Overlap or Opposition? EU and NATO's Strategic (Sub-)Culture

Abstract

This paper discusses the inter-organizational relationship of the two leading security organizations in Europe: the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Rather than discussing the two organizations’ material overlaps, the paper discusses their quest for organizational identity and role in the domain of foreign and defence policy, as well as the ideational structures that affect both institutions’ social behaviour and their behaviour toward each other. It aims first to tease out how structures of meaning in the form of norms, values, and beliefs have affected the two organizations’ behaviour toward each other; and second to introduce explanatory arguments about their subcultural relationship that can help explain their attitudinal divergences. The article makes two arguments: First, there is a significant normative overlap between the two institutions, especially with regards to future challenges and threats and the role of third parties and international organizations. Second, I introduce a preliminary argument by holding that the best way to make sense of the ideational divergences between the two organizations is to conceptualize NATO's strategic culture as a subculture of the European Union's strategic culture.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC) and the Centre for International Relations, Queen's University (Canada) for their generous support. I am particularly grateful to Peter Schmidt, Srdjan Vucetic, Elke Winter, Frédéric Merand, Gregory Liedtke, and three anonymous reviewers for their comments. All errors, of course, remain mine.

Notes

Asle Toje, ‘The EU, NATO and European Defence: A Slow Train Coming’, Occasional Paper, European Union Institute for Security Studies, Paris, 2008.

This literature is vast. See, for example, Hans-Christian Hagman, European Crisis Management and Defence: The Search for Capabilities (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); Bernhard May, May-Britt Stumbaum, and German Council on Foreign Relations (eds), NATO versus EU?: Security Strategies for Europe (Berlin: German Council on Foreign Relations, 2005); Antonio Missiroli, ‘EU–NATO Cooperation in Crisis Management: No Turkish Delight for ESDP’, Security Dialogue, Vol. 33, No. 1 (2002), pp. 9–26; Sten Rynning, ‘Why Not NATO? Military Planning in the European Union’, Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 26, No. 1 (2003), pp. 52–72; David S. Yost, NATO and International Organizations, vol. 3, Forum Paper (Rome: NATO Defense College, 2007).

See, for example, ‘Sharing (Which?) NATO Burdens’, The New York Times, 16 June 1988, A26; Andrew Bennett, Joseph Lepgold, and Danny Unger, Friends in Need: Burden Sharing in the Persian Gulf War, 1st edn (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997); Christopher Coker, Shifting into Neutral?: Burden Sharing in the Western Alliance in the 1990's, 1st edn (London and Washington, DC: Brassey's, 1990); Rosemary Fiscarelli, ‘Europe is Grabbing The Spoils of Peace’, The New York Times, 9 March 1990; Peter Kent Forster and Stephen J. Cimbala, The US, NATO and Military Burden-sharing (London, New York: Frank Cass, 2005); Michael R. Gordon, ‘U.S. War Game in West Germany to Be Cut Back’, The New York Times, 14 December 1989, A23; Josef Joffe, The Limited Partnership: Europe, the United States, and the Burdens of Alliance (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Pub. Co., 1987); Josef Joffe, ‘The Trans-Atlantic Numbers Game’, The New York Times, 18 May 1988, A31.

G. Wyn Rees, The US-EU Security Relationship: The Tensions between a European and a Global Agenda (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).

Jean-Yves Haine, ‘From Laeken to Copenhagen: European Defence. Core Documents Volume III’, Chaillot Paper, EU-ISS, Paris, 2003, especially pp. 178–180.

Jolyon Howorth and John Keeler (eds), Defending Europe: The EU, NATO and the Quest for European Autonomy (New York: Palgrave, 2003); Martin Reichard, The EU–NATO Relationship: A Legal and Political Perspective (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006).

See House of Commons of the United Kingdom Defence Committee, ‘The Future of NATO and European Defence: Ninth Report of Session 2007–08’, (London: Stationery Office); M.I. Clausson (ed.), NATO: Status, Relations, and Decision-Making (New York: Novinka Books, 2007); NATO–EU Cooperation in Post-Conflict Reconstruction, NDC Occasional Paper No. 15, NATO Defense College, Rome, 2006; Atlantic Council of the United States, ‘Transatlantic Transformation: Building a NATO–EU Security Architecture’, Policy Paper, Atlantic Council of the United States, Washington, DC, 2006; Centre for European Reform, A European Way of War (London: Centre for European Reform, 2004).

