How an Islamist party managed to legitimate its authoritarianization in the eyes of the secularist opposition: the case of Turkey

ABSTRACT

Since at least 2011, Turkey has undergone a dual process of democratic backsliding amid the emergence of a new, authoritarian regime under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. An interesting component of this process of authoritarian turn has been the lack of serious opposition on the part of the opposition parties CHP and IYIP parties to the growing political repression, curtailment of civil liberties and growing consolidation of power in the hands of Erdoğan. In this article, we deal with a major puzzle that emerged in Turkey's politics: how did the AKP regime legitimize its authoritarian transformation of the political system in Turkey in the eyes of CHP and IYIP, despite these parties’ political opposition to the AKP regime and its Islamist agenda? In answering this question, we make use of a causal theory that predicted the intensified use of legitimation claims on the part of the incumbent regimes during authoritarian restructuring. Combining the works of several scholars, we utilize the concept of “missions,” along with ideational narratives, performance objectives and six claims of legitimation to explain how the AKP managed to legitimize its authoritarian grip and regime change even in the eyes of the main opposition parties.

KEYWORDS:

• Legitimation
• authoritarianism
• Turkey
• mission
• ideational narratives

Introduction

Since at least 2011, Turkey has undergone a dual process of democratic backsliding amid the emergence of a new, authoritarian regime under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. As part of this authoritarian turn, Turkey’s political system has been transformed into a presidential system that has given most executive and legislative functions to president Erdoğan, eliminating the principle of separation of powers, and the checks and balances on executive authority. Today, Erdoğan’s AKP (Justice and Development Party) and its ally MHP (Nationalist Action Party) control the judiciary, the Turkish intelligence service, the police force, the state bureaucracy and, partially, the military. Erdoğan also controls most of the media coverage. Not only many journalists but also several opposition MPs have been imprisoned in the process of democratic erosion and authoritarian regime structuring.

An interesting component of this process of authoritarian turn has been the lack of serious opposition on the part of the opposition parties CHP (Republican People's Party) and IYIP (Good Party) parties to the growing political repression, curtailment of civil liberties and growing consolidation of power in the hands of Erdoğan. Specifically, in terms of the main repressive practices of the AKP regime, be it repression and imprisonment of Kurdish political actors, destruction of certain Kurdish towns, shutting down of media organizations and imprisonment of a big number of their members, neither party raised significant opposition to the Erdoganist regime over the years. Instead, they mostly parroted Erdoğan's narrative against the oppressed and their opposition remained limited to the area concerning power and rent sharing. This article deals with this puzzle: how did the AKP regime legitimize its authoritarian turn in the eyes of the opposition CHP and IYIP?

While this process of authoritarian turn has been explored from the angles of the AKP’s strategic calculations, its hegemonic intentions and insecurities, the literature has yet to systematically explore the legitimation strategies employed by the AKP regime to gain the consent of the main opposition parties to its authoritarianism.

Turkey’s authoritarian turn has been the focus of many recent studies. There is widespread consensus in the literature that Turkish democracy has been eroding and there has been a process of authoritarianization since at least 2011. Many scholars have opted for sub-categories of authoritarianism to describe the current regime in Turkey. Konak and Dönmez, as well as White and Herzog describe Turkey’s new regime as electoral authoritarian,¹ whereas Esen and Gümüşçü as well as Özbudun call it competitive authoritarianism.²

There are also those studies that provide alternative concepts to describe the new regime in Turkey. Yilmaz and Bashirov, for example, argue that the new regime in Turkey can best be defined as Erdoganism, which has four main dimensions: an electoral system of electoral authoritarianism; an economic system of neopatrimonialism; a political strategy of populism; and a political ideology of Islamism.³ Somer, however, claims that there have emerged both old (Kemalist) and new (Erdoganist) authoritarianisms in Turkey in recent years.⁴

Yet another stream of literature problematizes the Islamization of Turkey under AKP leadership. Scholars have examined the growing importance of the family, faith-based voluntary organizations, charities, education, and Islam for AKP rule.⁵ Bashirov and Lancaster claim that the AKP has radicalized, becoming an Islamist party in the years following a series of events beginning with the Gezi protests in 2013.⁶ Cinar and Kirdis call this same process “de-moderation” and “immoderation,” respectively.⁷

There have been some attempts to explain the AKP’s authoritarian turn. Akkoyunlu and Oktem argued that the concurrence of a revisionist Islamist project and geopolitical and ideological crises in Turkey’s region have driven existential angst and insecurity among the incumbent AKP to extreme heights.⁸ Starting with the Gezi protests in 2013, the paranoid idea that Western powers, through internal and external agents, are conspiring against the AKP’s rule and Turkey’s sovereignty has become dominant in Turkey. As a consequence of this existential insecurity the AKP has resorted to authoritarian measures to keep itself in power. Castaldo, on the other hand, claims that Erdoğan’s populism represents a significant catalyst for the rise of competitive authoritarianism in Turkey by providing motivation to acquire unchecked control over state institutions and use this power against the opposition.⁹

However, these studies do not provide sufficient explanation as to how the AKP managed to legitimize its authoritarian grip and regime change following the July 2016 coup attempt. Erdoğan has been successful in obtaining the consent of most citizens and elites, including those that represent the opposition parties, for his restructuring of the regime in Turkey. In other words, he has managed to legitimize this restructure in the eyes of not only his own supporters, but also opponents such as the CHP and IYIP. Such a massive restructuring required Erdoğan to offer “a regime-maintaining pattern of identification in which both citizens and relevant groups can see themselves,” and develop “cohesiveness so that sacrifices by the population or concessions among relevant elites can be expected.”¹⁰

Bayulgen et al. argue that the authoritarian reversal in Turkey happened as a result of the strategies of centralization, legitimation and repression pursued by the AKP. While we agree with the centralization and repression components of their analysis, the legitimation component is not sufficient to explain the success and stability of the AKP in materializing the authoritarian transformation.¹¹ Bayulgen et al. provide “ideological legitimation” as the main legitimation strategy employed by the AKP regime. However, their discussion of ideology which touches upon the issues of “Islamist public pronouncements” and neo-Ottomanism, focuses only on the AKP’s discourses directed at its own electorate, neglecting the areas of the AKP’s discourses that appealed to the opposition parties, mainly the CHP and IYIP.¹² In this article, we focus on these arguments put forth by the AKP that worked to entrench the legitimacy of its authoritarian practices in the eyes of the main opposition parties.

