Russia’s Private Military Enterprises as a Multipurpose Tool of Hybrid Warfare

ABSTRACT

This article covers the emergence, evolution and use of private military enterprises in Russia. Although formally illegal, there exist a diverse private military enterprises market in Russia with several providers more or less intertwined with state authorities. Building on previous research, the authors conclude that Russian private military enterprises gradually evolved from grassroots origins into a suitable tool for a wide range of hybrid warfare and counter-hybrid warfare operations. Moreover, the authors found that Russian private military providers recently underwent a transformation that turned them into a multipurpose tool usable in Russia’s geopolitical confrontation with the West. Russian PMCs have recently been seen in many African countries, where their activities contribute to two purposes — first, the commercial interests of their owners and donors. Second, the advance of Moscow’s geopolitical and economic interests. This modus vivendi is made possible by a peculiar, non-transparent relationship between the Russian state or specific state authorities (especially armed forces and intelligence services) and the owners of allegedly private military enterprises – the so-called hybrid model of the economy. Its essence is the leverage the state has over the privateers – an ability to summon them at any time in support of the state’s strategic goals in exchange for privateers’ impunity and tolerance of their de facto illegal business activities.

KEYWORDS:

• Private Military Enterprises
• Hybrid Economy
• Hybrid Warfare
• Russia
• Wagner Group
• Geopolitical Confrontation

Notes

¹ The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect the opinion of The Journal of Slavic Military Studies.

² As demonstrated later in the article, actual application of these laws is highly selective, arbitrary and serves particular political interests. See Dahlqvist, N. 2019. ‘Russia’s (not so) Private Military Companies’, RUFS Briefing no. 44, Swedish Defence Research Agency, January 2019. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://www.foi.se/rest-api/report/FOI%20MEMO%206653. Alternatively see Sukhankin, S. ‘War, Business and Ideology: How Russian Private Military Contractors Pursue Moscow’s Interests’, The Jamestown Foundation, 21 March 2019. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://jamestown.org/program/war-business-and-ideology-how-russian-private-military-contractors-pursue-moscows-interests/.

³ Østensen, Å. G., Bukkvoll, T. 2018. ‘Russian Use of Private Military and Security Companies – the implications for European and Norwegian Security’, FFI-Rapport no. 18/01300, Chr. Michelsen Institute. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://www.cmi.no/publications/file/6637-russian-use-of-private-military-and-security.pdf.

⁴ It is an interesting fact, though, that in 2009, State Duma Representative Andrei Lugovoi (the same Andrei Lugovoi who is wanted by the British authorities on suspicion of poisoning Alexander Litvinenko) proposed an amendment that would enable Russian PSCs to legally operate abroad. For more on the topic see also Østensen, Å. G., Bukkvoll, T. 2018. ‘Russian Use of Private Military and Security Companies – the Implications for European and Norwegian Security’, FFI-Rapport no. 18/01300, Chr. Michelsen Institute. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://www.cmi.no/publications/file/6637-russian-use-of-private-military-and-security.pdf. As for the international legal regulation, a PMC is not defined in any binding international law (only mercenaries are mentioned). There are only two documents of rather recommendatory nature – the Montreaux Document of September 2008 regarding the activities of, and good practices in, private military and security companies in war zones and the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers (ICoC) of September 2010. The Russian Federation, however, is not a signatory to either document. For a more detailed view of the international legal aspects of mercenary and private military business see Kurilev, K, Martynenko, E, Parkhitko, N, Stanis, D. 2017. ‘The Phenomenon of Private Military Companies in the Military and Power Policies of States in the 21st Century’, International Organisations Research Journal, no. 4, vol. 2. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://iorj.hse.ru/data/2018/01/15/1160391673/K.%20Kurilev,%20N.%20Parkhitko,%20D.%20Stanis,%20E.%20Martynenko.pdf.

⁵ Konovalov, I., Valeckij, O. 2013. Evolyutsiya chastnykh voennykh kompaniy. Pushkino: Tsentr Strategicheskoy Konyunktury.

⁶ Eremenko, A. 2014. ‘Blackwater.ru: The Future of Russian Private Military Companies’, The Moscow Times, 12 November 2014. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2014/11/12/blackwaterru-the-future-of-russian-private-military-companies-a41291. See also Gusarov, V. 2015. ‘Chastnye voennye kompanii Rossii kak instrument uzakonennogo terrora’, Informnapalm.org, 24 November 2015. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://informnapalm.org/15878-rossyjskye-chvk/.

⁷ Kuczyński, G. 2018. ‘Niewidzialna armia Putina’, Warsaw Institute, 30 March 2018. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://warsawinstitute.org/putins-invisible-army/.

⁸ Sukhankin, S. 2018. ‘Continuing War by Other Means’: The Case of Wagner, Russia’s Premier Private Military Company in the Middle East’, The Jamestown Foundation, 13 July 2018. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://jamestown.org/program/continuing-war-by-other-means-the-case-of-wagner-russias-premier-private-military-company-in-the-middle-east/.

⁹ The Interpreter, 2018. ‘Meet Patriot, the New Russian Private Military Contractor Competing with Wagner’, The Interpreter, 15 July 2018. Accessed on 20 May 2020, http://www.interpretermag.com/meet-patriot-the-new-russian-private-military-contractor-competing-with-wagner/. The same organisation in November 2018 asked the International Criminal Court to probe the activities of Russian private military companies and their sponsors since they could have been illegally used to ‘advance Moscow’s interests in Ukraine, Syria and several African countries while depriving private contractors of the ability to protect their rights and obtain due benefits.’ See The Associated Press. 2018. ‘Russian veterans seek probe of private military contracting’, The Associated Press, 20 November 2019. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://federalnewsnetwork.com/government-news/2018/11/russian-veterans-seek-probe-of-private-military-contracting/, alternatively Sukhankin, S. 2018. ‘Revolt of the “Disgruntled”: Russian Mercenaries Seek Justice in International Courts’, The Jamestown Foundation, 29 November 2018. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://jamestown.org/program/revolt-of-the-disgruntled-russian-mercenaries-seek-justice-in-international-courts/.

¹⁰ Østensen, Å. G., Bukkvoll, T. 2018. ‘Russian Use of Private Military and Security Companies – the Implications for European and Norwegian Security’, FFI-Rapport no. 18/01300, Chr. Michelsen Institute. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://www.cmi.no/publications/file/6637-russian-use-of-private-military-and-security.pdf.

