The Failure of a European Strategic Culture – EUFOR CHAD: The Last of its Kind?

Abstract

The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is in crisis. The concept of strategic culture is controversial, even more so at the European level. Yet as a historical context and as a grouping of shared beliefs and practices, it helps us to better understand how and why the promises of Saint-Malo were not met. A specific set of European political and security beliefs that should not be confused with a strategic culture were developed at the European level. The EU's misunderstanding of human security, combined with a widespread risk aversion, has transformed CSDP missions into political exercises, more focused on Europe's own image, posture and legitimacy than on the strategic requirements necessary to their success. The EUFOR Chad mission, the longest and most complex CSDP mission so far, was a good illustration of this problem. Moreover, this operation played a significant role in the French disillusion and estrangement from CSDP itself. The credibility and legitimacy of the Union in security and defence are now in doubt.

Notes

See The European Security Strategy. Translated into military preparedness and doctrine terms, the Headline Goal 2010 envisioned that the EU Military Staff would ‘be able by 2010 to respond with rapid and decisive action applying a fully coherent approach to the whole spectrum of crisis management operations covered by the Treaty on European Union’.

I distinguish between ‘security’ and ‘strategic’ culture for reasons explained below.

The inter-governmental approach favoured by Paris and London seems to occur more and more outside Brussels. The Lancaster House Defence Treaty of November 2010 is significant in this regard. It is striking how this Franco-British cooperation is about Paris and London's respective power perceptions as declining world powers rather than as leaders of Europe. Indeed, Europe and CSDP are barely mentioned in the Treaty. See Ben Jones, ‘Franco–British Military Cooperation: A New Engine for European Defence?’ Occasional Paper No. 8, EU-ISS, Paris, February 2011. As one scholar has argued, ‘The real threat [to CSDP], then, is not the Franco-British agreement, but the fact that the strengthening of Franco-British defence cooperation is taking place against a background of significant frustration in both London and Paris over EU defence efforts’. See Clara Marina O'Donnell, ‘Britain's Coalition Government and EU Defence Cooperation: Undermining British Interests’, International Affairs, Vol. 87, No. 2 (March 2011), p. 428.

As one Australian general quipped, ‘CSDP? This European device whereby Europeans send their best troops where they are not needed?’ (Author's conversation, London, June 2005).

Alastair Iain Johnston, ‘Thinking about Strategic Culture’, International Security, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Spring 1995), pp. 32–64; Colin S. Gray, ‘Strategic Culture as Context: The First Generation of Theory Strikes Back’, Review of International Studies, Vol. 25, No. 1 (January 1999), pp. 49–69; and Alastair Iain Johnston, ‘Strategic Cultures Revisited: Reply to Colin Gray’, Review of International Studies, Vol. 25, No. 3 (July 1999), pp. 525–530.

Raymond Aron, Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations (New York: F.A. Praeger, 1967); Anne Ahonen, ‘The Contemporary Debate in International Relations Theory and Raymond Aron's Epistemology and Ontology’, Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 29, No. 1 (March 1994), pp. 77–94; Hollis Martin and Steve Smith, Explaining and Understanding International Relations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991).

See Michael C. Desh, ‘Culture Clash: Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies’, International Security, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Summer 1998), pp. 141–170; Stephen M. Walt, ‘Rigor or Rigor Mortis, Rational Choice and Security Studies’, International Security, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Spring 1999), pp. 5–48, and the courageous but flawed attempt by Robert O. Keohane and Judith Goldstein (eds), Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions and Political Change, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993).

Theo Farrel, ‘Culture and Military Power’, Review of International Studies, Vol. 24, No. 3 (July 1998), p. 408. Or as Gray puts it: ‘Should I lose sleep worrying about whether I am a neoclassical realist or a constructivist? Could I possibly be both? Well, I think I am indeed both’ (Colin S. Gray, ‘Out of the Wilderness: Prime Time for Strategic Culture’, Comparative Strategy, Vol. 26, No. 1 [January–March 2007], p. 3).

Classical realism was much more sophisticated and cautious than its neo version. As Hans Morgenthau argued, ‘[New theories] do not so much try to reflect reality as it actually is as to superimpose upon recalcitrant reality a theoretical scheme that satisfies the desire for throughout rationalization. Their practicality is specious since its substitutes what is desirable for what is possible’ (Hans Morgenthau, ‘Common Sense and the Theories of International Relations’, Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 2, No. 2 [1967], p. 209). It is a pity that we have to live with an awful and absurd neologism, ‘neoclassical realism’.

