Notes
1Program on International Policy Attitudes. “Americans and Iraq on the Eve of the Presidential Election,” October 28, 2004, p. 6.
2M. Twain and C. D. udley Warner. The Gilded Age: A Tale of To-Day. (New York: The Library of America) p. 24.
3T. C. Reed. At the Abyss: An Insider's History of the Cold War. (New York: Presidio Press 2004) p. 4.
4Ibid. p. 22.
5Ibid.
6V. Zubok and C. Pleshakov. Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996) p. 74.
7H. Kissinger. Diplomacy. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994 p. 487.
8J. Erickson, Review of book by W. S. Dunn, Jr., Kursk: Hitler's Gamble, 1943. The Journal of Military History, 62, 3 (July 1998) p. 665.
9Reed, p. 33.
10Ibid. p. 231.
11Ibid. p. 275.
12Ibid. p. 265.
13Ibid. p. 227.
14Ibid. pp. 236–237.
15Ibid. p. 240.
16Ibid.
17Ibid. p. 256.
18S. J. Zaloga. The Kremlin's Nuclear Sword: The Rise and Fall of Russia's Strategic Nuclear Forces, 1945–2000. (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2002) pp. 205–211.
19M. Gorbachev. Memoirs. (New York: Doubleday, 1996) p. 407.
20Reed. p. 269.
21Ibid.
22Ibid.
23S. Kettmann. “Soviets Burned By CIA Hackers?” Wired News (www.wired.com), March 26, 2004.
24G. E. Weir and W. J. Boyne. Rising Tide: The Untold Story of the Russian Submarines That Fought the Cold War. (New York: Basic Books, 2003) pp. 202–210.
25Zaloga, p. 198.
26Ibid, p. 197.
27B. A. Fischer. The Reagan Reversal. (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1997) p. 130.
28Reed, p. 265.
29Ibid. p. 272.
30F. Fitzgerald. Way Out There in the Blue: Reagan, Star Wars and the End of the Cold War. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000) p. 467.
31O. Seliktar. Politics, Paradigms, and Intelligence Failures: Why So Few Predicted the Collapse of the Soviet Union. (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2004) p. 158.
32Fitzgerald, p. 467.
33V. Israelyan. On the Battlefields of the Cold War. (University Park, PA: Penn State Press, 2003) p. 24.
34Ibid. p.25.
35Ibid. p.51
36Ibid. p. 101.
37Ibid. p. xvii.
38Ibid. p. 87.
39Ibid. p. 69.
40Ibid. p. 240.
41Ibid. p. 284.
42R. D. English. Russia and the Idea of the West: Gorbachev, Intellectuals and the End of the Cold War. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000).
43Israelyan, p. 369.
44Ibid. p. 378.
45Ibid. p. 348.
46Ibid. p. 350.
47Ibid. p. 351.
48J. F. Matlock, Jr. Reagan and Gorbachev: How the Cold War Ended. (New York: Random House, 2004) p. 61.
49Ibid.
50Ibid. p. xiii.
51Ibid. p. 85.
52Ibid. p. xiii.
53Ibid. p. 89.
54Ibid. p. 113.
55Ibid. p. 114.
56Ibid. p. xiii.
57Ibid.
58R. L. Garthoff. The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War. (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1994) p. 79.
59Ibid. pp. 80–81.
60M. Evangelista. Unarmed Forces: The Transnational Movement to End the Cold War. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999) p. 241.
61Ibid. p. 389.
62G. Kennan. “The GOP Won the Cold War? Ridiculous.” New York Times, October 28, 1992.
63Matlock, p. 50.
64Fischer, p. 130.
65Fischer, p. 137.
66Ibid. pp. 136–137.
67Matlock, p, 78.
68Ibid.
69Fischer, p. 142.
70Matlock, p. 50.
71The preceding two paragraphs rely on information found in Chapter 3 of S. I. Schwartz ed., Atomic Audit: The Costs and Consequences of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Since 1940. (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1998). See also W. C. Uhler, “A Nuclear Accounting,” The Nation, July 13, 1998. In addition to Atomic Audit, Matlock's writing about strategic defense issues would have profited from a reading of Matthew Evangelista's book, Innovation and the Arms Race; Nikolai Sokov's book, Russian Strategic Modernization; and Steven J. Zaloga's book, The Kremlin's Nuclear Sword.
72Matlock, p. 157.
73Ibid.
74Ibid. p. 169.
75Ibid.
76Ibid. p. 162.
77Ibid. p. 232.
78Ibid. p. 221.
79Ibid. p. 222.
80Ibid. p. 241.
81K. Payne, The Fallacies of Cold War Deterrence and a New Direction. (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2001) p. 94.
82Matlock, p. 249.
83Gorbachev, p. 419.
84Matlock, p. 251.
85A. Chernyaev. My Six Years with Gorbachev. (University Park, PA: Penn State Press, 2000) p. 97.
86Gorbachev, p. 420. Moreover, although Reagan's public relations team persuaded the American media, and thus the people, that Reagan's defense of SDI was principled and heroic, Reagan actually reproached Gorbachev (at the end of the summit) by claiming: “You planned from the start to come here and put me in this position!” Ibid. p. 419
87English, p. 218
88Ibid, p. 223.
89Matlock, p. xv.
90Fitzgerald, p. 410.
91Matlock, p. 254
92S. Sternthal, Gorbachev's Reforms: De-Stalinization Through Demilitarization. (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997) p. 88.
93Ibid.
94Chernyaev, p. 144.
95Gorbachev, p. 165.
96Matlock, p. 144.
97Matlock, p. 317.
98Seliktar, p. 204.
99Ibid.
100Ibid. p. 115.
101Ibid. p. 207.
102Ibid. p. 211.
103Ibid.
104Matlock, p. 327.
105Ibid. p. 328.