Iranian Strategic Culture: The Impact of Ayatollah Khomeini's Interpretation of Shiite Islam

Abstract:

This article attempts to deepen our understanding of how state ideology, as a component of strategic culture, influences the manner in which states approach the use of violence. In that context, it examines the influence of Shiite Islam on the way that post-revolutionary Iran has employed force in its own defence. It argues that the influence of religion on Iranian strategic culture has been extensive. Islam has largely shaped the regime's perceptions of international relations, as well as how Iran should relate to the outside world. It has resulted in a highly revisionist foreign policy which attempts to remake the world in its own image. This orientation has left Iran internationally isolated and driven it to rely as far as possible on its own resources for its defence. It has also inclined Iran to forge closer relations with Islamic movements in the Middle East to compensate for the lack of allies among states. Islam has also prompted the regime to adopt deterrence by denial as the cornerstone of its military strategy. This military strategy renounces the use of force for material gain and condones it only when employed for the defence of the homeland and the wider Muslim community. However, it is still willing to strike pre-emptively if need be and take the fight to the enemy should Iran be attacked. Islam has also led Iran to emphasize faith and fighting spirit, over numbers and technology as the determining factors in war because it perceives victory as a divine gift bestowed on those who fight for Allah.

Notes

1. Some have gone as far as suggesting that there are in fact national styles of warfare. For example, see: Colin S. Gray, ‘National Styles in Strategy: The American Example’, International Security, Vol. 6, No. 2 (Fall 1981), p.22; Basil H. Liddell Hart, The British Way in Warfare (London: Faber and Faber Limited, 1932); and Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of the United States Military Strategy and Policy (New York: Macmillan, 1973).

2. This definition is adopted from Gray, ‘National Styles in Strategy’ (note 1), pp.35–7. For a good discussion of the history and evolution of the concept of strategic culture, see: Rashed Uz Zaman, ‘Strategic Culture: A “Cultural” Understanding of War’, Comparative Strategy, Vol. 28, No. 1 (2009), pp.68–88.

3. For a discussion of sources of strategic culture, see: Jeffrey S. Lantis, ‘Strategic Culture and National Security Policy’, International Studies Review, Vol. 4, No. 3 (Fall 2002), pp.87–113; and Alan Macmillan, Ken Booth, and Russell Trood, ‘Strategic Culture’, in Ken Booth and Russell Trood (eds), Strategic Cultures in the Asia–Pacific (New York: Macmillan, 1999), pp.365–6.

4. Many Iranian political scientists have emphasized the significance of Islam in revolutionary Iran. For instance, see: Misagh Parsa, States, Ideologies, and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of Iran, Nicaragua and the Philippines (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Val Moghadam, ‘Islamic Populism, Class, and Gender in Post revolutionary Iran’, in John Foran (ed.), A Century of Revolution: Social Movements in Iran (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1994); Said Amir Arjomand, ‘Iran's Islamic Revolution in Comparative Perspective’, World Politics, Vol. 38, No. 3 (1986), pp.383–414; Farida Farhi, ‘State Disintegration and Urban-Based Revolutionary Crisis’, Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 21, No. 2 (1988), p.232; Shahrough Akhavi, ‘The Ideology and Praxis of Shi'ism in the Iranian Revolution’, Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 25, No. 2 (1983), pp.195–221; Hamid Dabashi, Theology of Discontent: the Ideological Foundation of the Islamic Revolution in Iran (New York: New York University Press, 1993); and Mansoor Moaddel, Class, Politics and Ideology in the Iranian Revolution (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).

5. For an account of how clerics defeated their political rivals and their consolidation of power, see: Patrick Clawson and Michael Rubin, Eternal Iran: Continuity and Chaos (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), ch.6; and Said Amir Arjomand, The Turban for the Crown: The Islamic Revolution in Iran (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), ch.7 and ch.8.

6. For instance, see: Shireen Hunter, Iran and the World: Continuity and Change in a Revolutionary Decade (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990).

