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Abstract
In this paper we investigate the relation between knowledge and political action, focusing on knowledge claims stemming from science that at the same time have relevance in a policy context. In so doing, we will revisit some well-known and some lesser known approaches, such as C.P. Snow's thesis of the two cultures and Mannheim's conceptualization of theory and practice. We arrive at a distinction between knowledge for practice and practical knowledge, which we briefly apply to the case of climate change science and policy. We state as our thesis that policy is ever more reliant on knowledge, but science can deliver ever less certainty. Political decisions and programs have to recognize this fact, either implicitly or explicitly. This creates a paradox that is normally resolved through the political decision and not the dissemination of “truth” in the sense of uncontested knowledge. We use the case of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change as an example.
Notes
1. Our paper grows out of a discussion of the nature of the interface between knowledge and political action in Stehr (Citation2009a, b). We are grateful to Mike Hulme for his constructive comments on an earlier version of this paper.
2. We do not claim that this is exclusive to knowledge. In the social context, cognitive findings do not have a monopoly on human capacity to act. A similar function can be performed by the social norms internalized by actors, for example, or even needs and tendencies (Loyal and Barnes Citation2001).
3. In its etymology, however, power is related to ability, and one of the most fundamental definitions of ability would be: to make a difference. In this sense, and not in the sense in which power is usually discussed in the context of social relationships, namely as power exercised to gain something, or over a person, the definition of power as ability is reminiscent of the idea of knowledge as enabling (cf. Dyrberg Citation1997, pp. 88–99).
4. Building on the premise that knowledge constitutes an ability to act, one can differentiate between forms of knowledge, i.e. according to which capacity to act is embodied by knowledge. Lyotard's ([Citation1979] 1984, p. 6) attempt to differentiate between “investment knowledge” and “payment knowledge”, in analogy to the difference between expenditures for investment and consumption, can be considered an example of such a functional separation of forms of knowledge.
5. Niklas Luhmann's (Citation1992: 136) observations on the conditions for the ability to make a decision may permit an even broader application of knowledge. “One can only” decide, as he very plausibly emphasizes, “if and insofar as it is not determined what will happen”. On condition that the future is highly uncertain, the deployment of knowledge in the decision-making process can extend to many more social contexts, even to those that are normally marked only by routine and habitual behavior.
6. Similar concepts can be found in Friedrich Hayek's essay on “The Valuation of Knowledge in Society” from 1945, which is actually a pean to decentralization, the importance of local knowledge for taking action, and the price system as a mediator that conveys information and solves the problem of coordinating situative knowledge. Hayek ([Citation1945] 1976, p. 82) refers to the fact that economic problems always “arise only as a result of changes. As long as things stay as they are, or at least do not develop differently from what is expected, no new problems occur that require a decision, and no necessity arises to make a new plan”.
7. A more recent study by an economist, which above all deals with various conceptual problems in the attempt to quantify knowledge and integrate it into economic theory, is reminiscent in several passages of the definition of knowledge as the capacity to act: “I define knowledge in terms of potentially observable behaviour, as the ability of an individual or group of individuals to undertake, or to instruct or otherwise induce others to undertake, procedures resulting in predictable transformations of material objects” (Howitt [Citation1996] 1998, p. 99). Aside from the somewhat ponderous form of the definition, the restriction of the concept to the manipulation of material objects is a step backward, into the black box of “procedures” and “observable behaviour”. Ultimately, Howitt tends to equate knowledge with action.
8. A detailed scientific-theoretical and sociological account of this position can be found in Stehr (Citation1991).
11. According to the terminology used by the IPCC, climate predictions are to be distinguished from climate projections, which in turn are to be distinguished from scenarios. “A climate prediction or climate forecast is the result of an attempt to produce an estimate of the actual evolution of the climate in the future, for example, at seasonal, interannual or long-term time scales.” Climate projections “depend upon the emission/concentration/ radiative forcing scenario used”, and scenarios, in turn, “are based on assumptions concerning, for example, future socioeconomic and technological developments that may or may not be realised and are therefore subject to substantial uncertainty” (http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/glossary/ar4-wg1.pdf).
12. “The scenario approach enables a continual assessment of trends and developments that may affect its business in the future” (Skjærseth and Skodvin Citation2001, p. 53). Wright claims that the use of scenario planning resulted in Shell “having considered and rehearsed its responses to the 1973 oil crisis and price collapse of 1981 before these events happened” (Wright 2004, p. 6), and Grant explains that “although all the [major oil] companies used scenario analysis to some extent, only Shell utilises scenarios as the foundation and centrepiece of its strategic planning process. Other companies tend to use scenarios as a compliment and balance to their forecasting exercises, or to explore particular issues” (Grant 2003, p. 17).
13. By the way, the Stern Review (Stern Citation2007) made liberal use of the A2 scenario for its assessment of damages and costs of climate change.
14. This distinction is different from the IPCC terminology, which claims that it is policy relevant but not policy prescriptive. We pose the more fundamental question of what properties knowledge must have in order to become effective, whereas the IPCC emphasizes its neutrality with regard to policy options.
15. Myanna Lahson (Citation2008, p. 208) draws attention to the fact that the increasing attention paid to environmental questions among the public and in the sciences has also led to the “demonopolization” of science as the reliable guarantor of truthful findings: “In the face of new environmental problems, science plays an important yet insufficient role in establishing social binding definitions of truth in this context, attitudes towards the issues and technologies involved guide interpretations of the science”.
