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CONNECTING: THE EU, UN AND NATO

Strategic Culture and Multilateralism: The Interplay of the EU and the UN in Conflict and Crisis Management

Pages 644-666 | Published online: 15 Dec 2011
 

Abstract

This analysis aims to identify the relative significance of strategic culture for interorganizational cooperation problems, here of the European Union and United Nations in the realm of conflict and crisis management. First, the respective strategic cultures are identified and compared in order to formulate expectations (hypotheses) for co-operation problems. Second, the practice of inter-organizational co-operation is investigated by using illustrative examples from three European Union operations conducted in collaboration with the United Nations: Operation Artemis, DR Congo 2003, EU EUFOR DR Congo 2006, and EUFOR Chad 2008. Different types of material and institutional factors hampering cooperation are identified. Third, empirical findings are interpreted and evaluated in terms of evidence for strategic culture as a causal factor influencing co-operation. This analysis suggests that in this case strategic culture is apparently a comparatively marginal factor hampering interorganizational co-operation.

Notes

European Council, ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World. European Security Strategy 2003’, http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf (accessed on 10 April 2007).

See Council of the European Union, ‘Joint Declaration on UN-EU Co-operation in Crisis Management’, 2003, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/st12730.en03.pdf (accessed 10 January 2011); Council of the European Union, ‘Council Conclusions on the CSDP’, 2010, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/esdp/114737.pdf (accessed 10 January 2011).

For details see United Nations Security Council, Update Report. UN Co-Operation with Regional and Subregional Organisations in the Maintenance of International Peace and Security (New York: United Nations, 2010); Council of the European Union, ‘Joint Declaration’ (note 2); European Council, ‘EU–UN Co-operation in Military Crisis Management Operations Elements of Implementation of the EU–UN Joint Declaration, Adopted by the European Council (17-18 June 2004)’, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/EU-UN%20cooperation%20in%20Military%20Crisis%20Management%20Operations.pdf (accessed 20 January 2011); Thierry Tardy, ‘United Nations - European Union Relations in Crisis Management’, International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations, CERI Science Po, 2008, pp. 4–7.

See United Nations, Improving Lives. Results of the Partnership between the United Nations and the European Union in 2009 (Brussels: United Nations, 2010), http://www.EU-UN.europa.eu/documents/en/100607_Improving_Lives_2009.pdf (accessed 14 January 2011), p. 12; Tardy, ‘United Nations – European Union Relations in Crisis Management’ (note 3), pp. 3–4.

See Alastair Iain Johnston, ‘Thinking about Strategic Culture’, International Security, Vol. 19, No. 4 (1995), pp. 32–64. For a literature review see also Darryl Howlett, ‘Strategic Culture: Reviewing Recent Literature’, Strategic Insights, Vol. IV, No. 10 (October 2005), http://www.nps.edu/Academics/centers/ccc/publications/OnlineJournal/2005/Oct/howlettOct05.html (accessed 3 December 2010).

For an analysis of the opposite impact-dimension – that is, from the practice of cooperation on EU policy-making, though not framed in terms of SC – see Philippe Adriaenssens, ‘Rapprochement between the EU and the UN: History and Balance of Intersecting Political Cultures’, European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 13, No. 1 (2008), pp. 53–72.

For a rare theoretical, neo-institutional approach (though referring to the UN, the EU and NATO in the Balkan wars) see Rafael Biermann, ‘Towards a Theory of Inter-organizational Networking’, The Review of International Organizations, Vol. 3, No. 2 (2008), pp. 151–177.

See Paul Cornish and Geoffrey Edwards, ‘The Strategic Culture of the European Union: A Progress Report’, International Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 4 (2005), pp. 801–20; Adrian Hyde-Price, ‘European Security, Strategic Culture, and the Use of Force’, European Security, Vol. 13, No. 4 (2004), pp. 323–43; Vasilis Margaras, Common Security and Defence Policy and the Lisbon Treaty Fudge: No Common Strategic Culture, No Major Progress (Brussels: CEPS, 2010), p. 1, p. 6; Richard Gowan, ‘The Strategic Context: Peacekeeping in Crisis 2006–08’, International Peacekeeping Vol. 15, No. 4 (2008), pp. 453–69; Espen Barth Eide, et al., Report on Integrated Missions: Practical Perspectives and Recommendations. Independent Study for the Expanded UN ECHA Core Group (Oslo: Norwegian Institute for International Affairs, 2005), p. 20.

