The Promises of Prague versus Nuclear Realities: From Bush to Obama

Abstract

Contrasting the nuclear guidance documents and public statements of the George W. Bush and Barack Obama administrations reveals significant differences in American nuclear policy, but also surprising continuities. Bush's aim was never disarmament, but rather extending the life and potential role of American nuclear weaponry. An evaluation of the guidance documents that developed this approach, and major development programmes like the Reliable Replacement Warhead, shows that the Bush strategy was an attempted quiet revolution that foreshadowed a new nuclear era in which the former ‘weapon of last resort’ became a usable and necessary war-fighting device.

In contrast, Barack Obama promised significant changes in American nuclear policy. In his April 2009 speech in Prague, Obama offered a vision of a transformed international security context and the goal of total nuclear disarmament. Although he made eventual nuclear disarmament the central goal of American nuclear weapons policy, Obama stopped short of change on critical issues that have lingered since the Cold War. A moderate NPR and New START Treaty, together with pragmatic developments at the Nuclear Security Summit and the 2010 NPT Review Conference, as well as on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, indicate that the role of nuclear weapons in American security policy has changed less than is widely assumed. Obama has pursued a policy of nuclear balance, with incremental steps toward disarmament accompanied by measures to retain American primacy and nuclear options.

Notes

Daryl G. Kimball, ‘Obama's Prague Agenda Two Years On’, Arms Control Now, 11 April 2011. Available at http://armscontrolnow.org/2011/04/04/obamas-prague-agenda-two-years-on/

Barack Obama, ‘Remarks By President Barack Obama, Hradčany Square, Prague, Czech Republic’ (Washington DC: The White House, Office of the Press Secretary), 5 April 2009.

Kimball, ‘Obama's Prague Agenda Two Years On’ (note 1).

James Kitfield, ‘Road to Zero Nukes Remains Fraught’, National Journal, 1 June 2009. Available http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/ts_20090601_8825.php

The Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) was a new American nuclear warhead design and bomb family that was intended to be simple, reliable and to provide a long-lasting, low-maintenance future nuclear force for the United States. It was also the project name for the ongoing US Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) design project, started in 2004, to develop those designs. In the debate on the RRW, opponents have mainly focused on two issues: the reliability of the existing stockpile and the danger that an RRW will stimulate nuclear proliferation.

George W. Bush, National Security Strategy of 2002 (Washington, DC: The White House, December 2002), p. 29.

George Perkovich, ‘Bush's Nuclear Revolution: A Regime Change in Non-proliferation’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 82, No. 2 (March/April), p. 4.

Daryl G. Kimball and Greg Thielmann, ‘Obama's NPR: Transitional, Not Transformational’, Arms Control Today, May 2010. Available at http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2010_05/Kimball-Thielmann

Ibid.

Hans M. Kristensen, ‘Dismantling Fewer, Not More, Nukes’, Los Angeles Times, 11 June 2007. Available at articles.latimes.com/2007/jun/11/opinion/le-monday11.8

National Resources Defense Council, ‘Faking Nuclear Restraint: The Bush Administration's Secret Plan for Strengthening US Nuclear Forces,’ 13 February 2002, available at <http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/restraint.asp

James Russell and James Wirtz, ‘A Quiet Revolution: The New Nuclear Triad’, Strategic Insight, Vol. 1, No. 3, (May 2002), p. 1.

Robert M. Gates, letter to Senator Pete Domenici, 4 May 2007, available at http://www.nukestrat.com/us/guidance.htm

The Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) was a new American nuclear warhead design and bomb family that was intended to be simple, reliable and to provide a long-lasting, low-maintenance future nuclear force for the United States. It was also the project name for the ongoing US Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) design project, started in 2004, to develop those designs.

Russell and Wirtz, ‘A Quiet Revolution’ (note 12), p. 1.

Jack D. Crouch, ‘Special Briefing on the Nuclear Posture Review’, US Department of Defense, International Security Policy, 9 January 2002.

US Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, ‘The Nuclear Posture Review’, 8 January 2002, submitted to Congress on 31 December 2001. available at www.globalsecurity.org

Mark Bromley, David Grahame, and Christine Kucia, Bunker Busters: Washington's Drive for New Nuclear Weapons (Washington, DC: British American Security Information Council, 2002).

