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Articles

Can the EU’s new global strategy make a difference? Strengthening resilience in the Eastern Partnership countries

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Pages 1338-1356 | Received 31 Oct 2020, Accepted 05 Mar 2021, Published online: 28 Apr 2021
 

ABSTRACT

This article assesses the European Union’s (EU) performance in promoting societal resilience in the Eastern Partnership countries (EaP) on examples of Georgia and Ukraine. We examine two approaches to external resilience-building employed by the EU: support for the sources of societal resilience (social trust, legitimacy of governance actors, design of governance institutions) and prevention of domestic and external risks. Our research shows that while Ukraine and Georgia possess a moderate degree of societal resilience both countries also suffer from a high exposure to domestic and external risks, making them dependent on external resilience-building support from the EU. Analysis of the EU’s resilience-building agenda in Georgia and Ukraine shows a mixed record for the EU. While the EU managed to strengthen sources of resilience and alleviate domestic risks in both countries, it failed to mitigate geopolitical risks: leaving the window open for new conflicts and endangering the sustainability of its resilience agenda.

Acknowledgments

This publication is part of the research project Europe’s External Action and the Dual Challenges of Limited Statehood and Contested Orders (EU-LISTCO) that has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Programme under grant agreement no. 769866. This publication reflects only the authors’ view, and the European Commission is not responsible for any use that may be made of the information this publication contains.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 The paper mostly focuses on the EU institutions, but it also includes the EU member states in the analysis.

2 EEAS, Shared Vision, Common Action.

3 Stollenwerk, Börzel and Risse, “Introduction to this Special Issue,” 5.

4 Stollenwerk, Börzel and Risse, “Introduction to this Special Issue.” Same applies to the other neighborhood regions of the EU. For the analysis of the Western Balkan region, see: Bargues-Pedreny, Pol and Pol Morillas, “From Democratization to Fostering Resilience.”

5 EEAS, Shared Vision, Common Action, 23.

6 Stollenwerk, Börzel and Risse, “Introduction to this Special Issue,” 18.

7 Stollenwerk, Börzel and Risse, “Introduction to this Special Issue,” 7–10.

8 Tolstrup, “Black Knight.”

9 Stollenwerk, Börzel and Risse, “Introduction to this Special Issue,” 4.

10 Ibid.

11 Ademmer, Delcour and Wolczuk, “Beyond Geopolitics.”

12 Bouchet, “Russia’s ‘Militarization’ of Colour Revolutions.”

13 Stollenwerk, Börzel and Risse, “Introduction to this Special Issue,” 5.

14 Stollenwerk, Börzel and Risse, “Introduction to this Special Issue.”

15 Cenusa, Konończuk and Kakachia, Oligarchs in Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia; Hale and Orttung, Beyond the Euromaidan.

16 Lebanidze, Russia, EU and the Post-Soviet Democratic Failure; Bader, “Party politics in Georgia and Ukraine.”

17 Kuzio, Democratic revolution in Ukraine; Welt, “Georgia’s Rose Revolution.”

18 Hale and Orttung, Beyond the Euromaidan.

19 Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2020. Georgia Country Report.

20 IMF, World Economic Outlook.

21 We conceptualize and operationalize global and diffuse risks based on typology by Magen, Richemond-Barak and Stav. The authors identify six clusters of global and diffuse risks: Geopolitical rivalry and risks of major conflict; unconventional security risks; environmental; demography and uncontrolled migration; global financial and economic risks; technology-driven disruption. Magen, Richemond-Barak and Stav, Taking Global And Diffuse Risks Seriously. Whereas all six clusters are present in both Georgia and Ukraine we focus in this article on risks which are supposed to have most detrimental impact on two countries.

22 Asmus, A Little War that Changed the World; Jonsson and Seely, “Russian Full-Spectrum Conflict.”

23 Kakachia, How the West Should Respond to Russia’s “Borderization.”

24 Delcour and Wolczuk, “Spoiler or facilitator of democratization?”

25 Curanović, “Russia’s Mission in the World.”

26 Richey, “Contemporary Russian Revisionism.”

27 Kakachia and Lebanidze, Global and Diffuse Risks.

28 Stollenwerk, Börzel and Risse, “Introduction to this Special Issue,” 18.

29 About fostering resilience from the EU perspective see Bresan’s and Bergmaier’s contribution to this special issue: Bressan and Bergmaier, “From Conflict Early Warning to Fostering Resilience?” Also see: Ozcurumez, “The EU’s Effectiveness in the Eastern Mediterranean Migration Quandary.”