Gunay’s article briefly discusses how the AKP regime’s foreign policy has been used as an important source of legitimacy, by appealing to the trauma of the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire which is deeply ingrained in the collective memory of Turks.¹³ While insightful, Gunay’s article does not differentiate between the AKP’s base and the opposition parties in terms of how the foreign policy worked as a source of legitimation particularly to justify the recent authoritarian reversal in Turkey. In addition, our article provides a more complete account of legitimation that examines both internal and external contexts. Similarly, Saracoglu and Demirkol, and Cinar demonstrate how the AKP has used foreign policy to establish its hegemony over others, but not in terms of legitimizing its authoritarian turn.¹⁴

In this article, we argue that an important component of the AKP’s successful restructuring of the political regime in Turkey has been the legitimation of this process in the eyes of the opposition CHP and IYIP through a legitimation construct of “the New Turkey.” An authoritarian restructuring requires several properties, such as (1) justifying the power grab, and the subsequent installation of an authoritarian regime, (2) offering a regime-maintaining pattern of identification in which both citizens and relevant groups can see themselves, and (3) developing cohesiveness so that sacrifices by the population or concessions among relevant elites can be expected temporarily. In order to achieve these goals, the AKP needed to justify its actions in the eyes of not only its own constituents and co-opted allies, but also its political opponents, CHP and IYIP. We argue that the New Turkey construct has provided necessary ideational narratives and performance objectives that allowed the AKP to achieve these goals.

To explain the case of the AKP, we use an eclectic theory of legitimation that engages with the recent literature on the concept. In particular, we make use of analytical concepts developed by Gerschewski, von Soest and Grauvogel and Kneuer. In what follows, first we very briefly discuss the academic literature on legitimation strategies by authoritarian regimes and then Kneuer’s “missions theory.” Then we examine the regime restructuring in Turkey in recent years and explain the AKP’s mission of “New Turkey.” The following two sections respectively examine legitimation constructs of ideational narratives and performance objectives used by the Erdoganist regime and how the CHP and IYIP reacted to these legitimation constructs. The final section concludes.

Legitimation theory

How do autocratic regimes stabilize their rule? What part does legitimation play in this stabilization? These questions have become the focus of recent work on authoritarianism in the literature.¹⁵ This research generally focuses on the stabilizing role of institutions, including elections, but also the neopatrimonial arrangements, nationalist ideas and repressive methods. Gerschewski argues that autocracies have three pillars of stability: repression, co-optation and legitimation.¹⁶ Repression is an important backbone of autocracies and involves actual or threatened use of violence against well-known individuals and groups, as well as those of minor importance. However, repression alone cannot provide necessary stability to autocracies since it is costly and can have destabilizing effects in the long run.¹⁷

Another pillar is co-optation, which refers to “tie strategically-relevant actors (or a group of actors) to the regime elite.”¹⁸ Co-optation usually involves neo-patrimonial arrangements between the ruling elite and the co-opted groups such as those belonging to military, business and political spheres, and aims at preventing emergence of a strong opposition actors.

Legitimation means “the process of gaining support” and “seeks to guarantee active consent, compliance with the rules, passive obedience, or mere toleration within the population.”¹⁹ Every political order, be it democratic or autocratic, has to rely on some sort of legitimacy idea. Gerschewski states that legitimation has two components: specific and diffuse support.²⁰ Specific support refers to the performance orientation of legitimation and involves the autocracies’ peculiar ways of meeting popular demands in economic and security domains. Diffuse support, however is about the identity of the regime and stem from political ideologies, and “from religious, nationalistic, or traditional claims, from the charisma of autocratic leaders as well as from external treats.”²¹ The focus of legitimation research is directed at empirical analysis of these two components. Building on the literature on legitimation strategies of the authoritarian regimes, Von Soes and Grauvogel identify six claims to legitimacy: foundational myth, ideology, personalism, procedures, performance and international engagement.²²

The extant literature mainly focuses on “stabilization of autocracies.” However, as the case of Turkey shows, legitimation research needs to be expanded to the role of legitimation in securing regime restructuring, particularly democratic backsliding and autocratic transformation. Kneuer’s work provides such a framework through articulation of the concept of missions and its components.²³ This framework relies on empirical analysis of two components of legitimation that also cover six claims to legitimacy: ideational narratives and performance objectives. Ideational narratives have their sources in, inter alia, nationalist ideas, traditions, religious beliefs and identitarian narratives. They are “designed to achieve an affective appeal and generate allegiance to the regime.”²⁴ The performance objectives refer to the political programme of an authoritarian government, specifically its performance-focused objectives on national security, economic development, and social affairs. In our understanding, ideational narratives and performance objectives are related very closely to the concepts of specific and diffuse support in Gerschewski’s framework. They are also related to the six claims of legitimacy presented by Von Soest and Grauvogel.

Kneuer collects these two components under the roof of one main legitimizing construct, mission. Mission is introduced as “a functional equivalent to ideologies” and denotes the non-ideological character of most of today’s authoritarian regimes. Specifically, missions are pragmatic and present-oriented constructions. In our case, it has more explanatory power as we are analysing how an Islamist party managed to legitimate its authoritarianization in the eyes of opposition parties with different ideological orientations: a secularist, Kemalist party (CHP) and a Turkish secular-nationalist party (IYIP).

Our empirical analysis is divided into two sections, performance objectives and ideational narratives. Although derived from Kneuer’s framework, these are compatible with Gerscewski’s analytical concepts of specific and diffuse support as well. Moreover, in our analysis, we will incorporate von Soest and Grauvogel’s six “claims to legitimacy” which are used by authoritarian regimes as a means of securing their authoritarian rule. We will discuss foundational myth, ideological claims and personalism under the heading of ideational narratives, whereas procedures and performance narratives will be discussed under performance objectives. International objectives will be discussed both as a component of ideational narratives and performance objectives. Similar to von Soest and Grauvogel, our focus is on “legitimation as the strategy used to seek legitimacy rather than on legitimacy itself” (emphasis original).²⁵

In this article, we focus on how AKP legitimized its authoritarian turn in the eyes of the opposition CHP and IYIP. Our analysis does not include MHP, because MHP has been co-opted by the AKP since the June 2015 elections. Following the June 2015 elections in which the pro-Kurdish HDP passed the electoral threshold for the first time in history, the AKP shelved the Kurdish peace process, and embraced an ultra-nationalist position of the MHP that prescribed total elimination of Kurdish political figures. This de-facto alliance strengthened after the July 2016 coup attempt, and finally gained official character with the establishment of the People’s Alliance between AKP and MHP to contest the 2018 general elections.²⁶

The HDP, on the other hand, has been neither co-opted by the AKP regime, nor has it been the focus of AKP’s legitimation strategy. The AKP regime securitized the HDP following the June 2015 elections, and started a brutal repression against the party officials as a result of which many members of the party, including its co-president Selahattin Demirtas were put in prison.²⁷ Hence, the regime’s treatment of HDP falls into repression category. Moreover, the repression of HDP played a significant role in helping the AKP regime to co-opt MHP, and soften, and in some cases directly silence, the opposition of CHP and IYIP, as the HDP was constructed as an antagonistic other of the Turkish state, and all mainstream political parties.