¹¹ Falichev, O. 2016. ‘Okhrana dlia karmana’, Voenno-promyshlennyy kur’er, 21 March 2016. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://vpk-news.ru/articles/29840 and also Neelov, V. 2017. ‘Tsep dlya psov vojny. Chastnye voennye kompanii v Rossii: opyt deyateľnosti i perspektivy legalizacii’, Tsentr Strategicheskikh Otsenok i Prognozov, 22 July 2017. Accessed on 20 May 2020, http://csef.ru/ru/oborona-i-bezopasnost/504/czep-dlya-psov-vojny-chastnye-voennye-kompanii-v-rossii-opyt-deyatelnosti-i-perspektivy-legalizaczii-7787 or Marten, K. 2019. ‘Russia’s use of semi-state security forces: the case of the Wagner Group’, Post-Soviet Affairs, no. 3, vol. 35, 2019.

¹² The Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (Главное Управление Генералного Штаба Бооружëнных Сил Российской Федерации) abbreviated as ‘GU’ but still commonly referred to by its former acronym ‘GRU’ standing for Главное Разведывательное Управление (Main Intelligence Directorate) is the military intelligence service of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

¹³ Dahlqvist, N. 2019. ‘Russia’s (not so) Private Military Companies’, RUFS Briefing no. 44, Swedish Defence Research Agency, January 2019. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://www.foi.se/rest-api/report/FOI%20MEMO%206653. See also Kuczyński, G. 2018. ‘Niewidzialna armia Putina’, Warsaw Institute, 30 March 2018. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://warsawinstitute.org/putins-invisible-army/.

¹⁴ For Russian definitions of private military companies see for instance Apukhtin, Y. 2009. ‘Chastnye voennye kompanii: novaya tseľ politicheskoy kriminologii,’ Kriminologiya: Vchera, Segodnya, Zavtra, no. 2 (17). Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://criminologyclub.ru/PDF/17/17_18.pdf. Alternatively see also Neelov, V. 2013. ‘Chastnye voennye kompanii v Rossii: opyt I perspektivy ispoľzovaniya,’ Tsentr Strategicheskikh Otsenok i Prognozov, 6 November 2013. Accessed on 20 May 2020, http://csef.ru/media/articles/4838/4838.pdf. Or also Tsepkov, N, 2015. ‘Chastnye voennye kompanii: kratkij obzor mirovogo i rossijskogo regulirovaniya’, Zakon.ru, 14 December 2015. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://zakon.ru/blog/2015/12/14/chastnye_voennye_kompanii_kratkij_obzor_mirovogo_i_rossijskogo_regulirovaniya.

¹⁵ Volevodz, G. ‘O perspektivakh mezhdunarodno-pravovogo regulirovaniya deyateľnosti chastnykh voennykh i okhrannykh predpriyatiy.’ Mezhdunarodnoe ugolovnoe pravo i mezhdunarodnaya yustitsiya, MGIMO, no. 2, 2010. Cited by Sukhankin, S. ‘War, Business and Ideology: How Russian Private Military Contractors Pursue Moscow’s Interests’, The Jamestown Foundation, 20 March 2019. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://jamestown.org/program/war-business-and-ideology-how-russian-private-military-contractors-pursue-moscows-interests/.

¹⁶ Allison, O. 2015. ‘Informal but Diverse: The Market for Exported Force from Russia and Ukraine’. In The Markets for Force. Privatization of Security Across the World Regions, edited by M. Dunigan and U. Petersohn. Philadelphia: Pennsylvania University Press, p. 87.

¹⁷ Larson, C. 2019. ‘Wagner: A closer look at the Russian private security and military enterprise’, Offiziere.ch, 7 January 2019. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://www.offiziere.ch/?p=34979. No officially existing Russian enterprise, however, openly confesses this fact. For instance, RSB-Group claims on its website that it never actively participates in armed conflicts. On the other hand, its founder, businessman Oleg Krinitsyn, reportedly said that if needed or ordered, his company could within a week amass up to 1,000 fighters ready to take up arms, all with combat experience.

¹⁸ Østensen, Å. G., Bukkvoll, T. 2018. ‘Russian Use of Private Military and Security Companies – the Implications for European and Norwegian Security’, FFI-Rapport no. 18/01300, Chr. Michelsen Institute. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://www.cmi.no/publications/file/6637-russian-use-of-private-military-and-security.pdf.

¹⁹ Sean McFate, a former private military contractor himself, argues, however, that Russia is in this regard no exception. He is convinced that the Russian approach to private military providers is just a symptom of a new trend that will soon apply to other great powers as well. See McFate, S. 2014. The Modern Mercenary. New York: Oxford University Press and see also Giglio, M. 2019. ‘Inside The Shadow War Fought By Russian Mercenaries’, BuzzFeed News, 17 April 2019. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/mikegiglio/inside-wagner-mercenaries-russia-ukraine-syria-prighozhin.

²⁰ Kurilev, K, Martynenko, E, Parkhitko, N, Stanis, D. 2017. ‘The Phenomenon of Private Military Companies in the Military and Power Policies of States in the 21st Century’, International Organisations Research Journal, no. 4, vol. 2. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://iorj.hse.ru/data/2018/01/15/1160391673/K.%20Kurilev,%20N.%20Parkhitko,%20D.%20Stanis,%20E.%20Martynenko.pdf.

²¹ Luzin, P. 2019. ‘How the Kremlin Sealed the Deal with Russia’s Private Military Contractors’, Riddle.io, 20 February 2019. Accessed on 20 May 2020,https://www.ridl.io/en/how-the-kremlin-sealed-the-deal-with-russia-s-private-military-contractors/. The same opinion is held by Sergey Sukhankin, see Sukhankin, S. 2019. ‘From “Volunteers” to Quasi-PMCs: Retracing the Footprints of Russian Irregulars in the Yugoslav Wars and Post-Soviet Conflicts’, The Jamestown Foundation, 25 June 2019. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://jamestown.org/program/from-volunteers-to-quasi-pmcs-retracing-the-footprints-of-russian-irregulars-in-the-yugoslav-wars-and-post-soviet-conflicts/. The issue is at least ‘questionable’ also for Kassidiaris in Kassidiaris, A. 2019. ‘The Wagner Group Paradox’, InsideOver, 27 December 2019. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://www.insideover.com/war/the-wagner-group-paradox-and-the-mainstream-media-fallacy.html.