See Asle Toje, America, the EU and Strategic Culture (New York: Routledge, 2008), pp. 147–148; Christoph O. Meyer, The Quest for a European Strategic Culture: Changing Norms on Security and Defence in the European Union (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), pp. 163, 169; Peter van Ham, ‘Europe's Strategic Culture and the Relevance of War’, Oxford Journal on Good Governance, Vol. 2, No. 1 (2005), pp. 39–44; James Rogers, ‘From “Civilian Power” to “Global Power’: Explicating the European Union's Grand Strategy through the Articulation of Discourse Theory’, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 47, No. 4 (2009), pp. 831–862; Ian Manners, ‘Normative Power Europe Reconsidered: Beyond the Crossroads’, Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 13, No. 2 (2006), pp. 182–199 (Manners is not explicitly referring to any concept of SC); Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore, Rules for the World. International Organizations in Global Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004), pp. 3–9, 122–129, 130–135, 154–155.

See Alvaro de Vasconcelos, ‘The European Security Strategy 2003–2008. Building on Common Interests’, Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies (ISS), ISS Report No. 05, 2009, pp. 17–24.

As pertinent documents for the EU the following are analysed: European Council, ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World. European Security Strategy 2003’ (note 1); European Council, ‘Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy. Providing Security in a Changing World’, 2008, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/reports/104630.pdf (accessed 11 December 2010); Council of the European Union, ‘Draft European Union Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts’, 2008, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/misc/09537-r1.en1.html (accessed on 21 December 2010); Council of the European Union, ‘Civil Military Co-ordination’, 2003, http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/03/st14/st14457.en03.pdf (accessed 14 January 2011). For the UN these documents were chosen: United Nations, ‘An Agenda for Peace. Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping’, 1992, http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html (accessed 28 January 2011); United Nations, ‘Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (“Brahimi Report”)’, 2000, http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/ (accessed 15 January 2011); United Nations, ‘Integrated Missions Planning Process (IMPP)’, 2006, http://www.undg.org/docs/9907/IMPP-Revised-Guidelines-130606.pdf (accessed 15 January 2011); United Nations, ‘A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility. Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change’, 2004, http://www.un.org/secureworld/report2.pdf (accessed 16 January.2011); United Nations, ‘United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. Principles and Guidelines (“Capstone Doctrine”)’, 2008, http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbps/Library/Capstone_Doctrine_ENG.pdf (accessed 15 January 2011).

European Council, ‘European Security Strategy’ (note 1), p. 1; Council of the European Union, ‘Programme for Prevention’ (note 11), p. 2.

See also Vasconcelos, ‘The European Security Strategy 2003–2008’ (note 10), p. 17.

United Nations, ‘An Agenda for Peace’ (note 11), paras.13, 19, 80.

European Council, ‘European Security Strategy’ (note 1), pp. 9–10; European Council, ‘Report’ (note 11), p. 2; United Nations, ‘An Agenda for Peace’ (note 11), paras.15, 19, 81, 82.

European Council, ‘European Security Strategy’ (note 1), pp. 3–5; United Nations, ‘An Agenda for Peace’ (note 11), para.8.

European Council, ‘Report’ (note 11), p. 1; United Nations, ‘An Agenda for Peace’ (note 11), para.11; United Nations, ‘A More Secure World’ (note 11), para.1.

Council of the European Union, ‘Programme for Prevention’ (note 11), pp. 2–3, p. 5; in the EU's own definition, a crisis is ‘a situation deteriorating into violence’ (Ibid., p. 3); United Nations, ‘An Agenda for Peace’ (note 11), para.15.

European Council, ‘European Security Strategy’ (note 1), p. 7; see also Vasconcelos, ‘The European Security Strategy 2003–2008’ (note 10), pp. 17–18.

See European Council, ‘European Security Strategy’ (note 1), p. 12; European Council, ‘Report’ (note 11), pp. 9–10.

United Nations, ‘A More Secure World’ (note 11), para.4; United Nations, ‘Brahimi Report’, pp. VIII-X; United Nations, ‘Capstone Doctrine’ (note 11), p. 35.

See European Council, ‘European Security Strategy’ (note 1), pp. 10–1; European Council, ‘Report’ (note 11), p. 9; Vasconcelos, ‘The European Security Strategy 2003–2008’ (note 10), p. 19.

United Nations, ‘An Agenda for Peace’ (note 11), paras.5, 13; United Nations, ‘A More Secure World’ (note 11), para.2.

United Nations, ‘An Agenda for Peace’ (note 11), para.20; United Nations, ‘Capstone Doctrine’ (note 11), p. 22, pp. 24–25.

See European Council, ‘European Security Strategy’ (note 1), pp. 9, 11–13; European Council, ‘Report’ (note 11), p. 2.