7. For more information regarding the extensive powers bestowed on Valiye Faqih, see the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

8. M.H. Siddiqui, ‘Ayatullah Ruhullah al-Musavi Khomeini's Ultimate Reality and Meaning’, Ultimate Reality and Meaning, Vol. 9 (1986), p.127.

9. Ruhollah Khomeini, Islam-e Nab dar Kalam va Payam-e Imam Khomeini [Pure Islam in the Words and Messages of Imam Khomeini] (Tehran: Mu'assiseh-ye Tanzim va Nashr-e Asar-e Imam Khomeini, 2007), pp.127–34.

10. For instance, see: Willis Stanley, ‘The Strategic Culture of the Islamic Republic of Iran’, Comparative Strategic Cultures Curriculum, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Washington DC, 2006; Jennifer Knepper, ‘Nuclear Weapons and Iranian Strategic Culture’, Comparative Strategy, Vol. 27 (2008), pp.451–68; and Michael Eisenstadt, Strategic Culture of the Islamic Republic of Iran: Operational and Policy Implications, MES Monograph, No. 1, August 2011, p.8.

11. For example, see: Joseph T. Gerard, ‘The Impact of Ideology on the Iranian Military in the Iran-Iraq War, 1980–1988′, PhD dissertation, The Catholic University of America, 2002; Afshon P. Ostovar, Ideology, Politics and the Development of Military Power in Iran, 1979–2009, PhD dissertation, The University of Michigan, 2009; Anthony H. Cordesman and Martin Klieber, Iran's Military Forces and Warfighting Capabilities: The Threat in the Northern Gulf (London: Praeger, 2007); Daniel Byman et al., Iran's Security Policy in the Post-Revolutionary Era (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001); and Steven R. Ward, Immortal: A Military History of Iran and Its Armed Forces (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2009).

12. Ruhollah Khomeini, Dar Justojuy-e Rah az Kalam-e Imam: Mustazafin va Mustakberin [In Search of the Path from Imam's Words: Mustazafin va Mustakberin] (Tehran: Amir Kabir, 1983), pp.24, 28.

13. This is a reference to Koran (28:5) where it says, ‘And We wished to be gracious to Mustazafin on earth and make them leaders and inheritors [of the earth].’

14. Khomeini, Dar Justojuy-e Rah az Kalam-e Imam (note 12), p.23.

15. Ibid., p.322.

16. Ruhollah Khomeini, Kalamat-e Qisar: Pand-ha va Hikmat-ha-ye Imam Khomeini [Short Sentences: Advice and Wise Sayings of Ayatollah Khomeini] (Tehran: Intesharat-e Ilmi va Farhangi, 1993), p.107.

17. Farhang Rajaee, Islamic Values and World View: Khomeini on Man, the State, and International Politics (New York: University Press of America, 1983), p.81.

18. Ruhollah Khemeini, Dar Justojuy-e Rah az Kalam-e Imam: Isti'mar va Abarqudratha [In Search of the Path from Imam's Words: Colonialism and the Superpowers] (Tehran: Amir Kabir, 1983), pp.62, 311.

19. For a detailed discussion of this issue, see: Kamran Taremi, ‘Iran and the Middle Eastern Security Complex: Challenge and Response’, PhD dissertation, The Australian National University, 1997, ch.2.

20. The ‘Twin Pillar’ strategy was the product of the Nixon Doctrine. To save the United States from unpopular and costly military interventions abroad, the doctrine proposed that the task of safeguarding Western interests in the important regions be as far as possible entrusted to certain regimes allied to the United States. For a good discussion of the Nixon Doctrine, see: Amitav Acharya, U.S. Military Strategy in the Gulf: Origins and Evolution under the Carter and Reagan Administrations (London: Routledge, 1989), pp.21–24.

21. Khosrow Fatemi, ‘The Iranian Revolution: Its Impact on Economic Relations with the United States’, International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 12, No. 5 (November 1980), pp.304, 306.