Paul Kennedy, ‘Grand Strategy in War and Peace: Toward a Broader Definition’, in Paul Kennedy (ed.), Grand Strategies in War and Peace (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991), p. 5.

For a good overview of the usual deficiencies of a grand strategy, see Richard K. Betts, ‘Is Strategy an Illusion?’, International Security, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Fall 2000), pp. 5–50, and Robert Jervis, ‘U.S. Grand Strategy: Mission Impossible’, Naval War College Review, Vol. LI, No. 3 (Summer 1998), pp. 22–36.

See Jean Yves Haine, ‘The European Security Strategy and Threats: Is Europe Secure?’, in Sven Biscop and Jan Joel Andersson (eds), Forging a Global Europe – The EU and the European Security Strategy (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007), pp. 21–40.

See, among many, Jolyon Howorth, ‘The EU as a Global Actor: Grand Strategy for a Global Grand Bargain?’, JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 48, No. 3 (June 2010), pp. 455–474; Pascal Vennesson, ‘Competing Visions for the European Union Grand Strategy’, European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 15, No. 1 (February 2010), pp. 57–75; Alyson Bailes, ‘The European Security Strategy’, SIPRI Policy Paper No. 10, Stockholm, February 2005.

As Colin Gray reminds us, ‘Strategy is about influencing the will of an adversary’ (Colin S. Gray, ‘Strategic Thoughts for Defence Planners’, Survival, Vol. 52, No. 3 [June–July 2010], p. 161).

Basil H. Liddell Hart, Strategy (New York: Meridian, 1954/1991), p. 319. On the consequences of the budget crisis see, among others, Bastian Giegerich, ‘Budget Crunch: Implications for European Defence’, Survival, Vol. 52, No. 4 (August–September 2010), pp. 87–98.

Ursula C. Schroeder, ‘Strategy by Stealth? The Development of EU Internal and External Security’, Perspectives on European Politics and Society, Vol. 10, No. 4 (December 2009), pp. 486–505. On the Battle Groups, see Jean-Yves Haine, ‘Battle Groups: Out of Necessity, Still a Virtue?’, European Security Review, No. 39 (July 2008), pp. 1–5.

Antonio Missiroli, ‘The New EU “Foreign Policy” System after Lisbon: A Work in Progress’, European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 15, No. 4 (November 2010), pp. 427–452.

In the Lisbon Treaty (Art. 43.1 TEU) member states agreed on an extended definition of the Petersberg Tasks, stating that they: ‘[…] shall include joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peacekeeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilization. All these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories’.

He added: ‘Among practitioners, politicians often conflate strategy with policy objectives, focusing on what the desired outcomes should be, simply assuming that force will move the adversary toward it while soldiers often conflate strategy with operations focusing on how to destroy targets or defeat enemies tactically assuming that positive military effects mean positive policy effects’ (Betts, ‘Is Strategy an Illusion?’ [note 11], p. 7). This was underlined as soon as the ink of Saint-Malo was dry, yet more than 10 years after, it is still missing. See for example Alfred Van Staden et al., Towards a European Strategic Concept (The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingdael’, November 2000), available at http://www.nbiz.nl/publications/2000/20001100_cli_ess_staden.pdf, and Sven Biscop and Jo Coelmont, ‘A Strategy for CSDP: Europe's Ambitions as a Global Security Provider’, Egmont Paper No. 37, October 2010, available at http://www.egmontinstitute.be/paperegm/ep37.pdf

As noted by F. Heisbourg, ‘The EU cannot have a proper security strategy as long as decisions on the use of force rest in the hands of its member governments’. François Heisbourg, ‘The “European Security Strategy” is Not a Security Strategy”, in Steven Everts et al., A European Way of War (London: Centre for European Reform, 2004), p. 28. See also Sten Rynning, ‘The European Union: Towards a Strategic Culture?’, Security Dialogue, Vol. 34, No. 4 (December 2003), pp. 479–496.