European Council, ‘European Security Strategy’ (note 1), pp. 9–11 (p. 9); Council of the European Union, ‘Programme for Prevention’ (note 11), p. 2; Council of the European Union, ‘Civil Military Co-ordination’ (note 11), p. 5.

United Nations, ‘An Agenda for Peace’ (note 11), paras.16, 60; United Nations, ‘A more secure world’ (note 11), para.272.

European Council, ‘European Security Strategy’ (note 1), p. 7, p. 11; European Council, ‘Report’ (note 11), p. 9; Council of the European Union, ‘Programme for Prevention’ (note 11), pp. 4–7.

United Nations, ‘An Agenda for Peace (note 11)’, paras.15, 23.

Council of the European Union, ‘Programme for Prevention’ (note 11), p. 4, p. 6.

Council of the European Union, ‘Civil Military Co-ordination’ (note 11), pp. 3–5.

United Nations, ‘Brahimi Report’ (note 11), p. XIV; United Nations, ‘Integrated Missions’ (note 11), pp. 24, 6; United Nations, ‘Capstone Doctrine’ (note 11), pp. 53–57.

See United Nations, ‘Integrated Missions’ (note 11), p. 23; United Nations, ‘Brahimi Report’ (note 11), p. XIII.

United Nations, ‘Integrated Missions’ (note 11), p. 7.

See Council of the European Union, ‘Civil Military Co-ordination’ (note 11), pp. 3–5; Council of the European Union, ‘Joint Declaration’ (note 3), p. 2. Some renowned experts seem to support this conclusion, though not framing it in terms of a common ‘strategic culture’. See Jan Wouters, ‘The United Nations and the European Union. Partners in Effective Multilateralism’, Brugge, College of Europe, Department of EU International Relations and Diplomacy Studies, EU Diplomacy Papers, 2007, p. 4; Tardy, ‘United Nations – European Union Relations in Crisis Management’ (note 3), p. 4; Bastian Giegerich, ‘European Military Crisis Management’, Studia Diplomatica, Vol. LXII, No. 3 (2009), p. 40.

See Ham, ‘Europe's Strategic Culture and the Relevance of War’ (note 9), pp. 39–44; Rogers, ‘From “Civilian Power” to “Global Power”’, (note 9), pp. 831, 843–844; Barnett and Finnemore, Rules for the World (note 9), pp. 130–135, 154–155.

This selection covers only a limited number of EU–UN cooperations in conflict and crisis management and will not allow for general insights across all cases of inter-organizational cooperation in this field.

For basic facts and figures see respective EU and UN homepages: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=268&lang=en (accessed on 15 February 2011); http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/current.shtml (accessed on 15 December 2011). For a typology of EU–UN cooperation see Wibke Hansen, ‘EU–UN Cooperation in Peace Operations: Chances, Concepts and Constraints’, in Hans-Georg Ehrhart et al. (eds), Die Europäische Union im 21. Jahrhundert (VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2007), pp. 242–45; Tardy, ‘United Nations – European Union Relations in Crisis Management’ (note 3), pp. 5–6.

See Damien Helly, ‘The EU Military Operation in DR Congo (Artemis)’, in Giovanni Grevi et al. (eds), European Security and Defence Policy. The First Ten Years (1999–2009) (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies [ISS], 2009), pp. 181–85; EU Presidency, ‘The Situation in the Central African Region, Statement to the UN Security Council (24.11.)’, 2003, http://www.europa-EU-UN.org/articles/en/article_3028_en.htm (accessed on 21 December 2011); Fernanda Faria, ‘Crisis Management in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Role of the European Union’, Occasional Papers No. 51, EUISS, Paris, 2004, pp. 43–44; Helly, ‘The EU Military Operation’ (note 38), 183–184; Richard Gowan, ‘ESDP and the United Nations’, in Grevi et al. (eds), European Security and Defence Policy (note 38), pp. 117–126; Damien Helly, ‘The EU Military Operation in the Republic of Chad and in the Central African Republic (Operation EUFOR Tchad/ RCA)’, in Grevi et al. (eds), European Security and Defence Policy (note 38), pp. 339–351; A. Sarjoh Bah (ed.), Annual Review of Global Peace Operations. Center on International Cooperation (CIC) (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2009), pp. 36f. See also United Nations, ‘Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad’, 2008, http://minurcat.unmissions.org/Portals/MINURCAT/SG%20Report%2012%20September%202008.pdf (accessed 15 January 2011).

