueria, “Why “Professionalizing” International Election Observation Might Not Be Enough”.
50 Cheeseman and Klaas, How to Rig an Election, 25, 65.
51 Cheeseman and Klaas, How to Rig an Election, 25.
52 Kelley’s mission-level data does not suffer from this limitation but, unfortunately, does not cover the period after 2004; Kelley, Monitoring Democracy.
53 Kelley, Monitoring Democracy, chapter 4.
54 For definitions see Vickery and Shein, “Assessing Electoral Fraud in New Democracies”.
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Susan Dodsworth
Susan Dodsworth is a Research Fellow at the International Development Department of the University of Birmingham. Her research includes a collaborative project with the Westminster Foundation for Democracy. That project aims to strengthen the evidence base that underpins the provision of democracy assistance. Susan’s research has previously appeared in a variety of journals, including African Affairs and Journal of Development Studies.