Felix Berenskoetter and Bastian Giegerich, ‘From NATO to ESDP: A Social Constructivist Analysis of German Strategic Adjustment after the End of the Cold War’, Security Studies, Vol. 19, No. 3 (2010) p. 422. See also Jolyon Howorth, ‘Discourse, Ideas, and Epistemic Communities in European Security and Defence Policy’, West European Politics, Vol. 27, No. 2 (2004), pp. 211–234; Christoph O. Meyer, ‘Convergence towards a European Strategic Culture? A Constructivist Framework for Explaining Changing Norms’, European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 11, No. 4 (December 2005), pp. 523–549; Alessia Biava, ‘The Emergence of a Strategic Culture within the Common Security and Defence Policy’, European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 16, No. 1 (February 2011), pp. 41–58.

On the first point, see Helga Haftendorn, Robert O. Keohane and Celeste A. Wallander (eds), Imperfect Unions; Security Institutions over Time and Space (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), especially pp. 1–18. The other two are classically known as the chain-gang and the entrapment dilemma. See Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, ‘Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity’, International Organization, Vol. 44, No. 2 (Spring 1990), pp. 137–168.

As Albert Hirschman has noted, ‘Loyalty, far from being irrational, can serve the socially useful purpose of preventing deterioration from becoming cumulative, as it so often does when there is no barrier to exit… While loyalty postpones exit, its very existence is predicated on the possibility of exit. That even the most loyal member can exit is often an important part of his bargaining power vis-à-vis the organization’ (Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Declines in Firms, Organizations and States [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970], p. 78 and pp. 80–81).

That definition is from Paul Cornish and Geoffrey Edwards, ‘Beyond the EU/NATO Dichotomy: The Beginnings of a European Strategic Culture’, International Affairs, Vol. 77, No. 3 (July 2001), pp. 587.

For a nice summary of the importance of social mobilization in strategy, see Michael Howard, ‘The Forgotten Dimensions of Strategy’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 57, No. 5 (Summer 1979), pp. 975–986, and Stephen Peter Rosen, ‘Military Effectiveness: Why Society Matters’, International Security, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Spring 1995), pp. 5–31.

The reference work is Stephen M.Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987).

As a scholar of alliances noted long time ago, ‘The fact of entering into alliances does not transform national actors into coalition actors. The discrete members of the alliance retain all of their individuality, all of their separateness despite assumptions to the contrary’ (Edwin H. Fedder, ‘The Concept of Alliance’, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 12, No. 1 [March 1968], p. 81).

‘A policy cannot be branded “EU” unless backed by all 27. But 27 cooks in the kitchen is too many. On particular issues, the EU should encourage smaller groups of the most interested countries to draw up policy. It has done this already for Iran, where Britain, France and Germany take the lead’ (Charles Grant, Is Europe Doomed to Fail as a Power? [London: CER, 2009], p. 25).

For example, the Nordic Battle Group, led by Sweden, has now been dismantled.

See Robert T. Foley, Stuart Griffin and Helen McCartney, ‘“Transformation in Contact”: Learning the Lessons of Modern War’, International Affairs, Vol. 87, No. 2 (March 2011), pp. 253–270; Theo G. Farrell and Terry Terriff, The Sources of Military Change: Culture, Politics, Technology (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002).

There are of course many reasons why the conscription system was reconsidered in Germany, budgetary constraints being one of them. But the question of efficiency in engagement seems the most important. Former Army Chief Klaus Naumann argued that ‘I would like to hold on to [conscription]. If it still made sense, if you could still use it to form units in which the young man can say at the end of his service: “OK, I've learned how it works, I have the confidence to go into battle with this company, with this battery and survive”, but you can't do that in six months’. (Der Spiegel, 24 August 2010). According to a Nato official, ‘what's really lacking in zu Guttenberg's vision is the European dimension’ (quoted in Quentin Peel and James Blitz, ‘Security: A German Military Overhaul’, Financial Times, 31 January 2011).

See Final Report of the Commission on Human Security, (May 2003), http://www.humansecurity-chs.org/finalreport/English/FinalReport.pdf

As early as October 1998, Prime Minister Tony Blair argued that ‘a common foreign and security policy for the European Union is necessary, it is overdue, it is needed and it is high time we got on with trying to engage with formulating it’. See ‘European Defence: From Pörtschach to Helsinki’, House of Commons, Research Paper 00/20, (21 February 2000), available at http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons/lib/research/rp2000/rp00-020.pdf. See also Jolyon Howorth, ‘Britain, France and the European Defence Initiative’, Survival, Vol. 42, No. 2 (Summer 2000), pp. 33–55, and Robert E. Hunter, The European Security and Defense Policy: NATO's Companion-or Competitor? (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2002).