²² Sukhankin, S. ‘War, Business and Ideology: How Russian Private Military Contractors Pursue Moscow’s Interests’, The Jamestown Foundation, 20 March 2019. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://jamestown.org/program/war-business-and-ideology-how-russian-private-military-contractors-pursue-moscows-interests/

²³ The enterprise was formally registered in 2011 in St Petersburg although it was actually established by former FSB operators and navy servicemen at the end of the millennium. For more information about the company see Østensen, Å. G., Bukkvoll, T. 2018. ‘Russian Use of Private Military and Security Companies – the Implications for European and Norwegian Security’, FFI-Rapport no. 18/01300, Chr. Michelsen Institute. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://www.cmi.no/publications/file/6637-russian-use-of-private-military-and-security.pdf.

Some sources, however, indicate that the enterprise was eventually also registered offshore, in Belize. See Kuczyński, G. 2018. ‘Niewidzialna armia Putina’, Warsaw Institute, 30 March 2018. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://warsawinstitute.org/putins-invisible-army/.

²⁴ The enterprise was registered on 18 January 2012 with the registration number 1700599 as ‘Slavonic Corps Limited. ’ This text, however, sticks to the simplified ‘Slavonic Corps.’ For its registration see page 153 of Companies Registry. 2012. ‘Companies registry. List of Newly Incorporated/Registered Companies and Companies which Have Changed Names’, The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, 21 January 2012. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://www.cr.gov.hk/docs/wrpt/wk_new&changednamecoys_20120116.pdf.

²⁵ Enterprise unofficially established in 2005 and registered in 2011 by reserve intelligence officers, currently led by one of them, Oleg Krinitsyn. Its paramount specialisation is maritime security, operates mainly in Africa and the Middle East and is currently perceived to be ‘the most serious Russian PMC’. It is also the first Russian private military provider to set up its own cyber defence detachment. For more information on the enterprise see Neelov, V. 2013. ‘Chastnye voennye kompanii v Rossii: opyt I perspektivy ispoľzovaniya’, Tsentr Strategicheskikh Otsenok i Prognozov, 6 November 2013. Accessed on 20 May 2020, http://csef.ru/media/articles/4838/4838.pdf and also Østensen, Å. G., Bukkvoll, T. 2018. ‘Russian Use of Private Military and Security Companies – the Implications for European and Norwegian Security’, FFI-Rapport no. 18/01300, Chr. Michelsen Institute. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://www.cmi.no/publications/file/6637-russian-use-of-private-military-and-security.pdf.

²⁶ Some sources, incorrectly, indicated that Wagner Group might have been registered in Hong Kong or in Argentina. See Kassidiaris, A. 2019. ‘The Wagner Group Paradox’, InsideOver, 27 December 2019. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://www.insideover.com/war/the-wagner-group-paradox-and-the-mainstream-media-fallacy.html.

²⁷ Neelov, V. 2017. ‘Tsep dlya psov vojny. Chastnye voennye kompanii v Rossii: opyt deyateľnosti i perspektivy legalizacii’, Tsentr Strategicheskikh Otsenok i Prognozov, 22 July 2017. Accessed on 20 May 2020, http://csef.ru/ru/oborona-i-bezopasnost/504/czep-dlya-psov-vojny-chastnye-voennye-kompanii-v-rossii-opyt-deyatelnosti-i-perspektivy-legalizaczii-7787.

²⁸ Falichev, O. 2016. ‘Okhrana dlia karmana’, Voenno-promyshlennyy kur’er, 21 March 2016. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://vpk-news.ru/articles/29840.

²⁹ Nebolsina, M. A. 2019. ‘Private Military and Security Companies’, Russia in Global Affairs, no. 2, April – June 2019. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/articles/private-military-and-security-companies/.

³⁰ Reynolds, N. 2019. ‘Putin´s Not-So-Secret Mercenaries: Patronage, Geopolitics, and the Wagner Group’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 8 July 2019. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/07/08/putin-s-not-so-secret-mercenaries-patronage-geopolitics-and-wagner-group-pub-79442. The very same notion supports also Østensen, Å. G., Bukkvoll, T. 2020. Østensen, Å. G., Bukkvoll, T. 2020. ‘The Emergence of Russian Private Military Companies: A New Tool of Clandestine Warfare’, Special Operations Journal, vol. 6, no. 1, 2020. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/23296151.2020.1740528?needAccess=true.

³¹ Spearin, Ch. R. 2018. ‘Russia’s Military and Security Privatization’, The US Army War College Quarterly Parameters, vol. 48, no. 2., 2018. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=817673.

³² Galeotti, M. 2017. ‘Moscow’s Mercenaries Reveal the Privatisation of Russian Geopolitics’, Open Democracy, 29 August 2017. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/chvk-wagner-and-privatisation-of-russian-geopolitics/.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Giglio, M. 2019. ‘Inside The Shadow War Fought By Russian Mercenaries’, BuzzFeed News, 17 April 2019. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/mikegiglio/inside-wagner-mercenaries-russia-ukraine-syria-prighozhin.

³⁶ Spearin, Ch. R. 2018. ‘Russia’s Military and Security Privatization’, The US Army War College Quarterly Parameters, vol. 48, no. 2., 2018. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=817673.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Østensen, Å. G., Bukkvoll, T. 2018. ‘Russian Use of Private Military and Security Companies – the Implications for European and Norwegian Security’, Chr. Michelsen Institute, FFI-Rapport no. 18/01300. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://www.cmi.no/publications/file/6637-russian-use-of-private-military-and-security.pdf.

³⁹ Uawire. 2018. ‘Russian mercenaries ask Hague to investigate owners of private military companies’, Uawire, 20 November 2018. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://www.uawire.org/russian-private-military-company-mercenaries-ask-hague-to-investigate-company-owners.

⁴⁰ Sukhankin, S. 2019. ‘The Russian State’s Use of Irregular Forces and Private Military Groups: From Ivan the Terrible to the Soviet Period’, The Jamestown Foundation, 12 April 2019. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://jamestown.org/program/the-russian-states-use-of-irregular-forces-and-private-military-groups-from-ivan-the-terrible-to-the-soviet-period/paper-2-irregular-forces-in-russian-soviet-history/.

⁴¹ Kuczyński, G. 2018. ‘Niewidzialna armia Putina’, Warsaw Institute, 30 March 2018. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://warsawinstitute.org/putins-invisible-army/.