30 Draude, Hölck and Stolle, “Social Trust,” 354.

31 Worschech, “New Civic Activism in Ukraine.”

32 Zarembo, “Substituting for the State.”

33 Boulègue and Lutsevych, Resilient Ukraine.

34 Wike, “Where Trust is High, Crime and Corruption are Low.”

35 World Bank, Ukraine.

36 World Bank, Georgia.

37 Graafland and Lous, “Income Inequality.”

38 Polese and Stepurko, “In Connections We Trust.”

39 Caucasus Barometer, datasets by CRRC.

40 Algan and Cahuc, Trust, Growth and Well-being.

41 Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti, Making Democracy Work.

42 Rothstein and Uslaner, “All for All: Equality, Corruption, and Social Trust.”

43 Ibid.

44 Tyler, “Citizen Discontent with Legal Procedures.”

45 Rothstein and Uslaner, “All for All: Equality, Corruption, and Social Trust.”

46 Ibid.

47 Risse and Stollenwerk, “Legitimacy in Areas of Limited Statehood;” Eickhoff and Stollenwerk, Strengthening Resilience in the EU’s Neighbourhood, 5.

48 Cenusa, Konończuk and Kakachia, Oligarchs in Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia.

49 “Public Attitudes, Political Ratings in NDI-commissioned Survey,” Civil Georgia.

50 Ibid.

51 Kyivpost, “Poll says Ukrainians’ Trust in Volunteers Rises Again.”

52 According to the EU Neighborhood Barometer it is 69% in Georgia and 43% in Ukraine. National surveys indicate even higher support. See: Promote Ukraine. Ukrainian Trust in Authorities Decreases. https://www.promoteukraine.org/ukrainian-trust-in-authorities-decreases/ (accessed September 29, 2020).

53 Kakachia, “Is Georgia’s Orthodox Church an Obstacle to European Values?”

54 Higgins, “As Ukraine and Russia Battle Over Orthodoxy, Schism Looms.”

55 Lutsevych, How to Finish a Revolution, 7.

56 Puig, Situation Analysis of Civil Society in Georgia (Full Report), 5.

57 “IRI-commissioned Poll says Mood Somber in Georgia.” Civil Georgia,

58 IRI, Public Opinion Survey of Residents of Ukraine.

59 IRI, Public Opinion Survey Residents of Georgia June-July 2020.

60 Eickhoff and Stollenwerk, Strengthening Resilience in the EU’s Neighbourhood, 7.

61 Cenusa, Konończuk and Kakachia, Oligarchs in Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia.

62 Lebanidze and Kakachia, “Informal Governance.”

63 Bader, “Party Politics.”

64 World Bank, Fighting Corruption in Public Services.

65 Falkenhain and Solonenko, The EU and Civil Society in Eastern Europe.

66 Damarad and Yeliseyeu, Forward.

67 Myth Detector, “Connect to real opposition!”

68 Khaldarova and Pantti, “Fake news.”

69 Maksak and Gerasymchuk, Ukraine: Disinformation Resilience Index.

70 Lutsevych, How to Finish a Revolution.

71 Joseph, “Resilience as Embedded Neoliberalism,” 41.

72 European Commission, Eastern Partnership Policy Beyond 2020 Reinforcing Resilience, 2.

73 Börzel and Risse, Conceptual Framework, 22.

74 Edilashvili, “Georgia: Project Aims to Boost Orthodox Church’s Support for EU Integration;” Kakachia, “Is Georgia’s Orthodox Church an Obstacle to European Values?”