Beyond Albright's three Ds – no decoupling, no discriminating, no duplicating – the American reaction to Saint-Malo was rather negative. As US Ambassador to NATO Alexander Vershbow had argued in May 2000, ‘the danger here is that, if autonomy becomes an end in itself, ESDP will be an ineffective tool for managing crises and transatlantic tensions will increase’. Quoted by Barry R. Posen in ‘ESDP and the Structure of World Power’, The International Spectator, Vol. 39, No. 1 (2004), pp. 10–11.

William Pfaff, ‘A Foreign Legion for the Pentagon’, International Herald Tribune, 7 November 2002, quoted in Ulriksena Ståle, ‘Requirements for Future European Military Strategies and Force Structures’, International Peacekeeping, Vol. 11, No. 3 (2004), p. 461.

Jean-Yves Haine, ‘ESDP and NATO’, in Nicole Gnesotto (ed.), EU Security and Defence Policy: The First Five Years (1999–2004) (Paris: EU ISS, 2004), p. 143. For detailed accounts, see Elizabeth Pond, Friendly Fire: The Near-Death of the Transatlantic Alliance (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004); Phillip H. Gordon and Jeremy Shapiro, Allies at War: America, Europe, and the Crisis over Iraq (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2004).

This less well known aspect of the Franco-British rapprochement to cooperate on African policy is sometimes called ‘Saint-Malo II’. On this, see Tony Chafer and Gordon Cumming, ‘Beyond Fashoda: Anglo–French Security Cooperation in Africa since Saint-Malo’, International Affairs, Vol. 86, No. 5 (September 2010), pp. 1129–1147.

In Le Touquet on 4 February 2003, Paris and London declared that ‘preventing conflict and keeping or re-establishing peace in Africa are our constant concern. Both countries would like to emphasize that primary responsibility falls on Africa in this matter. We will take joint initiatives to that end at the United Nations and within the European Union and G8, ensuring in particular that they support the efforts of the African Union and of the sub-regional organizations, and that they strengthen Africa's peacekeeping capability’ (‘Franco-British Summit, Declaration on Franco–British Cooperation in Africa, Le Touquet 4.02.2003’, available at http://www.ambafrance-uk.org/Franco-British-summit-Declaration,4972.html).

As one scholar noted, ‘France badly wanted a mission to show the EU was capable of acting alone, where NATO would not be involved’. See Catherine Gegout, ‘Causes and Consequences of the EU's Military Intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo: A Realist Explanation’, European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 10, No. 3 (September 2005), pp. 437–438.

The French forces in Bunia interpreted the EU mandate extensively and some operations were carried outside it, that is, under strict French orders. Interview with Artemis Commander General Neveux, Paris, October 2003.

See UNDPKO, Operation Artemis: The Lessons of the Interim Emergency Multinational Force (New York: United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit, 2004); S. Ulriksen, C. Gourlay and C. Mace, ‘Operation Artemis: The Shape of Things to Come?’, International Peacekeeping, Vol. 11, No. 3 (2004), pp. 508–525, and Fernanda Faria, ‘Crisis Management in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Role of the European Union’, Occasional Paper, EU ISS, April 2004.

‘We now propose that the EU should build on this [operation Artemis] precedent so that it is able to respond through ESDP to future similar requests from the UN, whether in Africa or elsewhere’ (Franco–British Declaration, ‘Strengthening European Cooperation in Security and Defence’, 24 November 2003, http://www.fco.gov.uk/Files/kfile/UKFrance_DefenceDeclaration,0.pdf).

In December 2005, the European Council endorsed a document entitled ‘The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership’, largely inspired by the Millennium Goals. This document was written by the Commission, hardly discussed by the COREPER, barely overseen by the PSC. This institutional imbalance triggered a brief statement by J. Solana, the High Representative for CFSP, to remind the Commission that the Council and the ESDP-CFSP framework could not be bypassed. See also Niagale Bagayoko and Marie V. Gibert, ‘The Linkage between Security, Governance and Development: The European Union in Africa’, Journal of Development Studies, Vol. 45, No. 5 (May 2009), pp. 789–814.