⁴² For more on the topic see Informnapalm.rocks. n.d. ‘Private Military Companies in Russia: Carrying Out the Criminal Orders of the Kremlin’, Informnapalm.rocks, n.d. Accessed on 20 May 2020, http://informnapalm.rocks/private-military-companies-in-russia-carrying-out-criminal-orders-of-the-kremlin. Alternatively see also Neelov, V. 2013. ‘Chastnye voennye kompanii v Rossii: opyt I perspektivy ispoľzovaniya’, Tsentr Strategicheskikh Otsenok i Prognozov, 6 November 2013. Accessed on 20 May 2020, http://csef.ru/media/articles/4838/4838.pdf., Østensen, Å. G., Bukkvoll, T. 2018. ‘Russian Use of Private Military and Security Companies – the Implications for European and Norwegian Security’, FFI-Rapport no. 18/01300, Chr. Michelsen Institute. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://www.cmi.no/publications/file/6637-russian-use-of-private-military-and-security.pdf or Sukhankin, S. 2019. ‘From ‘Volunteers’ to Quasi-PMCs: Retracing the Footprints of Russian Irregulars in the Yugoslav Wars and Post-Soviet Conflicts’, The Jamestown Foundation, 25 June 2019. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://jamestown.org/program/from-volunteers-to-quasi-pmcs-retracing-the-footprints-of-russian-irregulars-in-the-yugoslav-wars-and-post-soviet-conflicts/.

⁴³ Østensen, Å. G., Bukkvoll, T. 2018. ‘Russian Use of Private Military and Security Companies – the Implications for European and Norwegian Security’, FFI-Rapport no. 18/01300, Chr. Michelsen Institute. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://www.cmi.no/publications/file/6637-russian-use-of-private-military-and-security.pdf.

⁴⁴ Bogdanov, K. 2012. ‘Private Military Companies in Russia: To be or not to be’, Russia Beyond, 17 April 2012. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://www.rbth.com/articles/2012/04/17/private_military_companies_in_russia_to_be_or_not_to_be_15499.

⁴⁵ Gerasimov, V. 2013. ‘Tsennosť nauki v predvidenii’, Voenno-promyshlennyy kur’er, 26 February 2013. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://www.vpk-news.ru/articles/14632.

⁴⁶ Spearin, Ch. 2019. ‘Russian Military and Security Privatization: Implications for Canada’, Canadian Military Journal, vol. 19, no. 2., 2019. Accessed on 20 May 2020, http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/Vol19/No2/PDF/CMJ192Ep4.pdf.

⁴⁷ Eben Barlow is a former lieutenant general of the Republic of South Africa’s armed forces and co-founder of the emblematic South African PMC Executive Outcomes that emerged in 1989 as the very first modern PMC. At the 2010 St Petersburg economic forum he took part in a minor discussion panel dealing with cooperation between the army and the private sector. His actual presence was, however, justified by a much more important speech about private military companies and their cooperation with regular armies, delivered behind closed doors to top-branch members of the General Staff. For more see Malkova, I., Baev, A. 2019. ‘Chastnaya armiya dlya prezidenta: istoriya samogo delikatnogo porucheniya Evgeniya Prigozhina’, The Bell, 29 January 2019. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://thebell.io/41889-2/.

⁴⁸ Sukhankin, S. 2019. ‘Unleashing the PMCs and Irregulars in Ukraine: Crimea and Donbas’, The Jamestown Foundation, 3 September 2019. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://jamestown.org/program/unleashing-the-pmcs-and-irregulars-in-ukraine-crimea-and-donbas/.

⁴⁹ Sukhankin, S. ‘War, Business and Ideology: How Russian Private Military Contractors Pursue Moscow’s Interests’, The Jamestown Foundation, 21 March 2019. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://jamestown.org/program/war-business-and-ideology-how-russian-private-military-contractors-pursue-moscows-interests/.

⁵⁰ Spearin, Ch. R. 2018. ‘Russia’s Military and Security Privatization’, The US Army War College Quarterly Parameters, vol. 48, no. 2., 2018. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=817673.

⁵¹ The place is also referred to in various sources as: ‘Deir ez Zor’, ‘Deir Ezor’, ‘Deir Ezzor’, ‘Deir Ezzour’, ‘Deir el-Zour’, or ‘Deir al-Zour.’ We will continue with referring to it as ‘Deir ez-Zor’ throughout the text.

⁵² Vadim Gusev and Evgeny Sidorov, former Moran Security Group officials and co-founders of the Slavonic Corps, were arrested immediately upon their return to Russia and later sentenced to three years in prison for mercenary activities. At the turn of the years 2014/2015 they were paroled. All their subordinates (including the current Wagner Group leader, Dmitriy Utkin, then-commander of one of the two Slavic Corps sub-unit) were forced by the FSB to sign an affidavit of silence about their presence in Syria and sent home without the pre-negotiated pay. For more on the case, see Fontanka.ru, ‘Komandiry “Slavyanskogo korpusa” v Sirii osuzhdeny za naemnichestvo’, Fontanka.ru, 28 October 2014. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://www.fontanka.ru/2014/10/28/129/ and also Larson, C. 2019. ‘Wagner: A closer look at the Russian private security and military enterprise’, Offiziere.ch, 7 January 2019. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://www.offiziere.ch/?p=34979 or also Spearin, Ch. R. 2018. ‘Russia’s Military and Security Privatization’, The US Army War College Quarterly Parameters, vol. 48, no. 2., 2018. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=817673.

⁵³ Prigozhin (born in 1961) a man without any previous military background is also known as ‘Putin’s chef’ for owning Concord Management and Concord Catering - enterprises supplying schools in Moscow and St Petersburg districts, the Kremlin, Ministry of Defence and several barracks, bases and military schools with meals, cleaning, building and energy services. Other enterprises connected with him, such as the Internet Research Agency or RIA FAN are commonly labelled as the ‘troll factories’ since they were indicted for illegal interference in the 2016 US presidential election which caused them to be listed on US sanction lists. For more on interesting figure of Evgeny Prigozhin, his businesses and involvement in the Russian propaganda machine see Zhegulev, I. 2016. ‘Evgeny Prigozhin’s right to be forgotten. What does Vladimir Putin’s favourite chef want to hide from the Internet?’, Meduza.io, 13 June 2016. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://meduza.io/en/feature/2016/06/13/evgeny-prigozhin-s-right-to-be-forgotten and also Giles, K., Akimenko, V. 2019. ‘Use and utility of Russia´s private military companies’, Journal of Future Conflict – Online Journal, fall 2019. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://www.queensu.ca/psychology/sites/webpublish.queensu.ca.psycwww/files/files/Journal%20of%20Future%20Conflict/Issue%201%20Fall%202019/Keir_Giles_and_Valeriy_Akimenko-Use_and_Utility_of_Russias_Private_Military_Companies.pdf.