AKP’s legitimization of the autocratic transformation in the eyes of the CHP and IYIP

The fact that the authoritarian turn has been legitimized in the eyes of the opposition CHP and IYIP constitutes the main puzzle of our article. Although these parties challenged the incumbent AKP in the presidential, local and parliamentary elections as well as in the constitutional referendum, this political challenge mainly rested on clash of interest and did not amount to a support of democratic ideals. However, neither party launched serious, necessary opposition to authoritarianization in the country, which involved the AKP’s increasing control of judiciary, oppression of civil society, cracking down on dissent, the imprisonment of judges, prosecutors, members of the parliament, and journalists. The main point here is that their decision to not field a necessary-level opposition, their silent affirmation of AKP’s crackdown, their use of AKP’s narrative against the regime’s constructed “enemies” enabled the autocratic transformation as a legitimate undertaking. The IYIP, which was established in October 2017 as an offshoot of the nationalist MHP, supported the regime’s position on crackdown against civil society organizations, liberal intellectuals, Kurdish activists and Gulenists. The group that established IYIP broke away from MHP, citing the latter’s pro-Erdoğan stance since 2015. Nonetheless, in terms of the issues of authoritarianization, which this article is concerned about, they largely followed the position of MHP. IYIP officials abstained from mentioning the regime’s human rights abuses, shutting down of independent media organizations, and its destruction of the HDP and Gulenists. Therefore, although IYIP opposed Erdoğan politically, it continued to support Erdoğan’s positions and legitimation constructs in terms most related to authoritarianization in Turkey. IYIP did not mention the Kurds in its party programme.²⁸ IYIP’s leader Meral Aksener supported the regime’s invasion of Syrian town Afrin, describing it as a “necessity” and warned that “Manbij should not be forgotten,” referring to the Syrian town that was once invaded by ISIS and then by the Syrian Democratic Forces.²⁹ The IYIP leadership also endorsed the regime’s narrative that demonized the HDP and the entire Gulenist organization.³⁰

CHP, on the other hand, decided not to effectively object to the rigging of the referendum in 2017 and presidential elections in 2018,³¹ thus providing a sense of legitimacy to the restructuring of the regime. CHP’s presidential candidate in the 2018 elections, Muharrem Ince, decided not to field strong opposition to numerous claims of vote rigging in the presidential elections, and instead, acknowledged Erdoğan’s victory on election night, without even waiting for all votes to be counted. Moreover, the CHP supported the elimination of political immunity for members of the Turkish parliament. This motion was introduced by the AKP and the MHP in order to open the door to prosecute the HDP MPs. Ironically, in addition to several HDP MPs, including the party’s leader Selahattin Demirtas, two CHP MPs, Enis Berberoglu and Eren Erdem, were also imprisoned thanks to the removal of the political immunity.

Moreover, CHP did not confront the AKP’s exclusionary narrative that constructed the political forces as enemies of each other: those who are “native and national” on the one hand, and “foreign and other” on the other. The latter group included the pro-Kurdish HDP, liberal intellectuals, as well as Gulenists. Especially in the post-abortive coup period, this discourse, which also portrayed Turkey under existential threat of invasion by foreign enemies and their internal agents, gained strong legitimacy and support both in political and societal level in Turkey. While this discourse has created a sense of belonging amongst AKP’s conservative-nationalist electorate, it has also worked to force the opposition CHP and IYIP to accept the legitimacy of AKP’s practices to “protect the nation” through antidemocratic practices. Due to the high-level societal legitimacy of and support for this narrative, instead of confronting this construction, CHP decided to take a conservative position, moving itself more to the “legitimate” centre and trying to demonstrate its “native and national” characteristics. The CHP participated in the “Democracy and Martyrs Rally” that was held on 7 August 2016. This regime-organized demonstration was designed to legitimize the regime’s narrative that constructed the post-coup repression as a defence of democracy and abused the concept of martyrdom to support the autocratic transformation. As the leader of CHP, Kemal Kilicdaroglu stated, “after July 15, there is a new Turkey” (emphasis ours).³² The AKP regime’s skilful use of this narrative has disarmed CHP’s capability to effectively resist the establishment of antidemocratic structures and cornered CHP to such an extent that any possible collaboration – even of tactical and short-term – with the HDP has been delegitimized and paralyzed. As a result, as an Economics Intelligence Unit report mentioned, “In recent years the CHP – the largest party in opposition, led by Kemal Kilicdaroglu – has taken an active yet often ineffective stance in defence of the rule of law and the independence of the judiciary.”³³

We do not claim that CHP or IYIP did not launch any opposition to the AKP regime during this period. Various CHP politicians, including the leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu, criticized Erdoğan’s policies in their speeches, in particular, Erdoğan’s ambition to establish a “one-man rule” in Turkey.³⁴ CHP also organized the Justice March (Adalet Yuruyusu) between June and July 2017, during which the party officials criticized the impact of the government purge on the independence of the judiciary.³⁵ Nonetheless, we argue that the CHP’s opposition was motivated mainly by its party interests and therefore have not had the desired effect. Moreover, the main themes of the CHP’s opposition were within the AKP regime’s overarching discourse that glorified ultranationalist, anti-Western themes, and trivialized the repression of independent media and civil society organizations.