22. CENTO was a mutual defence and economic cooperation pact that consisted of Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan with Britain and the United States acting as associate members. It was part of the wall of containment that the United States had built around the periphery of the Soviet Union. On CENTO see: Gad Hadley, CENTO: The Forgotten Alliance, Study of the Central Treaty Organization (Brighton: Institute for the Study of International Organization, 1971).

23. Dilip Hiro, Iran under the Ayatollahs (London: Routledge and Keagan Paul, 1985), p.317.

24. Kristen Blake, The US-Soviet Confrontation in Iran, 1945–1962: A Case in the Annals of the Cold War (Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, 2009), pp.122–5.

25. On US military missions to Iran, see: Thomas M. Ricks, ‘U.S. Military Missions to Iran, 1943–1978: The Political Economy of Military Assistance’, Iranian Studies, Vol. 12, Nos. 3–4 (Summer-Autumn 1979), pp.163–93.

26. Taremi, ‘Iran and the Middle Eastern Security Complex’ (note 19), pp.119–20.

27. Ibid., pp.121–2.

28. Ibid., p.123.

29. Ibid., p.213.

30. Ibid., pp.125–9.

31. For more information on the IRGC, see: Emanuele Otolenghi, The Pasdaran: Inside Iran's Revolutionary Guards Corps (Washington DC: FDD Press, 2011); Frederick Wehrey, Jerrold D. Green, Brian Nichiporuk, et al., The Rise of the Pasdaran: Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (Santa Monica: RAND, 2009); Jahangir Arasli, ‘Pasdaran Incoporated: Evolving From Revolutionary to Praetorian Guard’, Master's Dissertation, Naval Postgraduate School, 2010; and Kenneth Katzman, The Warriors of Islam: Iran's Revolutionary Guard (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993).

32. For a discussion of the policies adopted to Islamize the armed forces, see: William F. Hickman, Ravaged and Reborn: The Iranian Army, 1982 (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1982); Nikola Schahgalidian, The Iranian Military under the Islamic Republic (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1987); Sepehr Zabih, The Iranian Military in Revolution and War (London: Rutledge, 1988); Mark J. Roberts, Khomeini's Incorporation of the Iranian Military (Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 1996), and Nader Entessar, ‘The Military and Politics in the Islamic Republic of Iran’, in Hooshang Amirahmadi and Manouchehr Parvin (eds), Post-Revolutionary Iran (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988).

33. Isma'il Mansuri Larijani, Sairi dar Andesha-ye Difa-e Hazrat-e Imam Khomeini [A Review of Imam Khomeini's Views on the Question of Defence] (Tehran: Bunyad-e Hifz-e Asar va Arzishha-ye Difa-e Muqaddas, 1998), p.71.

34. Schahgaldian, The Iranian Military under the Islamic Republic (note 32), p.59.

35. Ruhollah Khomeini, Dar Justojuy-e Rah az Kalam-e Imam: Artesh [In Search of the Path from Imam's Words: The Armed Forces] (Tehran: Amir Kabir, 1983), pp.203–4.

36. On Iran's role in Bosnia Herzegovina, see: Elaine Sciolino, ‘The World: What's Iran Doing in Bosnia, Anyway?’, New York Times, 10 December 1995.

37. Today, some of IRGC's best military units, such as the 10th Sayyedol Shuhada Division, the 14th Imam Hussein Division, and the 41th Sarallah Division, the 17th Ali Ibn Abi Talib Division are named after Shiite Imams.

38. Ruhollah Khomeini, Quwa-ye Musallah dar Andisha-ye Imam Khomeini [The Armed Forces from the Perspective of Ayatollah Khomeini] (Tehran: Mu'assiseh-ye Tanzim va Nashr-e Asar-e Imam Khomeini, 2007), p.139.

39. Ann Tibbittz Schultz, Buying Security: Iran Under the Monarchy (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), pp.53, 54, 57.