⁵⁴ Østensen, Å. G., Bukkvoll, T. 2018. ‘Russian Use of Private Military and Security Companies – the Implications for European and Norwegian Security’, FFI-Rapport no. 18/01300, Chr. Michelsen Institute. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://www.cmi.no/publications/file/6637-russian-use-of-private-military-and-security.pdf.

⁵⁵ Sukhankin, S. ‘War, Business and Ideology: How Russian Private Military Contractors Pursue Moscow’s Interests’, The Jamestown Foundation, 21 March 2019. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://jamestown.org/program/war-business-and-ideology-how-russian-private-military-contractors-pursue-moscows-interests/.

⁵⁶ Dolgareva, A. 2018. ‘”Lyudi dolzhny znat pravdu’: eks-boyets rasskazal o sluzhbe v ‘ChVK Wagnera”’, Ridus, 20 February 2018. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://www.ridus.ru/news/271195?from=more.

⁵⁷ When asked in December 2018 about the Wagner Group and his relation to it, President Putin referred to the company as a legal ‘private security company’ which ‘can work and pursue their business interests anywhere in the world as long as they are not violating Russia´s domestic norms and regulations.’ His spokesman, Dmitry Peskov, later advocated the use of the term by saying that: ‘No private military companies exist in our country by law. Everyone is talking about some private military company, something called Wagner, but the point is that there is no provision in our legislation.’ For more on the matter see TASS, 2018. ‘Kremlin: no private military companies exist in Russia’, TASS, 21 December 2018. Accessed on 20 May 2020, http://tass.com/defense/1037365.

⁵⁸ Sukhankin, S. 2019. ‘Unleashing the PMCs and Irregulars in Ukraine: Crimea and Donbas’, The Jamestown Foundation, 3 September 2019. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://jamestown.org/program/unleashing-the-pmcs-and-irregulars-in-ukraine-crimea-and-donbas/.

⁵⁹ Vbloknot. 2018. ‘Igor Strelkov (Girkin), “Igor Strelkov: ‘Chastnik’ (Chast 1-4)”’, Vbloknot, 14 July 2018. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://vbloknot.com/18446-igor-strelkov-chastniki.html. Roughly corresponding numbers were given also by Polish expert on the matter, Grzegorz Kuczyński. See Kuczyński, G. 2018. ‘Niewidzialna armia Putina’, Warsaw Institute, 30 March 2018. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://warsawinstitute.org/putins-invisible-army/.

⁶⁰ Larson, C. 2019. ‘Wagner: A closer look at the Russian private security and military enterprise’, Offiziere.ch, 7 January 2019. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://www.offiziere.ch/?p=34979.

⁶¹ Moscow-based non-governmental civil movement E.N.O.T. Corps was concerned mainly with complex military-patriotic upbringing as well as organising patriotic boot camps for the youth in Russia and Serbia. In 2018, after losing its influential protectors, the movement was formally disbanded and its leaders imprisoned due to charges of extortion. For more on E.N.O.T. Corps activities see Sukhankin, S. 2018. ‘Russian PMCs, War Veterans Running “Patriotic” Youth Camps in the Balkans (Part Two)’, The Jamestown Foundation, 31 October 2018. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://jamestown.org/program/russian-pmcs-war-veterans-running-patriotic-youth-camps-in-the-balkans-part-two/. For infamous end of the enterprise see Polykhina, J. 2019. ‘”Enoty” v kletke’, Novaya Gazeta, 22 February 2019. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://novayagazeta.ru/articles/2019/02/22/79661-enoty-v-kletke.

⁶² Sukhankin, S. 2018. ‘Russian PMCs, War Veterans Running “Patriotic” Youth Camps in the Balkans (Part Two)’, The Jamestown Foundation, 31 October 2018. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://jamestown.org/program/russian-pmcs-war-veterans-running-patriotic-youth-camps-in-the-balkans-part-two/.

⁶³ For Strelkov´s confirmation visit Vbloknot. 2018. ‘Igor Strelkov (Girkin), “Igor Strelkov: ‘Chastnik’ (Chast 1-4)”’, Vbloknot, 14 July 2018. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://vbloknot.com/18446-igor-strelkov-chastniki.html. For Khomyakov´s confirmation see Polykhina, J. 2019. ‘”Enoty” v kletke’, Novaya Gazeta, 22 February 2019. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://novayagazeta.ru/articles/2019/02/22/79661-enoty-v-kletke.

⁶⁴ RSB-Group representatives dismissed the claim as false. See Østensen, Å. G., Bukkvoll, T. 2018. ‘Russian Use of Private Military and Security Companies – the Implications for European and Norwegian Security’, FFI-Rapport no. 18/01300, Chr. Michelsen Institute. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://www.cmi.no/publications/file/6637-russian-use-of-private-military-and-security.pdf.

⁶⁵ Sukhankin, S. 2019. ‘Unleashing the PMCs and Irregulars in Ukraine: Crimea and Donbas’, The Jamestown Foundation, 3 September 2019. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://jamestown.org/program/unleashing-the-pmcs-and-irregulars-in-ukraine-crimea-and-donbas/.

⁶⁶ The Interpreter, 2018. ‘Meet Patriot, the New Russian Private Military Contractor Competing with Wagner’, The Interpreter, 15 July 2018. Accessed on 20 May 2020, http://www.interpretermag.com/meet-patriot-the-new-russian-private-military-contractor-competing-with-wagner/.

