Even in the post‐Cold War world, the stability of nuclear deterrence as between not‐unfriendly US and Russian governments remains significant. Nuclear stability implies mutual confidence that the minimum conditions of rational deterrence models are fulfilled with high confidence. As US and Russian strategic nuclear arsenals are gradually reduced in conformity with the Moscow Treaty to levels far below current deployments, the qualities of forces and the performances of their command and control systems matter as much as do the exact quantities of weapons held by the two sides. Data analysis shows that both the US and Russia can expect to maintain a minimum counter‐city deterrent even at levels below the once proposed START III or agreed Moscow treaty limits, but defense deployments add uncertainty to projections and might compromise second strike retaliation under some conditions of launch readiness or warning.
Russia's vanishing deterrent
Reprints and Corporate Permissions
Please note: Selecting permissions does not provide access to the full text of the article, please see our help page How do I view content?
To request a reprint or corporate permissions for this article, please click on the relevant link below:
Academic Permissions
Please note: Selecting permissions does not provide access to the full text of the article, please see our help page How do I view content?
Obtain permissions instantly via Rightslink by clicking on the button below:
If you are unable to obtain permissions via Rightslink, please complete and submit this Permissions form. For more information, please visit our Permissions help page.
Related research
People also read lists articles that other readers of this article have read.
Recommended articles lists articles that we recommend and is powered by our AI driven recommendation engine.
Cited by lists all citing articles based on Crossref citations.
Articles with the Crossref icon will open in a new tab.