See Hans-Georg Ehrhart, ‘EUFOR RD Congo: A Preliminary Assessment’, European Security Review, No. 32 (2007), pp. 9–10; Denis M. Tull, ‘EUFOR RD Congo: A Success, But Not a Model’, in Muriel Asseburg, et al. (eds), The EU as a Strategic Actor in the Realm of Security and Defence (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), 2009), p.52; Marta Martinelli, ‘Implementing the ESDP in Africa: The Case of the Democratic Republic of Congo’, in Michael Merlingen et al. (eds), European Security and Defence Policy: An Implementation Perspective, (London: Routledge, 2008), p. 125; Helly, ‘The EU military operation in the Republic of Chad’, pp. 348–9.

James Dobbins, ‘Europe's Role in Nation-Building: From the Balkans to the Congo’, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2008, 110-11; Faria, ‘Crisis Management in Sub-Saharan Africa’ (note 38), p. 47; Kees Homan, ‘Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo’, in Andrea Ricci et al. (eds), Faster and More United? The Debate about Europe's Crisis Response Capacity (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2006), pp. 151–155.

Ehrhart, ‘EUFOR RD Congo’ (note 39), pp. 9–10; Claudia Major, ‘The Military Operation EUFOR RD Congo 2006’, in Giovanni Grevi et al. (eds), The European Security Strategy 2003–2008. Building on Common Interests (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies [ISS], 2009), pp. 318–321; Tull, ‘EUFOR RD Congo’ (note 39), p. 52; Martinelli, ‘Implementing the ESDP in Africa’ (note 39), p. 125.

Council of the European Union, ‘Council Conclusions on operation EUFOR Tchad/RCA’, 2008, http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/08/st12/st12101.en08.pdf (accessed 22 February 2011); United Nations, ‘Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Mission’ (note 38); Oxfam International: ‘Mission Incomplete: Why Civilians Remain at Risk in Eastern Chad’, Oxfam Briefing Paper 119/2008. See also Helly, ‘The EU Military Operation in the Republic of Chad’ (note 38), pp. 344–5, p. 350-1; Ehrhart, ‘EUFOR RD Congo’ (note 39), pp. 77-8.

Helly, ‘The EU Military Operation’ (note 38), p. 348; Bah (ed.), Annual Review (note 38), pp. 36–37.

Faria, ‘Crisis Management in Sub-Saharan Africa’ (note 38), p. 47.

Martinelli, ‘Implementing the ESDP in Africa’ (note 39), p. 118, p. 125; see also: Ståle Ulriksen et al., ‘Operation ARTEMIS: The Shape of Things to Come?’, International Peacekeeping, Vol. 11, No. 3 (2004), pp. 508–525; Homan, ‘Operation Artemis’, (note 40, p. 154); Pierre-Antoine Braud, ‘Implementing ESDP Operations in Africa’, in Anne Deighton et al. (eds), Securing Europe? Implementing the European Security Strategy (Zürich: ETH, 2006), pp. 76–77.

See Martinelli, ‘Implementing the ESDP in Africa’ (note 39), p. 125.

Giegerich, ‘European Military Crisis Management’ (note 35), p. 41.

See Ehrhart, ‘EUFOR RD Congo’ (note 39), p. 10; Martinelli, ‘Implementing the ESDP in Africa’ (note 39), p. 123; Gowan, ‘ESDP and the United Nations (note 38), p. 124.

For a similar but still different categorization of factors constraining inter-organizational cooperation see Tardy, ‘United Nations – European Union Relations in Crisis Management’ (note 3), pp. 7–13.

For details on the EU decision-making process in this realm see Winrich Kuehne, How the EU Organizes and Conducts Peace Operations in Africa: EUFOR/MINURCAT ( Berlin: Center for International Peace Operations [ZIF], 2009), pp. 10–11.

See Helly, ‘The EU Military Operation’ (note 38), pp. 183–184; Helly, ‘The EU Military Operation in the Republic of Chad’ (note 38), p. 350; Kuehne, ‘How the EU Organizes’ (note 50), pp. 10–11.

See Gowan, ‘ESDP and the United Nations’ (note 38), p. 125.

See Martinelli, ‘Implementing the ESDP in Africa’ (note 39), pp. 125–126; Gowan, ‘ESDP and the United Nations’ (note 38), p.125.

Tull, ‘EUFOR RD Congo’ (note 39), p. 48.

Ibid., p. 49, p. 53; see Martinelli, ‘Implementing the ESDP in Africa’ (note 39), p. 122; Major, ‘The Military Operation EUFOR RD Congo 2006’ (note 41), pp. 315–316.

Martinelli, ‘Implementing the ESDP in Africa’ (note 39), p. 122; see Richard Gowan, ‘The EU's Multiple Strategic Identities: European Security after Lebanon and the Congo’, Studia Diplomatica, Vol. 60, No. 1 (2007), pp. 59–80.

