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ABSTRACT
The democratization and war theory suggests that countries become more conflict-prone while in a transition phase to democracy. Drawing on this theory, we examine the relationship between democratic transition in Armenia and the escalation of the Karabakh conflict in 2018–2020 – prior to the second Karabakh war. Obviously, various factors led to a dangerous escalation of the conflict, which eventually ended in all-out war. Yet, the article primarily aims to find out how Armenia’s recent democratization is related to this escalation. Our findings confirm the above theory: the main empirical argument is that the key elements linking democratic transition to conflict escalation have been the increasingly nationalist, populist behaviour of the new Armenian leadership and a perceived provocation caused by it on Azerbaijani side.
KEYWORDS:
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This article has been corrected with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.
Notes
1 Babst, “A force for Peace”; Rummel, “Libertarianism and International Violence”; Levy, “Domestic Politics and War”; Maoz and Abdolali, “Regime Types and International Conflict.”
2 See, for example, Mansfield and Snyder, “Democratization and the Danger of War.”
3 Unlike other ethnic conflicts in the post-Soviet space, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict had a fundamentally international character from the beginning and was viewed primarily as an interstate conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan (For a detailed account of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, see for example, Babayev et al., The Nagorno-Karabakh deadlock.)
4 Ibid.; Mansfield and Snyder, “Democratic Transitions”; Mansfield and Snyder, Electing to Fight.
5 Miarka and Lapaj-Kucharska, “Armenian foreign policy.”
6 In general, some leaders refrain from directly provoking a war and instead use substitutes. In this way, a similar rallying effect can be achieved domestically. For example, they can use a foreign policy rhetoric of opposition, which is low-cost and involves little risk (Morin and Paquin, Foreign Policy Analysis, 181).
7 George and Bennett, Case studies, 206–207.
8 See, for the first relevant account by the authors, Mansfield and Snyder, “Democratization and the Danger of War.”
9 Ibid., 5. It should be noted that Mansfield and Snyder’s theory is generally applicable to both intrastate and interstate conflicts. Although the authors focus mainly on democratization and international wars, in their more recent work they argue that the risks of intrastate conflict also increase when democratic institutions are weak (Ibid., 7).
10 Ibid., 5.
11 Mansfield and Snyder, Electing to Fight, 2.
12 Mansfield and Snyder, Electing to Fight, 10, 39, 61.
13 Mansfield and Snyder, Electing to Fight, 2, 9–10.
14 Ibid., 10, 61.
15 Ibid., 2, 9.
16 Mansfield and Snyder, “Democratization and the Danger of War,” 26.
17 Mansfield and Snyder, Electing to Fight, 10–11.
18 Ward and Gleditsch, “Democratizing for Peace.”
19 Gleditsch and Hegre, “Peace and Democracy.”
20 Enterline, “Regime Changes, Neighborhoods.”
21 Cederman et al., “Democratization and War,” 519.
22 Jenne, “Populism, nationalism,” 25.
23 Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties, 141.
24 Hall, “On Provocation,” 3.
25 Ibid., 3–4.
26 Freedom House, “Freedom in the world 2019.”
27 Freedom House, “Nations in transit 2019.”
28 The Economist Intelligence Unit, “Democracy Index 2019,” 32.
29 Ibid., 32.
30 OSCE, “ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report,” 1.
31 Munck and Leff, “Modes of Transition,” 346.
32 Ohanyan, “Is Armenia’s democracy on borrowed time?”
33 Broers and Ohanyan, Armenia’s Velvet Revolution, 232-233, 235.
34 Górecki, “A revolution in instalments.”
35 Authors’ interview with an Armenian expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 2022.
36 Lanskoy and Suthers, “Armenia’s Velvet Revolution,” 95–96; Grigoryan, “Reforms in Armenia.”
37 Armenia’s previous President Serzh Sargsyan (2008–2018) and his predecessor Robert Kocharyan (1998–2008) both came from Nagorno-Karabakh. The two victorious commanders of the first Karabakh war were able to catapult to power in Armenia; and under their rule, many Karabakh Armenians assumed leadership positions in Armenia as well, such as Minister of Defense Seyran Ohanyan (2008–2016). Thus, until 2018, the country had been dominated by the “Karabakh clan” that personally identified with the conflict.
38 Authors’ interview with a political analyst at Conciliation Resources, a London-based peacebuilding organization, April 29, 2022.
39 Mejlumyan and Kucera, “Armenia: After ex-president released.”
40 NEWS, “People Block Armenia courts’ entrances.”
41 Prime Minister of Armenia, “Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s Statement.”
42 For example, individuals with close ties to the former regime controlled under PanArmenian Media Group a significant portion of media resources.
43 Nahapetyan, “The challenges of Armenia’s media landscape.”
44 Shirinyan, “Karabakh Discourses in Armenia,” 144.
45 Muradov and Huseynov, “Shusha provocation.”
46 Grigoryan, “Armenia first.”
47 Shirinyan, “Karabakh Discourses in Armenia,” 142.
48 Grigoryan, “One Year after Armenia’s ‘Velvet Revolution.’”
49 Gamaghelyan and Rumyantsev, “The road to the Second Karabakh War,” 326.
50 Authors’ interview with an Armenian expert at the Yerevan-based Regional Studies Centre, April 27, 2022.
51 Prime Minister of Armenia, “Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s Statement.”
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid.
54 For a detailed account of the Pashinyan government’s populism with adverse foreign policy implications, see for example Nikoghosyan and Ter-Matevosyan, “From ‘revolution’ to war.”