For example, instead of opposing the systematic repression of every person thought to be affiliated with the Gulen Movement, CHP decided to use the anti-Gulenist mantra to score political points against AKP. Thus, it has solidified, legitimated and strengthened AKP’s narrative that constructed members of the Gulen movement as enemies of the nation and as even terrorists. Also, not only did the CHP “remained silent on the repression and marginalization of the HDP,” but also “voted for the lifting of the immunities of mandate holders in May 2016” and “vehemently supported the AKP government's military invasions of the Kurdish territories in northern Syria and northern Iraq to combat the PKK and Kurdish gains.”³⁶ It has been argued that the ultra-nationalist faction (ulusalcilar) in the CHP dominates the post-coup-attempt era discourse in the party and, consequently, CHP prioritizes state-security over the massive and systematic human rights violations.³⁷

The New Turkey mission

The above section demonstrated that the AKP regime has managed to legitimize the autocratic transformation of the political system in Turkey in the eyes of the main opposition parties CHP and IYIP. In this section, we deal with the question as to how the AKP has managed to do so. As we discussed in detail, we will use the concept of missions, ideational narratives and performance objectives to explain the AKP’s legitimation strategy. Our explanation will also discuss the six claims of legitimacy proposed by von Soest and Grauvogel where relevant. The empirical section will be composed of two sections: ideational narratives and performance objectives.

In this section, we examine the AKP regime’s legitimizing strategy, its “New Turkey” mission. The New Turkey mission has a strong emphasis on a fully independent, very strong Turkey that is a leading regional and even global power. One of the most noteworthy features of the mission is that it is presented as a “native” and “national” strategy. Accordingly, since he seized absolute power, Erdoğan has presented himself as the chief (in Turkish reis), the wise, native and national (yerli and milli) leader of the Turkish people who executes the mission.

According to Taha Ozhan, an ideologue of the new regime, the New Turkey is comprised of three factors: independence, democracy and development.³⁸ Here, independence refers to being “unshackled from Western domination,”³⁹ and is closely related to anti-Western sentiments of the nationalist and conservative sections of the society who are the overwhelming majority in Turkey. This narrative is also closely related to the ontological insecurity of Turkey vis-à-vis the West.⁴⁰ The “democracy” is a rather “Turkish-style” democracy that relies on majoritarianism, a hegemonic leader who is the embodiment of the Rousseauean general will and obedient institutions, somewhat similar to the concept of Russian democracy provided by Putin.⁴¹ Development refers to reaching economic, military and political power such that Turkey is considered as a great power. As a practical demonstration of this power, the New Turkey “has neither a need nor patience to receive order from anyone [to pursue its interests] in Syria and Iraq.”⁴² This idea appeals to almost all nationalists, be it secular or religious, Kemalist or Eurasianist. It simultaneously appeals to those who think the West is exploiting the Kurdish and Alevi issues, and is using Gulenists, Kurds and Alevis to undermine Turkey. While the mission’s apparent emphasis on reinventing the old Ottoman glory days is not well-received by secular elites,⁴³ Erdoğan skilfully manipulates the elite opinion and perception through tactical references to Mustafa Kemal and tries to downgrade the Ottoman ideal in official addresses directed at the Kemalist elite.⁴⁴ The New Turkey mission’s emphasis on independent, strong, well-developed Turkey, freed from its internal and external enemies appeals to very wide segments of society and members of political elite.⁴⁵

Ideational narratives

Ideational narratives have their sources in, inter alia, nationalist ideas, traditions, religious beliefs and identitarian discourses. The main ideational narratives of the New Turkey mission are to gain independence from foreign intrusion and achieve former greatness as an independent and powerful Turkish Muslim nation that leads the Muslim World and has an important say in international and global affairs.

Erdoğan exploited the July 2016 coup attempt to mobilize Turkish society based on his discourse of “defending their country” against “internal traitors” or the enemies of the state that were controlled as puppets by external enemies. The idea that Turkey is under attack is the main pillar of the entire mission-construct. The regime generated a demonic image of the Gulen Movement, labelling it with various insults and hateful notions, and labelling it as a terrorist organization.⁴⁶ Erdoğan’s discourse of victimhood, and the promise of revanchism – at a national and international level – supports the acceptance of this mission and narrative.

Foreign policy has been another important area where the Erdoğan regime has managed to legitimize its restructuring of the old regime and concomitant authoritarian turn. The main ideational narrative is achieving the former greatness of the Turkish nation, with another narrative of independence vis-à-vis the West. Erdoğan intentionally initiated a shift in Turkish foreign policy orientation after the coup attempt.⁴⁷

The coup attempt in July 2016 provided an ample opportunity to the Erdoğan regime to effectively use these ideational narratives in domestic context. After the attempted coup in 2016, Erdoğan purged his opponents in the military from their positions. The regime considers the purged officers and soldiers Gulenists and since the failed coup, Erdoğan and his inner circle, including the minister for interior affairs, Suleyman Soylu, specifically accused the United States of being the mastermind behind the coup attempt.⁴⁸ Turkish media outlets controlled by the regime claimed that the United States had tried to assassinate President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan on the night of the failed coup.⁴⁹ Erdoğan has accused the West of supporting terrorism and standing by coup plotters and questioned Turkey’s relationship with the United States, claimed that the “script” for the unsuccessful putsch was “written abroad” (meaning in the US) and claimed that Western spies are “roaming freely” across Turkey.⁵⁰

In this, the Erdoğan regime has managed to turn the July 15 coup attempt into a new “foundational myth” of the Turkish nation. Von Soest and Grauvogel argue that “particularly strong solidarity ties are established during periods of violent struggle such as war and liberation movements which are often used as powerful legitimation narratives.”⁵¹ The parties use their role in national liberation struggle as a powerful legitimation argument. The July 2016 coup attempt provided an ample opportunity to the incumbent Islamist regime in Turkey to establish a narrative of foundational myth around its role in leading the modern liberation movement in 2016.⁵² This narrative had resonance with the CHP and IYIP (then a faction of MHP until October 2017). AKP’s narrative forced CHP and IYIP to either accept the foundational myth or be painted as supporters of the coup attempt and hence, the puppets of external and internal enemies. Although the power of this narrative on CHP and IYIP faded by the late 2018, by then, the regime had already completed the autocratic transformation.

