Emotion as a dimension of ethical and moral motivation

Abstract

In a world in flux in which the scientific certainties derived from earlier social paradigms are being challenged by the intrusion of phenomena not confinable within the bounds of ‘rational actor’ assumptions, the edge of objectivity of the social sciences is being tested. Emotion as a Dimension of Ethical and Moral Motivation grapples with this epistemic problem by arguing that emotion—defined here as ‘that which sets the mind and judgement in motion'—is a proper, indeed necessary object for contemporary analysis and the renewal of methodological enquiry. Through an analysis of the dynamics of identity and exile, and a critique of traditional sociological approaches to identity, the author argues that the finality of the social sciences should not be to separate the realms of social imagination and reality, but rather to try to understand the social realities which emerge from their encounter. The central hypothesis of the paper is that emotion is the primordial source of ethical judgement, as illustrated in universals such as the sense of justice and dignity. Emotion indeed provides crucial insights into the central questionings of contemporary sociology over identity, individual and collective, and sheds light on the formation of political and ethical judgement. Considered from the point of view of political responsibility, emotion becomes a dimension of moral motivation.

Notes

I would like to thank Bertrand Guillarme for his thoughtful comments, and Philip Golub for his insightful remarks and his help in reworking the English version of this text.