Russell and Wirtz (note 12), p. 1.

Ibid.

Ibid.

US Department of Defense, ‘Nuclear Posture Review Report’, 8 January 2002, submitted to Congress on 31 December 2001. Excerpt is available at www.globalsecurity.org

Ibid.

CRS Report for Congress, ‘Nuclear Weapons and US National Security: A Need for New Weapons Programs?’ Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, Order Code RS21619, 15 September 2003, p. 1.

The most controversial aspect of the National Security Strategy of 2002 was its prevarication regarding ‘pre-emption’ and ‘prevention.’ Prevention aims to forestall the emergence of a potential long-term military threat. Action is taken to eliminate the adversary's existing capabilities and/or to preclude its acquisition, development and deployment of threatening capabilities. Additionally, action may be taken to remove the hostile regime from power and, hence, to eliminate the spectre of attack once and for all. Preventive operations are taken well before the adversary has begun preparations for an actual attack; indeed, possibly well before he has even made a decision to attack. Consequently, the defender has much greater latitude as to the timing of the preventive action, ideally initiated at a time when the adversary is inferior in capabilities and unprepared for the strike. Pre-emption, on the other hand, aims to disrupt an actual immediate military threat. It is an attempt to seize the military initiative in order to gain strategic advantage, ideally through surprise attack, and to avoid conceding the initiative to the adversary, which could have possibly disastrous results. Pre-emptive operations are taken, usually in the heat of a crisis, within a relatively narrow window: after the adversary has made the decision to attack – as suggested through indicators such as belligerent statements of hostile intent, mobilization and forward deployment of armed forces, etc. – but before he has actually initiated offensive military operations.

George W. Bush, National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (NSCWMD) (Washington, DC: The White House, 2002), pp. vi, vii, viii, ix. For the classified version of NSPD-17, see The Washington Times, 31 January 2003, available at, http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-17.html

Ibid.

Hans M. Kristensen, ‘US Nuclear Weapons Guidance’, The Nuclear Information Project: Documenting Nuclear Policy and Operations, Federation of Atomic Scientists, available at http://www.nukestrat.com/us/guidance.htm

Ibid.

STRATCOM's responsibility is directed in the Unified Command Plan. Apart from overall responsibility for maintaining the strategic nuclear war plans and reconnaissance forces, STRATCOM provides theatre nuclear and counter-proliferation support to combatant commanders to assist them in developing tailored annexes designed to counter weapons of mass destruction. STRATCOM also provides specialized planning and consequence analysis, when requested by other combatant commanders.

The nuclear option in CONPLAN 8022 was first described in Arkin, ‘Not Just a Last Resort?’ The Washington Post, 15 May 2006, p. B01.

Hans M. Kristensen, ‘US National Security Strategy and Pre-emption,’ Defense Nationale and Securite Collective, July 2006. Available from http://www.defnat.com/en/acc_frames/resultat.asp?cid_article=20060718&ccodoper=3&cid=200607&ctypeencours=0

Hans M. Kristensen, ‘Global Strike: A Chronology of the Pentagon's New Offensive Strike Plan’, Federation of American Scientists, March 2006, p. 3.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Hans M. Kristensen, ‘Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations, 2005’, The Nuclear Information Project – Documenting Nuclear Policy and Operations, Federation of Atomic Scientists, available at http://www.nukestrat.com/us/jcs/jp3-12_05.htm

Ibid.

Ibid.

US Department of Defense, ‘Quadrennial Defense Review’, 6 February 2006, p. 49.

Ibid.

Peter C.W. Flory, ‘Statement Before the Senate Armed Services Committee Strategic Forces Subcommittee Hearing Regarding Global Strike Issues, March 16 2006’, (hearing delayed until 29 March 2006), United States Senate Committee on Armed Services, 29 March 2006.

US Department of Defense, ‘Quadrennial Defense Review’, 6 February 2006, p. ix.

George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of 2006 (Washington, DC: The White House, 2006), p. 18.

Ibid.