A crucial reason why this narrative has been influential over both CHP and IYIP is that it is not based strictly on Islamist ideology, but rather on a broader concept of Turkish nationalism. While Islamist references have been effectively used by the AKP regime to maintain the support of its conservative base, the July 15 coup attempt has been described with narratives of nationalism, independence from the Western influence, and fight against internal enemies that have resonated with both the opposition and the supporters of the AKP.⁵³

Nonetheless, the regime has failed to deliver on some of its internal objectives in relation to making Turkey great again and a global leader, most importantly that of economic development. An important argument that Erdoğan and the AKP promoted on the referendum trail in 2017 was that the presidential system would allow the Turkish economy to boom. However, the Turkish economy has been in freefall over the last two years, especially after Erdoğan’s election to president in June 2018. Since January 2018, the Turkish Lira has lost more than 38% of its value, leading to very high levels of inflation (19.5%), and eventual recession after three quarters of negative growth spanning mid-2018 to early 2019. Turkish citizens and banks are finding it very hard to repay their debts, most of which is denominated in US Dollars and Euros.⁵⁴ Therefore, while the referendum itself gained procedural legitimacy for the presidential system, the fact that the AKP and Erdoğan failed to deliver on their economic objectives, has forced them to resort to ideational narratives even more ferociously to stave off growing criticisms and justify their worsening economic record. This is in line with scholars’ findings in the contexts of other countries, such as Venezuela and Russia.⁵⁵ Erdoğan has resorted to the narrative of national independence against the interest lobby and foreign plotters who wants to steal the Turkish people’s bread and butter, presenting the AKP as the hero of the people who delivers economic outputs during this hard time.⁵⁶

Performance objectives

The main performance objective of the regime is eliminating internal enemies and allies of the West that operate inside Turkey so that the New Turkey will be an independent and great power. This internal enemy category includes most famously the Gulenists and Kurdish nationalists, but also anyone and any organization who cooperates with the West and/or opposes the Erdoğan regime’s internal or external policies for any reason. This performance objective includes tracing and eliminating these domestic enemies in order to re-establish security and order. This process has been designated by Erdoğan as a process of “cleansing” or “purifying” the state, its institutions and society.

An effective instrument of this performance objective has been the authoritarian police state’s mass persecution of those who are considered to be supporters of Gulen or HDP.⁵⁷ This has also helped the AKP with the performance objective of the regime, to establish a strong state which was mentioned in the above section. Thus, a considerable number of civil and military bureaucracy, including approximately 50% of all admirals and generals in the Turkish military, about 4000 judges and prosecutors, more than 9000 police officers, more than 8000 academics, 28,000 teachers, and more than 150,000 public servants have been purged since 2016.⁵⁸ Within the army, most of the purged personnel have been identified to be pro-NATO officers, as Erdoğan believes that NATO was behind the coup attempt in July 2016.⁵⁹

In domestic politics, Erdoğan has pursued a policy of overthrowing the kind of opposition that questions the official narrative of 15 July 2016. Those who rejects this narrative is considered a potential Gulenist. This performance objective does not only include eliminating Gulenists but also other opposition that questions this performance objective, for example, liberal-democrat intellectuals and some Kurdish activists.

Erdoğan has stated multiple times that he and the regime would enter the “hiding places of the traitors.”⁶⁰ The great majority of persecutions of the aforementioned groups are based on allegations not supported by solid evidence and the principle of individual criminal responsibility has been systematically violated, being replaced by guilt by association. Furthermore, Turkey’s human rights record has deteriorated severely in the wake of the coup attempt through the systematic and massive purge, with the main opposition parties (CHP and IYIP) accepting the discourse of the articulated “mission,” its performance objectives and the ways and means of achieving them.

In foreign policy, the main performance objectives of the New Turkey mission are: (1) gaining regional leadership in the ex-Ottoman Muslim lands of the Balkans and the Middle East; and (2) opposing Western, especially American, interests in the region. Since the failed coup attempt, various US, German and other Western citizens have been charged or arrested.⁶¹

Turkish–US relations worsened dramatically after the failed coup. Erdoğan considered the US reaction to the failed putsch as supportive and demanded the extradition of Fethullah Gulen, the Pennsylvania-based Islamic scholar and leader of the Gulen Movement. There are other complications as well, including Turkey’s S-400 air defence system acquisition from Russia, the US-origin F35 Joint Strike Fighter aircraft issue, US–Turkey interactions in Syria in relation to Kurdish region in the country’s north, the effect of Turkey’s domestic situation on bilateral relations.⁶² While Turkey views Kurdish rebels in north Syria as terrorists, the US has been backing them in the fight against ISIS. Another issue concerns US sanctions on Iran due to its dubious nuclear programme and Turkey’s backing of Iran via Turkish Halkbank. A US investigation into Turkish Halkbank for its violation of sanctions on Iran, and the implicit approval of the Erdoğan regime, has further increased tensions.⁶³ The detention of Reverend Brunson, Golge and other American citizens in Turkey has also contributed to the deterioration.⁶⁴ After the failed coup, Erdoğan also loosened Turkey’s ties with other Western countries such as Germany, the Netherlands and Austria. Several crises arose at this time that must be explained in the context of the negative atmosphere of the post-coup deterioration. Regarding their perceptions about the regime, CHP and IYIP are quite close to Erdoğan’s mission and performance objectives.

How did the mission work on the opposition CHP and IYIP to create legitimacy for the regime’s autocratic transformation? The New Turkey mission, complete with its ideational narratives and performance objectives, has enabled the AKP to justify its authoritarian restructuring of the political regime in the eyes of not only the citizens but also the opposition elites within the IYIP and the CHP.

While Erdoğan’s objectives to Islamize society and create a pious generation served to gain legitimation in the eyes of his conservative base; for the MHP (later IYIP) and CHP, it was the anti-Western, nationalist and pro-Eurasianist narratives that were most effective. Erdoğan’s anti-Westernism has found resonance within both the nationalist MHP (later IYIP) and the CHP, with its distrusts of Western powers stemming from the Kemalist ontological insecurity vis-à-vis the West.⁶⁵

CHP prioritizes state-security over the massive and systematic human rights violations. CHP has historically been the guardian of the Kemalist ideology in Turkey which has rested on the rigid Turkish nationalist ideology that discredited all non-Turkish identities as alien. Its state-centric roots and secular nationalist ideological fabric commonly prioritized the securitization of sensitive policy areas such as identity politics and religion-state affairs. When it comes to HDP and the Kurdish movement, CHP historically considered “the Kurdish question per se as a danger to Turkish national and territorial unity and prefers an anti-Kurdish attitude.”⁶⁶

Thanks to its ultra-nationalist components, the New Turkey mission has appeased the CHP, since the secular-nationalist world-view dominated the position of the party regarding the Kurdish issue. The CHP was also keen to eliminate Gulenists and was not eager to defend the rights of other democratic forces such as the liberals who in the past supported the AKP’s right to rule Turkey. For most secular-nationalists, the elimination of the Gulenists by an Islamist leader and his party was a positive arrangement – even if the destruction of the constitutional order and democracy was a high price to pay for this objective. The Kemalists within the CHP are not known for their support for the basic rights of the Kurds in Turkey. On the contrary, their position on the Peace Process (negotiations with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party) was similar to that of the MHP.⁶⁷ As the main opposition party, the CHP has continued its opposition to Erdoğan in most areas outside the mission and those policies connected with it.