See Stephanie C. Hofmann, ‘Why Institutional Overlap Matters: CSDP in the European Security Architecture’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 49, No. 1 (2010), pp. 101–120.

In studying these two security strategies and not the policies and practices surrounding or following them, it is acknowledged that this approach inevitably sets the limitations of this essay. However, space limitations do not allow a detailed examination of the two organizations' security policies and practices over time. We will also refrain from analysing the behaviour of states as it risks producing tautological arguments as to how strategic culture has influenced the behaviour of states or groups of states.

I hereby indirectly acknowledge that NATO had established the dominant security culture in the Cold War – qua practice so to speak – and the emergence of an autonomous European Union in the 1990s has questioned and altered this situation.

The purpose here is not to make a historical argument nor to show how their respective strategic cultures have evolved over time.

The danger of tautological inference is explicitly noted, for example, in Joel D. Aberbach, Robert D. Putnam, and Bert A. Rockman, Bureaucrats and Politicians in Western Democracies (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981), pp. 30–31; Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 50; Thomas U. Berger, ‘Norms, Identity, and National Security in Germany and Japan’, in Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.) The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), p. 328; Charles Kupchan, The Vulnerability of Empire (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994), pp. 26–27; Jeffrey Legro, Cooperation under Fire: Anglo-German Restraint during World War II (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995), p. 30.

In the case of the EU, I will also include a 2008 Report by the European Council on the implementation of the ESS, which is an update of the 2004 ESS.

For a related approach see Ronald R. Krebs and Patrick T. Jackson, ‘Twisting Tongues and Twisting Arms: The Power of Political Rhetoric’, European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 13, No. 1 (2007), pp. 35–66.

John S. Duffield, World Power Forsaken: Political Culture, International Institutions, and German Security Policy after Unification (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), p. 33.

Kupchan, The Vulnerability of Empire (note 12), p. 43; Robert D. Putnam, ‘Studying Elite Political Culture: The Case of “Ideology”’, American Political Science Review, Vol. 65, No. 3 (1971), p. 652.

Some have called this approach ‘discourse analysis’.

I very much acknowledge here that NATO of the 1990s and NATO in the 2000s are very much different organizations. Indeed, NATO has undergone a significant process of internal transformation, and also adapted to the new situational environment that presented itself. However, space limitations here do not allow me to fully discuss and engage in such long-term trend analysis – that is, changes of strategic cultures over time.

Inspiration for these clusters came from Christoph Meyer, ‘Convergence towards a European Strategic Culture? A Constructivist Framework for Explaining Changing Norms’, European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 11, No. 4 (2005), pp. 523–549.

Indeed, I assume that both the EU and NATO are sovereign and autonomous social actors that act independently of their member states. A counterargument is provided by Peter Schmidt in this volume.

It should be noted though that not all scholars agree with this clustering. For a different approach see Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), pp. 5–22.

This point was made by Sarah M. Corse and Marian A. Robinson, ‘Cross-cultural Measurement and New Conceptions of Culture: Measuring Cultural Capacities in Japanese and American Preschools’, Poetics, Vol. 22, No. 4 (1994), pp. 313–325.

Duffield, World Power Forsaken (note 15); Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff, The Sources of Military Change: Culture, Politics, Technology (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002); Colin Gray, ‘Strategic Culture as Context: The First Generation of Theory Strikes Back’, Review of International Studies, Vol. 25, No. 1 (1999), pp. 49–69; Peter J. Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).

Ronald L. Jepperson and Ann Swidler, ‘What Properties of Culture do we Measure?’ Poetics, Vol. 22, No. 4 (1994), p. 360.

John Gerard Ruggie, ‘Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Towards a Neo-realist Synthesis’, World Politics, Vol. 35, No. 2 (1983), pp. 261–285. John Gerard Ruggie, ‘What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge’, International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 4 (1998), pp. 855–885.

Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999). To be sure, constructivists do not negate the influence that material factors can have on social actions.

Iver B. Newmann and Hennikki Heikka, ‘Grand Strategy, Strategic Culture, Practice: The Social Roots of Nordic Defence’, Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 40, Nos. 5–23 (2005), p. 6.

Martha Finnemore, The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs about the Use of Force (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003), p. 15.

Alexander Wendt, ‘Constructing International Politics’, International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (1995), pp. 73–74. I am fully aware that the literature further delineates between constitutive and regulative norms. This distinction, however, is not relevant here. For a discussion see John R. Searle, The Construction of Social Reality (New York: Free Press, 1995), p. 28.

Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security (note 23), p. 19; see also Finnemore, The Purpose of Intervention (note 28), p. 22; Audie Klotz, ‘Norms Reconstituting Interests: Global Racial Equality and U.S. Sanctions Against South Africa’, International Organization, Vol. 49, No. 3 (2005), pp. 451–478; Audie Klotz, Norms in International Relations: The Struggle Against Apartheid (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995); Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’, International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 4 (1998), p. 892.

However, this paper's purpose is not to discuss the norm evolutions of those two organizations. Consequently, I will not analyse the processes of ‘norm emergence’, ‘norm cascade’, and ‘norm internalization’ as described by Finnemore and Sikkink, ‘International Norm Dynamics’ (note 30), pp. 887–917.

See David Elkins and Richard E.B. Simeon, ‘A Cause in Search of Its Effect, or What Does Political Culture Explain?’, Comparative Politics, Vol. 11, No. 2 (1979), p. 130; Lucian W. Pye, ‘Culture and Political Science: Problems in the Evaluation of the Concept of Political Culture’, in Louis Schneider and Charles M. Bonjean (eds), The Idea of Culture in the Social Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), pp. 65–67.

Berger, ‘Norms, Identity, and National Security in Germany and Japan’, (note 12), p. 329; Harry Eckstein, ‘Culturalist Theory of Political Change’, American Political Science Review, Vol. 82, No. 3 (1998), p. 790.

Duffield, World Power Forsaken (note 15), p. 24.

Ibid. An alternative proposition was put forward by Legro, who noted that bureaucratic organizational cultures could influence the strategic culture of states. See Jeffrey Legro, ‘Culture and Preferences in the International Cooperation Two-Step’, American Political Science Review, Vol. 90, No. 1 (1996), p. 120.

Duffield, World Power Forsaken (note 15), p. 29.

Putnam, ‘Studying Elite Political Culture’ (note 16), p. 651.

Duffield, World Power Forsaken (note 15), p. 23; see also Berger, ‘Norms, Identity, and National Security in Germany and Japan’ (note 12); Elkins and Simeon, ‘A Cause in Search of Its Effect’ (note 32). This point, however, is debated in the literature. While Meyer finds that a EU security culture is emerging, Giegerich disagrees with such an assessment. See Bastian Giegerich, European Security and Strategic Culture: National Responses to the EU's Security and Defence Policy (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2006); Christoph O. Meyer, The Quest for a European Strategic Culture: Changing Norms on Security and Defence in the European Union (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006). I acknowledge that there are methodological inconsistencies in comparing two state-based security strategies with that of a supranational organization. However, since the making of Europe's foreign and defence policy still remains highly intergovernmental as opposed to supranational, this approach appears to be justified.

It is in this sense that my conceptualization of culture is inherently interactionist and provides the means through which actors construct meanings in given situations.

Iver B. Neumann and Hennikki Heikka, ‘Grand Strategy, Strategic Culture, Practice’ (note 27), p. 7.

Barry Barnes, ‘Practice as Collective Action’, in Theodore R. Schatzki, K. Knorr-Cetina, and Eike von Savigny (eds), The Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory (New York: Routledge, 2001), p. 19.

Finnemore and Sikkink, ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’, (note 30), pp. 891–892.

European Council, ‘A Secure Europe in A Better World: European Security Strategy’, (Brussels: European Council, 2003) p. 3.