75 Liik, Metodiev and Popescu, Defender of the Faith?

76 Delegation of the European Union to Georgia, Georgian Orthodox Church visits EU Institutions.

77 Liik, Metodiev and Popescu, Defender of the Faith?

78 Bolkvadze, “Hitting the Saturation Point,” 758.

79 Romanova and Umland, Ukraine’s Decentralization Reforms, 6.

80 Ibid., 21.

81 Council of Europe, Reports: Annual National Opinion Polls; NDI, Opportunities and Challenges.

82 Romanova and Umland, Ukraine’s Decentralization Reforms; Georgian Institute of Politics, Georgia’s Implementation of 20 Eastern Partnership Deliverables for 2020.

83 News Wires, “US, EU Back Georgia Protesters after Thousands Rally Outside Parliament.”

84 Lebanidze, Russia, EU and the Post-Soviet Democratic Failure.

85 Lebanidze, “What Makes Authoritarian Regimes Sweat?”

86 Krastev, “Electoral Reform – the Good News we Missed from Georgia.”

87 Legucka and Legieć, Protracted Conflicts.

88 Litra, Medynskyi and Zarembo, Assessing the EU's Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Interventions in Ukraine.

89 European Commission, Eastern Partnership Policy Beyond 2020 Reinforcing Resilience.

90 Ibid.

91 Litra, Medynskyi and Zarembo, Assessing the EU's Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Interventions in Ukraine.

92 Lebanidze, Russia, EU and the Post-Soviet Democratic Failure.

93 Pamment, The EU’s Role in Fighting Disinformation.

94 Mikhelidze and Tocci, “Europe’s Russia Sanctions are Not Working.”

95 European Commission, Theorizing the European Neighborhood Policy.

96 Lavrelashvili, “Resilience-Building in Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine.”

97 From comparative angle, both countries show similar qualities with regard to sources of resilience and exposure to domestic and external risks. There are some differences in terms of socio-political structures and structural characteristics of two countries which generate some qualitative differences in sources of resilience (Ukraine having more social trust but less empirical legitimacy) and risk mitigation capacities (with Georgia being more vulnerable to external risks due to its smaller size and more vulnerable location). However, overall two countries show more similarities than differences – perhaps making it easier for the external actors to design resilience-strengthening policies.

98 EEAS, Shared Vision, Common Action.

99 Korosteleva, “Reclaiming Resilience Back;” Petrova and Delcour, “From Principle to Practice?”

100 Petrova and Delcour, “From Principle to Practice?”

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Kornely Kakachia

Kornely Kakachia is Professor of Political Science at Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University, Georgia, and Director of Tbilisi based think tank Georgian Institute of Politics. His current research focuses on Georgian domestic and foreign policy, security issues of the wider Black Sea area and comparative party politics. He was a recipient of IREX and OSI fellowships and was a visiting fellow at Harvard University’s Black Sea Security programme, (2009– 2010) Harriman Institute, Columbia University (2011) and The Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies. He was Erasmus Mundus Professor at Jena University, University Paris 8, University College Dublin, Free University of Berlin and DAAD short-term researcher at University of Giessen (2016).

Agnieszka Legucka

Agnieszka Legucka, senior research fellow on Russia in Eastern Europe Program at Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM). Associate professor in security studies at the Faculty of Bussines and International Relations in Academy of Finance and Business Vistula in Warsaw. Her areas of expertise include Russian foreign and internal policy, security issues and conflicts in the EU's Eastern Neighbourhood, EU-Russia and NATO-Russia relations, Russian disinformation and hybrid threats. She is also a deputy editor-in-chief of the journal “Sprawy Międzynarodowe” [International Affairs]. Author of the several publications, i.e. book “Geopolitical factors and consequences of armed conflicts in the post-Soviet area” (Warsaw: Difin 2013), co-author of the Report “Kremlin Kids: The Second Generation of the Russian Elite” (PISM, 2019).

Bidzina Lebanidze

Bidzina Lebanidze is Postdoctoral Fellow at the Institute of Slavic Languages and Caucasus Studies at the Friedrich Schiller University Jena, Associate Professor of International Relations at the Ilia State University and a Senior Analyst at Georgian Institute of Politics. He obtained his doctorate in Political Science from the Free University of Berlin, and his Master’s degree in International Relations from Tbilisi State University. Previously, he also held various teaching and research positions at University of Bremen, University of Freiburg, Berlin School for Economics and Law, Free University of Berlin and Konrad-Adenauer- Stiftung.