The state-centric approach and their similar positions on the failed coup and the Kurdish question bring the CHP and MHP (and later IYIP) in line with Erdoğan’s mission. Even after their departure from the MHP, IYIP leaders either continued repeating Erdoğan’s or MHP’s narratives. In this narrative, the West is unreliable, dishonourable, suspicious, and evil-minded – an external force that endangers Turkey’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, stability and economic prosperity. Turkey’s NATO membership is portrayed as exploiting Turkey and hindering its capabilities to make its own foreign and security decisions.⁶⁸ MHP and IYIP legitimize this perception with their Turkish right-wing nationalist ideology, whereas CHP legitimizes it through its anti-imperialistic and left-nationalistic ideology.⁶⁹ The instrumentalization of security concerns both in domestic and in foreign relations, underpinned by the failed coup (domestic politics dimension) and anti-Western discourses (foreign and security policy dimension), thus fulfil their function. While MHP acts in full submission to the regime, even collaborating with Erdoğan and his party, as in the 2019 presidential elections (People-Alliance) and enabling Erdoğan to retain his position, CHP situates itself somewhere between the Erdoğan–MHP alliance and the Kurds. Although CHP cooperated with the IYIP in the 2018 presidential elections (Nation Alliance), it did not cooperate with the pro-Kurdish HDP, whose co-chair Selahattin Demirtas (jailed for about two years) was the third candidate in the elections.

A dramatic demonstration of the legitimacy of the autocratic transformation has been the “ideological uniformity” displayed by the major parties and candidates ahead of the 2018 presidential elections. Whether it was CHP’s Muharrem Ince, IYIP’s Meral Aksener or AKP’s Tayyip Erdoğan, “candidates espouse strong sentiments of activist nationalism, Muslim piety or, sometimes, both.”⁷⁰ Neither party raised an issue with the repression of the HDP politicians or the armed conflict with the Kurds in Southeastern Turkey and Northern Syria.

The success of this mission is that it has legitimized a new “national” stand in foreign affairs based on its discourse. Thus, when the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) adopted a resolution in January 2019 on the worsening situation of opposition politicians in Turkey with 72 votes in favour, the Turkish members of the PACE, from the AKP, MHP, CHP and IYIP voted against the motion whereas members from the HDP voted in favour.⁷¹

Conclusion

In this article, we dealt with a major puzzle that emerged in Turkey politics: how did the AKP regime legitimize its authoritarian transformation of the political system in Turkey in the eyes of the main opposition parties (CHP and IYIP), despite these parties’ political opposition to the AKP regime and their ideological differences with AKP’s Islamism? In answering this question, we made use of a causal theory that predicted the intensified use of legitimation claims on the part of the incumbent regimes during authoritarian restructuring. Combining the works of several scholars, we utilized the concept of “missions,” along with ideational narratives, performance objectives and six claims of legitimation to explain how the AKP managed to legitimize its authoritarian grip and regime change even in the eyes of the main opposition parties.

We tested both of these strategies according to Kneuer’s theoretical model of “mission,” which is defined as legitimatory construct that functions to create a political programme that focuses on performance and to generate ideational/identitarian discourses that produce loyalty to the regime. In contemporary Turkey, the mission of New Turkey is based on permanent confrontation against internal and external threats. In domestic affairs, the study confirms that the mission was able to shape a sufficient equilibrium in the regime. More importantly, the dialogue-form of political communication between the “native and national” alliance (AKP-MHP), the CHP, and IYIP re-produces this balance and contributes to the durability of the regime. The success of the mission is, again, due to the coup attempt, which legitimized a new “national” stand on foreign affairs. Erdoğan portrays his leadership as the pivot of strong statehood and stability and emphasizes traditional values and patriotism, a unitary state, the territorial integrity of Turkey and Turkey’s significant leadership roles in international affairs. As a matter of fact, all these features are jeopardized if “native and national leadership” diminishes. The mission and its performance objectives concern the survival of the state and nation, which means they are strategies to ensure stability of the regime. Kneuer also highlights the relevance of the question of how long missions are able to facilitate regime endurance, and this remains to be seen in the Turkish case as well. The future of the regime in Turkey depends to some extent on the persuasiveness of the discourse, whose main narrative is based on the failed coup.

We argued that the Erdoğan regime designed the “New Turkey,” in both domestic and foreign policy realms, as its central mission to justify its authoritarian turn. The main ideational narratives of this mission are to gain independence from foreign intrusion and achieve its former greatness as an independent Muslim power who is an important global actor, former greatness of the Turkish nation, and gain independence vis-à-vis the West. The main performance objectives of the regime are eliminating internal enemies and allies of the West from within and the establishment of the strong state, gaining regional leadership in the ex-Ottoman Muslim lands of the Balkans and the Middle East, and opposing Western, and especially American, interests in this region. We argued that the mission, complete with its ideational narratives and performance objectives, enabled the AKP to justify its authoritarian restructuring of the political regime in the eyes of not only the citizens but also the opposition elites within the IYIP and the CHP. While Erdoğan’s objectives to Islamize the society and create a pious generation have served to gain legitimation in the eyes of his conservative base, for the IYIP and CHP, anti-Western, nationalist and pro-Eurasianist narratives have been more effective. Erdoğan’s anti-Westernism has found resonance within both the IYIP politicians, known for their Turkish nationalist and xenophobic tendencies, and the CHP, with its perception of Western powers as imperialists, inherited from the Turkish independence war years. The Turkish case is a remarkable example of authoritarianization where a ruling party has effectively benefitted from the political opportunity structures created by serious and traumatic crisis (the coup attempt) and has legitimized its regime change by appealing to the fears, anxieties and expectations of the elites of the opposition parties.