Ibid. pp. 3–4, 7; European Council, ‘Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy: Providing Security in a Changing World’, S407/08(2008), p. 1.

European Council, ‘European Security Strategy’ (ESS) (note 43), p. 4.

Ibid. p. 4. For a discussion of this see Jolyon Howorth, ‘Beyond NATO? The European Security and Defence Project’, in John Baylis and Jon Roper (eds), The United States and Europe: Beyond the Neo-Conservative Divide?, (New York: Routledge, 2006), pp. 117–118.

Nicole Gnesotto, European Defence: A Proposal for a White Paper (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2004), p. 26.

European Council, ‘European Security Strategy’ (ESS) (note 43), p. 4; European Council, ‘Implementation of the European Security Strategy’ (note 44).

North Atlantic Council, Strategic Concept: For the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Adopted by the Heads of State and Government in Lisbon (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 2010), points 7 and 8. The obvious countries are Iran and North Korea.

Ibid., point 9.

RAND has warned NATO about this threat for nearly a decade. See F. Ronfeldt, The Emergence of Noopolitik: Toward an American Information Strategy (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1999); John Arquilla and David F. Ronfeld (eds), Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001). See also Melissa E. Hathaway, ‘Toward a Closer Digital Alliance’, SAIS Review, Vol. XXX, No. 2 (2010), pp. 21–31.

North Atlantic Council, Strategic Concept (note 49), point 12.

Ibid., points 13 and 15.

See also Pascal Vennesson, ‘Europe's Grand Strategy: The Search for a Postmodern Realism’, in Nicola Casarini and Constanza Musu (eds), European Foreign Policy in an Evolving International System (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p. 18.

European Council, ‘A Secure Europe in A Better World’ (note 43), p. 7. For further analysis of this notion see Justin Vaisse, ‘Transformational Diplomacy’, Chaillot Paper, EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris, 2007. On the EU neighbourhood policy see, for example, Vennesson, ‘Europe's Grand Strategy’ (note 54), pp. 18–19; F. Algieri and Arnold Kammel, ‘In Search of Structure: The EU's Foreign Policy Strategy against the Background of a Missing Global Order’, European View, Vol. 8, No. 2 (2008), p. 289; Stefan Gänzle and Alan G. Sens, The Changing Politics of European Security: Europe Alone? (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).

European Council, ‘Implementation of the European Security Strategy’ (note 44).

The EU also does not defend its moral principles of liberty or democracy with the use of force. See also Christoph Meyer, ‘Convergence towards a European Strategic Culture? A Constructivist Framework for Explaining Changing Norms’, European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 11, No. 4 (2005), pp. 523–549.

Albert Bressand, ‘Between Kant and Machiavelli: EU Foreign Policy Priorities in the 2010s’, International Affairs, Vol. 87, No. 1 (2011), pp. 59–85, pp. 59–85.

European Council, ‘European Security Strategy’ (ESS) (note 43), p. 7.

Sven Bernhard Gareis, ‘Sicherheitspolitik zwischen “Mars und Venus”? Die Sicherheitsstrategien der USA und der EU im Vergleich,’ in Johannes Varwick (ed.), Die Beziehungen zwischen NATO und EU: Partnerschaft, Konkurrenz, Rivalitaet? (Opladen: Verlag Barbara Buderich, 2005), p. 88; Kenneth Keulman, ‘European Security and Defence Policy: The EU's Search for a Strategic Role’, in Janet Adamski, Mary Troy Johnson, and Christina M. Schweiss (eds), Old Europe, New Security: Evolution for a Complex World (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2006), p. 52.

This may be explainable by pointing out that the ESS was written in 2003 in response to the NSS.

European council, ‘European Security Strategy’ (ESS) (Note 43), p. 9.

See, for example, Volker Heise and Peter Schmidt, ‘NATO und EU: Auf dem Weg zu einer strategischen Partnerschaft?’, in Thomas Jäger, Alexander Höse, and Kai Oppermann (eds), Transatlantische Beziehungen: Sicherheit, Wirtschaft, Öffentlichkeit, ed. Thomas Jäger, Alexander Höse, and Kai Oppermann (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, 2005).