⁶⁷ Utkin (born in 1970) worked for Moran Security Group, later took part in the Syrian campaign with Slavonic Corps in 2013, and upon his return helped to build up Wagner Group from the Slavonic Corps’ remnants. He and several of his subordinates from the Wagner Group (for instance former professional soldiers and special force operators, ex-Colonel Andrey Troshev and ex-Major Alexander Kuznetsov) could be seen at the official award reception at the Day of Heroes of the Fatherland in the Kremlin on 9 December 2016. Reportedly, at least 15 individuals who worked for the Wagner Group were awarded various medals and orders. See Informnapalm.rocks. n.d. ‘Private Military Companies in Russia: Carrying Out the Criminal Orders of the Kremlin’. Informnapalm.rocks, n.d. Accessed on 20 May 2020, http://informnapalm.rocks/private-military-companies-in-russia-carrying-out-criminal-orders-of-the-kremlin.

⁶⁸ Vbloknot. 2018. ‘Igor Strelkov (Girkin), “Igor Strelkov: ‘Chastnik’ (Chast 1-4)”’, Vbloknot, 14 July 2018. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://vbloknot.com/18446-igor-strelkov-chastniki.html. Sergei Sukhankin enumerates several sources of personnel recruitment, training and equipping for the enterprise: All-Russian war veteran organizations, Cossack societies in southern Russia, state-sponsored Volunteer Society for Cooperation with the Army, Aviation, any Navy (DOSAAF) and military commissariats dispersed basically all over the Russia. See Sukhankin, S. 2019. ‘Russian PMCs in the Syrian Civil War: From Slavonic Corps to Wagner Group and Beyond’, The Jamestown Foundation, 18 December 2019. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://jamestown.org/program/russian-pmcs-in-the-syrian-civil-war-from-slavonic-corps-to-wagner-group-and-beyond/.

⁶⁹ Gusarov, V. 2015. ‘Chastnye voennye kompanii Rossii kak instrument uzakonennogo terrora’, Informnapalm.org, 24 November 2015. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://informnapalm.org/15878-rossyjskye-chvk/. Sukhankin, S. 2018. ‘Continuing War by Other Means: The Case of Wagner, Russia’s Premier Private Military Company in the Middle East’, The Jamestown Foundation, 13 July 2018. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://jamestown.org/program/continuing-war-by-other-means-the-case-of-wagner-russias-premier-private-military-company-in-the-middle-east/.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Berg, E. 2017. ‘“People think it doesn’t affect them. But it affects everyone.” Meduza interviews the reporter who blew the lid on Russian mercenaries fighting in Syria’, Meduza.io, 30 August 2017. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://meduza.io/en/feature/2017/08/30/people-think-it-doesn-t-affect-them-but-it-affects-everyone. It is ironic but eloquent enough that these services have to be delivered to the Wagner Group by state entities, as it is exactly this sort of logistic and support service that constitute the backbone of what standard Western PMCs provide to their customers. Without active state assistance in arming, equipping and logistics enterprises such as Wagner would not be able to wage extensive offensive and larger scale operations. See Østensen, Å. G., Bukkvoll, T. 2020. ‘The Emergence of Russian Private Military Companies: A New Tool of Clandestine Warfare’, Special Operations Journal, vol. 6, no. 1,, 2020. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/23296151.2020.1740528?needAccess=true.

⁷² Deutsches Asienforschungszentrum, 2018. ‘Russia‘s New PMC Patriot: The Kremlin´s Bid for a Greater Role in Africa?’, Deutsches Asienforschungszentrum, 2 August 2018. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://www.dafz.org/regional-affairs/africa/russias-pmc-patriot/.

⁷³ One of the managers of the Shchit is allegedly Evgeny Sidorov – that very same Evgeny Sidorov who co-founded Slavonic Corps in 2013 and later spent some 2 years in prison for its mercenary adventures. For more on Shchit, its short history and current activities see Korotkov, D. 2019. ‘Bez “Shchita”’, Novaya Gazeta, 28 July 2019. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://novayagazeta.ru/articles/2019/07/28/81406-bez-schita or alternatively also Sukhankin, S. 2019. ‘New Russian PMC Spotted in Syria: Potential Military Links and Implications’, The Jamestown Foundation, 7 August 2019. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://jamestown.org/program/new-russian-pmc-spotted-in-syria-potential-military-links-and-implications/.

⁷⁴ Sukhankin, S. 2018. ‘“Continuing War by Other Means”: The Case of Wagner, Russia’s Premier Private Military Company in the Middle East’, The Jamestown Foundation, 13 July 2018. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://jamestown.org/program/continuing-war-by-other-means-the-case-of-wagner-russias-premier-private-military-company-in-the-middle-east/.

⁷⁵ Østensen, Å. G., Bukkvoll, T. 2018. ‘Russian Use of Private Military and Security Companies – the Implications for European and Norwegian Security’, Chr. Michelsen Institute, FFI-Rapport no. 18/01300. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://www.cmi.no/publications/file/6637-russian-use-of-private-military-and-security.pdf.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Sukhankin, S. 2018. ‘“Continuing War by Other Means”: The Case of Wagner, Russia’s Premier Private Military Company in the Middle East’, The Jamestown Foundation, 13 July 2018. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://jamestown.org/program/continuing-war-by-other-means-the-case-of-wagner-russias-premier-private-military-company-in-the-middle-east/.

⁷⁸ Marten, K. 2019. ‘Russia’s use of semi-state security forces: the case of the Wagner Group’, Post-Soviet Affairs, no. 3, vol. 35, 2019.

⁷⁹ Boyarskij, A. 2014. ‘Chastniki boevykh dejstvij’, Kommersant-Dengi, 10 November 2014. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2600100. See also Østensen, Å. G., Bukkvoll, T. 2018. ‘Russian Use of Private Military and Security Companies – the Implications for European and Norwegian Security’, FFI-Rapport no. 18/01300, Chr. Michelsen Institute. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://www.cmi.no/publications/file/6637-russian-use-of-private-military-and-security.pdf.

⁸⁰ Sivkov, K. 2017. ‘Partizany na dovoľstvii’, Voenno-Promyshľennyi Kur’er, 10 April 2017. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://vpk-news.ru/articles/36159.

⁸¹ Kapustin, A. 2018. ‘Khirurgicheskij instrument’, Russkaya Planeta, 20 January 2018. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://rusplt.ru/policy/hirurgicheskiy-instrument-32653.html.

⁸² Sivkov, K. 2017. ‘Partizany na dovoľstvii’, Voenno-Promyshľennyi Kur’er, 10 April 2017. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://vpk-news.ru/articles/36159. See also Sukhankin, S. 2018. ‘Russia to Use Irregular Forces Against “Hybrid Threats”: The Case of Kaliningrad’, The Jamestown Foundation, 24 July 2018. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://jamestown.org/program/russia-to-use-irregular-forces-against-hybrid-threats-the-case-of-kaliningrad/.