55 Kucera, “Azerbaijan sees new possibilities.”
56 In fact, Baku did not take any military steps during the period of post-revolutionary instability in Armenia.
57 Aliyev, “The year 2019 will give a new impetus.”
58 Huseynov and Shafiyev, “Peace Negotiations,” 102; de Wall, “The Nagorny Karabakh Conflict,” 4.
59 Huseynov and Shafiyev, “Peace Negotiations,” 102; Abrahamyan, “Pashinyan Stiffens Armenia’s Posture toward Karabakh.”
60 Prime Minister of Armenia, “Speech delivered by Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan.” The Minsk Group, created by the OSCE in the early 1990s, was tasked with brokering a peaceful negotiated solution to the NK conflict. Co-chaired by France, Russia and the USA, this group have made countless attempts and numerous rounds of negotiations over the decades – with no success.
61 See, for example, Prime Minister of Armenia, “RA Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s Visit.”
62 OSCE Minsk Group, “Press Statement.”
63 Asbarez, “New Territories in the event of new war.”
64 Tert, “«Նոր պատերազմ՝ նոր տարածքների դիմաց».”
65 Shusha was founded as the capital of the Karabakh Khanate (1748–1822) on the territory of contemporary Azerbaijan that also included Nagorno-Karabakh; and famous in whole Azerbaijan, the Jidir Plain has historically been the main location for public events in the city.
66 Prime Minister of Armenia, “Nikol Pashinyan attends opening of 7th Pan-Armenian Summer Games.”
67 Cutler, “Looking Beyond Armenia’s Defeat.”
68 Shafiyev, “A Flare-Up Long Foretold.”
69 Prime Minister of Armenia, “100 Facts About New Armenia.”
70 Prime Minister of Armenia, “The Velvet Revolution should inevitably lead.”
71 Azatutyun, “The inauguration ceremony of NKR President.”
72 Nikoghosyan and Ter-Matevosyan, “From ‘revolution’ to war,” 13.
73 Kanadyan, “Nikol Pashinyan’s Imprint on the 2020 Karabakh War”; Cornell, “How did Armenia so badly miscalculate.”
74 MFA Azerbaijan, “Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.”
75 Trend News Agency, “When drunk Pashinyan danced in Shusha on Jidir-Duzu.”
76 MFA Azerbaijan, “AR XİN Mətbuat.”
77 President of Azerbaijan, “Sochi hosts plenary session.”
78 Ibid.
79 President of Azerbaijan, “Ilham Aliyev was interviewed by Al Jazeera.”
80 The only positive change in 2019 was a decrease in the number of deaths on the frontline.
81 President of Azerbaijan, “Prezident İlham Əliyev bir qrup.”
82 MFA Azerbaijan, “Statement by the Press Service Department.”
83 President of Azerbaijan, “Informal Summit of the Cooperation Council of Turkic Speaking States.”
84 Authors’ interview with a Baku-based Azerbaijani expert on foreign policy, May 3, 2022.
85 MFA Armenia, “Comment by the Foreign Ministry Spokesperson.”
86 MFA Azerbaijan, “Head of the Press Service Department.”
87 President of Azerbaijan, “Ilham Aliyev addressed the nation.”
88 Hall, “On Provocation,” 13.
89 Rzayev, “Azerbaijan-Armenia clashes put an end to cautious optimism.”
90 Ibid.
91 Stepanyan, “In response to the Azerbaijani offensive.”
92 Eurasianet, “Pro-war Azerbaijani protesters break into Parliament.”
93 Ibid.
94 President of Azerbaijan, “Ilham Aliyev chaired Cabinet meeting.”
95 State Service for Mobilization and Conscription, “Information.”
96 Eurasianet, “Fighting between Armenians and Azerbaijanis spills.”
97 Prime Minister of Armenia, “The Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia presented.”
98 Gamaghelyan and Rumyantsev, “The road to the Second Karabakh War,” 326.
99 Prime Minister of Armenia, “For the first time in the history of independent Armenia.”
100 Mansfield and Snyder, “Democratization and the Danger of War,” 33.
101 Authors’ interview with an U.S.-based Armenian expert, April 10, 2022.
102 Kanadyan, “Nikol Pashinyan’s Imprint on the 2020 Karabakh War.”
103 RIA Novosti, “Экс-глава Армении.”
104 As an inexperienced, erratic politician who did not know the intricacies of international politics well, Pashinyan also did not take the risk of war seriously; and his government kept relying on its “democratic invincibility”, meaning that the world would not allow war against a democratic country (Nikoghosyan and Ter-Matevosyan, “From ‘revolution’ to war,” 11). Also, in addition to the subordination of foreign policy to domestic objectives, the “chronic incompetence” of his team worsened the quality of decision making (Ibid., 16). While playing mainly to the domestic audience, Pashinyan thus “went too far and too fast in the wrong direction” (Authors’ interview with an Armenian expert at the Yerevan-based Regional Studies Centre, April 27, 2022).
105 President of Azerbaijan, “Ilham Aliyev attended the Absheron EPS Project.”
106 MFA Azerbaijan, “Press release of the Press Service Department.”
107 Ibid.
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Azar Babayev
Azar Babayev is an Associate Professor of Political Science at ADA University in Baku. His research interests are in the areas of conflict resolution and democracy promotion, with a focus on the post-Soviet space. Prior to joining ADA University, he was a postdoctoral research fellow at the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt in Germany. He has recently co-edited The Nagorno-Karabakh Deadlock: Insights from Successful Conflict Settlements (Springer VS 2020).
Kamran Mahmudov
Kamran Mahmudov holds a master's degree in international relations and diplomacy from ADA University and a bachelor's degree in history from Baku State University. During his graduate studies, he worked also as a research assistant, allowing him to develop advanced knowledge and skills in conducting academic research.