40. Stephanie G. Neuman, ‘Arms Transfer, Indigenous Defence Production and Dependency: The Case of Iran’, Hossein Amirsadeghi (ed.), The Security of the Persian Gulf (London: Croom Helm, 1981), pp.139–40; Yezid Sayigh, ‘Arms Production in Pakistan and Iran: The Limits of Self-reliance’, in Eric H. Arnett (ed.), Military Capacity and the Risk of War: China, India, Pakistan, and Iran (Oxford: Oxford University Press and SIPRI, 1997), p.178.

41. Sayigh, ‘Arms Production in Pakistan and Iran’ (note 40), pp.55–61; and Neuman, ‘Arms Transfer’ (note 40), p.141.

42. International Institute of Strategic Studies, Iran's Ballistic Missile Capabilities: A Net Assessment (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies and Routledge, 2010), p.2.

43. Robert Hewson, ‘The Sinking Feeling: Iran's Anti-Ship Missile Array’, Rusi Defence Systems (Summer 2012), pp.102–3, http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/RDS_201206_Hewson.pdf.

44. Sayigh, ‘Arms Production in Pakistan and Iran’ (note 40), p.179.

45. John M. Shields et al., Military Industries in the Islamic Republic of Iran: An Assessment of the Defence Industries Organization (DIO) (Monterey, CA: Centre for Nonproliferation Studies, 1996), pp.41–4.

46. Ibid., p.5.; Hawk missiles produced in Iran are dubbed Shahin and the entire system is called Mersad. More information is available at: http://hamshahrionline.ir/details/238166; and http://www.entekhab.ir/fa/news/139226.

47. See: http://www.mashreghnews.ir/fa/news/236089/%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D9%87%D9%88%D8%A7%DB%8C%DB%8C %D9%88%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AA-%D8%AF%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B9-%D8 %AF%D8%B1-4-%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%84-%DA%AF%D8%B0%D8%B4%D8%AA%D9%87.

48. For a list of the products made by the Iranian Defence Industries Organization, see their website: http://www.diomil.ir/.

49. On Iran's relations with Iraqi Islamic movements, see: R.K. Ramazani, Revolutionary Iran: Challenge and Response in the Middle East (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), pp.35–8.

50. On SCIRI, see ibid. On Iran's ties to Hizballah, see: Hunter, Iran and the World (note 6), pp.123–7; and Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Raymond Hinnebusch, Syria and Iran: Middle Powers in a Penetrated Regional System (London: Routledge, 1997), pp.122–9.

51. Eisenstadt, ‘Strategic Culture of the Islamic Republic of Iran’ (note 10), p.8.

52. Ruhollah Khomeini, Jang va Difa dar Andisha-ye Imam Khomeini [War and Defence from Imam Khomeini's Perspective] (Tehran: Mu'assiseh-ye Tanzim va Nashr-e Asar-e Imam Khomeini, 2008), Vol.24, p.ii.

53. Ruhollah Khomeini, Kashf-e Asrar [Revelation of Secrets] (n.p., n.d.), p.230.

54. On Shiite Imams, see: Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Hamid Dabashi, and Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr (eds), Expectation of the Millennium: Shi'ism in History (New York: State University of New York Press, 1989), ch.1; and Hamid Dabashi, Shi'ism: A Religion of Protest (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2011), Part I.

55. Ruhollah Khomeini, Dar Justojuy-e Rah az Kalam-e Imam: Jang va Jihad [In Search of the Path from Imam's Words: War and Jihad], 2nd ed. (Tehran: Amir Kabir, 1984), p.3. Ayatollah Khamenei's views about the importance of deterrence by denial mirror those of Ayatollah Khomeini. For the latter's views on this question, see: Mohammad Ghasem Foruqi Jahromi, Sipah, Mauloud-e Inqilab: Manshur-e Sipah [The Corps, An Offspring of the Revolution: The Charter of the Corps] (Tehran: Muavanat-e Ravabit-e Umumi va Intisharat-e Sipah, 2001), pp.167–8.