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No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Ihsan Yilmaz

Professor Ihsan Yilmaz is the Research Chair of Islamic Studies and Intercultural Dialogue at Deakin University. Previously he worked at Oxford, SOAS and Istanbul Fatih Universities.

Mehmet Efe Caman

Dr Mehmet Efe Caman is a Visiting Assistant Professor at the Memorial University's political science department. Previously he worked as a full professor at Turkish-German University in Istanbul.

Galib Bashirov

Dr Galib Bashirov is a Research Fellow at the Deakin University's Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Dialogue. He has a PhD from the Florida International University.

Notes

1 Konak and Özgür Dönmez, “Deconstructing a Neopatrimonial via Humour”; White and Herzog, “Examining state capacity.”

2 Esen and Gümüşçü, “Rising competitive authoritarianism in Turkey”; Özbudun, “Turkey’s Judiciary and the Drift.”

3 Yilmaz and Bashirov, “The AKP After 15 Years.”

4 Somer, “Understanding Turkey’s Democratic Breakdown.”

5 Kaya, “Islamisation of Turkey Under the AKP Rule”; Kandiyoti and Emanet, “Education as Battleground”; Ozturk, “Turkey’s Diyanet Under AKP Rule”; Yilmaz, “Islamic Populism and Creating Desirable Citizens.”

6 Bashirov and Lancaster, “End of Moderation.”

7 Cinar, “From moderation to De-moderation”; Kirdis, “Wolves in Sheep Clothing.”

8 Akkoyunlu and Oktem, “Existential Insecurity.”

9 Castaldo, “Populism and Competitive Authoritarianism.”

10 Kneuer, “Legitimation Beyond Ideology,” 188–9.

11 Bayulgen, Arbatli, and Canbolat, “Elite Survival Strategies.”

12 Ibid.

13 Gunay, “Foreign Policy as a Source of Legitimation,” 41.

14 Saracoglu and Demirkol, “Nationalism and Foreign Policy”; Cinar, “‘Western’ or ‘Muslim’ Identity.”

15 See in detail Dukalskis and Gerschewski, “What Autocracies Say”; Gerschewski, “The Three Pillars,”; “Legitimacy in Autocracies”; von Soest and Grauvogel, “Comparing Legitimation Strategies”; “Identity, Procedures and Performance”; Holbig, “Ideology after the End of Ideology”; Kailitz, “Classifying Political Regimes Revisited.”

16 Gerschewski, “The Three Pillars of Legitimacy.”

17 Davenport, “State Repression and Political Order”; Escriba-Folch, “Repression, Political Threats.”

18 Gerschewski, “The Three Pillars,” 22.

19 Ibid., 18.

20 See also Easton, “A Systems Analysis.”

21 Gerschewski, “The Three Pillars,” 20.

22 Von Soest and Grauvogel, “Identity, Procedures and Performance.”

23 Kneuer, “Legitimation Beyond Ideology.”

24 Ibid., 3.

25 Von Soest and Grauvogel, “Identity, Procedures,” 288.

26 Stevenson, T. “‘Our Bodies Are Turkish, Our Souls Islamic!’ The Rise of Turkey's Ultra-nationalists.” Middle East Eye. https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/our-bodies-are-turkish-our-souls-islamic-rise-turkeys-ultra-nationalists.

27 Weiss, “From Constructive Engagement to Renewed Estrangement?”

28 Deutsche Welle. “Turkish Nationalists Form New Party Challenging Erdoğan.” 2017. https://www.dw.com/en/turkish-nationalists-form-new-party-challenging-erdogan/a-41101708.

29 Euronews. “Akşener: Fırat'ın doğusu asla gözden kaçırılmamalıdır.” 2018. https://tr.euronews.com/2018/02/26/aksener-f-rat-n-dogusu-asla-gozden-kac-r-lmamal-d-r.

30 Yenicag. “İYİ Parti'den FETÖ iddiasına sert tepki!.” 2019. https://www.yenicaggazetesi.com.tr/iyi-partiden-feto-iddiasina-sert-tepki-239924h.htm.

31 See OSCE, Turkey, Constitutional Referendum, 16 April 2017: Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions; OSCE, Turkey, Early Presidential and Parliamentary Elections, 24 June 2018: Final Report https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/turkey/397049.

32 BBC Turkce. “Yenikapı'da üç partinin katılımıyla ‘Demokrasi ve Şehitler Mitingi’.” 2016. https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler-turkiye-37002177.

33 The Economist Intelligence Unit. Turkey: Political Forces at a Glance. 2019. https://country.eiu.com/article.aspx?articleid=1478038731&Country=Turkey&topic=Summary&subtopic=Political±forces±at±a±glance.

34 See Milliyet. “Tek adam rejimine karşıyız.” 2016. http://www.milliyet.com.tr/siyaset/tek-adam-rejimine-karsiyiz-2333114.

35 Roberts, R. “Thousands Gather in Istanbul to Protest Against Turkish President Following ‘Justice March’.” 2017. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/thousands-of-protesters-gather-istanbul-protest-turkey-president-erdogan-a7832446.html.

36 Gurbey, G. “The Difficult Relationship Between the Kemalist CHP and the Kurdish HDP.” 2019. https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/north-africa-west-asia/difficult-relationship-between-kemalist-chp-and-kurdish-hdp/, see also Keyman, “The CHP and the ‘Democratic Opening’.”

37 Karabagli, H. “CHP'nin ‘ulusalcı’ kanadında Kaftancıoğlu rahatsızlığı.” 2018. https://t24.com.tr/haber/chpnin-ulusalci-kanadinda-kaftancioglu-rahatsizligi,535881.

38 Ozhan, T. “The New Turkey Phenomenon.” 2014. https://www.setav.org/en/the-new-turkey-phenomenon/.

39 Koru, S. “Has Erdoğan’s Populism Reached Its Limits?” 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/02/opinion/turkey-erdogan-election-defeat.html.

40 Zarakol, “Ontological (In)security”; Capan and Zarakol, “Turkey’s Ontological Self.”

41 Aliriza, B. “Erdoğan Takes Total Control of ‘New Turkey’.” 2018. https://www.csis.org/analysis/erdogan-takes-total-control-new-turkey.