Hans M. Kristensen, quoted in ‘FAS Urges White House to Exclude Nuclear Weapons From National Security Strategy in War on Terrorism’, Federation of Atomic Scientists, 16 March 2006, available at http://www.fas.org/press/news/2006/2006mar_natlsecstrategy.html

Robert Nelson, ‘Complex 2030: DOE's Misguided Plan to Rebuild the US Nuclear Weapons Complex’ Nuclear Weapons & Global Security, December 2006, available at http://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear_weapons_and_global_security/nuclear_weapons/policy_issues/complex-2030-does-misguided.html

Ibid.

Complex 2030 – An Infrastructure Planning Scenario for a Nuclear Weapons Complex Able to Meet Threats of the 21st Century (Washington, DC: Office of Defense Programs, US National Nuclear Security Administration, 2006), p. 1.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

US Congress, ‘Hearing on Department of Energy's FY2008 Budget for NNSA Programs, House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development’, 29 March 2007.

Jonathan Medalia, ‘The Reliable Replacement Warhead Program: Background and Current Developments’, Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade Division, Congressional Research Service, 2009, p. 50.

Ibid.

Ibid.

For a discussion of the Reliable Replacement Warhead, see Hugh Gusterson, ‘Understanding the Reliable Replacement Warhead’, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, July/August 2007, pp. 30–49; Nuclear Weapons Complex Assessment Committee, The United States Nuclear Weapons Program: The Role of the Reliable Replacement Warhead (Washington, DC: AAAS, 2007).

Senate Armed Services Committee, ‘National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008’, Report 110-77, 110th Congress, 1st session, June 5, 2007, p. 395 (Section 1061).

US Department of Energy, ‘FY2009 Congressional Budget Request’, National Nuclear Security Administration, pp. 91–9.

US Department of Energy, ‘FY2009 Congressional Budget Request’, p. 25. The JASON study referenced is JSR- 07-336E, ‘Reliable Replacement Warhead Executive Summary’, 7 September 2007, p. 8, available at http://www.fas.org'/irp/agency/DOD/jason/rrw.pdf

US Congress, Hearing on FY2009 Budget for Strategic Defense Programs', House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, 110th Congress, 2nd Session, 27 February 2008, transcript by CQ Transcriptions.

US Congress, ‘Hearing on Nuclear Weapon Activities’, House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development, 109th Congress, 1st Session, 29 March 2007

Elaine M. Grossman, ‘US General Calls for Faster Action on Reliable Replacement Warhead’, Global Security Newswire, 6 March 2008. Available at http://www.citizenseducationproject.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=210&Itemid=37

Ibid.

Greg Webb, ‘Leading US Scientist Criticizes Warhead Effort’, Global Security Newswire, 27 February 2008. Available at http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/GSN_20080227_8776F360.php

US Congress, ‘House Committee on Appropriations, Energy and Water Development Appropriations Bill’, pp. 123–4.

US Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, ‘Terminations, Reductions, and Savings: Budget of the US Government, Fiscal Year 2010’, 2009, p. 55.

Perkovich, ‘Bush's Nuclear Revolution’ (note 7), p. 4.

George P. Schultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, ‘A World Free of Nuclear weapons’, Wall Street Journal, 4 January 2007, available at http://fcnl.org/issues/nuclear/world_free_of_nuclear_weapons; George P. Schultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, ‘Toward a Nuclear- Free World’, Wall Street Journal, 15 January 2008, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120036422673589947.html?mod=opinion_main_commentaries

Obama, ‘Remarks By President Barack Obama’ (note 2).

Paul Meyer, ‘Prague One Year Later: From Words to Deed’, Arms Control Today, May 2010. Available at http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2010_05/LookingBack

Ibid.

Obama, ‘Remarks By President Barack Obama’ (note 2).

Meyer, ‘Prague One Year Later: From Words to Deed’ (note 72).

Obama, ‘Remarks By President Barack Obama’ (note 2).

Ibid.

Meyer, ‘Prague One Year Later: From Words to Deed’ (note 72).

Obama, ‘Remarks By President Barack Obama’ (note 2).

Ibid.

Meyer, ‘Prague One Year Later: From Words to Deed’ (note 72).

Barack Obama, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: The White House, 2010), p. 23.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid., p. 24.

Ibid.