European Council, ‘European Security Strategy’ (ESS) (note 43), p. 9.

2385th European Council meeting, General Affairs, 19-20.XI.2001, Brussels, 19–20 November 2001.

European Council, ‘Implementation of the European Security Strategy’ (note 44), pp. 4, 9.

Emil J. Kirchner and James Sperling, ‘The New Security Threats in Europe’, European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 7, No. 4 (2002), pp. 423–452.

European Council, ‘European Security Strategy’ (ESS) (note 43), p. 10.

North Atlantic Council, Strategic Concept (note 49), preface.

It should be noted t that NATO's member states from Central and Eastern Europe have pushed the alliance particularly hard for reassurance that self-defence is still the central objective of the alliance. See, for example, NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement (Brussels: North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO], 2010); David Yost, ‘NATO's Evolving Purposes and the Next Strategic Concept’, International Affairs, Vol. 86, No. 2 (2010), pp 489–522; ‘Fewer Dragons, More Snakes: NATO is About to Adopt a New Strategic Concept. Can it Keep Pace with the Way the World is Changing?’, The Economist, 11 November 2010; Linas Linkevicius, ‘Reset With Russia, but With Reassurance’, The New York Times, 9 September 2010.

North Atlantic Council, Strategic Concept (note 49), preface, point 4 a.–c.

However, it needs to be pointed out that NATO is a military alliance that holds very limited civilian crisis management capabilities. See Natalia Touzovskaia, ‘EU-NATO Relations: How Close to “Strategic Partnership”?’, European Security, Vol. 15, No. 3 (2006), pp. 235–258.

Ibid., points 20–22. NATO's role in civilian crisis management is particularly idealistic as it currently possesses only very limited civilian crisis management capabilities to be deployed.

2385th European Council meeting, General Affairs, 19-20.XI.2001, Brussels, 19–20 November 2001: 2, 9.

NATO's management of the strategic vacuum left behind by the withdrawal of the Soviet Union in the aftermath of the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 is a case in point. For a discussion see Ingo Peters, ‘The OSCE, NATO and the EU within the “Network of Interlocking European Security Institutions”: Hierarchization, Flexibilization, Marginalization’, in OSCE Yearbook 2003 (Hamburg: Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg, 2004); Uwe Nerlich, ‘Das Zusammenwirken multilateraler Institutionen: Neue Optionen für kollektive Verteidigung und internationale Friedensmissionen’, in Bernard von Plate (ed.), Europa auf dem Wege zur kollektiven Sicherheit? (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1994); Michael Cox, ‘Whatever Happened to the ‘New World Order?’, Critique, Vol. 25, No. 1 (1997), pp. 85–96.

‘European Security Strategy’ (ESS) (note 43), p. 9.

Ibid. p. 9.

North Atlantic Council, Strategic Concept (note 49), point 2.

On the notion of multilateralism as an issue in transatlantic affairs see John van Oudenaren, ‘What is Multilateral?’, Policy Review, Vol. 117, February/March (2003), pp. 33–47; John van Oudenaren, ‘Transatlantic Bipolarity and the End of Multilateralism,’ Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 120, No. 1 (2005), pp. 1–32.

North Atlantic Council, Strategic Concept (note 49), point 32.

See Jolyon Howorth and John T.S. Keeler (eds), Defending Europe: The EU, NATO and the Quest for European Autonomy (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003).

Based on the latest OECD data, the EU is the world's leading provider of official development assistance (US$45 billion of a total US$128 billion). See http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?DatasetCode=REF_TOTALODA (accessed 2 February 2010).

A similar argument was made by Heise and Schmidt, ‘NATO und EU’ (note 63).

See Hans van Santen and Arnout Molenaar, ‘EU-NAVO-samenwerking: tijd voor transformatie’, Internationale Spectator, Vol. 62, No. 6 (2008), pp. 343–348.

States from CEE in particular insisted on this principle at NATO's Lisbon Summit in 2010.

For a greater discussion see Arnold Kammel and Benjamin Zyla, ‘Looking for a “Berlin-Plus in Reverse”? NATO in Search of a New Strategic Concept’, Orbis, Fall (2011), pp. 1–14.