See Helly, ‘The EU Military Operation in the Republic of Chad’ (note 38), pp. 340–341, 346–347; Alexander Mattelaer, ‘The Strategic Planning of EU Military Operations – The Case of EUFOR TCHAD/RCA’, IES Working Paper, 2008, pp. 18–19.

See Helly, ‘The EU Military Operation in the Republic of Chad’ (note 38), p. 349.

Gowan, ‘ESDP and the United Nations’ (note 38), p. 120.

See Helly, ‘The EU Military Operation’ (note 38), pp. 184-185; Braud, ‘Implementing ESDP Operations in Africa’ (note 45), p. 77; Homan, ‘Operation Artemis’ (note 40), p. 154.

Martinelli, ‘Implementing the ESDP in Africa’ (note 39), p. 125.

See Braud, ‘Implementing ESDP Operations in Africa’ (note 45), pp. 76–77; Gowan, ‘ESDP and the United Nations’ (note 38), p. 125.

See Helly, ‘The EU Military Operation’, (note 38) pp. 184–185; Braud, ‘Implementing ESDP Operations in Africa’ (note 45), p. 77; Homan, ‘Operation Artemis’ (note 40), p. 154.

See Faria, ‘Crisis Management in Sub-Saharan Africa’ (note 38), pp. 44–45, 47; Homan, ‘Operation Artemis’ (note 40), pp. 151–155.

Gowan, ‘ESDP and the United Nations’ (note 38), p. 122; Major, ‘The Military Operation EUFOR RD Congo 2006’ (note 41), p. 316.

Gowan, ‘The EU's Multiple Strategic Identities’ (note 56), pp. 68, 75.

Giegerich, ‘European Military Crisis Management’ (note 35), p. 41.

Kuehne, ‘How the EU Organizes’ (note 50), p. 10.

See Tull, ‘EUFOR RD Congo’ (note 39), pp. 47–48; Major, ‘The Military Operation EUFOR RD Congo 2006’ (note 41), p. 316.

See Dobbins, ‘Europe's Role in Nation-Building’ (note 40), pp. 110–111.

Helly, ‘The EU Military Operation in the Republic of Chad’ (note 38), pp. 347–348.

See Braud, ‘Implementing ESDP Operations in Africa’ (note 45), pp. 76–77.

Martinelli, ‘Implementing the ESDP in Africa’ (note 39), p. 123. See for a similar argument, though relating to the Balkan wars, Biermann, ‘Towards a Theory’ (note 7), p. 158.

Gowan, ‘ESDP and the United Nations’ (note 38), p. 125.

Ibid.

See Braud, ‘Implementing ESDP Operations in Africa’ (note 45), pp. 76–77.

Kuehne, ‘How the EU Organizes’ (note 50), p. 12.

See Ehrhart, ‘EUFOR RD Congo’ (note 39), p. 11; Martinelli, ‘Implementing the ESDP in Africa’ (note 39), p. 123.

Kuehne, ‘How the EU Organizes’ (note 50), p. 11.

Gowan, ‘The EU's Multiple Strategic Identities’ (note 38), p. 79, Major, ‘The Military Operation EUFOR RD Congo 2006’ (note 41), p. 317.

Benjamin C. Tortolani (ed.), Annual Review of Global Peace Operations, (New York: Center on International Cooperation [CIC], 2010), pp. 40–41.

See Gowan, ‘ESDP and the United Nations’ (note 38), p. 122; see also Helly, ‘The EU Military Operation in the Republic of Chad’ (note 38), p. 348.

Helly, ‘The EU Military Operation in the Republic of Chad’ (note 38), pp. 344–345, 348.

See Kuehne, ‘How the EU Organizes’ (note 50), p. 11; Braud, ‘Implementing ESDP Operations in Africa’ (note 45), pp. 76–77; Homan, ‘Operation Artemis’ (note 40), p. 154; Major, ‘The Military Operation EUFOR RD Congo 2006’ (note 41), p. 314, p. 318; Helly, ‘The EU Military Operation’ (note 38), pp. 184–185.

Kuehne, ‘How the EU Organizes’ (note 50), pp. 10–11.

Martinelli, ‘Implementing the ESDP in Africa’ (note 39), p. 123.

Kuehne, ‘How the EU Organizes’ (note 50), pp. 10–11.

Helly, ‘The EU Military Operation in the Republic of Chad’ (note 39), pp. 348–349.

Tardy, ‘United Nations - European Union Relations in Crisis Management’ (note 3), p. 11.

Ibid., p. 8.

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