David E. Hoffman, ‘Reviewing the Review: Obama's New Nuke Strategy is a Good Start. But the Cold War's Legacy Lives On’, Foreign Policy, 6 April 2010. Available at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/04/06/reviewing_the_review

US Department of Defense, ‘The Nuclear Posture Review 2010’, Washington, DC, April 2010, p. viii. Available at http://www.defense.gov/npr/docs/2010%20nuclear%20posture%20review%20report.pdf

Ibid.

Obama, ‘Remarks By President Barack Obama’ (note 2).

US Department of Defense, ‘The Nuclear Posture Review 2010’ (note 89), p. 16.

Ibid., p. 17.

Kimball and Thielmann, ‘Obama's NPR’ (note 8).

US Department of Defense, ‘The Nuclear Posture Review 2010’ (note 89).

Ibid., p. v.

Ralph A. Cossa, ‘Moving Toward ‘No First Use’', International Security Network, 9 April 2010. Available at http://csis.org/publication/pacnet-17-2010-nuclear-posture-review-moving-toward-%E2%80%98no-first-use

Kimball and Thielmann, ‘Obama's NPR’ (note 8).

US Department of Defense, ‘The Nuclear Posture Review 2010’ (note 89), p. 30.

David J. Trachtenberg, ‘Assessing the NPR: A Closer Look,’ Center for Defense Studies, 20 April 2010. Available at /www.defensestudies.org/cds/assessing-the-npr-a-closer-look/

Obama, ‘Remarks By President Barack Obama’ (note 2).

Hans M. Kristensen, ‘The Nuclear Posture Review’, FAS Strategic Security, 8 April 2010. Available at http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2010/04/npr2010.php

Ibid.

US Department of Defense, ‘The Nuclear Posture Review 2010’ (note 89), p. 20.

Ibid., p. 25.

Hans M. Kristensen, ‘The Nuclear Posture Review’ (note 102).

US Department of Defense, ‘The Nuclear Posture Review 2010’ (note 89), p. 16.

Ibid., p. 32.

Ibid., p. 28.

Ibid., p. 28.

Hans M. Kristensen, ‘The Nuclear Posture Review’ (note 102).

Ibid., p. 39.

Hans Kristensen, ‘Nuclear Plan Shows Cuts and Massive Investments’, FAS Strategic Blog, June 2010, available at http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

The treaty is officially titled Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms.

For a brief summary of the original START Treaty, as well as a review of the US-Russian negotiations on the new START Treaty, see Amy F. Woolf, Strategic Arms Control After START: Issues and Options, CRS Report R40084 (Washington, DC: U.S. Congressional Research Service, 2010).

For details on this agreement see Amy F. Woolf, Nuclear Arms Control: The Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty, CRS Report RL31448 (Washington, DC: U.S. Congressional Research Service, 2010).

Office of the Press Secretary. ‘Key Facts about the New START Treaty’ (Washington, DC: The White House, 26 March 2010).

Ivan Oelrich and Hans Kristensen, ‘Verification Extended Public Interest Report’, The Federation of American Scientists, Vol.63, No. 2, (2010), available at http://www.fas.org/pubs/pir/_docs/PIR%20-%20Summer%202010.pdf, p. 8.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid., p. 7.

Ibid., p. 8.

Ibid.

John Kerry, quoted in Peter Baker, ‘Senate Passes Arms Control Treaty with Russia, 71-26’, The New York Times, 22 December 2010.Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/23/world/europe/23treaty.html

Richard Burt, quoted in ibid.

Daryl G. Kimball, quoted in ibid.

Oelrich and Kristensen, ‘Verification Extended Public Interest Report’ (note 122) p. 9.

Ibid.

Barack Obama, ‘Arms Control Today 2008 Presidential Q&A: Democratic Candidate Barack Obama’, Arms Control Today, 24 September 2008. Available at http://www.armscontrol.org/2008election

Testing the No-New-Nuclear-Weapons Pledge', FAS Strategic Security, 18 March 2010, available at http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2010/03/newnukes.php

Ibid

As asked by Hans M. Kristensen, ‘Does a new ‘weapon’ refer to the warhead on the missile or the delivery vehicle itself or both? And how new must a weapon be to be considered ‘new’ – does it require an entirely new design or can a modified design be considered a ‘new’ weapon?'

Hans M. Kristensen, ‘Senate Approval of New START Moves Nuclear Arms Control Forward’, FAS Security Strategy, 22 December 2010.