EU, Council of the European Union, General Affairs and External Relations, 2760th Meeting, Brussels, 13 November 2006. See also Thierry Tardy, ‘EU–UN Cooperation in Peacekeeping: A Promising Relationship in a Constrained Environment’, in Martin Ortega (ed.), ‘The European Union and the United Nations. Partners in Effective Multilateralism’, Chaillot Paper no 78, EU ISS, Paris, 2005.

Gorm Rye Olsen, ‘The EU and Military Conflict Management in Africa: For the Good of Africa or Europe?’, International Peacekeeping, Vol. 16, No. 2 (2009), p. 254. Jean-Yves Haine and Bastian Giegerich, ‘In Congo, a Cosmetic EU Operation’, International Herald Tribune, 12 June 2006.

See Barcelona Report of the Study Group on Europe's Security Capabilities: A Human Security Doctrine for Europe, (September 2004), available at www.lse.ac.uk/collections/pressAndInformationOffice/newsAndEvents/archives/2004/HumanSec_Doctrine.htm. See also Janne Haaland Matlary, ‘When Soft Power Turns Hard: Is an EU Strategic Culture Possible?’, Security Dialogue, Vol. 37, No. 1 (March 2006), pp. 105–121. One scholar uses the term ‘humanitarian power Europe’. See Christoph O. Meyer, The Quest for a European Strategic Culture: Changing Norms on Security and Defence in the European Union, (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2006), p. 141, and also Ian Manners, ‘The Normative Ethics of the European Union’, International Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 1 (January 2008), pp. 45–60.

The civilian side of CSDP has not been a great success either. See Daniel Korski and Richard Gowan, ‘Can the EU Rebuild Failing States? A Review of Europe's Civilian Capacities’, ECFR, October 2009.

Zaki Laïdi, ‘Is Europe a Risk Averse Actor?’, European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 15, No. 4 (November 2010), pp. 411–426. According to transatlantic polls in 2007, only 20 per cent of Europeans supported committing more troops for combat actions in general (see Transatlantic Trends, available at www.transatlantictrends.org).

Mary Kaldor et al., ‘Human Security: A New Strategic Narrative for Europe,” International Affairs, Vol. 83, No. 2 (March 2007), pp. 273–288.

For a trenchant critique, see Roland Paris, ‘Human Security. Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?’, International Security, Vol. 26, No. 2 (Fall 2001), pp. 87–102, and Jean-Yves Haine, ‘The European Crisis of Liberal Internationalism”, International Journal, Vol. LXIV, No. 2 (Spring 2009), pp. 453–479. As one scholar put it, the military ethos that it induces is: ‘pretend to be warlike but don't fight’ (Tommi Koivula, ‘Towards An EU Military Ethos’, European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 14, No. 2 [May 2009], p. 171). Some, at last, have recognized that the operational meaning of the concept is a failure. See Janne Haaland Matlary, ‘Much Ado about Nothing: The EU and Human Security’, International Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 1 (January 2008), pp. 131–143; Mary Martin and Taylor Owen, ‘The Second Generation of Human Security: Lessons from the UN and EU Experience’, International Affairs, Vol. 86, No. 1 (January 2010), pp. 211–224.

As former Commissioner Chris Patten recorded, ‘EU foreign ministers have since early 2004 issued 19 Darfur statements using phrases such as “serious concern” or “profound concern” a total of 53 times in a period that has seen some 200,000 slaughtered and 2.5 million displaced by government forces or government-backed militia, the Janjaweed. When something more than words is needed, the EU does not have much to boast about…’ (quoted in Andrew Rettman, ‘Ex-Commissioner Attacks EU Verbalism on Darfur’, EU Observer, 20 March 2007).

Private conversation with French officials, Paris and Brussels, September 2004.

See Paul Williams and Alex Bellamy, ‘The Responsibility to Protect and the Crisis in Darfur, Security Dialogue, Vol. 36, No. 1 (March 2005), pp. 27–47.

EU diplomat, quoted by Asle Toje, The European Union as a Small Power after the Post-Cold War (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p. 106.

As always, the UN mandate was extensive. The EU ‘multidimensional’ force was ‘to help create the security conditions conducive to a voluntary, secure and sustainable return of refugees and displaced persons, inter alia by contributing to the protection of refugees, displaced persons and civilians in danger, by facilitating the provision of humanitarian assistance in eastern Chad and the north-eastern Central African Republic and by creating favorable conditions for the reconstruction and economic and social development of those areas’ (UN Security Council, ‘Security Council Resolution 1778 Authorizing the “Establishment Of ‘Multidimensional Presence” in Chad, Central African Republic’, 25 September 2007, available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/sc9127.doc.htm).