56. Mansuri Larijani, Sairi dar Andesha-ye Difa-e Hazrat-e Imam Khomeini (note 33), p.73.

57. Ayatollah Khomeini as quoted in Ali Taghizadeh Akbari, Mohammad Reza Sangari, and Mehdi Abdollahi, Avamil-e Farhangi va Manavi Difa-e Muqaddas [Cultural and Spiritual Factors in Sacred Defense], Vol. 1, Bavarha-ye Dini va Amdad-ha-ye Ghaibi [Religious Beliefs and Invisible Assistance] (Qom: Intisharat-e Zamzam-e Hidayat, 2008), p.59.

58. For example, see comments to that effect by Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajizadeh, the commander of Iran's Aerospace Forces, in an interview with al-Alam News Network, http://www.tebyan.net/newindex.aspx?pid=222665.

59. After the war, Iran declared that it had produced poison gas to deter Iraq from attacking Iranian military and civilians, and that these chemical agents were destroyed prior to Iran joining the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in 1993.

60. Ayatollah Khamenei's fatwa in this regard is available at, http://farsi.khamenei.ir/speech-content?id=3463.

61. ‘Recent Media Reports on Iran’, IAEA Press Statement, 17 September 2009.

62. For a discussion of Iranian attacks on shipping to and from Arab Gulf states supporting Iraq, see: Nadia El-Sayed, The Gulf Tanker War: Iran and Iraq's Maritime Swordplay (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989); and Martin S. Navias and E. R. Hooton, Tanker Wars: The Assault on Merchant Shipping during the Iran-Iraq Conflict, 1980–1988 (London: I.B. Tauris, 1996).

63. Mehdi Marandi and Davood Soleymani, Difa-e Muqaddas dar Andisha-ye Imam Khomeini [Sacred Defense from the Viewpoint of Imam Khomeini] (Tehran: Muassisih-ye Chap va Nashr-e Uruj, 2011), p.630.

64. Ibid., pp.581–8.

65. Ahmad Dehqan, Nagofte-ha-ye Jang: Khatirat-e Sipahbod-e Shahid Ali Sayyad Shirazi [The Untold Stories of the War: The Memoirs of the Martyred Brigadier General Ali Sayyad Shirazi], 13th ed. (Tehran: Intisharat-e Suri-ye Mehr, 2009), p.317.

66. For the ayatollah's comments in this regard, Khomeini, Kalamat-e Qisar (note 16), p.100.

67. For instance, see the transcript of the interview given by Brigadier General Yahya Rahim Safavi (IRGC) to Iranian television available at, http://www.vangeva.ir/news/NewsDetails.aspx?NID=332c8dc9-1737-4fbb-96d8-a7d474f27959. Safavi was the commander in chief of the IRGC from 1997 to 2007. He is currently a senior military aide to Ayatollah Khamenei.

68. In the words of the ayatollah, ‘All we have [including victory in battle] is from God.’ Ayatollah Khomeini as quoted in Mohsen Mohammadi Alamuti, ‘Manakavi Jang-e Namutaqarin az Didqah-e Iran va Amrika’ [A Search for the Meaning of Asymmetric Warfare from the Perspective of Iran and the United States], in Majmue-ye Maqalat: Naqsh-e Manaviat dar Nabard-e Nahamtaraz [A Collection of Essays on the Role of Spirituality in Asymmetric Warfare] (Qom: Intisharat-e Zamzam-e Hedayat, 2010), p.183.

69. Khomeini, Dar Justojuy-e Rah az Kalam-e Imam: Jang va Jihad (note 55), pp.8–9.

70. Hossein Abbasian, ‘Rabet-e Manaviat va Jihad’ [The Relationship between Spirituality and Jihad], in Majmue-ye Maqalat-e: Naqsh-e Manaviat dar Nabard-e Nahamtaraz [A Collection of Essays on the Role of Spirituality in Asymmetric Warfare] (Qom: Intisharat-e Zamzam-e Hidayat, 2010), p.62.