⁸³ Reynolds, N. 2019. ‘Putin´s Not-So-Secret Mercenaries: Patronage, Geopolitics, and the Wagner Group’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 8 July 2019. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/07/08/putin-s-not-so-secret-mercenaries-patronage-geopolitics-and-wagner-group-pub-79442.

⁸⁴ Marten, K. 2019. ‘Russia’s use of semi-state security forces: the case of the Wagner Group’, Post-Soviet Affairs, no. 3, vol. 35, 2019.

⁸⁵ Vbloknot. 2018. ‘Igor Strelkov (Girkin), “Igor Strelkov: ‘Chastnik’ (Chast 1-4)”’, Vbloknot, 14 July 2018. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://vbloknot.com/18446-igor-strelkov-chastniki.html.

⁸⁶ Crowley, S. 2018. ‘Wagner in the C.A.R: who blesses the Russian mercenaries down in Africa?’. BMB Russian, 29 August 2018. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://bearmarketbrief.com/2018/08/29/wagner-in-the-c-a-r-who-blesses-the-russian-mercenaries-in-africa/.

⁸⁷ The company enjoys a 25% share guarantee of all oil deposits liberated from ISIS – an agreement between Evro Polis and the Syrian Energy Ministry was brokered by Russian Energy Minister Alexander Novak. See Marten, K. 2019. ‘Russia’s use of semi-state security forces: the case of the Wagner Group’, Post-Soviet Affairs, no. 3, vol. 35. 2019.

⁸⁸ Dolgareva, A. 2018. „‘Lyudi dolzhny znat pravdu’: eks-boyets rasskazal o sluzhbe v ‘ChVK Wagnera’”, Ridus, 20 February 2018. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://www.ridus.ru/news/271195?from=more.

⁸⁹ For more information on the battle between Syrian units accompanied by Wagner Group operators against Kurdish forces supported by US air and artillery strikes see Larson, C. 2019. ‘Wagner: A closer look at the Russian private security and military enterprise’, Offiziere.ch, 7 January 2019. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://www.offiziere.ch/?p=34979.

⁹⁰ Giles, K., Akimenko, V. 2019. ‘Use and utility of Russia´s private military companies’, Journal of Future Conflict – Online Journal, fall 2019. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://www.queensu.ca/psychology/sites/webpublish.queensu.ca.psycwww/files/files/Journal%20of%20Future%20Conflict/Issue%201%20Fall%202019/Keir_Giles_and_Valeriy_Akimenko-Use_and_Utility_of_Russias_Private_Military_Companies.pdf

⁹¹ Which encompass training and consulting local security forces, taking part in suppression of anti-government movements/protests/revolts/uprisings, protecting critical infrastructure, rendering personal security to the regime elites, intelligence gathering and last but not least, weapon delivery and its maintenance.

⁹² Blank, S. 2017. ‘The Foundations of Russian Policy in the Middle East’, The Jamestown Foundation, 5 October 2017. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://jamestown.org/program/foundations-russian-policy-middle-east/.

⁹³ Moscow´s spin doctors allegedly meddled into 20 African countries´ electoral campaigns in order to keep Russia-friendly autocrats in their offices or vice versa, install such politicians into leading roles. For more on the topic see Warsaw Institute, 2019. ‘Russia in Africa: Weapons, Mercenaries, Spin Doctors’, Warsaw Institute, 22 October 2019. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://warsawinstitute.org/russia-in-africa-weapons-mercenaries-spin-doctors/.

⁹⁴ Bocharkin, A. 2018. ‘Russian Private Military Companies in Africa: What Are They Doing There?’, Petrimazepa, 25 November 2018. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://petrimazepa.com/en/russian_private_military_companies_in_africa_what_are_they_doing_there. For more on the topic see also Malkova, I., Baev, A. 2019. ‘Chastnaya armiya dlya prezidenta: istoriya samogo delikatnogo porucheniya Evgeniya Prigozhina’, The Bell, 29 January 2019. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://thebell.io/41889-2/ and Mackinnon, A. 2021. ‘Who Blessed the Vlads Down in Africa?’, Foreign Policy, 24 September 2021. Accessed on 18 November 2021, https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/09/24/russia-wagner-group-mali-africa-putin-libya/.

⁹⁵ Giles, K., Akimenko, V. 2019. ‘Use and utility of Russia´s private military companies’, Journal of Future Conflict – Online Journal, fall 2019. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://www.queensu.ca/psychology/sites/webpublish.queensu.ca.psycwww/files/files/Journal%20of%20Future%20Conflict/Issue%201%20Fall%202019/Keir_Giles_and_Valeriy_Akimenko-Use_and_Utility_of_Russias_Private_Military_Companies.pdf

⁹⁶ Sukhankin, S. 2019. ‘The Russian State’s Use of Irregular Forces and Private Military Groups: From Ivan the Terrible to the Soviet Period’, The Jamestown Foundation, 12 April 2019. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://jamestown.org/program/the-russian-states-use-of-irregular-forces-and-private-military-groups-from-ivan-the-terrible-to-the-soviet-period/paper-2-irregular-forces-in-russian-soviet-history/.

⁹⁷ SMMLIBYA. 2019. ‘Libya’s Khalifa Haftar Makes Unannounced Visit to Moscow for Consultations with Russian Defense Ministry’, Special Monitoring Mission to Libya, 11 April 2019. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://smmlibya.wordpress.com/2019/04/11/libyas-khalifa-haftar-makes-unannounced-visit-to-moscow-for-consultations-with-russian-defense-ministry/. See also Weiss, M., Vaux, P. 2019. ‘Russia´s Wagner Mercenaries Have Moved into Libya. Good Luck with that’, Daily Beast, 28 September 2019. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://www.thedailybeast.com/russias-wagner-mercenaries-have-moved-into-libya-good-luck-with-that.

⁹⁸ Spearin, Ch. R. 2018. ‘Russia’s Military and Security Privatization’, The US Army War College Quarterly Parameters, vol. 48, no. 2., 2018. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=817673.

⁹⁹ Murtazin, I. 2018. ‘Na etoy kukhne chto-to gotovitsya’, Novaya Gazeta, 9 November 2018. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://novayagazeta.ru/articles/2018/11/09/78517-na-etoy-kuhne-chto-to-gotovitsya.