‘Not having the European force deployed directly on the border enables President Déby to continue to freely intervene in Darfur’ (Bjoern H. Seibert, ‘EUFOR Tchad/RCA: A Cautionary Note’, European Security Review, No. 37 [March 2008], p. 3).

He later recalled: ‘It was important for EUFOR to remain neutral and it had to learn how to refuse offers that would threaten its own neutrality without humiliating the parties involved’. See ‘Ensuring Peace and Security in Africa: Implementing the New Africa–EU Partnership’, Summary of Conference held on 27–28 October 2010, (London: Chatham House), p. 18. Available at www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/17861_1010confsummary.pdf

The contributions were as follows: France (2,000); Ireland (450); Poland (400); Austria (210); Sweden (200); Romania (120); Belgium (120); Spain (80); Netherlands (60); Finland (40); and Slovenia (15).

On this see Alexander Mattelaer, ‘The Strategic Planning of EU Military Operations: The Case of EU for Chad/RCA’, IES Working Papers, No. 5, 2008, p. 18.

Roland Marchal, ‘Chad/Darfur: How Two Crises Merge’, Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 33, No. 109 (September 2006), pp. 467–482.

These groups put together represented well above 10,000 men. Of course, none were coordinated. For a detailed account of these potential ‘enemy’ forces, see Bjoern H. Seibert, ‘African Adventure? Assessing the European Union's Military Intervention in Chad and the Central African Republic’, MIT Security Studies Program Working Paper, November 2007, pp. 11–15.

See International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance (London: Taylor and Francis, 2007), pp. 267–268.

‘France's intentions were unclear for many Europeans who feared Paris would use the European flag to mask a policy aimed at supporting an authoritarian regime. Many who had a genuine interest in acting on the margin in Darfur and in promoting CSDP feared being dragged into a mere regime protection measure.’ Damien Helly, ‘EUFOR CHAD/CAR’, in Giovanni Grevi, Damien Helly and Daniel Keohane (eds), ESDP: The First 10 Years (1999-2009), (Paris: EU ISS, 2009), p. 346.

Quoted in ‘EUFOR in Chad and CAR: The EU's Most Taxing Mission Yet’, IISS Strategic Comments, Vol. 14, No. 4 (May 2008), p. 2.

Rebels were one element, banditry another. The lessons learned report noted that ‘de-linking the security crisis in the East from internal Chadian politics was a deliberate decision made during the planning phase, and there was a “debate” on whether or not this was appropriate’. It also noted that ‘NGOs regretted EUFOR's inadequate understanding of the context, particularly the security situation and the conditions needed to be created for long-term IDP returns’. See Helly, ‘Lessons from EUFOR Chad/CAR’ (note 63), p. 10.

As Colin Gray argued, ‘adversity cannot cancel culture’. In the European case, the ‘security’ culture was far away from strategic realities. (Gray, ‘Strategic Culture as Context’ [note 5], p. 62).

Quoted in Toje, The European Union as a Small Power (note 54), p. 111.

Oxfam International, ‘Insecurity still Rampant in Chad as UN Takes over from EU’, 13 March 2009.

See International Crisis Group, ‘Chad: Powder Keg in the East’, Africa Report, 15 April 2009, No. 149, p. 19.

Helly, ‘Lessons from EUFOR Chad/CAR’ (note 63), p. 11.

CSDP had been associated with a ‘soft-balancing’ exercise against US power. But CSDP had been about Europe's own image and about differentiating, not balancing, the US. See T.V. Paul, ‘Soft Balancing in the Age of U.S. Primacy’, International Security, Vol. 30, No. 1 (Summer 2005), pp. 46–71 and Jolyon Howorth and Anand Menon, ‘Still Not Pushing Back: Why the European Union is Not Balancing the United States’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 53, No. 5 (October 2009), pp. 727–744.

And as realists know, ‘alliances have no meaning unless the human actors feel bound by their obligations’ (Lauren Paul Gordon, ‘Diplomacy: History, Theory and Policy’, in Gordon, Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory and Policy [New York: Free Press, 1979], p. 5).