71. The Koran (8:17).

72. There are many verses in the Koran where Allah speaks of His support for the Muslim army promising them victory in battle. For example, see: Koran (22:38), (30:47), (61:13), (9:14), (33:25), and (58:21).

73. Ayatollah Khomeini as quoted in Foruqi Jahromi, Sipah, Mauloud-e Inqilab (note 55), p.682.

74. Ayatollah Khomeini as quoted in Hossein Shaidaiyan, ‘Manaviat va Inzibat-e Manavi’ [Spirituality and Spiritual Discipline], in Majmueh Maqalat-e: Naqsh-e Manaviat dar Nabard-e Nahamtaraz [A Collection of Essays on the Role of Spirituality in Asymmetric Warfare] (Qom: Entesharat-e Zamzam-e Hedayat, 2010), p.107.

75. Markaz-e Barrasi va Tahqiqat-e Aqidati Siyasi, Tavakkol dar Jibhe [Tavakkol on the Fronts], (n.p.: Vahid-e Amuzesh-e Aqidati Siyasi Sipah-e Pasdaran-e Inqilab-e Islami, 1984), p.14.

76. This operation was launched in early 1983 by the US government. It sought to block Iranian access to arms both in the US and on the international arms market. Its purpose was to force Iran to sue for peace rather than pursue the war until Saddam's regime was overthrown. For more information in this regard, see: David Crist, The Twilight War: The Secret History of America's Thirty -Year Conflict with Iran (New York: The Penguin Press, 2012), p.205.

77. For a good discussion of Iraq's easy access to arms, see: Kenneth R. Timmerman, The Death Lobby: How the West Armed Iraq (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1991).

78. A very good example of these commanders is the late Brigadier General Ali Sayyad Shirazi who for most of the course of the war was the commander of the ground forces of the Iranian regular military. See: Dehqan, Nagofte-ha-ye Jang (note 65).

79. See: http://dornews.com/NewsDetails.aspx?News=973721.

80. Ayatollah Khamenei as quoted in Akbari, Sangari, Abdollahi, Avamil-e Farhangi va Manavi Difa-e Muqaddas (note 57), p.19.

81. The Koran (33:22).

82. For instance see: (3:123, 124, 125), (8:9), and (48:4). There is disagreement among Koran scholars about what form and shape the assistance rendered by angels takes.

83. For reference to this type of assistance, see the Koran (3:13), and (8:44).

84. See the Koran (8:11), (3:154), and (33:9).

85. In the words of the Koran (9:111): ‘Allah hath purchased of the believers their persons and their goods; for theirs [in return] is the garden [of Paradise]: they fight in His cause, and slay and are slain: a promise binding on Him in truth, through the Law, the Gospel, and the Koran: and who is more faithful to his covenant than Allah? Then rejoice in the bargain which ye have concluded: that is the achievement supreme.’

86. Ayatollah Khomeini as quoted in Akbari, Sangari, Abdollahi, Avamil-e Farhangi va Manavi Difa-e Muqaddas (note 57), pp.154–55.

87. Ibid, p.106.

88. Referring to the Iran-Iraq War, he said: ‘You [the Iranian military] are inferior to your enemy in terms of both numbers and weaponry. Your adversary is assisted by the world over. Under these circumstances, the side that has nothing has to fight relying on its superior faith.’ Ayatollah Khomeini as quoted in Mohammadi Alamuti, ‘Manakavi Jang-e Namutaqarin az Didqah-e Iran va Amrika’ (note 68), p.183.

89. Khomeini, Kalamat-e Qisar (note 16), p.100.

90. Akbari, Sangari, Abdollahi, Avamil-e Farhangi va Manavi Difa-e Muqaddas (note 57), p.92.

91. Ibid., p.98.

92. Ayatollah Khomeini as quoted in Larijani, Sairi dar Andisha-ye Difa-e Hazrat-e Imam Khomeini (note 33), pp.69, 128.

93. On the battle of Karbala and its religious significance, see: Dabashi, Shi'ism: A Religion of Protest (note 54), pp.73–100.