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ABSTRACT
One determinant of the success or failure of political revolutions is whether there is a split among the ruling elites. Elite defections in a competitive authoritarian regime can tip the balance in favour of regime change and democratization. This article examines when and why elites defect through the case of Burkina Faso. In October 2014, President Blaise Compaoré of Burkina Faso was forced to step down after 27 years in power and multiple term limits contraventions. We propose a new theory linking growth in democratic attitudes at the grassroots to elite defection from hegemonic parties. We argue that a broad increase in popular democratic attitudes can both decrease the costs and increase the benefits of elite defection, creating conditions that enable elites to rescind their loyalty to the regime. We support this argument with interviews with ruling-party defectors in Burkina Faso and two rounds of Afrobarometer survey data. Our findings demonstrate that democratic attitudes can grow under competitive authoritarian regimes, and that these citizen attitudes can impact regime change by increasing the likelihood of elite defection.
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank Zoumana Wonogo and Colin Cross for excellent research assistance. During this research, Lauren Honig was supported by a Visiting Fellowship from the Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies at the University of Notre Dame. We are grateful to audiences at the Midwest Political Science Association and two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Notes
1. McKie, “The Politics of Institutional Choice”; Harkness, “Military Loyalty.”
2. Tilly and Tarrow, Contentious Politics.
3. Schedler, “Nested Game”; Edgell et al, “When and Where Do Elections Matter?.”
4. O’Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule; Magaloni, Voting for Autocracy; Grzymala-Busse, Rebuilding Leviathan; Brownlee, “Portents of Pluralism”; Levitsky and Way, “Beyond Patronage.”
5. Brownlee, Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization.
6. Ibid.; Geddes, “What Do We Know about Democratization?”
7. Magaloni, Voting for Autocracy; “Credible Power Sharing.”
8. Haggard and Kaufman, The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions; Reuter and Gandhi, “Economic Performance and Elite Defection.”
9. Wood, Forging Democracy from Below.
10. Levitsky and Way, “Beyond Patronage.”
11. Magaloni, Voting for Autocracy.
12. Reuter and Gandhi, “Economic Performance and Elite Defection.”
13. Nunley, “African Elections Database.”
14. Bouju, “La Leçon Des Ordures.”
15. Biehler and Le Bris, “Les Formes d’Opposition.”
16. Hagberg, “Enough Is Enough.”
17. Chouli, “People’s Revolts in Burkina Faso.”
18. Wise, “Chronicle of a Student Strike.”
19. Harsch, “Urban Protest in Burkina Faso.”
20. Hilgers, “Identité Collective.”
21. Mazzocchetti, “Entre Espoirs et Désillusions.”
22. Dwyer, “Situating Soldiers’ Demands.”
23. Wilkins, “The Death of Thomas Sankara”; Bado, “La Démocratie Au Burkina Faso.”
24. RFI, “Burkina Faso”
25. Le Faso.net, “Salif Diallo”
26. All Africa.com,“Meeting de l'Opposition ”
27. Reuters, “Major Party Supports Move to Extend Burkina Faso Leader’s Rule.”
28. International Crisis Group, “Burkina Faso.” 2
29. Frère and Englebert, “Briefing.”
30. Hagberg et al., “Au Coeur de La Révolution Burkinabè,” 203.
31. Frère and Englebert, “Briefing.”
32. Afrobarometer 2008 and 2012.
33. Q70A 2008; Q71A 2012.
34. In 2008, 51% rarely or never; Often (29%), always (9%), DK (10%); In 2012, 50.42% rarely or never; Often (16%), always (4%), DK (29%); 2012 Q52C. This high response to the “don’t know” category may indicate an implicit “Often” or “always.”
35. Gallup World Poll 2008 and 2012
36. 2008 survey, Q30; 2012 survey, Q32.
37. Bratton and Walle, Democratic Experiments in Africa.
38. Weber, “Demography and Democracy.”
39. The federal system of the Mossi pre-colonial state remains salient. Two key subgroups are the Plateau Mossi and the Yatenga Mossi.
40. The key cities included are the capital (Ouagadougou), the economic capital (Bobo –Dioulasso), and the president’s hometown (Ziniare).
41. For further discussion of substantive interpretations of Afrobarometer democracy indicators, see: Zuern, “Democratization as Liberation.”
42. Afrobarometer Round 6.
43. Mattes and Bratton, “Learning about Democracy”; Fails, “Substantive Democratization.”
44. L’Institut National Democratique, “Diagnostic,” 57.
45. The ADF/RDA was aligned with the ruling CDP; they supported Compaoré in the 2005 and 2010 presidential elections, not running their own candidate, and supported the referendum on presidential term limits in 2014.
46. Sidwaya Quotidien, “Burkina Faso”
47. Sidwaya Quotidien, “Sondage Afrobaromètre” ; Lefaso.net, “Sondage Afrobaromètre”
48. Harsch, Burkina Faso, 148–51.
49. Reuter and Gandhi, “Economic Performance and Elite Defection.”
50. Magaloni, Voting for Autocracy.
51. Haggard and Kaufman, The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions.
52. Magaloni, Voting for Autocracy.
53. Brownlee, Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization.
54. Afrobarometer Rounds 5 and 6.
55. Afrobarometer Round 6: Sudan 43%; Swaziland 45%.
Additional information
Funding
Notes on contributors
Sarah Andrews
Sarah Andrews is an Assistant Professor of Global Studies at Principia College.
Lauren Honig
Lauren Honig is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Boston College.