This section should be seen as taking exploratory steps to further explain inter-institutional relationships.

See, for example, Ken Gelder and Sarah Thornton, The Subcultures Reader (London and New York: Routledge, 1997), p. 1. The concept has its origins in the fields of sociology and anthropology; elements of it can be found in the classical sociological tradition ranging from Karl Marx and Emile Durkheim to Max Weber and Talcott Parssons.

Shyon Baumann, ‘Culture and Culture Change,’ in Lorne Teppermann and James Curtis (eds), Principles of Sociology: Canadian Perspectives (Don Mills, Ont.: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 35–36.

To be sure, a subculture should not be confused with countercultures that strongly and vehemently reject dominant societal beliefs and norms. For a discussion see J. Milton Yinger, Countercultures: The Promise and Peril of a World Turned Upside Down (New York: Free Press, 1982); J. Milton Yinger, ‘Contraculture and Subculture,’ American Sociological Review, Vol. 25, No. 5 (1960), pp. 625–635.

Alfred McClung Lee, ‘Levels of Culture as Levels of Social Generalization,’ American Sociological Review, Vol. 10, No. 4 (1945), pp. 125–143. See also M. Gordon, ‘The Concept of Sub-culture and its Application’, Social Forces (1947).

Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture (note 12), pp. 27–31. For a country-specific application of the concept see, for example, Justin Massie, ‘Regional Strategic Subcultures? Canadians and the Use of Force in Afghanistan and Iraq’, Canadian Foreign Policy, Vol. 14, No. 2 (2008), pp. 19–48.

This, however, is not to say that the EU only holds one subculture; indeed, it can have many and varying subcultures at the same time.

Alvaro de Vasconcelos, ‘Introduction: Why an EU Perspective on the NATO Strategic Concept Matters’, in What do Europeans want from NATO? (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2010), p. 7.

M. Komarowsky and S. Sargent, ‘Research into Subcultural Influences upon Personality,’ in S. Sargent and M. Smith, Culture and Personality (New York: The Viking Fund, 1949).

For a discussion of subcultures emerging from either within or from outside of the context of a dominant culture see David Downes, The Delinquent Solution: A Study in Subcultural Theory (London: Routledge, 1966), pp. 8–12.

For the notion that the EU should adapt a unique way or war see Centre for European Reform, A European Way of War (note 7).

For an account of an embryonic division of labour between the EU and NATO see Richard G. Whitman, ‘NATO, the EU and ESDP: An Emerging Division of Labour?’, Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 25, No. 3 (2004), pp. 430–451.

For an interesting discussion see Rebecca Steffenson, Managing EU–US Relations: Actors, Institutions and the New Transatlantic Agenda (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2005); Nikos Kotzias and Petros El Liakouras, EU–US Relations: Repairing the Transatlantic Rift (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); Elias G. Carayannis, Dimitris G. Assimakopoulos, and Masayuki Kondo, Innovation Networks and Knowledge Clusters: Findings and Insights from the US, EU and Japan (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008); Natividad Fernández Sola and Michael Smith, Perceptions and Policy in Transatlantic Relations: Prospective Visions from the US and Europe (Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2009).

Teija Tiilikainen, ‘The EU, NATO and Russia’, in What do Europeans want from NATO? (note 94), p. 22.

On the notion of preferences see Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach’, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 31, No. 4 (1993), pp. 473–524; Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics’, International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 4 (1997), pp. 513–533.

This number may appear to be confusing, but the EU's own accounting places the mission in support of the African Union in Darfur as half civilian and half military. See http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=268&lang=en (accessed 24 March 2011).

Berger, ‘Norms, Identity, and National Security in Germany and Japan’, (note 12), p. 326; Legro, Cooperation under Fire (note 12), pp. 22–25; Arendt Lijphart, ‘The Structure of Inference,’ in Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba (eds), The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (Boston: Little Brown, 1980), p. 42; Harry Eckstein, ‘A Culturalist Theory of Political Change’, American Political Science Review, Vol. 82, No. 3 (1988), p. 792.