42 140journos. “Erdoğan: ‘Cumhuriyet, Gazi Mustafa Kemal Paşa Liderliğinde Yürütülen Destansı Bir Mücadelenin Ürünüdür’.” 2016. https://140journos.com/erdo%C4%9Fan-cumhuriyet-gazi-mustafa-kemal-pa%C5%9Fa-liderli%C4%9Finde-y%C3%BCr%C3%BCt%C3%BClen-destans%C4%B1-bir-m%C3%BCcadelenin-%C3%BCr%C3%BCn-ad41aede62b8.

43 The Economist. “Erdoğan Inaugurates a New Political Era in Turkey.” 2018. https://www.economist.com/europe/2018/06/28/erdogan-inaugurates-a-new-political-era-in-turkey.

44 140journos. “Erdoğan: ‘Cumhuriyet, Gazi Mustafa Kemal Paşa’.”

45 TV100. “Erdoğan: Yeni Türkiye'yi kabullenmekte zorlanıyorlar.” 2019. https://www.tv100.com/erdogan-yeni-turkiyeyi-kabullenmekte-zorlaniyorlar-haber-459390.

46 For a detailed summary of this hate-discourse of the regime, see: Rethink Institute (Ed.), Hate Speech and Beyond: Targeting the Gulen Movement in Turkey, Turkey Task Force, Rethink Paper 16, (2014). http://www.rethinkinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/Hate-Speech-and-Beyond.pdf.

47 Erdoğan has presented himself as a defender of the Muslim world against Western “double standards” and hegemony. He instrumentalized the trauma of the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire in order to link nationalist feelings with the Ottoman collective memory. Narrowing of the space for political contestation led to the increasing monopolization of power in the hands of Erdoğan and enabled him to dominate the domain of foreign policy.

48 Kotsev, V., and J. Dyer. “Turkey Blames U.S. for Coup Attempt.” USA Today, July 18, 2016. https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2016/07/18/turkeyblames-us-coup-attempt/87260612.

49 Tim Arango and Ceylan Yeginsu. “Turks Can Agree on One Thing: U.S. Was Behind Failed Coup.” The New York Times, August 2, 2016. https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/03/world/europe/turkey-coup-erdogan-fethullah-gulen-united-states.html.

50 https://www.economist.com/europe/2019/03/28/turkeys-president-erdogan-accuses-the-west-of-terrorism.

51 Von Soest and Grauvogel, “Identity, Procedures and Performance,” 290.

52 Tas 2018, “The 15 July Abortive Coup,” 14–5.

53 Von Soest and Grauvogel provide personalism as another important legitimacy claim. While Erdoğan’s personal charisma has certainly been influential over the supporters of AKP, it is clear that Erdoğan’s personality has indeed been a source of severe contempt on the part of the opposition CHP and IYIP. Therefore, Erdoğan’s personality has not been a part of the regime’s legitimation strategy over the opposition.

54 Al Jazeera. “What Can Stop Turkey's Economy from Unravelling?” 2019. https://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/countingthecost/2019/06/stop-turkey-economy-unravelling-190601104735631.html; Borzou, D. “Erdoğan Is Failing Economics 101.” 2018. https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/05/25/erdogan-is-a-mad-economist-and-turkey-is-his-laboratory.

55 Kneuer, “Legitimation Beyond Ideology”; Von Soest and Grauvogel, “Identity, Procedures and Performance.”

56 Guldogan, D. “Turkish President Slams Interest Lobby, Credit Agencies.” 2018. https://www.aa.com.tr/en/economy/turkish-president-slams-interest-lobby-credit-agencies/1142418; Karakas, E. “Turkey’s Economic Crisis not a Foreign Plot.” 2019. https://ahvalnews.com/turkey-recession/turkeys-economic-crisis-not-foreign-plot.

57 Gunay, “Foreign Policy as a Source of Legitimation,” 43

58 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report on the impact of the state of emergency on human rights in Turkey, including an update on the South-East, March 2018, https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/TR/2018-03-19_Second_OHCHR_Turkey_Report.pdf.

59 Jacinto, L. “Turkey’s Post-Coup Purge and Erdoğan’s Private Army.” Foreign Policy, July 13, 2017. http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/07/13/turkeys-post-coup-purge-and-erdogans-private-army-sadatperincek-gulen.

60 Haberler. “Erdoğan: ‘İnlerine Gireceğiz' Dedik ve İnlerine Girdik’.” 2018. https://www.haberler.com/erdogan-inlerine-girecegiz-dedik-ve-inlerine-11348883-haberi/.

61 The Telegraph. “Erdoğan Accuses West of ‘Writing the Script’ for Turkey Coup.” August 2, 2016. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/08/02/erdogan-accuses-west-of-writing-the-script-for-turkey-coup; Smith, H. “Human Rights Workers Are Western Spies, Erdoğan Claims.” The Times, July 26, 2017. https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/erdogan-brands-detained-human-rights-workers-westernspies-mzft582f8.

62 Zaiotti and Thomas, “Turkey: Background and US Relations.”

63 Jones, D. “US Turkish Tensions Rise Again Over Bank's Fate.” 2018. https://www.voanews.com/middle-east/us-turkish-tensions-rise-again-over-banks-fate.

64 Wadham, N., C. Koc, and O. Ant. “Plenty of U.S.-Turkey Tension Remains Even After Pastor's Return.” 2018. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-10-13/pastor-s-release-aids-u-s-turkey-ties-but-many-tensions-remain.

65 Zarakol, “Ontological (In)security”; Capan and Zarakol, “Turkey’s Ontological Self.”

66 Gurbey, “The Difficult Relationship.”

67 Keyman, “The CHP and the ‘Democratic Opening’.”

68 Sozcu. “Erdoğan: Ey NATO sen ne zaman bizim yanımızda olacaksın.” 2018. https://www.sozcu.com.tr/2018/gundem/erdogan-3-bin-300-terorist-etkisiz-hale-getirildi-2280482.

69 Grigoriadis and Ozer indicate that CHP can be defined as a leftist-nationalist movement that defended Turkish exceptionalism, anti-imperialism and Jacobinism, see: Grigoriadis and Ozer, “Mutations of Turkish Nationalism,” 102.

70 Kasaba, R. “Nationalism and Piety Dominate Turkey’s Election.” 2019. http://theconversation.com/nationalism-and-piety-dominate-turkeys-election-98609.

71 Ahwal News. “Turkish Opposition Opposes Europe Resolution Condemning Turkey’s Treatment of Opposition.” 2019. https://ahvalnews.com/council-europe/turkish-opposition-opposes-europe-resolution-condemning-turkeys-treatment-opposition.