¹⁰⁰ Giles, K., Akimenko, V. 2019. ‘Use and utility of Russia´s private military companies’, Journal of Future Conflict – Online Journal, fall 2019. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://www.queensu.ca/psychology/sites/webpublish.queensu.ca.psycwww/files/files/Journal%20of%20Future%20Conflict/Issue%201%20Fall%202019/Keir_Giles_and_Valeriy_Akimenko-Use_and_Utility_of_Russias_Private_Military_Companies.pdf.

¹⁰¹ Weiss, M., Vaux, P. 2019. ‘Russia´s Wagner Mercenaries Have Moved into Libya. Good Luck with that’, Daily Beast, 28 September 2019. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://www.thedailybeast.com/russias-wagner-mercenaries-have-moved-into-libya-good-luck-with-that.

¹⁰² Weiss, M., Vaux, P. 2019. ‘Russia´s Wagner Mercenaries Have Moved into Libya. Good Luck with that’, Daily Beast, 28 September 2019. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://www.thedailybeast.com/russias-wagner-mercenaries-have-moved-into-libya-good-luck-with-that.

¹⁰³ Bocharkin, A. 2018. ‘Russian Private Military Companies in Africa: What Are They Doing There?’, Petrimazepa, 25 November 2018. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://petrimazepa.com/en/russian_private_military_companies_in_africa_what_are_they_doing_there. Alternatively also Larson, C. 2019. ‘Wagner: A closer look at the Russian private security and military enterprise’, Offiziere.ch, 7 January 2019. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://www.offiziere.ch/?p=34979.

¹⁰⁴ Leviev. R. 2019. ‘From Russia with Wagner: are Russian mercenaries suppressing the Sudan protests?’, Conflict Intelligence Team, 11 January 2019. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://citeam.org/are-ru-mercenaries-suppressing-the-sudan-protests/?lang=en.

¹⁰⁵ Uawire. 2019. ‘Russia signs military deal with Sudan’, Uawire, 26 May 2019. Accessed on 20 May 2020, http://www.uawire.org/russia-signs-military-deal-with-sudan?mc_cid=de82a5e278&mc_eid=11a3aaa5cd.

¹⁰⁶ Bocharkin, A. 2018. ‘Russian Private Military Companies in Africa: What Are They Doing There?’, Petrimazepa, 25 November 2018. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://petrimazepa.com/en/russian_private_military_companies_in_africa_what_are_they_doing_there.

¹⁰⁷ Warsaw Institute, 2019. ‘Russia in Africa: Weapons, Mercenaries, Spin Doctors’, Warsaw Institute, 22 October 2019. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://warsawinstitute.org/russia-in-africa-weapons-mercenaries-spin-doctors/.

¹⁰⁸ Thomas, E. 2019. ‘Russian Trolls Are Staging a Takeover in Africa – With Help From Mercenaries’, Daily Beast, 23 March 2019. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://www.thedailybeast.com/yevgheny-prigozhins-russian-trolls-are-staging-a-takeover-in-the-central-african-republicwith-help-from-his-wagner-mercenaries.

¹⁰⁹ Sukhankin, S. 2018. ‘Russia’s hired guns in Africa’, European Council on Foreign Relations, 12 November 2018. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_russias_hired_guns_in_africa. The Russian outlet Novaya Gazeta published in February 2019 an investigative article that in detail tracks Prigozhin´s private jet flights from Moscow or Saint Petersburg to various destinations in Turkey, Lebanon, Syria and dozens of African countries where Prigozhin is reported to have business interests. See Dolinina, I, Marokhovskaya, A, 2019. ‘Spetsy I spetsii’, Novaya Gazeta, 4 February 2019. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://novayagazeta.ru/articles/2019/02/04/79417-spetsy-i-spetsii.

¹¹⁰ Bocharkin, A. 2018. ‘Russian Private Military Companies in Africa: What Are They Doing There?’, Petrimazepa, 25 November 2018. Accessed on 20 May 2020,, https://petrimazepa.com/en/russian_private_military_companies_in_africa_what_are_they_doing_there.

¹¹¹ Gordienko, I. 2019. ‘My Son´s Father Was Killed While Reporting on a Private Russian Militia. I´m Still Waiting for Justice’, Time, 30 July 2019. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://time.com/5637539/russia-central-african-republicmilitia-anniversary/.

¹¹² Thomas, E. 2019. ‘Russian Trolls Are Staging a Takeover in Africa – With Help From Mercenaries’, Daily Beast, 23 March 2019. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://www.thedailybeast.com/yevgheny-prigozhins-russian-trolls-are-staging-a-takeover-in-the-central-african-republicwith-help-from-his-wagner-mercenaries.

¹¹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁴ Flanagan, J. 2019. ‘Bloodshed and retreat from Mozambique for Putin´s private army the Wagner Group’, The Times, 25 November 2019. Accessed on 20 May 2020, https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/bloodshed-and-retreat-from-mozambique-for-putin-s-private-army-the-wagner-group-696tnpzqh

¹¹⁵ Coen, T. 2021. ‘The Wagner Group in Mali: Another Failed EU Strategy in Sahel?’, FINABEL, European Army Interoperability Centre, 19 October 2021. Accessed on 18 November 2021, https://finabel.org/the-wagner-group-in-mali-another-failed-eu-strategy-in-sahel/.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Adam Potočňák

Adam Potočňák is a Ph.D.-candidate at the Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social Studies, Masaryk University, Brno, Czech Republic and also a research fellow at the Centre for Security and Military Strategic Studies at the University of Defence in Brno. He focuses his research on armed conflict analysis, global powers competition, US-Russian relations and security environment of the Caucasus region.

Miroslav Mareš

Miroslav Mareš is a professor at the Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social Studies, Masaryk University in Brno, Czech Republic. He is a guarantor of the Security and Strategic Studies curriculum and senior researcher of the International Institute of Political Science in Brno. He focuses on research of political violence and extremism and security policy, especially in Central Europe. He is a member of the editorial board of the Radicalization Awareness Network (RAN) of the European Union, author and co-author of more than 200 academic articles, chapters, and books like Extremismus – Theorien – Konzepte – Formen (with Astrid Bötticher), or Militant Right-Wing Extremism in Putin’s Russia: Legacies, Forms and Threats (with Jan Holzer and Martin Laryš).